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
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AFRICA QUARTERLY

- 5 UN and Freedom for Portuguese Colonies
Dr Michael Adeleye Ojo
- 29 The Imperialists in Africa
Dr Lawrance J. Sakarai
- 60 The Contribution of Asia and Africa to Contemporary
International Law
Dr T.O. Elias
- 76 The External Trade Pattern of Cameroon —1957-72
Dr Wilfred A. Ndongko
- 88 India and Africa (A Quarterly chronicle for
January - March 1976)
Dr Vijay Gupta
- 113 Africa Through Indian Eyes - A Documentation List
Miss Pakeeza Sultan
- 126 Book Reviews

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Dr Michael Adeleye Ojo

U. N. and Freedom for Portuguese Colonies

During the 15th Century, Portugal, like all other European colonial powers, began to engage in imperialist adventures with the intent of conquering from the Africans as much of their territories as possible. This process of territory acquisition by European powers led to several conflicts which were not settled until the Berlin Treaty of 1885. The Treaty gave the European powers the right to conquer specified areas of Africa, which started the "Scramble for Africa".¹ Due to the poor condition of Portugal, a larger proportion of her empire in East Africa was taken over by the British, the Germans and the Italians. All that had remained in the hands of Portugal were Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.² As a result of this sharp reduction, Portugal lost her prestige and standing in Europe.

Prior to the coup d'etat of April, 1974, Portugal had built up a strong land force of over 100,000 troops and police and was unofficially effectively allied to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It was also reluctant to grant her colonies' independence because they have been bound together for such a long time.

Portugal is the poorest European state, to keep its shattering economy running it has shed lot of blood over the last decade to maintain itself in all its colonies in Africa. It has refused to accept the wind of change during the sixties, and declined to grant even semblance of equality to its African subjects. It decided to wage a war against all Africans who dared to challenge its colonial policies in Africa. This paper is a study of decolonization in African territories under Portuguese colonial rule. It is also a historical analysis of events, policies and moral actions involving the United Nations, African states, sympathetic non-Africans and the African Liberation movements. The study does not only catalogue the major United

Nations activities against Portugal but also examines the forces at work and their varying motivations during the period under study.

A. Historical Background

Portugal was one of the first European states to explore and colonize Africa. It had some small trading stations along the Western coast as early as the 1500's. Gradually, it carved out one of the largest empires consisting of two major territories, Angola and Mozambique as well as Portuguese Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands, Lao Tome and Principe. When Vasco da Gama landed in Natal, South Africa on Christmas Day 1497, later in Inhabane and finally in Sofala, he was really looking for the way to India and not in the least interested in establishing any post in East Africa.

When the Portuguese first arrived in Africa, they found it necessary to set up trading posts in the continent. They established a post on the Island of Mozambique to avoid direct contact with the people on the mainland, and for the supply of the ships sailing from Lisbon to Iddia with fresh foods. Later, in the 16th century, the Portuguese attacked the various coastal city states that were beginning to question their intrusion in the trade with India.

It is evident throughout the first three hundred years of the Portuguese presence in Africa, contact with Africans occurred chiefly at military posts, religious missions, and trading posts, all of which represented a sort of far frontier of the Portuguese settlers. It is not surprising that during these centuries the colonial administration remained the same.⁴

From about 1500 to 1822, administration in Portuguese Africa was, at least on paper, divided between areas of direct military civil control under governors, concessions awarded to individuals and companies, and African Protectorates. There was a difference between East and West, until the middle of the eighteenth century, Portuguese East Africa with its areas was governed under the authority of the Governors of Portuguese India. Angola was controlled economically from Brazil, as it amounted to its dependency.

The Metropolitan Overseas Council was founded in July 1643. By 1650, a typical African territory had an administration consisting

of a governor or captain-general, a chief police and treasury head, a council consisting of officials and local citizens, a chief justice who was the second ranking man in the colony.

The local administration was in the hands of Governor-Generals appointed by the government or councils elected largely by the European settler population. Africans in the territories had no possibility to express their opinions or share in decisions that affected them. Elections were open only to those with a certain level of Portuguese education and even they could only vote for the one official party, the Union Nacional of Prime Minister Salazar. All important decisions were taken in Lisbon where the voice of the overseas territories was weak and where they were in the minority. For example, Mozambique sent only seven deputies to the National Assembly of which one was Black.⁵

The Portuguese government continued to consolidate its position in the rest of the territories, until it had a virtual control of the whole of the territories. Portuguese authority was accepted because it was backed up with the use of the army and police and kept the African people under their sovereignty. Portuguese authority was imposed during the last sixty years by dividing the territories into chiefdoms, ruled by carefully hand-picked paramount chiefs, petty chief and headmen who put under the direct supervision of Portuguese were white administrators. These administrators and chiefs were responsible for seeing to it that Portuguese law and order is maintained and that every able-bodied African serves Portuguese interests. The African chiefs were instruments of the Portuguese government to carry out political, economic and social policies decided in Portugal.⁷

There was little or no change in the lot of the African population. It benefitted very little from the economic aspect except from the poorly paid labour. Most of the cash farming and industry was run by the settlers or with foreign capital and much of the wealth produced was carried off to Portugal. When the Portuguese government discovered there was a heavy flow of African labour to South Africa, and the Rhodesias, it immediately put up a net to extract every benefit from it for the white man. It established "International Labour Laws"⁸ which enabled her to use the Africans in South Africa. The labour laws were made to force Africans to

employ themselves in Europeans' farms, homes, plantations, the government, industries, the mines, etc., within six months or else face arrest and forced labour, by the Portuguese government.

Under this system, millions of Mozambicans were forced to take up jobs within and outside of Mozambique at wages much below subsistence levels. Under these laws it was possible for the South African mining interests to obtain each year hundreds of thousands of cheap workers who flocked into the gold, diamond and coal mines to escape arrest, for they could not prove to the Portuguese administrators that working in their own farms and taking care of their own homesteads was a bona fide productive activity.⁹

Under this kind of rule, Africans found it extremely difficult to make any alterations in the social system under a constitutional and legal manner.

African attempts to change things were always thwarted by Portuguese Power. A scholar puts his views on this problem when he writes:

To impede this, Portugal did not neglect to accompany its reforms with a reinforcement of the apparatus of control. The courts and Police force were able to supervise the territories by means of pass-cards. Native labour statutes and residence restrictions. PIDE, the secret police, had an excellent intelligence system and a tight network of informers. Border inspection was designed to avoid infiltration from learning of events elsewhere. Dissenters were discouraged by imprisonment, corporal punishment and torture. Any acts of violence were crushed relentlessly.¹⁰

When fatal illness removed the aged Salazar from the head of the Portuguese dictatorship, observers speculated that the end of his regime might mean the end of the Police state in Mozambique and Angola. However, the new state under Caetano which was expected to be of liberal policies proved to be only a facade and of dictatorship. Caetano declared unwillingness to meet African nationalist demands in the colonies. As a result of this, Africans in the territories took to approaching the problems through armed liberation movements.

B. The War of Liberation

The Portuguese control over the territories became firmer, the hope for fair and justified treatment turned into disappointment. The people had no other means available. They followed the footsteps of other countries who demanded their independence through revolution and armed struggle. Their efforts for independence took violent form. There was an increasing resort to terrorist action.

B.1. Angola

The first African Liberation movement to be established in Angola was the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) which was inaugurated in October 1956.¹¹ At the beginning, MPLA was a moderate political organisation consisting mainly of mulattoes and assimilated Africans. It was an urban centered organization. Another organization-Movimento de independencia Nacional de Angola (MINA) was formed between 1957 and 1958. It merged with MPLA in order to form the widest possible front to wage the liberation struggle in Angola.¹²

On February 4, 1961 a chain of events unfolded in Angola. The MPLA activists launched an attack on a police station and the San Paul's fortresses. In response to this attack, the Portuguese forced many MPLA leaders to flee to neighbouring Zaire, where they came into contact with UPA. There, the rivalry between the two organizations for the loyalty and support of the African masses in Angola become very evident.

This struggle for power within the guerrilla movement came to a temporary end when the Kasavubu government gave the UPA the upper hand. This decision resulted in a gradual decline in the stocks of the MPLA. The tide turned in MPLA's favour. Only when the African liberation committee of the OAU recognized it as the only organisation in actual combat in Angola, and gave it half of the subsidy that was previously allocated to GRAE.¹³

There are several other organizations for the liberation of Angola ; among them is the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). Although younger and smaller than both the MPLA and GRAE, UNITA has surprising successes since its establishment inside Angolan territory in March, 1966.¹⁴

B 2. Mozambique

The first national organization for the liberation of Mozambique, the Uniao Democratico Nacional de Mocambique (UDENAMO), was formed on October 2, 1960, among Mozambican exiles in Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Malawi), under the leadership of Adelino Gambe. In April 1961, UDENAMO moved its headquarters to Dar-es-Salaam.¹⁵ A second organization, the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) was founded in Mombasa, Kenya, in February 1961; and a third organization, the Union Africana de Mocambique Independente (UNAMI) was also established in 1961 and moved its headquarters to Dara-es Salaam in the same year.¹⁶

The three organizations—UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI, merged to form the Frente Libertacao de Mocambique FRELIMO in June 1962 under pressure of Pan African demands for unity among the various liberation movements fighting against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique.

However, since the establishment in 1962 FRELIMO has been constantly rent by fierce ideological, ethnic, and personal rivalries, which have caused damaging effects to the organization.¹⁷ The continued existence of FRELIMO is largely due to the active concern of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who granted FRELIMO major basis in his country from which to launch its struggle, coupled with the necessity of justifying the exclusive material support the movement is receiving from the OAU.¹⁸

B 3. Portuguese Guinea

In the Portuguese Guinea, there were two major liberation movements. The more important one was the Partido Africano de Lodependencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)¹⁹ based in Conakry. PAIGC launched a guerrilla struggle in 1962 and its army, 5,000 in number made fair progress; its rival in Dakar, was the Frente de Libertacao de la Independencia Nacional de Guine (FLING) which did not open a front and soon left the field.

The struggle in Portuguese Guinea was more of a success. The freedom fighters came in large numbers from Guinea. They harassed the colonial troops and by the end of 1962, 15 percent of the

territory was cleared. The 10,000 Portuguese troops could not halt them and they expanded Northwards and before long they claimed one third of the country.²⁰ As a result of this, the military budget was increased and Guinea was placed under a military governor. By the end of 1965, the number of Portuguese troops rose to 20,000 and the freedom fighters were slowed down. But the fighting continued and by 1967, the liberation movement claimed to have freed over half the territory.

In 1962, the liberation movements pursued their efforts and at certain points made headway. In Guinea, the gains were consolidated. Much of the hinterland was freed, the Portuguese were surrounded in the cities and scarcely able to counter attack. PAIGC's leader, Amilcar Cabral, planned a more thorough campaign than any of his counterparts,²¹ and the first stage was to rouse and enlighten the people. While the liberation army advanced the political wing of the movement tried to consolidate the rear. When Cabral's forces took over the full control of certain free zones, schools and hospitals were set up and the people were prepared for independence.²² The Portuguese were gradually isolated in the capital.

The war of liberation movement had been going on for years. The only success achieved was in the smallest territory of Guinea Bissau. Guinea was able to declare herself independent of the Portuguese in 1973. The reason for the slow progress of the struggle was that Portugal fielded more and better armed troops than the liberation army. The independent states were aware of this and they had committed themselves to provide material and financial aid. At the Cairo Assembly in 1964, the leaders of GRAE and PAIGC complained of lack of support. Holden Roberto insisted that the "aid received from independent African countries has not permitted us to face the war as necessary."²³ He then announced that he had no choice but to seek aid where he could find, including communist countries.

Portuguese authorities maintain that they have control of the situation in Angola and the struggle against "terrorism" will be continued until final victory.²⁴ Indeed, the Angolans aided the Portuguese with their ethnic splits and recurrent divisions within the various liberation movements. In Angola, leadership has passed

from GRAE to MPLA. The Zambia based MPLA has the official support of the OAU- Organization of African Unity.²⁵

FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique) the Mozambique liberation front located in Tanzania remains the only significant resistance movement in Mozambique. In spite of continued international criticism causing Portugal to withdraw from UNESCO, the nation wants to retain the control of her "overseas provinces."²⁶

Condemnation by numerous foreign governments is however compensated by the recent more friendly attitude of the United States towards Portugal. The United States has been granted the extended use of Lajes air base in the Azores²⁷ and because of this, it will be difficult for the United States to go against Portugal.

Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea were considered by Portugal as an integral part of the Portuguese nation and the possibility of their political independence was never expected in Lisbon. Since the coup d'etat of April, 1974, Portuguese policies in Africa have undergone radical changes. Under General Spínola who has since been dethroned, efforts were made to liberate these colonies. A committee was appointed to negotiate with the guerrilla leaders of the territories in London. As a result of these meetings Guinea's independence was accepted by Portugal and Mozambique's and Angola's dates of independence were agreed to by the parties concerned.

C. The Activities of the United Nations

Portugal became a member of the United Nations in 1955. At that time the Colonial powers were still fighting against the General Assembly's interference with their affairs and their colonies. Because of their delaying tactics, they gained some success. But in the previous year, the Bandung Conference of Asian and African peoples passed a resolution condemning colonialism in all its manifestations. They declared that the subjection of peoples to alien domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights and is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. Such a rule is also an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

Portugal realized how the Charter was used to hasten the decolonization process and was determined not to submit to the experience. It even disclaimed the possession of any non-self-governing territories. After calling Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea as colonies until 1951, Portugal revised its constitution in 1951, and reintroduced the term "Provinces" of which they had been called before 1910. It argued that these overseas areas could not be considered as non-self-governing territories because they were part of the national territory, a military state governed by one constitution. The Portuguese foreign minister wrote that, this constitution

did not recognize the existence within the nation of non-self governing territories, and it would be unconstitutional for some parts of the nation to have one international status and others a different one. The interpretation and application of its constitution was a question of each Government alone, and the Portuguese government denied the United Nations the least competence in the matter.²⁸

Therefore, the Portuguese did not consider that Chapter XI of the Charter was applicable to them, and they had no intention of supplying information as required by Article 73e.

When Portugal disregarded the instruction, the General Assembly therefore appointed a committee of six,²⁹ to examine the principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article 73e of the United Nations.

- ★ Free association should be "the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes." The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference.³⁰
- ★ Integration with an independent state should be on the basis of complete equality.
- ★ Integration should come about after the integrating territory had attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its "peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice"; it should

be the result of the freely expressed wishes by the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change of their status :

- ★ The limitations required by Security and constitutional considerations under Article 73e did not relieve a member state of the obligation to transmit economic, social and educational information.
- ★ Responsibility for transmitting information under Article 73e continued until constitutional relations of the territory with the administering member precluded the latter from receiving statistical and other information relating to economic, social, and educational in the territory.
- ★ Only in very exceptional circumstances could such information have a security aspect.

With the above principles adopted during its fifteenth session,³¹ the Assembly immediately passed a resolution stating that the territories under Portuguese administration mentioned below were non-self-governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, declaring that an obligation existed on the part of Portugal to transmit information on these territories under Chapter XI, and requesting that Portugal do so. The territories listed were the Cape Verde Archipelago, Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea; Sao Tome and Principe and their dependencies; Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda; Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda; Mozambique; Goa and its dependencies, called the states of India, Macao and the dependencies; and Timor and its dependencies.

Portugal rejected both the report of the Committee of Six and the General Assembly's resolution that arose from it, and argued the reasons in a long statement during the debate of the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee in the same session of the General Assembly.

Portugal's basic argument was that its relations with its overseas territories were regulated by the national constitution and the United Nations had no authority to discuss national constitution; to do so would mean interference in the internal affairs of member states, which was expressly forbidden by Article 2 (7) of the Charter.³²

Many attempts were made by the communists and the Afro-Asians to have the Security Council declare the situation in the Portuguese provinces a threat to peace. If this has been through, it would have been possible to apply Chapter VII of the Charter which provides for sanctions and, in the last resort, military action against the offender. Those who took the lead against Portugal based their case on the doctrine that the Charter is an evolving and dynamic instrument consisting of the original documents and interpretations resulting from the Security Council's actions and resolutions and that what may have been simply a solemn declaration is today a recognized, perhaps enforceable obligation.³³

The Portuguese arguments were rejected by the United Nations majority. The General Assembly and its various committees continued to accuse Portugal of violating the Charter. During the first five years of membership, Portugal could count on a certain support from NATO allies and this helped in the passing of any drastic resolutions aimed against Portugal.

On March 15, 1961, the Security Council met at the request of the Afro-Asian members to consider the situation in Angola. A resolution was introduced by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic calling on Portugal as a matter of urgency to introduce reforms that would enable the Angolans to exercise the right to self-determination. This resolution also proposed the creation of a subcommittee to study conditions in the territory. Despite the fact that the resolution was supported by Russia and the United States, it failed, to obtain the necessary votes, because of a large number of abstentions.

Angola was first debated by the General Assembly on April 20, 1961, when a resolution³⁴ was passed with United States' approval and British and French abstention calling on the Portuguese government to consider the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 XV. This was the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples already referred to. The General Assembly also decided to set up a subcommittee of five to investigate the situation in Angola.

On June 7, the Security Council met to consider an Afro-Asian resolution calling on Portugal to stop using repressive measures in Angola and to give every facility to the United Nations sub-committee, opposing the motion. The Portuguese contested the right of the United Nations to interfere and asserted that Portugal was the victim. After two days of debate, the Security Council adopted the resolution softened by a Chilean amendment expressing hope of a peaceful solution, by 9 votes to 0, with Britain and France abstaining. Two of Portugal's NATO allies, the United States and Turkey, voted in favor.³⁵

On December 19, the General Assembly, with the United States' and Britain's approval, once again condemned Portugal for failing to comply with Chapter XI of the Charter and refusing to supply information as requested of it.

Early in 1962, the General Assembly reopened the question of Angola and considered a demand presented by Poland and Bulgaria for sanctions against Portugal. This was rejected in favor of an Afro-Asian resolution that reaffirmed the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence. The resolution called upon Portugal to desist from repressive measures and release all political prisoners, urged the government to undertake without delay, extensive political, economic, and social reforms and, in particular, to set up freely elected and representative political institutions; and requested members of the United Nations to deny Portugal support or assistance that might be used for suppression of the Angolan people.³⁶

On December 14, 1962, another resolution³⁷ was passed. It urged all states to prevent the sale and supply of army and military equipment to Portugal and requested the Security Council, to take all appropriate measures to secure compliance. The resolution was adopted by 80 to 7—the seven against being the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, South Africa, Spain, and Portugal with 13 abstentions.

In July of 1963, the Security Council, at the request of 32 African states, met again to discuss the Portuguese territories and to hear a delegation representing the OAU. The meeting was also attended by Portuguese Foreign Minister Nogueira, who rejected

all accusations against Portugal. The meeting ended with the adoption of a resolution by 8 votes to 0, with the United States and the United Kingdom abstaining, calling on Portugal to recognize the right of its African subjects to self-determination and independence, requesting all states to refrain from giving any assistance that would enable Portugal to continue repression, and to prevent the supply of arms and military equipment for this purpose.

In December 1963, the General Assembly adopted a resolution³⁸ by 91 to 2—Portugal and Spain against—with 11 abstentions; including the United States and the United Kingdom. The resolution requested the Security Council to take action and to give effect to its decisions of July. The Council met on December 11, and in a new resolution³⁹ passed by 10 to 0, with France abstaining, called on members to comply with its July resolution. It also requested the Secretary General to promote negotiations with Portugal and report back in six months.

A few weeks before the meeting of the Security Council, African delegates to the International Conference of Public Education at Geneva had walked out as a protest against the presence of the Portuguese. This was the beginning of a campaign designed to exclude Portugal from participating in any agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations. It was followed by Portugal's expulsion, in the same month from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. A walkout of Afro-Asian and Soviet bloc delegates from the United Nations Trade and Development Conference in Geneva in April 1964, and the adoption of a resolution in May, 1965, by the Executive Committee of UNESCO, banning Portugal from taking part in the International Conference of Public Education and the International Conference on Illiteracy. Finally, the 19th World Health Assembly in May, 1966, suspended the right of Portugal to "participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and in the regional activities."⁴⁰

In summer of 1965, the United Nations Committee on Colonialism (committee of twenty-four) visited Africa, receiving delegations and petitions from thirteen nationalist parties from the Portuguese territories. Seven were Angolans, three were from Mozambique, one was from Portuguese Guinea, one was from the Cape Verde

Islands, and one was from Sao Tome Principe. At its final session, the Committee, by 18 votes to 2 (U.S. and U.K.) with 3 abstentions (Australia, Denmark and Italy), adopted a resolution⁴¹—criticizing the NATO countries for their alleged support of Portugal and calling once again for sanctions.

In November 1965, the Security Council rejected an Afro-Asian demand for an economic boycott of Portugal, and both the United States and the United Kingdom abstained from voting on the resolution.⁴² Having failed to obtain a vote for sanctions in the Security Council, the Afro-Asians made another bid in the Assembly, where they succeeded, on December 18, in putting through a resolution⁴³ calling for, among other measures, the rupture of the diplomatic relations with and an international arms and trade boycott of Portugal. The vote was 66 to 26, with 15 abstentions. The small majority against Portugal indicated that, while almost all members of the United Nations were willing to condemn it publicly, only three-fifths were prepared to contemplate action against Portugal, despite the fact that most of them would not have been affected by it. Similar resolutions continued to be voted, in 1966 and 1967 with no new development, except that in 1966, the General Assembly recommended that the World Bank and other specialized agencies, should not cooperate with Portugal. The recommendation was well respected in 1967.

In November, 1968, both the strength of the General Assembly resolution and the voting pattern changed. Previous references to Portuguese policy as a "crime against humanity" were dropped, as there were requests that the World Bank suspend loans to Portugal. These changes represented the first time that African countries were willing to modify a previous harsh resolution on a colonial issue. In response, many countries that had voted against Portugal in 1967 chose to abstain, including the United States, Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, and Australia. The final result was 96 to 3, the three being South Africa, Portugal and Brazil. Some observers viewed this 1968 vote as a change of strategy by the African nations, which hoped to reduce Western countries to more actively play an anticolonial role and to influence the new Caetano government at a time when Liberalizing winds were whispering in Portugal.⁴⁴

The year 1968 continued with the United Nations activities on decolonization in the Portuguese territories with the special committees reaffirming the previous resolutions and also calling upon the General Assembly and the Security Council to take necessary actions against Portugal and also by appealing to the members of the NATO and other nations to refrain from aiding Portugal against the territories under her control. It also continued by urging other agencies of the United Nations to take necessary steps against Portugal and sought their moral and financial assistance for the peoples of the territories. The Secretary-General also, in consultation with the specialized agencies and with the host and interested governments, was requested to expand the United Nations training programs for the indigenous inhabitants from the territories.

In its meeting of September 23, 1965, the Special Committee adopted a resolution condemning Portuguese Government for the use of Napalm, white phosphorus, chemical defoliants and poisonous gas in its war against the peoples of Guinea (Bissau). On December 20, 1968, the General Assembly adopted resolution (2465 XXIII) on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It deplored the failure of Portugal to comply with the declaration and of relevant resolutions on decolonization. It also deplored the attitude of certain states which, in disregard of pertinent United Nations resolutions, continued to cooperate with the Government of Portugal which continued repressing the African peoples. The General Assembly also expressed its grave concern about the development of the agreement or alliance between Portugal and South Africa which could easily endanger international peace and security. It therefore requested all states and the specialized agencies and international institutions to withhold assistance of any kind from Portugal until it stopped its policy of colonialism and racial discrimination.

The United Nations continued with its activities on decolonization in Africa in the year 1969. The special committee reaffirmed its former resolutions and called on Portugal to apply without any delay the principle of self-determination to the peoples of the territories under its domination and also to cease forthwith all repressive activities and military operations against the peoples of Angola, Mozambi-

que and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. The committee also reminded all states, most especially Portugal's military allies in NATO to stop giving Portugal all means of military assistance including the supply of arms, the training of military personnel, the sale of weapons, military equipment and materials including aircraft, helicopters and vehicles as well as supplies for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition.

The committee drew the attention of the Security Council to the deterioration of the situation in the territories. It made it clear that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. Finally, it drew the Council's attention to the urgent need for adopting the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions and the General Assembly's resolution on this question.

The General Assembly recalled its past resolutions as well as those of the special committee and the Security Council. It expressed its concern over Portugal's persistent refusal to recognize the right of the peoples under its domination to self-determination and freedom and to cooperate with the United Nations. It then called upon Portugal to adopt immediate measures for implementation of the Assembly's resolution of December 14, 1960. It called upon all states, the specialized agencies and other international organizations concerned to increase, in cooperation with organization of African Unity their moral and material assistance to the people of the territories who were struggling for their freedom and independence.

The Security Council adopted three resolutions with regard to the situation in the territories—Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. The three resolutions were submitted by Zambia, Senegal and Guinea. Zambia submitted resolution 268 of July 28, 1969. Senegal submitted resolution 273 of December 9, 1969, while Guinea submitted resolution 275 of December 22, 1969. Despite the attacks lodged by members of the Southern African Entente against independent African states, which could have constituted a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council called for action under Chapter VII, and confined itself to censure, condemn or warn Portugal for her attacks and threats.⁴⁵

On August 18, 1970, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on it. It reaffirmed the right of the peoples of the territories under Portuguese administration to achieve self-determination, freedom and independence, and also recognized the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve that right. It condemned Portugal's refusal to implement General Assembly's and Security Council's resolutions, and condemned its colonial war against the peoples of the territories, as well as their intervention of South African forces against the peoples of the territories. It called upon the Government of Portugal to implement the General Assembly's resolution of December 14, 1960 (containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples).⁴⁶ It also called upon the Government of Portugal in connection with armed conflict, to apply the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of Prisoners of War. The previous resolutions were reaffirmed. Appeal was also made to all specialized agencies and international institutions associated with the United Nations, in particular, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to cease from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance. Because the Government of Portugal failed to implement the General Assembly's resolution of December 14, 1960, the agencies and institutions were requested to cooperate with the organization of African Unity and also with the National Liberation Movement through the OAU to increase their assistance, especially in the field of medicine, education and agriculture.

The General Assembly reaffirmed its former resolution and also passed or adopted new ones. It called upon member states to campaign against foreign economic interests going on in the territories for the benefit of the colonial powers, to end military activities in the territories and to oppose collaboration between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. On December 14, 1970 the General Assembly adopted resolution 2708 (XXV).⁴⁷ In addition to this, the General Assembly also took necessary steps to bring about the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It deplored the refusal of the colonial powers, most especially Portugal and South Africa, to imple-

ment the Declaration as well as other relevant resolutions on the question of decolonization. In this resolution, special emphasis was placed on the territories under Portuguese administration. The attitude of these states which continued to cooperate with the Government of Portugal were also condemned by the General Assembly.

The Assembly reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples in the colonial territories. It noted the progress made by the National Liberation Movements, appealed to all states and organizations to provide the territories with moral and material assistance, and asked them to withhold assistance of any kind from the Government of Portugal until it renounced its policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination. Last, but not least, it also requested the colonial powers to withdraw their military bases and installations from colonial territories and to stop establishing new ones.

The following years witnessed the passage of a series of resolutions which in many cases, reaffirmed the old resolutions.

The Special Committee and the General Assembly drew the attention of the Security Council to the deteriorating conditions of things in the territories under Portuguese domination. The Security Council listened to the statements of those individuals invited to address the Council on the question. It took note of the statement made by the Chairman of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

The Council was gravely concerned about the continued measures of repression by the Portuguese government in its military operations against the African people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The Council was highly concerned at the repeated violations by the armed forces of Portugal of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African states. It was very disturbed at the use of chemical substances which Portugal was using in its wars against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). It recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) in their demand for the achievement of self-determination and independence.

The Council therefore reaffirmed the peoples' right to self-determination and independence as it was recognized by the General Assembly's resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960. It condemned Portugal's refusal to implement the resolution and all other resolutions of the Council. It therefore called upon Portugal to :

- (a) recognize immediately the right of the Peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly's resolution 1514 (XV) ;
- (b) cease immediately the colonial wars and all acts of repression of the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) ;
- (c) Withdraw all its armed forces as employed for the purpose of repression of the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)
- (d) promulgate an unconditional political amnesty and the restoration of democratic political rights ;
- (e) transfer power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples in accordance with General Assembly's resolution 1514 (XV).⁴⁸

The Security Council also called upon the Government of Portugal to stop violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states.

It also called upon all states to stop forthwith the offering of any assistance which could enable Portugal to continue its repression of the people of the Territories under its administration and also to take all necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government. It requested the Secretary General to follow the implementation of the resolution and report to the Council from time to time.

The United Nations tried all possible means for decolonization in Portuguese Africa. But, it had not been able to achieve its full objective. The effect of the United Nations resolutions on Portuguese policy towards its African territories appears very uncertain. Much of the United Nations' attention which should

have been focused on Portuguese government and its African territories was turned to Southern Rhodesia since 1965 when the regime declared its independence. It appears that the greatest pressure for a modification of Portugal's colonial policy is likely to come from the economic burden on Portugal of the defence and security costs involved in suppressing various guerrilla movements in the territories. It is estimated that Portugal spent approximately 40 percent of its national budget which is estimated to be something like £50 million a year on the fruitless war.⁴⁹

Many petitions and reports from different angles have made the United Nations turn its attention back to territories properly. On January 20, 1973⁵⁰ Amilcar Carbal, Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) since 1956 and who was recognized as one of the most prominent leaders of the African struggle against white Supremacy, was assassinated in Conakry, Guinea. The following September, the PAIGC declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau, claiming that guerrilla forces controlled three-quarter of the country.

On November 2, 1973, the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution adopted by a vote of 93 to 7 with 30 abstentions welcomed Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations and thereby creating the sovereign state of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.⁵¹

This action was taken by the United Nations General Assembly following a request made by 56 states, members of the United Nations on October 12, 1973.

It was also announced that after a short debate and with an overwhelming majority, the conference of the World Health Organisation in Geneva admitted the 'Republic' of Guinea-Bissau' as its 140th member. Ninety-two countries voted in favor, thirty-one countries abstained, only the United States voted against. The representative of Guinea-Bissau, Redriques Boal, who was warmly applauded called the admission to the World Health Organization a 'political victory.'⁵²

The United Nations tried as much as possible with a recommendation from the security council, Guinea Bissau was formally granted independence on September 10, 1974 and the world's body admitted her as a member of the United Nations in the General Assembly's 29th session.

In the case of Mozambique on September, 7, 1974. The Portuguese foreign minister, Mr. Mario Soares, and the President of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Mr. Samora Michael, signed an agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, establishing the modalities for the transfer of power in Mozambique to an independent government headed by FRELIMO. Under the terms of the Agreement Mozambique became independent on June 25, 1975.

During the interim period prior to this date, a transitional government was appointed by the Portuguese Government and a Prime Minister designated by FRELIMO and nine cabinet ministers of whom six were to be appointed by FRELIMO and three by Portugal. The High Commissioner, Admiral Victor Crespo, is also commander-in-chief of the Portuguese armed forces in Mozambique.⁵³

In the case of Angola, things were not all that easy. Because of the various factors of which the principal one was the diversity—the division among the necessary partners in negotiations. In addition to this it had the largest population of European origin among the territories under Portuguese administration. Nevertheless contacts had been made on various levels, not only with the liberation movements but also with the leaders of neighboring countries, and there was a possibility that the best possible solution will be found, a solution which could bring an independent future, freedom from colonial and neo-colonial pressure; promotion of progress and racial harmony of its people.

Conclusion

Decolonization in the territories under Portuguese administration has not been easy because Portugal was not ready to leave the territories. Instead she has decided to keep these territories as an integral part of Portugal.

Despite the fact that Portugal is poor and could not maintain itself, it continues to spend a great part of her resources to withstand the guerrilla movements in the territories.

The response of the big powers were another impetus which has strengthened Portugal to continue disobeying the activities of the United Nations.

The United States of America could not support the resolutions passed by the United Nations and has abstained from voting in matters dealing with decolonization, more especially in the case of Portuguese territories because of her loyalty to Portugal as a NATO member. Portugal also has won the support of the United States by allowing her to continue using the Lajes Air Base in the Azores. When Guinea-Bissau admitted to the World Health Organization in May 1974, in Geneva, United States was the only country which voted against it.

Though General Spínola had tried as much as possible to liberate these territories by appointing a committee to have a conference with the guerrilla leaders of the territories. With the persistent efforts of the guerrilla leaders, the activities of the organization of African Unity and also with the pressure from the United Nations, June 25, 1975, has been accepted, marked as the independence day for Mozambique. Because things are still unsettled for Angola we recommend that the liberation movement and its leaders continue to put more pressure on Portugal. The same advice is offered to the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. Freedom for Angola can only be won, I conclude, when pressures are mounted and enthusiasm undampened.

If the new government of Portugal intends to grant independence to Portuguese overseas territories about which there is no doubt, the sooner this is done the better. With this done the entire struggle for decolonization in the territories under Portuguese administration will have been successfully completed.

FOOTNOTES

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2 David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, *Portuguese Africa*, "A Handbook", (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 1.

3 Ronald H. Chilcote, *Portuguese Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1967), p. 5.

4 Jon Woronoff, *Organizing African Unity* (New Jersey: The Scare Crow Press, Inc., Metuchen, 1970), p. 208.

U. N. and Freedom for Portuguese Colonies

- 5 Jon Woronoff, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
- 6 A. de Sousa Franklin, "The Portuguese System of Protecting Native Landed Property", *Journal of African Administration*, January 1957. Also: Lucy Mair, *Native Policies in Africa* (London, 1936), Eduart Mondlane, "Mozambique" M.C.W. Stillman (ed.), *Africa in the Modern World* (Chicago, 1955), p. 244.
- 7 International Law Office, *Office Bulletin XLV*. No. 2, Supplement II (April, 1962) pp. 231-232.
- 8 1960-1962 Labour Reforms:
"Rural Labour Code for Portuguese Overseas Provinces", *International Labour Review*, Summer, 1962, and Adriana Mpreira, *Portugal's Stand in Africa* (New York, 1962), pp. 225-261. For a recent attack on Portuguese Native and Labour Policies, supposedly by a long-time American resident of Angola, see anonymous article "Kingdom of Silence", *Harper's Magazine*, May, 1961.
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12. Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements : Contemporary Struggle Against White Minority Rule* (London : Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 234.
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16. *Ibid.* p. 278.
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20. David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuel, *Op. Cit.*, p. 400.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 419.
22. *The New York Times*, July 21, 1964, p. 15.
23. *The Europa Year Book 1973*, A World Survey, Volume II (Europa Publishers Limited, London, 1974), pp. 90-91.
24. Gibson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 234.
25. *The Europa Year book*, 1973, *Op. Cit.*
26. Abshire and Samuel, *Op. Cit.*, p. 435.
27. Franco Nogueira, *The United Nations and Portugal* (London, 1963), p. 78.
28. The Committee of Six are : The United States, The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Mexico, India and Morocco.
29. *General Assembly Resolution 742 VIII* (November, 27, 1953).

30. United Nations General Assembly *Resolution 1541*, XV (December 1960).

31. The article reads : Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter.

32. Patricia Wohlgemuth, *The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations* (New York, 1963), p. 28.

33. United Nations, *Document A*, Res. 1603 XV (April 20, 1961).

34. Abshire and Samuel, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

35. United Nations, *Document A*, Res. 1742 XVI (January 30, 1962).

36. *Ibid.*, A, Res. 1807, XVII (December 14, 1962).

37. General Assembly's *Resolution 1913 XVIII* (December 3, 1963).

38. Security Council *resolution 5484* (December 11, 1963).

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41. S/218 (November 23, 1965).

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43. *Washington Post*, November 22, 1968. p. B-10.

44. This section is based on *U.N. Year Book 1969* (New York, 1970), pp. 706-707.

45. *United Nations Year Book*, 1960, pp. 49-50. For text of Declaration contained in General Assembly's resolution 1514 XV (December 14, 1960).

46. *United Nations Year Book 1970*, pp. 709-710 for the full text of the resolution.

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49. *Objective Justice*. Quarterly magazine covering United Nations activities against Apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism (New York : United Nations office of Public Information, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1973), p. 2.

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Dr Lawrence J. Sakarai

The Imperialists in Africa

Viewed in its broadest sense, development means a conscious progressive movement towards an identifiable goal having for its purpose economic, political and social transformation of the material objective conditions of the masses existence. Certain definite economic, political and social structures are necessary for this.

In spite of the fact that several Third World Governments seem apparently committed to uplifting the masses, there is an all round increase of misery, disease, starvation and death.²

To most of the Third World, an apparent political independence is very recent—most of Africa became independent in the sixties. Most Third World Governments plead for time—i.e. backwardness and misery cannot have instant solutions. In Africa, two countries—Liberia & Ethiopia—have had the longest period of 'political independence.'³ Yet, their development has been stunted and perverted.

Of the Liberian economy, the *Strany Mira*⁴ states :—"After the Second World War the Government of Liberia under the leadership of W. Tubman began to carry out a programme of economic development of the country. The dominance of foreign monopolies hinders the raising of the extremely low standard of living of the population."⁵

The Soviet Encyclopaedia⁶ stated that in 1961, Liberia "..... continued to be oriented towards the Western Powers & particularly the U.S.A. "Khodash, (Liberia, Moscow, 1961, pp. 52; 58/9),⁷ stated :—"The economic dependence of Liberia on the U.S.A. enables the latter to control all strategically important points in Liberia—large airfield ports, etc." Liberia is economically dependent on the U.S.A.—that is expressed in the US—Liberian Agreement of July, 1959 on military aid.

Ethiopia as an 'independent' state has had larger history. Yet, here again there is perverse development—a great misery characterises modern Ethiopia.⁸

The general trend in Africa is an increasing impoverishment to the masses, the increasing affluence and apparent power of the elite class, the preserved existence of medieval forms of exploitation in the rural areas and the military dictatorship and coups that occur with certain regularity.

Whilst this essay shows all these contradictions in themselves, it sees them in their ".....relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement while each thing in its movement is inter-related with and interacts on the things around it."⁹

The principal contradiction that development faces is the capitalist mode of production—the major fetter on development is imperialism—the monopoly stage of capitalism.¹⁰ Africa is an inextricable part of Imperialism. What this essay observes are the many blatantly complex strands that bind Africa to the Imperialists' economies, that control Africa's 'development'—canalizing its resources into their military-industrial complex for the hegemony of the world.

The leitmotiv of this essay then will be underdevelopment. Underdevelopment implies definite measurable things—it implies a self-perpetuating control of the productive forces under capitalist economic structures. Destroying or adapting the old modes to a much higher step of production, capitalism introduced into a predominantly semi-tribal, semi-feudal area, a much more ruthlessly efficient structure of exploitation.¹¹

The history of capitalism in Africa goes back to the Industrial Revolution and the slave Trade. Postlethwayt decried the slave trade as "the first principle and foundation of all the rest, the main-spring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion."¹²

The slave trade from East Africa can be dated from around the 6th century A.D.¹³—perhaps earlier. With Indian and Arab merchants operating in East Africa, slaves as commodities were moved freely into marts along the West Coast of India, Arabia, & Persian Gulf. This was a fairly well organised network. But with the Industrial

Revolution and Britain's quest for markets, a far more efficient organisation was brought into existence. Ultimately, the capitalist mode of production began to dominate.¹⁴

With capitalism began the more efficient plunder of the Third World, the carving up of the world, the colonisation of vast areas, the subjugation of entire peoples, the emergence of imperialism (i.e. capitalisms' highest stage), and imperialist wars.

After the Second World War, the US emerged as the principal imperialist power—all other lesser imperialism began to come under its hegemony. It was at this stage that U.S. capital began its massive penetration into Africa and monopolies began assuming control over the most important economic activities of Africa.

During this colonial period, the structures facilitating imperialist exploitation in the agrarian as well as the industrial sectors were firmly laid.

In the agrarian sector, rural classes and private property came into existence, a money-economy was introduced and commodity production followed. Cash crops transformed rural Africa. Side by side with this process the imperialists retained the barter economy, the semi-tribal and the semi-feudal social relations and a great part of the subsistence sector. But faced by the onslaught of a superior rural sector growing cash crops—the subsistence farming peasantry rapidly degenerated.

In the colonial period, the monopolies were against developing the industrial sector. The mining of raw materials was their principal venture and this was completely controlled by foreign capital.

It was during this period as well that US increased its investment in Africa. Capitalism alone gained from these investments—African development was static. Auxillary facilities like railways, hospitals and communications served imperialism's purpose—not Africa's.

In time there grew definite sheltered sectors in the colonial country. With these sectors, a pampered elite class was also brought into existence. Subservient to imperialism, this class became the faithful allies of imperialism and found reason for their existence only under imperialism.

More than ten years after the People's Republic of China came into existence, nationalism, began to manifest itself in Africa. There were a few armed nationalist uprisings—by and large, Africa passed peacefully (not through revolution) to 'independence'. The elites came to power and the 'development' of Africa became a popular slogan.

Investments, loans and gifts—i.e. international finance capital under various guises—invaded Africa. The foreign debt increased. African economies became heavily reliant on foreign capital and African countries became client states. This is the essence of neo-colonialism.¹⁵

Under neo-colonialism then, development moves in the direction laid down in the colonial period with important but not significantly qualitative differences and away from a radical progressive transformation of the masses.

For some understanding of this entire process from the rise of imperialism to neo-colonialism, this essay will briefly trace the historical development of the situation in Africa. This entails many things—i.e. a study of the rise of capitalism, imperialism and colonisation; the creation of capitalist markets: the colonisation of Africa; the decolonisation process and so on. The study of these things will proceed along general lines. A certain particularity will become necessary in outlining the economic structures of the neo-colonial countries. What will be attempted is a certain historical understanding of the socio-economic and political forces that make for under-development.

The Slave Trade and the rise of the Industrial Revolution

The major part of the capital that launched the Industrial Revolution came from the African slave trade between the 18th and 19th centuries. The pioneering work in this field is Eric Williams : *Capitalism and Slavery*.¹⁶ Williams established that ".....the slave trade created British industry at home....." In 1718, William Wood was quick to appreciate the foundations that the slave trade was laying. Thus he described it as ".....the spring and prent whence the other flow". A few years later Postlethwayt commented on the importance of the slave trade to the movement of industry. He described the trade as "the first principle and foundation of all the

rest, the mainspring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion.”¹⁷

Williams stated that it was in effect a triangular trade (i.e. with England, France and Colonial America supplying the exports and the ships; Africa the human merchandise; and the plantations the colonial raw materials), that made industry possible. Williams describes this triangular trade: “The slave ship sailed from the home country with a cargo of manufactured goods. These were exchanged at a profit on the coast of Africa for Negroes, who were traded on the plantations, at another profit, in exchange for a cargo of colonial produce to be taken back to the home country. As the volume of trade increased, the triangular trade was supplemented, but never supplanted by a direct trade between home country and the West Indies, exchanging home manufactures directly for colonial produce. The triangular trade, thereby gave a triple stimulus to British industry. The Negroes were purchased with British manufactures; transported to the plantations, they produced sugar, cotton, indigo, molasses and other tropical products, the processing of which created new industries in England; while the maintenance of the Negroes and their owners on the plantations provided another market for British industry; New England agriculture and New Foundland fisheries. By 1750, there was hardly a trading or a manufacturing town in England which was not in same way connected with the triangular or direct colonial trade. The profits obtained provided one of the main streams of that accumulation of capital in England which financed the Industrial Revolution”. And the British Empire, according to Postlethwayt, was “.....a magnificent superstructure of American Commerce and naval power on an African foundation.”¹⁸

All this was the result of Britain's direct participation in the slave trade. No less important, was Britain allowing the slave trade in East Africa because through that trade alone did British manufactured goods move into the Area.

What Britain recognised in tacitly sanctioning the slave trade to function in East Africa was that out of crude slave markets, capitalist markets were being brought into existence, British manufactured goods began to penetrate the interior, a money economy

was beginning to come into existence in certain areas—all in all markets were being created for Britain and the Industrial Revolution was moving to a higher phase of production.¹⁹

The further rise and consolidation of the Industrial Revolution was in no small measure due to colonisation. Lichtheim voices this argument :—"The Industrial Revolution could not have occurred in Britain but for the possession of a colonial empire which provided outlets far in excess of anything the home market could absorb. Industrialization entailed a sudden expansion of productive capacity only possible in a "country which occupied a key position within the evolving world economy. The decisive factor was a global monopoly of export markets."²⁰

Lichtheim's argument is a subtle distortion of facts. The initial launching phase of the Industrial Revolution was due to the accumulation from the Slave Trade (from Eric Williams)—its further consolidation was definitely due to colonisation. The initial phase of the Industrial Revolution and the later era of colonisation are two distinct epochs—the latter flowed from contradictions in the former. The second distortion is Lichtheim's stating that Britain occupied a key position within the world economy at that stage. Greene contradicts this. By 1870, Greene states, Britains industrial monopoly was lost and both Germany and the U.S. began to out-produce and undersell Britain.²¹ Engels, writing in 1886, stated :—"The working of the industrial systems of this country, impossible without a constant and rapid extension of production and therefore of markets, is coming to a dead stop...Foreign industry, rapidly developing, stares English production in the face everywhere."²² Writing in 1894, Engels again stated :—"The former monopoly of England in industry has been challenged by a number of competing industrial countries : infinitely greater and varied fields have been opened in all parts of the world for the investment of 'surplus European capital...'"²³ On the quest for markets Engels observed :—"The colossal expansion of the means of transportation and communication—ocean liners, railways, electrical telegraphy, the Suez Canal, has made a real world-market a fact."²⁴

By 1870, a conscious policy of Expansion began²⁵—but much prior to that (1815), Europe's claims in Africa amounted to 500,000 sq. mls.—or, about one-twenty third of Africa. Woolf states that

“probably not one-twenty third of this one-twenty third was actually occupied or administered.”²⁶

Britain possessed small patches of territory in Zambia, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone; Portugal claimed territory stretching from the southern boundary of French Congo down to Cape Frio but she actually occupied a few places on the coast of Angola; Spain held Fernando Po; Denmark and Holland a few stations on the coast.²⁷

By 1870 a definite movement into Africa began. France conquered Algeria by 1841, Senegal by 1854, Porto Novo on the Dahomey Coast by 1868, inland tracts in Gabon by 1862. In 1862, France purchased some territory on the Somali Coast. Britain extended her hold upon Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast—in 1861 she acquired Lagos. Britain’s chief conquests were in South Africa. By 1880, the Capitalist powers claimed about 1,000,000 sq. mls. of African territory—in Algeria, the West Coast, the East Coast and South Africa.²⁸ Approximately 10.8 per cent of the European colonial powers territory was in Africa.²⁹

Ten years later, a very rapid colonisation movement claimed nearly 6 million sq. mls. in Africa with a population of nearly 74 million people. Nearly all Africa came under the hegemony of European powers. By 1890, the giant corporations began penetrating Africa. Fourteen years later nearly 11½ million sq. mls. of African territory with a population of approximately 123 million people came under European colonial domination.³⁰ The increasing areas of African territory and people that rapidly came under European colonial domination can be seen from Table I.

Thus, by 1914, seven powers had partitioned Africa among themselves. The powers and extent of their colonial territories can be seen in Table II.

By 1914, Great Britain’s colonial possessions increased to 33.8 million square kilometres with 440 million inhabitants; France 11.1 million square kilometres with 95.1 million inhabitants and Germany 3.4 million square kilometres with 77.2 million inhabitants.³¹ Thus Britain emerged as the principal imperialist power, with the largest markets.

TABLE I
Partition of Africa in 1815, 1880, 1890 & 1914. Total
African Population and Territory in Hands of European States

	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area</i> <i>sq. mls.</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area</i> <i>sq. mls</i>
		1815		1880
Northern Coast	—	—	—	—
West Coast	—	—	—	—
South Coast	—	120,000	2,000,000	250,000
East Coast	—	—	—	—
	3,000,000	500,000	10,000,000	1,000,000
		1890		1914
Northern Coast	18,700,000	1,546,700	28,700,000	3,636,000
West Coast	33,000,000	2,500,000	64,400,000	5,147,480
South Coast	3,875,000	491,000	8,190,000	1,207,405
East Africa	19,086,000	1,461,000	21,586,000	1,583,559
	74,661,000	5,998,300	122,876,000	11,574,444

From Woolf (1968)—p. 67.

TABLE II
The Partition of Africa in 1914

	<i>Extent acquired in</i> <i>Sq. Miles</i>
France	4,283,200
Britain	3,495,544
Germany	1,031,000
Italy	1,091,000
Belgium	800,000
Portugal	780,000
Spain	75,000

(Woolf (1968)—p. 68)

In the mid 1890's, Chamberlain made it clear that Britain sought colonies for markets and investment. This was the period of the cartles, besides this was the period approaching the boom.³² Chamberlain's plea reflected the times : "Give me the demand for more goods and then I will undertake to give plenty of employment in making the goods ; and the only thing in my opinion, that the Government can do in order to meet this great difficulty that we are considering is so to arrange its policy that every inducement shall be given to the demand ; that new markets shall be created, and that old markets shall be effectually developed.....it is a necessity, as well as a duty, for us to uphold the dominion and empire which we now possess. For these reasons among others I would never lose the hold which we now have over our great Indian dependency—by far the greatest and most valuable of all the customers we have or ever shall have in this country. For the same reasons I approve of the continued occupation of Egypt ; and for the same reasons I have urged upon this Government, and upon previous Governments, the necessity for using every legitimate opportunity to extend our influence and control in that great African continent which is now being opened up to civilization and commerce.³³ Chamberlain should have added that the companies were playing an important part in opening up colonies—Engels writing in 1895, stated : "Africa is leased directly to the companies (Niger, South Africa, German South-West and German East Africa), and Mashonaland and Natal seized by Rhodes for the stock exchange."³⁴

By the end of the 19th century—capitalism transformed into imperialism—the monopoly stage of capitalism.³⁵

Lenin describes this stage :—

"Translated into ordinary human language this means that the development of capitalism has arrived at a stage when, although commodity production still "reigns" and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in reality been undermined and the bulk of the profits go to the "geniuses" of financial manipulation. As the basis of these manipulation and swindles lies socialized production ; but immense progress of mankind which achieved this socialization, goes to benefit the speculation."³⁶

Monopoly capital became an international phenomenon after the First World War—a war for the partition and re-partition of the

world.³⁷ By the Treaty of Versailles, Germany lost her possessions in Africa, Great Britain and France gained about 80 per cent of African territory—British possession formed an uninterrupted chain from the Cape of Good Hope right up to the Nile Delta. France's vast African colonial empire stretched from the Gulf of Guinea to the Mediterranean from the Atlantic Ocean to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The mandate system also extended the imperialists' territories in Africa. Lenin described the system as "..... handing out mandates for exploitation and plunder—handing out to an insignificant section of the world's population the right to exploit the majority of the population of the globe."³⁸

The First World War did not solve the contradictions of the imperialists. Following the re-partitioning of the colonies (i.e. distribution of markets), was a fierce competition for more markets. The imperialist economies were now functioning on a peace time bases and industry (particularly heavy industry) began making rapid strides. The colonies thus acquired further significance.

International finance capital began its movement into the African colonies. This brought about several changes in African economies which were re-aligned to meet the imperialists' needs—i.e. raw materials markets, spheres of capital investment."³⁹

African Economies after the First World War

During the initial phases of imperialist growth (1870-1918), Africa's importance was primarily in its gold and diamonds. By 1913, gold exports came to 40.9 per cent and diamonds 14.2 per cent of the total domestic exports of Africa. South Africa's share in these exports was large.⁴⁰ South Africa's shares were substantial in mineral exports too. Africa's agricultural exports were small.

By 1929, Africa's agricultural exports registered substantial increase (see table III). The character of African economies had changed—cash crops began to dominate the agricultural sector. Sik states :—"During World War I, the imperialists convinced themselves that the African colonies could play a great role from the point of view of the economy of the mother country and the entire world economy, not only as suppliers of gold and diamonds, cocoa and cloves, etc, but also as producers of the most needed sorts of minerals and vegetable raw materials (copper, lead, chromite,

TABLE III

Value (a) of Exports of Selected African Products, and as Percentages of Total Domestic Exports of Africa, 1913, 1929, 1935, (000) (a) The statistics given in this table are approximate (b) information not available

	Total British Territories Excluding the Union of South Africa			Total British territories			Total all Non-British Territories			Total All Territories			Percentage of Total Domestic Exports of Africa		
	1913	1929	1935	1913	1929	1935	1913	1929	1935	1913	1929	1935	1913	1929	1935
Gold	4,588	3,650	9,134	42,117	48,675	80,706	240	490	2,779	42,417	49,165	83,485	40.9	27.5	46.7
Diamonds	2,669	2,149	1,536	14,716	14,223	4,513	23	1394	1,315	14,736	15,617	5828	14.2	8.7	3.3
Copper	52	940	4,029	501	1,560	4,369	370	3370	1,842	871	4930	6211	0.8	2.8	3.5
Wool	(b)	175	120	5,715	14,696	9,636	(b)	(b)	60	5,715	14,696	9,696	5.5	8.2	5.4
Maize and Maize Meal	105	760	408	189	3,585	3,399	(b)	385	229	189	3970	3628	0.2	2.2	2.0
Cotton and Cotton seed	895	10,077	7,271	895	10,237	7,300	29	1193	1,661	924	11,430	8961	0.9	6.4	5.0
Palm products	6,309	9,113	4,602	6,309	9,113	4,602	662	3673	1,979	6,991	12,786	6581	6.7	7.2	3.7
Cocoa	3,006	12,000	6,788	3,006	12,010	6,788	253	1381	1,251	3,259	13,391	8039	3.1	7.5	4.5
Rubber	598	221	82	598	221	82	2399	130	...	2,997	351	82	2.9	0.2	0.04
Ground Nuts	861	3,394	2,728	861	3,394	2,728	80	4811	5334	941	8,205	8062	0.9	4.6	4.5
Total	19,083	42,489	36,698	74,967	117,714	124,123	4073	16827	16,450	79,040	135,541	140573	76.2	75.3	78.7

Table from Frankel (1938) p. 209

manganese, ore, cotton etc.), should substantial improvements be made in transportation and production technology.”⁴¹

In the mining sector, the production of gold and diamonds was stepped up—in addition, monopoly finance capital began to develop the extraction of various industrially important minerals such as copper (Congo, Northern Rhodesia—Zambia), tin (Nigeria), Chrome ore (Southern Rhodesia) and Manganese ore (Gold coast).

In the agricultural sector, the imperialists began to force the production of three groups of colonial crops for their particular purpose. Cotton, rubber and fibrous plants were needed for industrial purposes; the products obtained from oleaginous plants (palm oil, palm kernels, groundnuts) were in great demand in the world’s markets—besides, margarine, made from vegetable oils, was replacing butter in the imperialist world—vegetable oils were widely used in the war industry, and efforts were made to develop production of those products in which Africa either had the monopoly or was one of the principal suppliers.⁴² Africa’s mineral as well as agricultural production grew steadily. This can be observed by comparing the table below (Table IV) with Table (III).

TABLE IV

Share of Black Africa in the Worlds’ production of some precious metals, mineral and vegetable raw materials before World War II (Percentages)

Diamonds	— 98	Palm nuts	— 97	Sesame	— 47
Gold	— 60	Cloves	— 90	Wool	— 15.5
Chrome Ore	— 53	Palm oil	— 70		
Copper	— 9.5	Cocoa	— 65		
Lead	— 9.5	Groundnuts	— 60		

(Figures of metals and wool are exclusive of the production of the U.S.S.R.) (Sik (1966)—II—104)

With the Second World War, Britain lost her position as the principal imperialist—the U.S.A. emerged as the most powerful single nation. It began to step up its movement into Africa.

Much prior to this, (after the First World War), the US had considerable interests in Africa. US exports to Africa in 1923 were valued at \$ 43 million (26% per cent of the total exports of the

US). Five years later this figure rose to \$ 151 million. In 1919, there were 105 US companies operating in the African colonies. The total US investment in African mines, plantations, commercial and (mainly oil) prospecting enterprises was \$ 10 million in 1912, \$ 102 million in 1929 and \$ 118 million in 1931. US capital also penetrated the mining (copper) industry of the Congo and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), the gold industry of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, the Gold Coast, and the Congo, the diamond industry of the Congo and Angola. Of the \$ 118 million of US investments, nearly \$ 90 million had been made in British possessions.⁴³

Trade in the colonial Era

From 1884 to 1888, imports into the U.K. from East Africa were valued at £ 115,000; from 1889 to 1893, £ 221,000; from 1894 to 1898, £ 273,700; and from 1909 to 1913, £ 1,427,500. Almost all these imports were of food and raw materials. U.K. exports to East Africa also showed a tremendous increase. From 1884 to 1888 the value of these exports was worth £ 199,744; from 1889 to 1893 £ 368,749; from 1894 to 1898, £ 368,749; from 1894 to 1898, £ 1,084,784; and from 1909 to 1913, £ 2,808,556.⁴⁴ What these statistics show is the potential of the East African markets for food and raw materials and the ability to absorb British manufactured goods.⁴⁵

From 1907 to 1935, British colonies domestic exports were far more in terms of value than non-British territories. This is clearly apparent—from table V below.

TABLE V

Domestic exports of Africa for selected years :—1907—35: (000)

	1907	1913	1928	1931	1935
Total : all					
British					
Territories	57,248	90,412	151,576	98,429	151,775
South Africa	45,485	64,565	88,991	65,076	97,931
Total : all					
non-British					
Territories	9,380	13,274	25,392	18,846	26,715

From Frankel; S.H: *Capital Investment in Africa* (OUP—1938 Table—43)

At the same time, whilst exports steadily rose, imports as well registered a steady rise indicating an expanding colonial market. This is apparent from the next table.

TABLE VI

Total value of Imports of Africa—1907—1935—Select Years £ (000)

	1907	1913	1928	1931	1935
Total : all British Territories	40,496	65,647	138,006	84,524	113,415
Total all non- British Territories	9,635	16,236	32,194	22,023	20,961

(From Frankel (1938)—Table 44.

Commenting on these statistics, Frankel stated that in 1935, the total trade of British territories formed 85 per cent of the whole, and the proportion of trade had never fallen below 80 per cent. It was actually 84 per cent in 1907—"...and during the whole of the period since then, British territories have maintained their preponderating importance in this respect."⁴⁶ Frankel further states that due to monocultures, only eight products in 1935 accounted for 76.6 per cent of the total domestic exports of Africa. The products were :—gold (46.7 per cent) diamonds (3.3 per cent), copper (3.5 per cent), wool (5.4 per cent) cotton and cotton seed (5.0 per cent), palm products (3.7 per cent), cocoa (4.5 per cent), and groundnuts (4.5 per cent).⁴⁷

In the decade between 1938-48, America's African trade went from \$ 150 million to \$ 1,200 million—at which figure it represented almost 15 per cent of all Africa's foreign trade. Prior to the Second World War less than 5 per cent of Africa's trade was with the U.S.)⁴⁸

During the period 1958-1960, African countries exported goods to the value of \$ 16,400 million and imported goods to the value of \$ 21,500 million. The deficit in just three years of unequal

trade thus came to \$ 5,100 million.⁴⁹ Monoculture, which keep African economies tied to imperialist powers, also brings an un-balanced trade. A single item brings more than half of all export revenues in eighteen African countries and two items, in thirteen countries. Cocoa beans make up more than two-thirds of Ghana's exports; coffee & cocoa constitute four-fifth of the exports of Ivory Coast; rubber accounts for two-thirds of Liberian exports.⁵⁰

Monoculture still operates—African countries are caught in a vicious cycle of producing cash crops (introduced in colonial times for foreign exchange. In the three years from 1960 to 1962, the bulk of the domestic exports from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were cash crops (see table VII below).

TABLE VII
1960—62

Country	Cash Crop	Per cent of Total Domestic Exports
Kenya	Coffee	28.8
	Tea	12.5
	Sisal	12.1
		55.4
Uganda	Coffee	43.0
	Cotton	33.7
	Tea	4.2
		80.9
Tanganyika	Sisal	29.0
	Cotton	14.9
	Coffee	12.3
		56.2

(Table from :—Future Trade, Balance of Payments and Aid Requirements + by B. van Arkadie and P. Neegwa in *Problems of Foreign Aid: A Conference Report* (Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salam, Tanzania. 1965), p. 106.

For 1963 those same commodities contributed 55.2 per cent, 84.6 per cent and 63.3 per cent of total domestic exports; or £ 24.2 million, £ 43.6 million, and £ 40.2 million respectively (Arkadie and Ndegwa),

Commenting on this concentration and its instability vis-a-vis world prices, Arkadie and Ndegwa state :— "Because of this concentration, the level of East African export earnings is potentially highly instable. The causes of fluctuations are two-fold : instability in (1) the output of the important commodities, and (2) the prices at which these exports sell. In East Africa, the fall in the level of export prices has been responsible for the poor performance of exports in recent years. In Uganda, in particular, export earnings have been falling from 1957 through 1962 ; and this decline would have been pronounced but for an increase in the quantity exported. Looking at the three countries together, quantity exported increased by 71 per cent." "Thus, the total value of East African domestic exports would have been £ 166.0 million in 1962 if the prices of 1954 had held instead, of the actual value of £ 126.8 million recorded in that year."⁵¹

What Arkadie and Ndegwa do is to state the difficulty and comment on falling prices of the principal agricultural export commodities. The problem is much deeper and lies in the colonial past when sections of peasant societies were forced into growing cash crops, when commodity production was introduced, when money economy replaced a barter-economy and when sheltered agricultural sectors were brought into existence. With 'independence', African governments found themselves saddled with a colonial economy which was impossible to alter except through changing the entire capitalist mode of production.

No African Government has done this—the powerful structures of the colonial economy still dominate. Thus, in spite of falling (or manipulated) prices, cash crop production is stepped up. Very few significant attempts are being made to diversify in the agricultural sector. The most affluent class in the rural areas is the cash crop farmer.⁵² This class owes its position to colonial agricultural policy.

Falling prices of cash crop exports are liable to manipulation. The Ghanaian episode clearly shows this. When the imperialists be-

came dissatisfied with Nkrumah's radical posture, they undermined the Ghanaian economy by 'falling' prices in cocoa beans—a principal source of foreign exchange.

Whilst "export prices have been falling steadily in the last eight years (and have fallen by 24 per cent since 1954), the import price have been, up to 1960, higher than their level in 1954. The terms of trade facing East Africa have been deteriorating up to 1960 and only in the last two years have they shown a sign of improvement, although they are still 20 per cent worse than in 1954."⁵³ (The price index of major agricultural exports has fallen by 24 points between 1954 and 1962).

Whilst export prices have been steadily declining in recent years, import prices have been simultaneously rising. This is apparent from the table below :

TABLE VIII

External Trade Indices—1961—1967

	(1960=100)						
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 est.
Export							
Price	97	98	112	113	103	99	95
Import							
Price	96	91	100	109	114	113	117
Terms of							
Trade	101	108	112	104	90	88	82

(Source : Yaffey, M.J.H. :—*Balance of Payment Problems of a Developing Country : Tanzania* (Weltforum Verlag—Manchen Germany—1970)—p. 22. Table 4.

The above table reflects Tanzania's position—this is no less true of the other underdeveloped areas. The destination of exports also reflects a country's attachments. Tanzania trades with several areas, but 62 per cent of her exports go to the imperialists (U.S; U.K; E.E.C; and Japan).⁵⁴

In 1967, 90 per cent of Africa's exports comprised minerals and agricultural products : oil, unrefined copper, and coffee constituted 37 per cent ; cocoa and cotton—13 per cent.⁵⁵ Agricultural development is held in check by producing cash crops for export in spite of its falling price index. The result is a calculated lop-sided deve-

lopment. In tropical Africa, about five sixths of the output of 33 countries consists of seven agricultural crops—cocoa (23 per cent) coffee (19 per cent), cotton (16 per cent), groundnuts (15 per cent), tobacco, rubber and sisal together 14 per cent.⁵⁶

Agricultural production for export is directly related to colonialism. Jenkins states :—"The consequence of colonialism was the creation of large number of one—dimensional colonies, later nation states whose only *raison d'être* was the production of one or two basic commodities for sale in one or the other of the rich, industrialized nations. Thus, Cuba produced sugar for the Americans, Brazil produced coffee to go with it. Bolivia produced America's tin, and Venezuela the oil. South America is not alone in revealing this pattern; Africa is the same. Nigeria and Ghana produce cocoa for Britain, Kenya produces tea and coffee. The pattern is very consistent : the population of the poor nations work mostly in agriculture to produce one or two basic foods for consumption in the rich nations. In return the rich nations export processed goods of all kinds, from cars to canned beans back to the elites of the poor nations. Traditional economics would indicate that this division of labour is an eminently sensible way of organizing the world, one in which every one can gain simply because each nation concentrates on the production of those goods that its particular circumstances make the most economical to produce. In fact this division of labour that has been imposed by colonialism is to the gross disadvantage of the poor nations, whose agricultural production economies, and as a consequence, their social structure, have been distorted to produce a system that only makes sense when these poor nations are considered as an appendage to one or other rich nation. So Ghana was a producer of cocoa for Britain before independence and remains a producer of cocoa for Britain now. What is more, any bilateral aid that Britain might give to Ghana can only possibly increase this dependence and make it even more difficult for Ghana to change its agricultural system, grow other crops and thus become more genuinely independent."⁵⁷

Imperialism, Africa and Raw materials

With the colonisation of Africa, the imperialists quickly realised its raw material potential. International finance capital moved in to

develop mining. The greatest amount of capital went into the South African mining sector. Various good reasons dictated this choice :—the great potential in South Africa mining, the existence of a racialist white capitalist ruling class, the availability of cheap labour and so on.⁵⁸

Gradually finance capital moved into mining in the rest of Africa. Heavy amounts of capital were poured into the extraction of raw materials. Africa's industrial sector was practically non-existent because of the lack of capital to finance it (since nearly all of it went into extraction plants).

The mining sector was developed primarily as an export sector. Mining industries in Africa come under the domination of foreign capital. Africa's share in world mining is high. Excluding the USSR, Africa produces (as a per cent of world total) over 98 per cent of diamonds, around 75 per cent of gold, 40 per cent of metals of the platinum group, 70-80 per cent of Cobalt, 26-27 per cent of copper, 40 per cent antimony, over 50 per cent of chromites and manganese, over 70 per cent of Germanium, around 20 per cent Uranium, over 30 per cent phosphates, 9 per cent of Zinc, 13-14 per cent of tin and around 10 per cent iron ore.⁵⁹ All Africa's raw materials (over 90 per cent) went to the imperialist nations who regulated prices so as to keep the exporting countries receipts from raw materials within controllable limits. In 1950-1962, the underdeveloped countries receipts from raw material exports increased on an average by a mere 3.5 per cent per annum which was clearly insufficient to meet their requirements in imported industrial equipment.⁶⁰

Nkrumah gives some statistics to highlight the imperialists' strategy for price control. He quotes UN experts who estimate ".....that the dependent countries had to pay \$ 2.5 to \$ 3 billion more for their imports of manufactured goods in 1947 than they would have to pay if price ratio were the same as in 1913." Further: "For the period from 1950-1961, according to the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the U.N., the index returns for primary materials fell from 97 to 91 (70 for cocoa, coffee and tea), while that for manufactured goods rose from 80 to 110. For steel, which is an indispensable commodity on an increasing scale for developing countries, it reaches the very much higher figure of 134. In terms of exchange as between primary producing countries and the exporters

of manufactured goods, there has been a decline in ten years from 113 to 82, to the disadvantage of the former. The value of Ghana's exports in 1962 was the same as that for exports in 1961, but the volume had increased by about 6 per cent. The value of imports in 1962 was reduced by 16 per cent but the volume fell by only 14 per cent. In the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) while 1962 saw an increase of 77 per cent in exports over 1961, and imports declined by 15 per cent, the value of the exports hardly covered half the value of the imports."⁶¹

What makes African economies particularly vulnerable is their heavy reliance on export earnings. Export and import in "Africa's economies have a much larger share than that of other underdeveloped countries. Imports accounts for 30 per cent and exports for 23 per cent of the continents gross national product. Export earning per capita is 6.4 times higher in Africa than in India."⁶²

The reliance on a high proportion of trade in the national product, forces African economies into heavy dependence (more than that of any other underdeveloped country). In very many ways Africa remains the internal market of Western Europe which accounts for 67 per cent of its (Africa's) exports and 62.6 per cent of its imports."⁶³

In various ways, all this accounts for Africa's inability to build heavy industries. To increase the difficulty with more constraints, checks and balances, imperialist countries have surrounded themselves with walls of protective tariffs—"In many cases, protective effects of the tariff structure are so high as to make it exceedingly difficult for developing countries to export their own raw materials in processed form :"⁶⁴ Significantly, "such restrictions have virtually disappeared on trade in manufactured goods among developed countries."⁶⁵

The bulk of the profits from the exploitation of raw materials goes to the imperialists. The mining of these raw materials in Africa is almost entirely controlled by imperialist monopolies. These monopolies, their interests, profits ventures and interrelationships are studied in detail by Nkrumah in his *"Neo-Colonialism : The Last Stage of Imperialism"*

In spite of this massive exploitation, a small part of the revenue from mineral exploitation does accrue to African states. But it is a

fallacy"...to believe that this small part of the total revenue secured through raw materials exploitation serves in its entirety to widen the underdeveloped country's internal market."⁶⁶

The imperialists would definitely feel threatened if African Governments decide to control the production and marketing of their raw materials. Their reliance on Africa's raw materials is complete. Emphasising their importance, W.W. Rostow (Johnson's special adviser) said :—"It is to these countries (ex-colonies) that we must look for the bulk of possible increase in supplies. The loss of materials through aggression would be equivalent to a military set back." Warning of the consequences that would overtake the US should they be deprived of raw materials, Rostow added :—"The location, natural resources and the population of underdeveloped countries are such that should they become effectively attached to a Communist bloc, the US would become second (read second rate) power in the world". Finally, Rostow sees the fate of Imperialism in relation to the underdeveloped areas :—"The evolution of the underdeveloped areas is likely to determine the fate of Western Europe."⁶⁷

Imperialist Investment and Profits from Africa

Much foreign investments flowed into Africa to develop mining extraction, partial processing and shipping out raw materials during the colonial period.⁶⁸ The primary intention of investments is profit.⁶⁹

Capital is exported because a "superabundance of capital" has arisen in the advanced countries.⁷⁰ "This possibility of exporting capital is created by the fact that a number of backward countries have already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse: main railways have either been or are being built there... . The necessity for exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become "overripe" and (owing to the backward stage of agriculture and the impoverished state of the masses) capital cannot find a field for "profitable" investment".⁷¹

By the beginning of the 29th century "...the export of capital reached formidable dimensions..."⁷²

Whilst capital is exported for profit, it "...affects and greatly accelerate the development of capitalism in those countries to which

it is exported. While, therefore the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the capital exporting countries, it can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the world."⁷³

The export of capital changed all modes of production, introduced commodity production, brought about rural classes, led to the stratification and the proletarianization of the peasantry.

Around the 60's foreign, private and state investments in Africa amounted to approx. \$ 20,000 million—Britain, France and Belgium together accounted for \$ 16,000 or 80 per cent. By 1959, U.S. investments were twenty times the pre-war amount and exceeded \$ 2,000 million. In 1952, US monopolies controlled 22.8 per cent of Africa's oil output, 40.3 per cent of manganese ore, 46.8 per cent of vanadium, 34.5 per cent of lead, 15.3 per cent of zinc, 96.2 per cent of cadmium, and 59.8 per cent of bauxite.⁷⁴

US direct private investments in Africa increased between 1945 and 1958 from \$ 110 million to \$ 789 million—most of it drawn from profits. New money invested (of the increase of \$ 679 million), was only \$ 149 million. US direct private investment in 1964 was \$ 1,769 million; 1967—\$ 2,277 million; and 1970 \$ 3,476 million. From all this US earned profits to the tune of \$ 704 million. Official estimates put U.S. monopolies profits from Africa, between 1946-1959 at \$ 1,234 million.⁷⁵ In 1961, alone, U.S. monopolies took £ 11.2 million out of Africa.⁷⁶ Soviet economists estimate that monopolies receive from \$ 4,000 million to \$ 6,000 million a year in profit on the capital invested in underdeveloped Africa.⁷⁷

The book value of annual earnings on direct private investment in Africa gives 3 per cent profit in 1960 (\$ 33 million), 21 per cent in 1964 (389 million), 19 per cent in 1967 (\$ 453 million), and 24 per cent in 1970 (\$ 845 million). Since 1964, Libya's oil alone showed a 66 per cent rate of profit for the following four years—this represented over two-third of the total entire earnings of the continent.⁷⁸

The earnings of the monopolies is a different category. Some idea will be formed of monopolies and their superprofits from just a few statistics. Firestone has taken out \$ 160 million worth of rubber from Liberia—in return the Liberian Government had to rest.

content with \$ 8 million. The average net profit made by this monopoly was three times the entire Liberian revenue. Rhodesian Anglo-American's consolidated net profit for the year ending 30 June, 1971 was £ 20,590,783—after providing £ 11,541,475 for taxation.⁷⁹

The profits of copper mining companies in Zambia up to 1965 was £ 266.1 million (excluding dividends).⁸⁰

This is not an exhaustive study of the profits from investments and monopolies profits. But from the above statistics what is apparent is Africa's tremendous potential for imperialists as a profitable multiplier of money.

If the profits made by the imperialists are staggering, so are the foreign debts accruing to Africa. By and large, the foreign indebtedness of the third World Countries, resulting both from the large export credits many of them have contracted and from development assistance, has risen rapidly, to a level of nearly \$ 50 billion. Debt service has been growing at 17 per cent per annum, absorbing much of the increase in export earnings which has been about 6 per cent per annum.⁸¹

Nkrumah states that figures from the World Bank for 1962 showed that 71 Third World nations owed foreign debts of some \$ 27,000 million on which they paid in interest and service charges some \$ 5,000 million. Foreign debts since then have been estimated as more than £ 30,000 million in these areas. In 1961, the interest rates on almost three quarters of the loans of the major imperialist powers, amounted to 7 or 8 per cent.⁸²

Another method of capital export is in the form of aid programmes. A.H. Jamal, Minister of State, Directorate of Development and Planning of the United Republic of Tanzania describe aid :— I want to suggest that perhaps the time has come for us to consider seriously, whether the term 'foreign aid' properly describes the global phenomenon which we are witnessing today and which in quantitative terms means that a capital movement of some \$ 6,000 million is taking place annually from the developed countries to the developing countries, while at the same time some \$ 2,000 million is paid back annually to the developed countries by way of service and redemption charges on past capital investment. If, in addition, account is taken of the steadily adverse terms of trade of the developing

countries, and of the rapidly advancing technology providing in absolute terms greater economic growth to the industrialized countries, then the net result is to increase the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' of the world. Further more, if we remember that the early momentum in economic growth which the present developed countries were able to gain resulted from the formidable combination of at least two important circumstance—that is to say, the industrial revolution and the almost unrestricted access to raw materials at prices having little relevance to their then comparable intrinsic values—are we right in describing the present process of global adjustment which is taking place on capital account as 'foreign aid'? Then there is the rather special relationship between the U.K. and the East African countries. They all belong to the sterling area. The U.K. has an almost unique responsibility, for two reasons. On the one hand as the major industrialized country it derives benefits from its favourable terms of trade at a time when commodity prices seem to be following a secular falling trend. On the other hand, as the sterling area banker, it benefits from higher sterling reserves, whenever these come about from increases in the earnings of primary commodities exported by the developing members of the Commonwealth.⁸³

We have gone much beyond Jamal's statement on aid to encompass his views on trade. Aid and trade are closely connected. Pearson states of this aid :—"Finally, aid has often been directed at the promotion of financing of exports from developed countries with little relevance to development objectives in the receiving country."⁸⁴ Teresa Hayter goes much deeper into the question of aid in her book "*Aid as Imperialism*" (Penguin-1971) she states:—"aid' has never been an unconditional transfer of financial resources". She further states:—"I believe, now, that the existence of aid can be explained only in terms of an attempt to preserve the capitalist system in the Third World" and ;—"Aid can be regarded as a concession by the imperialist powers to enable them to continue their exploitation of the Third World...." (p. 15).

The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Republic of Kenya, Dr. J.G. Kiano, looks at aid critically :—"In the first place, we are told this is aid, but on looking more carefully we find it is not aid at all. The first gift horse called aid is simply an attempt to find

a trade outlet for the donor country's products. The U.S. Agency for International Development, from which we have gained quite a lot.....tells us that we may have the loan, but that we must buy most of the materials from the United States. This is one particular form of aid which is a hidden outlet for the exports of the donor country. Briefly, the donor country says, we will give you this money but you must buy the product from us ... Let us proceed a step further. East African Governments have signed various agreements involving credit facilities for \$ 10 million, or £ 10 million, or 10 million roubles, but we never see the money. We are told that we can get this in the form of machinery or the equipment for development projects. When we try to choose the machinery or the equipment, the range is rather limited. So, really if we are to make use of the credit facilities we have to revise our development plan to fit in an entirely new project we did not want in the first place I do not consider that foreign investment is aid. Investment from which we may get some benefit and from which the investor himself will get benefit is not foreign aid. It is a misuse of the English language to call foreign investment any form of aid whatsoever."⁸⁵

Total official 'aid' to Africa during the period 1960-62 was \$ 1,440 million for 1960; \$ 1,540 m for 1961 and \$ 1,754 m for 1962. Asia's average share of aid during this period was \$ 2,267 million.⁸⁶

There is a definite purpose in aid flowing from these official sources.⁸⁷ All three sources are imperialist dominated. In a statement attributed to the late President Kennedy by M. Bonnefous in 'Les Millions qu'on Envoient', aid and anti-communism go hand in glove—it is "To help the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to modernize themselves, and to safeguard their liberty and freedom of choice, at least for the future; to make possible the creation of new links between the Atlantic Community and the Third World, and to defend the frontiers of the free world everywhere". Bonnefous sees this as "the real battle between communism and the free world" (read imperialism).⁸⁸ Jalee comments:—"... international aid is distributed by agencies which are institutions of imperialism cloaked in the garb of the U.N.; it is distributed solely within the bounds of the imperialist camp with the basic purpose of defending its frontiers."⁸⁹

There are other purposes as well, Smith states that U.S. loans to Africa were "..... to strengthen an African states' private sector, for instance, U.S. loans have been extended to the country's industrial development banks which, in turn, makes loans to local businessmen. It is openly aimed, thereby to foster a local bourgeoisie which will have a stake not only in cooperating with American monopoly capital domestically, but also in matters of foreign policy."⁹⁰

Thus, any Third World state accepting aid must give a free hand for capital and business, must be conducive to the productive investment of capital and must allow the Agency a voice in planning economic policy.⁹¹

It is this voice that African Governments give to the imperialists that puts them in the class of puppets of imperialism or neo-colonialist collaborators. Nkrumah, defined neo-colonialism as imperialism's last desperate attempt to retain the strangle-hold over Africa. The client states do much to maintain imperialism's presence in Africa.

Senegals' five year plan for 1955-66, 1969-70, envisaged obtaining 65% of the capital investments from foreign sources. Many other states do likewise.⁹²

Nigeria is a target of US foreign investment—\$ 200 million was invested after independence. West Africa (i.e.) the former French territories is massively penetrated by U.S. capital. U.S. involvement in West Africa is second to France.⁹³

In 1963, 18 African countries, former French colonies, signed an agreement with the European Common Market—"in this way, half of the sovereign African States with a total area of about 14 million square kilometres and a population of more than 50 million, found themselves economically dependent on the European Common Market.....It is indicative that the countries of the Afro-Malagasy Union have become EEC associates."⁹⁴

Under the Yanode agreements ".....the eighteen African states must provide the greatest freedom to the citizens and companies of the six European countries to set up business inside the eighteen African states—and in return, of course, the African states are equally free to set up their industries and business in Europe..." Under the agreements, the African states cannot introduce any exchange restrictions affecting investments. Thus, business and

capital can flow freely in this huge trading area. With the imperialist powers of the EEC having large funds to invest, and the African states having none, "it isn't" difficult to see which direction, this 'equal' flow will take. This 'equal' treaty will perpetuate the present division of labour, for without tariffs to protect them the African states will find it impossible to start new industries against the competition of the advanced European countries. The semi-colonial, underdeveloped countries will continue to supply the basic raw materials—and remain poor. The advanced countries will continue to have access to raw materials on their own terms—and continue to become richer."⁹⁵

Felix Houphouët Boigny, President of Ivory Coast plays the biggest role in the Council of the Entente made up of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey—all part of the 18 states who reached an agreement with the EEC. Boigny has "a strong attachment with France, to Western values and to the free enterprise system."⁹⁶

Kenya would also come into the group of African states who would want closer relations with the imperialists. In the programme for development, the Kenyan Government proposes to "borrow from foreign governments and international institutions and stimulate the flow of private capital from abroad."⁹⁷

It is where states come under the grip of international finance capital that neo-colonialism becomes apparent. Nkrumah defines it:—"A state can be said to be a neo-colonialist or client state if it is independent *de jure* and dependent *de facto*. It is a state where political power lies in the conservative force of the former colony and where economic power remains under the control of international finance capital. Such a state is in the grip of neo-colonialism. It has become a client state. It is not master of its own destiny."⁹⁸

Lenin as well commented on countries "... which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence...."⁹⁹

Three objectives are pursued by the current neo-colonialist policy in Africa:—firstly to preserve and broaden the imperialist exploitation of the continent by economic means; second, to block the African countries 'advance towards genuine independence; third

to retain them within the world imperialist system and use them in the struggle against the socialist world.¹⁰⁰

Thus, the present situation in Africa is characterised by the massive presence of international finance capital and the flight of capital from Africa.

FOOTNOTES

1. Special thanks to M/s Nilanjana Biswas and Nirmala Sakarai for their kind assistance.

2. Much has been written on this. As a specific reference we may mention Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*.

3. This essay will attempt to show that given the present economic structure of African economies, it is impossible to talk in terms of a real political independence. This is largely true of a great part of the Third World.

4. Quoted in David Morrison :—*The USSR & Africa—1945-1963*. (OUP-London-1964) p. 95 (Appendix).

5. Nkrumah, K. :—*Neo-Colonialism :—The Last Stage of Imperialism*" (Nelson-1965), Nkrumah Shows Foreign Monopolies Operations in Africa.

6. *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii* (1962)—quoted in Morrison (1964); p. 95.

7. Morrison (1964); p. 95 (Appendix)

8. Lawrence J. Sakarai and Nilanjana Biswas :—*"Ethiopia : Time of Reckoning"*—*Economic & Political Weekly* Vol. IX : 30 : III : 74 Famine Stalks Ethiopia—*Times of India*—24 : IV : 74.

9. Mao Tse Tung : *On Contradiction* Vol. I; *Selected Works* (Peking—1967); p. 313.

10. Lenin, V. I.;—*Imperialism : The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Peking—1970).

11. To observe how this was done in Latin America—see A.G. Frank : *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (Pelican-Penguin 1969).

12. Eric Williams :—*Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill—1944); p. 51.

13. The slave trade, involving three areas—i.e. the West Coast of India, Arabia and Persian Gulf, and East Africa, is traced to c. 6th century A.D. This as well as trade patterns between these areas, merchant shipping and later imperialist invasion of the Indian Ocean is dealt with in some detail in the authors unpublished work *"Indian Merchants in East Africa from the Earliest Times."*

14. "The corruption of social and political life in Western Europe, the growth of Chauvinism and racism, the eventual development of imperialism and jingoism, all owe much to the heinous rape of non-European peoples that accompanied the early development of Western Capitalism."

See Baran, P. :—*The Political Economy of Growth* (John Calder, London-1957) p. 143 (footnote—14).

15. Nkrumah details the mechanics of neo-colonialism—See Nkrumah 1965.
16. Published by Chapel Hill—1944.
17. *Ibid*—37, 51.
18. *Ibid*—pp. 51/2.
19. Though the Industrial Revolution dictated the abolition of slave labour and the slave trade, Britain was forced to come to terms with the East African slave trade. It was only through that trade that her manufactured goods could enter the East African Markets. These markets were vital for Britain—her industrial monopoly was lost and U.S. and Germany began to outproduce and undersell her. In East Africa itself, Britain faced heavy competition for these markets from the Germans, Americans and the French. It was only because she won the confidence of the Indian merchants (the principal merchants in the area) that Britain secured these markets. Once she was certain of these markets, Britain laid a heavy hand on the slave trade. This is studied in some detail in my unpublished work : “*The Indian merchants in East Africa from the Earliest Times*”.
20. George Lichtheim :—*Imperialism* (Pelican-Penguin—1971)—p. 72.
21. Felix Greene :—*The Enemy—notes on Imperialism and Revolution* (Jonathan Cape—London—1970) pp. 63-64.
- 22. See Karl Marx: *Capital Vol. I* (Lawrence and Wishart—London—1970) p. 6.
23. Karl Marx—*Capital Vol. III* (Lawrence & Wishart—London—1970) p. 489 (footnote 8).
24. *Ibid*.
25. Hobson, J.A :—*Imperialism. A Study* (London—1938), p. 19.
26. Woolf, H : *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (London-1968)—p. 55.
27. *Ibid*.
28. *Ibid*—55/6—60.
29. Lenin (1965)—90.
30. Woolf (1968)—pp. 61/8.
31. Lenin (1965)—95.
32. Lenin (1965)—pp. 19/20.
33. Woolf (1968)—p. 18.
34. Quoted in Solodownikov, V :—*Africa fights for Independence* (Moscow—1970) p. 17.
35. Lenin (1965)—20.
36. *Ibid*—26/7.
37. Woolf directly connects this war with Europe's Policy in Africa—“European policy in Africa may not have been the immediate cause of the great War, but you cannot have a policy such as Europe pursued in Africa between 1880 and 1914 without great wars”—Woolf (1968)—p. 321.
38. Endre Sik : *The History of Black Africa*—V. II; (Budapest, 1966) p. 101; also see Table 15 in Jenkins R : *Exploitation* (Mac Gibban Kee, London—1970) p. 117.

39. Sik (1966)—pp. 102/3.
40. For South Africa's share see Frankel S.H : *Capital Investment in Africa* (OUP-1978) Table 49. p. 208.
41. Sik (1966)—p. 103.
42. *Ibid*—102/4.
43. *Ibid*—133.
44. Woolf (1968)—p. 332.
45. *Ibid*—p. 331.
46. Frankel (1938)—p. 207.
47. *Ibid*—207.
48. Nkrumah (1965)—58; 60.
49. Iskenderov (1972)—p. 66.
50. *Ibid*.
51. Arkadie, Van B, and Ndegwa, P : *Future Trade, Balance of Payments, Aid requirements in Problems of Foreign Aid* (Institute of Public Administration University College Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (945).
52. See for eg : Polly Hill's two works :—*The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern China* (Cambridge—1963) and *Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa* (Cambridge—1970).
53. Arkadie and Ndegwa (1965)—p. 107.
54. Yaffey (1970)—Table 4, p. 22.
55. Solodovnikov (1970) p. 95.
56. Stewart Smith : *US Neo-Colonialism in Africa* (Progress Publishers—Moscow—1974).
57. Jenkins (1970)—p. 44.
58. See Frankel (1938) Chaps. III & IV.
59. Iskenderov (1972)—p. 74.
60. *Ibid*—p. 67.
61. (E/C.N. 14/239), Part A December, 1963)—in Nkrumah (1965) p. 238.
62. Aleksandrovskaya, H.E. and L.V. Goncharov :—*Some Trends of Development of African Economies in Africa in Soviet Studies Annual* (Moscow—1969) p. 27.
63. *Ibid*.
64. Lester B. Pearson :—*Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development* (Praeger—London 1969)—p. 88.
65. *Ibid*.
66. Baran (1957)—p. 182.
67. Essack, A.K. "200 Super Corporations that Dominate the Capitalist World"—in *Africa and the World* (89), (Fleet Street, London E.C. 4) Vol. 6, No. 54; Dec. 1969.
68. Frankel (1938), Chap. V. Section I treats this in some detail.
69. See Hobson (1938) p. 52 who shows profits on investments from 1884—1903.

70. Lenin (1970)—p. 73.
 71. *Ibid.*
 72. *Ibid.* p. 74.
 73. *Ibid.* p. 76.
 74. Braginsky (Moscow Undated) p. 168.
 75. Smith (1974)—p. 53.
 76. Africa loses could either by £ 555 million or £ 419 million—Nkrumah (1965)—62; 57.
 77. Iskenderov (1972)—66.
 78. Smith (1974)—56/57,
 79. Nkrumah (1965): p. 66, 159.
 80. Aleksandrovskaia and Goncharov (1969)—34.
 81. Pearson (1969); p. 13.
 82. Nkrumah (1965)—242.
 83. *Problems of Foreign Aid* (1965)—p. 4.
 84. Pearson (1969)—p. 50.
 85. *Problems of Foreign Aid* (1965)—pp. 7/8.
 86. *Ibid*—p. 53. Table—VIII
 87. IFC (International Finance Corporation)
- IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)
- IDA (International Development Association)
89. Jalee, D : "*The Pillage of the Third World*" (Modern Reader Paperbacks —N.Y. and London p. 69.
 88. *Ibid.*
 90. Smith (1974)—p. 47.
 91. See for example Mr. Wood's (President) *Address to the Board of Governors*—IBRD, Washington, Sept; 26; 1966, p. 4—quoted by Popov, Y.S :—*The World Bank and the Economic Development of Africa in Soviet Studies (Annual) —1969* (Moscow—1970) p. 21.
 92. Solodovnikov (1970)—p. 75.
 93. Smith (1974); p. 69; 72.
 94. Ettinger, Y :—*African Solidarity and neo-Colonialism* (Moscow undated)
 95. Greene (1970) p. 166.
 96. Ettinger (Moscow—undated) p. 16.
 97. Iskenderov (1972)—125.
 98. *Liberation Struggle*—Issue No. 5; May, 1972, p. 11 (Published by Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Writers and Journalists, The Basement 101-3, Gower Street, London).
 99. Solodovnikov (1972), p. 92
 100. Ettinger (Moscow—Undated) p. 67.

Dr T.O. Elias

The Contribution of Asia and Africa to Contemporary International Law

One of the problems facing the newly independent states of Asia and Africa in the past two decades was the non-availability on a sufficient scale of trained manpower on the international plane, both at home and abroad, particularly at the United Nations and its specialised agencies. Not all of these new states, however, lacked the men: for example India and Japan have had a much longer period of apprenticeship than the other, having taken some part in such international congresses as those on the Treaty of Versailles 1919 and the Congo and Niger Rivers Conventions; although their roles at the end of the First World War were still relatively minor ones.

From the 17th to the 19th century, the order had been the organisation of various concerts of Europe designed to ensure that certain power blocs would gain ascendancy in the interest of their nation-States. It would be true to say that international law since Grotius, especially after the Treaty of West-phalia (1648), was largely European both in character and in application. A few years after independence the new states soon began to consider programmes of concerted action against their shortcomings on an inter-state basis. The shortage of expertise in personnel for States' Foreign Ministries at home and for representational purposes abroad no doubt called for concerted action. There was also the need for a high level of Afro-Asian solidarity on a number of important issues—political, economic and social—all of which clearly required the restructuring of the international legal order.

The first notable attempt at such a concerted effort is the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, first founded in 1956 with the title of Asian Legal Consultative Committee by seven Asian

States under the leadership of India; two years later, its title had to be changed to the present one in order to accommodate African States as well. Today, thanks to the combined efforts of our indefatigable Secretary-General, Mr. B. Sen and myself, there are some thirty member States of our organisation. Among the principal aims of the Committee are the following three :

- (a) to consider specific legal problems which may be referred to the Committee by any member government under Article 3 (b) of the Committee's Statutes and to make recommendations thereon;
- (b) examination of matters before the International Law Commission and other United Nations agencies in the field of international law and trade law with a view to making recommendations thereon to assist member governments which sometimes have to answer questionnaires and make comments and draft codification and conventions;
- (c) preparation of background material and arranging exchange of views on matters of common interest and on important questions which are to come up at diplomatic conferences under the auspices of the United Nations and other agencies.

Other subsidiary functions of the Committee are :

- (1) the undertaking of publications on matters of common interest, examples being the two massive volumes, one each on the constitutions of Asian and of African States;
- (2) collection of materials on any legal question for any member State at its request, and
- (3) training of officers of member States in research methods in the field of international law, this again being at request of member States.

The Committee's Secretariat here in New Delhi is steadily becoming international in both composition and outlook, there being at the moment a mixed staff which, while being of necessity largely Indian, has attracted personnel from at least four other countries as a matter of deliberate policy. Annual conferences of the Committee have been held by rotation in the capitals of the following Member

Dr T. O. Elias

States—India, Egypt, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, Iraq and Japan.

As well as having published annual reports of the fifteen sessions already held at the various State Capitals, the Committee has also undertaken and issued special reports on such crucial questions as Legality of Nuclear Tests (a study which, in view of the recent cases before the International Court of Justice between France and Australia and New Zealand, has turned out to be prophetic), Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (a subject of current importance in view of the increasing social and commercial intercourse between the countries of Africa and Asia), the Rights of Refugees (a development of contemporary relevance to both Africa and Asia where there have in recent years been national upheavals in adjacent countries and across frontiers), Relief against Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion (again a subject of current importance between Africa on the one hand and India, Japan and China on the other, due to increasing economic and financial interactions), and the protracted *South-West Africa Cases* (which are a source of common concern to India and Africa as a result of their common experience at the hands of apartheid South Africa. It is significant that even at a time when India had no nuclear weapon, the late Prime Minister Nehru was the first world statesman and lawyer to call the attention of the Committee in 1961 to the need to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of the legality of nuclear tests then being carried out in parts of Africa and Asia. One of the most interesting studies under preparation by the Committee is the Digest of Judgments of the Courts of Asian and African Countries on International Legal Questions. This important subject has not been given the consideration that it deserves in the writings of international lawyers, and it is most appropriate that the Committee should have undertaken it as one of the sure means of assessing the contribution of the courts of Asia and Africa to the development of international law.

In order to appreciate the significance of the contribution already made by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in the relatively short span of its eighteen years of existence, let us recall its relationship with the United Nations, the International Law

Commission, the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the League of Arab States, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and the Hague Conference on Private International Law. An interesting recent development has been the practice of these various bodies and of non-Asian and African countries to be represented at sessions of the Committee by their legal experts in the capacity of observers. There were, for instance, at the January 1974 Tokyo session, a total of thirty-nine such delegations which included countries from Latin American; Scandinavian, British, West and East European countries and the United States of America, as well as many Asian and African non-Member States. These experts obviously came to ascertain the views of Asia and Africa on the current issues concerning The Law of the Sea, to the Third conference on which the Committee was invited last year by the United Nations Organisation as a participant in its own right.

It may be pointed out that was not the first time that the Committee had been invited to participate in a codification conference under the auspices of the United Nations. For instance, the Committee took part in the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Relations in 1961 when the Committee's recommendations on the subject were tabled and discussed as a conference document. Also at both sessions held in 1968 and in 1969, the Committee participated actively in the work of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of Treaties in Vienna. The present speaker had the honour of being elected Chairman of the Committee of the Whole at both sessions and was also elected Chairman of the Afro-Asian Group working with the West European, the East European and the Latin American Groups *pari passu* with the Conference proceedings. It is to the credit of Africa and Asia that, when the prospects of success at this crucial conference looked bleak, it was given to me as Chairman to propose the solution which ended the deadlock and thereby saved the Vienna Conference on The Law of Treaties from imminent collapse. The trouble was that the draft convention combined large elements of progressive development of international law and its

codification. The most controversial section of the Convention was Part V which deals with the causes of the invalidity of treaties on the grounds of mistake, fraud, coercion and *jus cogens* (that is, those peremptory norms of customary international law from which States cannot derogate). The Western Power expressed serious doubts as to the practicability of enforcing claims of invalidity on grounds such as these, and they questioned whether the other provisions of the Draft Convention and those in Part V could be acceptable without at the same time providing an adequate machinery for the settlement of disputes arising out of them. A package deal was then introduced by me which provided that the International Court of Justice should be given jurisdiction to determine disputes between the parties to a treaty as to its invalidity on any of these grounds. At the same time, a detailed procedural machinery for achieving proper adjudication was set out in another provision of the package deal. Both the Big Powers and the Third World (which seemed to want the party invoking the invalidity of a treaty to determine the question without any recourse to compulsory system of adjudication) were called upon to accept the deal *as a whole*; the alternative would have been chaos. At that poignant moment, both sides showed statesmanship and, after a fairly long adjournment of the proceedings, returned to the Conference chamber to accept my proposals.

While we are still on the subject of contribution made to United Nations Conferences of Plenipotentiaries for the drawing up and conclusion of international conventions, we may note quite briefly the part which the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee has played and continues to play in the current effort to achieve an acceptable body of modern legal principles to govern the regime of the seas. The Committee has been actively engaged in the study of a new Law of The Sea for some five years now, and has quite early taken up the United Nations declaration in 1970 and the even earlier requests of two member-governments of the Committee that a third conference on the subject was both necessary and desirable. Subcommittees of the Committee set up were to study various aspects of the topic in depth. The first comprehensive public discussion of these studies took place at the Committee's session held in Colombo (Sri Lanka) in January 1971 when a strong contingent from Latin-American countries attended as observers and intervened to press

their demand for two-hundred-mile limit for territorial waters. Other delegations also come from the United States. It was at that conference that the Committee outlined its own distinctive concepts of the Exclusive Economic Zone which embraced not only the outmoded three-mile limit for territorial waters but also included an area of the sea adjacent to the coast which covers the fishing grounds as well as the area for the exploitation of the mineral and other resources of the subjacent soil as coming within the boundaries of national jurisdiction. The purpose of the Exclusive Economic Zone is to safeguard the interest of coastal States in the waters adjacent to their coast without unduly interfering with the other legitimate uses of the sea by other states. The proposal meant that each coastal state should have a territorial sea of twelve miles beyond which there would be this additional economic zone. This zone should not be regarded as territorial waters, since freedom of the high seas as well as freedom of laying sub-marine cables were already established under customary international law. On the other hand, the zone must not be regarded as forming part of the high seas because the coastal state should have the exclusive right to exploit, regulate and control fisheries, take and enforce pollution measures as well as exploit the resources of the sea-bed within the zone. Other state could exercise similar rights of exploitation of the resources within the zone only when so licensed by the coastal states.

We may also recall in this connection that the African Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea which was held in Yaounde in June 1972 adopted the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone which, be it noted, originated in a Kenyan proposal. Again, in May 1973, the Organisation of African Unity, following the draft Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea adopted by the Council of Ministers, ratified the Declaration which recognises the right of each coastal state to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone beyond their state to waters up to a limit of two hundred nautical miles. The matter was taken a stage further when fourteen African States introduced Draft Articles on Exclusive Economic Zone before the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee.¹

Allied to this concept of an exclusive economic zone, is that of the *patrimonial sea* which was first adumbrated in the declaration of

the Ministers of Caribbean States in June 1972. The Mexican delegate who attended as an observer the New Delhi session of the Committee held in January 1973 explained the *patrimonial sea* idea at some length. The Committee thereupon decided to make a comparative study of the two concepts, but before this was done, India had made certain proposals for an exclusive fisheries zone which should be complimentary to and an elaboration of one of the aspects of the Exclusive Economic Zone. After much discussion for the clarification of the limits of the concept, there was introduced before the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee a Six Power proposal on the concept of the Fisheries Zone.² On the whole, the idea of an exclusive economic zone soon gained wide acceptance among the member-states of the Committee and it would seem that all future discussions on the subject of the law of the sea must take account of it. The general acceptability of the concept of an Exclusive Economic Zone is further underlined by the conclusions of the Fourth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Nations.

On other aspect of the proposals regarding the law of the sea is the question of the establishment of an international machinery to govern the regime of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction, that is to say, beyond the exclusive economic zone. The Committee did not consider that the area of the sea-bed which should be placed under an international agency should be as large as proposed by the Big Powers, or that the powers to be given to the agency should be as all-pervasive as had been envisaged for it. There is no doubt that the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Japan already possess the most advanced technological know-how in the exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction. The Committee was accordingly reluctant to accept the Trust concept put forward by the Big Powers which would enable them to use their technology for the exploitation of the resources of the ocean floor as "the common heritage of all mankind". The Committee, both collectively as a body and through its members as individuals, put forward its own detailed proposals at Caracas and later at Geneva where members of the Committee took part as Chairman and as Secretary of the conferences, and no doubt espoused the cause of Asian, African and Latin-American countries in ensuring a just and acceptable solution to the problems posed by the law of the sea since the last

convention was concluded in 1958 and amended in 1960. So intractable have been these problems of the law of the sea that no formula satisfactory to all has yet been found. It is not known what a definitive conference in the future will decide, but the Committee's position should be the achievement of a balanced system which should ensure fairness and justice to all.

Before we turn to a consideration of some of the activities of Asia and Africa in the United Nations and its agencies, let us examine briefly the work of other regional organisations in parts of both continents in the last two decades or so. The League of Arab States is no doubt a political organ primarily, but the importance of certain of its declarations and resolutions on international issues is that they connote legal consequences. This is especially so with regard to Middle East affairs. Take for instance the League's stand that Israel must withdraw from all occupied Arab territories which it has occupied since the 1967 war, and remember that this has become the official position of the United Nations in its resolution on the subject. This would seem to be in accordance with the customary international law principle that no state may keep any territory acquired by conquest. Similarly, the influence of the League must not be underrated in connection with the question of ratification or acceptance of United Nations draft conventions; member-states of the League normally follow its lead in such cases, as witness the delay in ratifying the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties because, it is understood, the League wants to establish an Arabic version of the text of the Convention before the member-state will ratify the convention.

The Organisation of African Unity is another regional body which, in addition to being essentially a political organ, provides specifically for the ultimate use of the United Nations machinery for dispute settlements with regard to interpretation of the Charter of the Organisation; the Charter contains an in-built mechanism in the form of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration for the resolution of conflicts between its member states. The body also makes important declarations having legal consequences, as for example, its declaration on the law of the sea in respect of the Exclusive Economic Zone concept to which we have referred earlier.

One of the results of the conference of the International Commissions of Jurists (of Geneva) held in Lagos in January 1961 was a proposal by all the African states there present that a Commission of African Jurists be established. After a preliminary meeting in Lagos in 1963 on the subject, the inaugural conference was held in January 1964 at which were present twenty-one independent African States which under my chairmanship unanimously adopted a convention and a statute. The delegates also resolved to place the Commission under the Organisation of African Unity as one of its six specialised commissions. The Organisation of African Unity eventually accepted the recommendation. The new organisation was intended to serve as a permanent forum for the discussion and study of the many legal and constitutional problems of Africa. The objectives of the Commission of African Jurists may be summarised as follows :

- (a) to promote and develop understanding and cooperation amongst African jurists;
- (b) to encourage the study of law, especially African Law, and to advance the concept of justice;
- (c) to consider legal problems of interest and those that may be referred to it by any of its Members and by the Organisation of the African Unity and to make recommendations thereon;
- (d) to encourage the study of African Customary Law in the universities and institutes of legal studies in Africa and elsewhere, and its codification by the African Governments, and
- (e) to establish relationship with other international organisations on the basis of non-alignment.

The Commission has not so far been active in the pursuit of its aims and purposes probably because its proposal for the advancement of the Rule of Law in Africa might be critical of acts or omissions of some of the Member Governments.

If the pre-occupation of the Commission of African jurists is with the private law sector, public international law is the prime concern of the conference held in March 1967 in Lagos on "International Law and African Problems" under the joint auspices of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endow-

ment for International Peace. The working papers included Treatment of Aliens, The Methods of Encouraging the Wider Study and Appreciation of International Law in Africa, Government Legal Advising in the Field of Foreign Affairs, Treaties and Succession of States and Governments in Africa, The Relevance of International Law to African Problems and Cooperation in the Utilization of International Rivers in Africa.³ Of the various papers studied, the one on succession of states and Governments is of especial importance because the delegates from Tanzania, in explaining the state practice in the East African countries, submitted that neither the automatic succession theory nor the "clean state" theory adequately described the current practice. They further submitted that, generally speaking, pre-existing treaties did not survive the transition from trusteeship to independent Tanganyika statehood, where there was a continuity of treaty relationship in Zanzibar which both antedated and postdated the period of the protectorate. Bilateral treaty relationships in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar survived the union wherever they were not inconsistent with constitutional provisions and wherever they were in accordance with geographical limitations expressed or implied in the treaty; boundary agreements were inherited, provided they were clear and unambiguous. Visa abolition agreements survived the grace period, and those that did not were terminated within the ensuing three years; no commercial agreements survived the grace period, but a few were renegotiated after independence. Finally, it was their contention that the so-called Nyerere Doctrine of Succession helped to ease the adjustment of fundamentally changed circumstances by permitting a grace period during which all interested parties could review the desirability of continuing treaty relationships, since customary international law recognises that consent of states is the basic norm of their treaty relationship⁴. When one looks at the draft Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties recently completed by the International Law Commission and submitted to the General Assembly, one will find clear evidence of the influence of the thinking of African jurists on the provisions dealing with the "clean state" theory.

The other topics received equally extensive discussions at the conference, but it would be impolitic to attempt at detailed review

here. An important outcome of that conference was the follow-up meeting which was held, again at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in June 1968 under the joint auspices of the Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York. It was a more restricted conference in that it was a standing committee meeting of the previous one and it was attended by representatives of Ghana, U.A.R., Dahomey, Algeria, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal and Nigeria as well as the representatives of the Carnegie Endowment and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. After the fullest consideration of the Subcommittee's report, it was unanimously decided that there should be established an African Institute of International Law. According to Article 2 of the Constitution of the new Institute, the object is to foster the study of international law and international relations in Africa and to promote African contribution to the development of international law. To this end, the Institute is required to :

- (a) co-operate with similar institutes and societies in Africa and in other parts of the world ;
- (b) be a Documentation Centre for all Africa ;
- (c) seek to encourage research in the field of international law and international relations in Africa ; and
- (d) publish studies in international law and African problems and, in particular, an African Yearbook of International Law. As both the 1967 and 1968 conferences were held under my chairmanship, I was elected Chairman of the African Institute of International Law with an Executive Council and a Secretariat entrusted to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

The proposed Documentation Centre and African Yearbook of International Law have had to be held in abeyance pending a decision of the Organisation of African Unity as to whether it should undertake to foot the bill or permit one or more member States of the Organisation to do so. One other reason for the apparent inactivity of the African Institute of International Law may be due to the fact that many of its leading members had by 1969 become more and more involved with the already established and functioning Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee which began to attract

more African Government participation about this time.

If we may now attempt a summary of the main activities of the Afro-Asian Group of States in the work of the United Nations, it is no exaggeration to say that their contribution to contemporary international law has been notable. The United Nations General Assembly began its life in 1946 with 51 States of which only Ethiopia and Liberia were founder Members from Africa, although there were a few like India and others from Asia as well. By 1960, the number had grown to 97 and today, there are some 145 Members of the United Nations Organisation, out of which 47 are Africans, and 29 are Asians, making a total of 76 or more than half of the entire membership of UNO. While it is true that mere Preponderance of numbers does not *ipso facto* signify a greater Afro-Asian contribution to the work of the Organisation than that of the other members, it is my thesis that the Asian-African group of States have made a noteworthy contribution to modern international law. We may classify the spheres of this contribution into the following five categories :

- (a) Constitutional
- (b) Legal and judicial
- (c) economic
- (d) social and cultural

A. *International Constitutional Law* is a recent phenomenon in the wider field of international law and it has steadily grown out of the multiplicity of international organisation and their various conventions and statutes which create and regulate their activities. Apart from their built-in machinery for determining the respective competences of their constituent organs, there is also the external regulative control in the form of the UN Administrative Tribunal and the collateral powers granted to many of these international organisations to request advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice. All these arrangements are designed to ensure that the United Nations itself, its specialised agencies and the other international organisations act with their proper limits in accordance with their charters and the general principles of international law⁵. Asia and Africa have made notable contributions to the UN, the

ILO, the WHO, and so on in the development of their institutions along generally acceptable lines.

B. Under *Legal and Judicial* we must include the International Law Commission, the International Court of Justice, the UN Administrative Tribunal and other quasi-legal bodies like the UNCITRAL. The ILC is a creation of the General Assembly under Article 13 of the Charter and its main function is to engage in the task of codification and progressive development of international law. Beginning life with 15 members in 1947, the ILC has since had to increase its membership to 25, so as to ensure that the principal legal systems and the main forms of civilisation are represented thereon. There are now 5 Africans and 4 Asians on the Commission, that is, more than one-third of the total membership. The ILC, as the principal law-drafting body of the UNO, has done a great deal to widen the horizon of international law and to expand its frontiers by attuning the law to contemporary needs and aspirations of the whole of mankind. It has modernised almost the whole field of *diplomatic law*, as witness the Consular and The Diplomatic Conventions of 1961 and 1962, the Convention on Special Missions and that on The Representatives of States at the UN and at international conferences; *treaty law*, as represented by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and by the Convention on Succession of States in respect of treaties; *maritime law*, as for example, the Convention on The Law of the Sea 1958 and 1960; the draft Conventions on The Rights and Duties of States Definition of Aggression and many other drafts on various subjects referred to it by the General Assembly for study and codification based on progressive development. It would be tedious to stop to analyse the specific contributions of Asian and African participants to the several draft codes and conventions, but anyone who cares to look for these should find them all over the place.

Similarly, even in the judicial sphere one finds clear evidence of the impact made by Asia and Africa on the World Court within the last two decades. Of the 15 members of the ICJ, three are Africans and three are Asians, thus making two-fifths of the total membership. Although a number of decisions and opinions of the Court delivered in the last few years have earned world-wide criticism as reflecting more of the old thinking in international law

than contemporary norms and aspirations, nevertheless the feeling is now abroad that the notable changes in the law being brought about by the work of the ILC are being reflected more and more in the pronouncements of the Court, particularly within the past four or five years. It is greatly to be hoped that this progressive attitude of the Court will be maintained in increasing measure in the years that lie ahead.

We need not deal here with the additional law-drafting work of other subsidiary organs like the UNCITRAL which, for example, is confined to trade law. It is sufficient to note that there are such a bodies and that the legal work they do is of great importance to contemporary international law.

C. *International Economic Law* is another new branch of international law which has emerged largely out of the creation and operation of economic and financial institutions like the IBRD IDA and UNCTAD. More specifically oriented towards Asian and African needs are the Economic Commission for Asia and that for Africa. One of the origins of this aspect of the law is GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade). Certain basic norms of economic law and patterns of behaviour have grown up which not only define economic and financial relationships between two or more states *inter se* and between one or more states and international financial institutions, but also ensure that equity and fairness inform every aspect of the arrangement in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The Economic and Social Council, as one of the principal organs of the UN, is empowered to set up commissions in the economic and social field and it has carried out these duties in respect of Asia and Africa. The decisions of ECOSOC are made by a majority of the members present and voting, and the Asian African states' voices have always been duly heard as and when necessary on matters touching their interests. The enlarged ECOSOC has an increased membership from 18 to 27.

D. The prominence given by the UN to the educational, scientific and cultural development of the new states is symbolised by the rapid growth of UNESCO, especially in Asia and Africa. Under Article 55 of the UN Charter, one of the main functions of

the Organisation is to promote solutions of international economic social, health and related problems as well as international cultural and educational co-operation. ECOSOC may make and initiate studies and reports with respect to these matters and may coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies and make recommendations to the General Assembly.

E. A new area in which modern international law has expanded its frontiers is the field of *Humanitarian Law*. Under Article 62 of the UN Charter, the ECOSOC has power to make recommendations to the General Assembly for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. Under Article 68, it has set up the Commission on Human Rights. Beginning with the well-known Universal Declaration of human Rights, 1948, the General Assembly has adopted some seven conventions on economic and social rights, women's rights and other rights covering almost all the known areas of human relationships and endeavours. The present Humanitarian Law conventions are quite ample in their provisions. What remains to be done is to establish satisfactory machinery for their effective implementation. The efforts of the Third World, especially Asia and Africa, in developing the various charters and conventions are too well-known to require any elaboration here. But we would do well to emphasise in passing the great work of the Right to Self-Determination as a distinctive feature of the achievement of UNO since about 1950. There are 3 chapters of the UN Charter specifically devoted to the interests of depended peoples: Chapter XI requires Member States which have assumed responsibilities of the administration of non-self-governing territories recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote the well-being of the inhabitants. To this end they undertake to develop self-government, to take due account of political aspirations of the peoples and to assist them in the development of their free political institutions. Chapters XII and XIII establish a Trusteeship System for the international supervision of the administration of territories placed under the system through individual agreements. Such territories were formerly placed under the Mandate of certain powers. The basic objective of the trustee-

ship System is to promote the political, economic and social advancement of the Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence of appropriate. Because of the slow pace at which self-government was being granted, the General Assembly, at its 1960 session on December 14 adopted a resolution entitled "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", proclaiming that all peoples have the right to self-determination and by virtue of that right they freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Various committees were as a consequence established, and the Special Committee of Twenty-Four was officially known as The "Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples". By 1964, the UN membership had risen from 97 in 1960 to 115; today, it stands at 145. Asia and Africa naturally contributed most to this development. The culmination of their joint struggle was the definitive recognition given to the distinctive legal concept of self-determination in the Opinion given by the International Court of Justice in *the Namibia Case* in June 1971.

On the whole, it can truly be said the Asia and Africa, often with the assistance of Latin American and sometimes of the East European States, have made notable contributions to the development of contemporary international law in the various ways indicated above. One can only hope that one has not exaggerated that contribution.

FOOTNOTES

1. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L40
2. A/EC. 138/SC. II/L38
3. See D.P.O. Connell's "Independence and Succession to Treaties" in the British Yearbook of International Law 1963, at p. 95.
4. See "The Establishment of the African Institute of International Law and the Documentation Centre: Verbatim Report of the Proceedings of the Standing Committee Meeting of the Nigerian Conference on "International Law and International Problems", 1970 Government Printer, Lagos.
5. See e.g. *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151 ; *Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 150.

Dr Wilfred A. Ndongko

“The External Trade Pattern of Cameroon : 1957-72”

Cameroon, like the other African countries and the rest of the underdeveloped nations, has justifiably been concerned with its external trade position because international trade has been a very important source of foreign exchange and capital which are essential for the financing of its long-term development programmes. In particular, the importance of foreign demand for Cameroon exports and of supply of its imports, and the subsequent effects they have on the shifting of its production possibility frontier, incomes and employment ; has been given a very important place in the overall economic policy of the Cameroonian Government, particularly with respect to national development.

To the extent, that the dominant factor which has determined ‘exportability’ was and has continued to be the existence of guaranteed external markets for the Cameroon products, the analysis of its external trade pattern will be divided into two major periods. The first period is from 1957-to 1966—when former West and East Cameroon traded mainly with their former colonial masters ; the West with the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth Countries and the East with France and the other members of the Franc zone. For this reason and for purposes of clarity, the external trade of former West Cameroon and East Cameroon will be examined separately.

The second period from 1966 to 1972, is during when the Common External Tariff regulations of the Central African Customs and Economic Union—UNEAC (of which former East Cameroon was already a member) were extended to West Cameroon. During

that period, West Cameroon lost the Commonwealth preference since the two trading and monetary zones or areas (namely the Sterling and Franc), were incomparable. In particular, the higher UDEAC external tariff rates limited West Cameroon trade with the United Kingdom and the other commonwealth countries, following the former's absorption into the Franc Zone.

II—The Period 1957—1966 :

In general, prior to 1961, the economic development of both West and East Cameroon did not lead to balance of payments difficulties and pressures but was accompanied by export surplus since 'exportability', to use Hirschman's terminology, was high in both areas. (see Table 1 for the trend of both area's trade balance).

TABLE 1A :

West Cameroon External Trade Balance : 1957-60

(value in thousand pounds sterling)

Item	1957	1958	1959	1960
	£	£	£	£
Exports :	5,321	6,913	7,298	8,619
Imports :	2,370	2,961	2,543	3,442
Trade Balance	+2,931	+3,952	+4,755	+5,177

TABLE 1B :

East Cameroon External Trade Balance : 1958—60

(Value in million francs CFA)

Item	1958	1959	1960
	Frs	Frs	Frs
Exports :	24,321	26,767	23,951
Imports :	22,444	20,153	20,849
Trade Balance :	+1,877	+6,614	+3,102

Source : *Federal Estimates : 1962-63* Ministry of Finance, Yaounde. July, 1962.

This can be explained by the fact that the external trade of East and West Cameroon, before 1961, was mainly with the franc

zone and the sterling zone, respectively. As concerns their major trading partners, East and the sterling zone, respectively. As concerns their major trading partners, East and West Cameroon traded principally with their former metropolitan powers—East Cameroon with France, and West Cameroon with Britain. Although both areas produced largely the same agricultural products for exports, there was almost no competition between them, since their principal trading partners were different.

In regard to West Cameroon, about 75% of its total exports in 1958 went to the United Kingdom.¹ For specific exports like bananas, rubber and timber, the United Kingdom alone absorbed 60% of the total export production of these commodities from West Cameroon.

Only in respect of cocoa was the picture different ; here the Netherlands was the principal importer of this crop. Although the import picture showed a more diversified market, it was nevertheless dominated by the U.K. For example, in 1959, some 65% of that State's imports came from Great Britain. Other countries from which West Cameroon also imported goods include (in order of their importance) the Netherlands, the United States, Germany, Japan, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg.

East Cameroon's external trade was dominated by the European Economic Community, (particularly by France) which was that State's principal market for its bananas, cotton and coffee products. However, in 1960, the Netherlands supplanted France as East Cameroon's principal purchaser of cocoa and timber. Other important buyers which emerged from within the EEC included West Germany, Italy and Belgium. Outside the EEC, the main trading partners were the United States and Switzerland. The import market was dominated by France to a much greater extent than the export market. For example, in 1959, France alone accounted for a total import value of 14,000 million francs CFA, out of an approximate total of 19,000 million francs CFA worth of imports into East Cameroon.²

Between 1958 and 1961, the principal trading area of the East Cameroon was the Franc Zone. Exports to this zone from this State increase from 61% to 64% between 1960 and 1961. There was also an increase in trade with the EEC (excluding

France)—although exports from the East to the EEC decreased in 1961, imports into that State from the Community increased from 8% in 1958 to 10% in 1961.³ Export trade with the Franc zone became less intensified than before because of the increasing trade with other countries apart from the EEC. For example, the establishment of a joint foreign trade customs schedule between the East Cameroon and the members of the Equatorial Economic and Customs Union in July, 1962,⁴ increased the number of trading partners of the East. This development led to a further diversification of the export trade of East Cameroon away from France, since the new Customs Union had a potential market of 10⁶ million people.⁵

The period 1961 to 1966 was characterised by a considerable change in the external trade pattern of West Cameroon, particularly as by the end of 1961 it had reunified with East Cameroon—which carried out most of its trade with the franc zone. A detailed analysis of West Cameroon's external trade pattern during this period is presented in Table 2.

It can be observed from Table 2 that during the period 1961/1962 to 1962/63, the United Kingdom was still the major trading partner of West Cameroon. However, from 1963/64 onwards, and particularly in 1964/65, the EEC as a whole began to replace U.K. as the major importer of West Cameroon goods (Italy alone imported 1173 million francs worth of goods), although most of its imports still came from the sterling area, i.e. the U.K. (1,168 million francs) and Nigeria (319 million francs CFA). By 1965/66 and 1966/67 the EEC and France, in particular, had almost completely replaced the U.K. and other members of the Commonwealth, as the major trading partners of West Cameroon.⁶

In the case of East Cameroon, its external trade was continuously dominated by the EEC and particularly by France, even after the reunification of the two areas. An analysis of the external trade pattern of East Cameroon between 1961 and 1966 is presented in Table 3. It can be observed from Table 3 that from 1961 to 1962 East Cameroon's trade with the Franc Zone became less intensified than before because of the increasing trade with the other members of the EEC.

TABLE 2

West Cameroon—External Trade Pattern (1961-66)
(in million francs CFA)

Trading Partners	Imports					Exports				
	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66
France	17	296	540	287	406	7	18	336	831	411
Belgium and Luxembourg	14	42	77	46	84	13	141	382	322	358
Netherlands	180	305	316	280	396	73	443	856	798	591
West Germany	155	123	169	201	216	143	99	428	295	291
Italy	10	25	74	71	79	293	428	450	1173	954
Scandinavian countries	157	250	230	189	1423	84	32	14	66	1004
Czechoslovakia	6	45	65	56	46	—	—	—	—	11
Nigeria	—	—	—	319	309	—	—	43	130	87
U.S.A.	211	291	412	312	431	69	205	196	188	111
Venezuela	1	73	26	42	30	—	—	—	—	—
Japan	96	285	571	621	795	—	—	—	38	—
Hong Kong	34	63	136	90	114	—	—	—	—	—
United Kingdom	1653	2077	1806	1168	85	4276	2072	2157	964	44
Other Countries	577	629	429	394	389	726	304	136	123	312
Total	3111	4502	4851	4132	4803	5674	3742	4998	4928	4174

Sources : Statistical Annual Report of West Cameroon : 1965-66-67
Regional Statistical Service, Buea, 1968. (pp. 48-49).

External Trade Pattern of Cameroon

In general, it can also be observed from Table 3 that the EEC countries gradually replaced France as the major partners of East Cameroon, particularly, in regard to export trade with France which fell from 67% in 1962/63 to 50.5% in 1965/66. However, France continued to be the major supplier of goods to East Cameroon whilst both export and import trade with the EEC continued to increase during the period under consideration.

TABLE 3

East Cameroon : External Trade Pattern : 1961-66

(value in Millions of CFA Francs)

Exports	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
<i>Partner</i>						
France	14.25	15.30	16.53	18.09	14.06	13.01
Other EEC countries	5.95	5.35	7.85	6.96	8.55	9.02
Netherlands	3.49	3.34	4.73	4.03	4.65	—
Germany	0.88	1.12	1.68	1.87	2.40	—
United States	1.35	1.59	1.56	2.18	3.07	4.92
United Kingdom	0.51	0.30	0.55	0.57	0.35	0.45
Japan	0.05	0.10	0.21	0.20	0.32	0.42
Rest of World	3.09	3.88	2.42	2.04	2.92	4.59
Total :	24.20	25.52	29.12	30.03	29.27	32.11
All franc area countries	15.58	17.34	17.86	19.25	15.36	—
All EEC countries	20.20	20.65	24.38	25.04	22.62	22.03
Industrial countries	22.29	22.97	26.89	28.17	26.37	28.82
Less developed countries	1.63	2.05	2.05	0.79	1.30	3.59
Unclassified	0.28	0.50	0.18	1.07	1.60	—
Total	24.20	25.52	29.12	30.03	29.27	32.41
Imports						
France	12.90	13.76	15.23	16.90	19.14	18.81
Other EEC countries	2.39	2.44	3.06	4.07	5.31	5.86
Germany	1.42	1.45	1.60	1.91	2.37	—

Belgium-Luxembourg	—	—	—	—	1.21	
Italy	0.32	0.32	0.53	0.86	1.07	—
United States	1.41	1.49	1.30	1.20	1.99	1.49
Japan	0.48	0.75	0.78	0.91	0.87	0.98
United Kingdom	0.65	0.61	0.48	0.58	0.57	0.64
Rest of World	5.88	6.10	5.88	4.93	5.11	4.53
Total	23.71	25.15	26.73	28.59	32.99	32.31
All franc area countries	16.30	16.90	18.61	19.25	21.15	—
All EEC countries	15.29	16.20	18.29	20.97	24.45	24.67
Industrial countries	18.12	18.22	21.31	24.00	27.91	27.78
Less developed countries	4.79	3.78	4.57	1.90	2.02	4.53
Unclassified	0.80	3.15	0.85	2.69	3.06	—
Total	23.71	25.15	26.73	28.59	32.99	32.31

Sources : IMF and IBRD, *Direction of Trade* ; Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun, *Etudes et Statistiques* (monthly) Paris ; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, *Quarterly Economic Bulletin*, Yaounde.

The analysis of the trade patterns of West and East Cameroon during the period 1957–1966, has revealed the following. Firstly, the pre-1961 external trade of both areas was concentrated with the formal colonial administrators. Secondly, after 1961 West Cameroon began to reduce its trade with the United Kingdom whilst East Cameroon began to increase its trade with the other members of the EEC, and also began to diversify its trade away from France. The gradual change in both the external trade pattern of West and East Cameroon, during the period 1961–1966, can be explained, partly by the reunification of the two areas and the subsequent loss of the Commonwealth Preference by the former, and partly by the association of the latter with the EEC—which necessitated a diversification of its trade away from the Franc Zone (except the UDEAC), particularly from France.

III—The Period 1966-72

The period—1966 to 1972—was characterised firstly by the extension of the UDEAC external tariff in July 1966, to West Came-

roon and also by the increase, in particular of Cameroon's import trade with the other UDEAC member states.

These changes can be observed from Table 4. Secondly, during this period, Cameroon experienced an increase in its trade surplus with the other EEC countries (except France). For example, during the period under review, Cameroonian trade surplus with the EEC states increased from approximately 4,000 million francs in 1966 to about 10,000 million francs in 1971, whereas its trade deficit with France increase from approximately 6,000 million francs in 1966 to nearly 14,000 million francs in 1971 (see Table 4. This can be explained partly by the high costs of French goods imported into Cameroon and partly by the limited size of the French market for Cameroonian exports.

A further characteristic of Cameroonian trade pattern during the period 1966/72 was the increase of trade with such non-traditional trading partners like the United States, Guinea and Japan. In the case of trade with the United States, although, Cameroon maintained a trade surplus with that country between 1966 and 1972, however, in general, its exports to the U.S- fluctuated between 4,000 million francs and 6,000 million francs per year whilst its imports increased steadily from 1,893 million francs in 1966 to 5,000 million francs in 1972. On the other hand, Cameroonian trade with Japan and Guinea, during the period under review, was dominated by persistent trade deficits as can be be observed from Table 4.

To sum up this section, the period 1966 to 1974 saw a rapid but cautious diversification of Cameroon's external trade, particularly in respect of exports, away from France to the other EEC member countries, the UDEAC and the new trading partners like the United States, Japan and Guinea. It also saw a rapid reduction of trade with the United Kingdom and an almost complete elimination of official trade with the other Commonwealth countries, notably Nigeria.

The above analysis of foreign trade pattern of Cameroon between 1957 and 1972, has revealed that during that period the share of the country's exports to France decreased from approximately 88.0% in 1958 to 33.1% in 1972 (a reduction of approximately

TABLE 4
Cameroon—External Trade Pattern (1966-1972)
(Value in Million Francs CFA)

Major Trading Partners	1966	(% Share in 1966)	Imports					11 months (% Share in 1972)	
			1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1972
France	19,166	(60.0)	25,905	24,342	25,907	33,941	34,331	30,921	(50.0)
Other EEC members	6,641	(20.8)	8,329	8,384	11,154	12,799	13,326	14,983	(24.2)
United Kingdom	1,623	(5.0)	1,376	2,163	2,282	2,500	2,894	2,379	(3.9)
U.S.A.	1,893	(6.0)	2,519	2,665	3,165	5,166	4,964	5,048	(8.1)
Guinea	698	(2.1)	1,275	1,214	1,366	1,663	1,655	3,370	(5.9)
UDEAC countries	403	(1.2)	842	2,156	2,709	552	3,558	3,370	(5.5)
Japan	1,532	(4.9)	1,432	1,225	1,284	1,595	1,857	1,683	(2.8)
Total	31,956	(100%)	41,679	42,149	47,149	61,216	62,585	61,754	(100%)

Trading Partner	1966	(% Share in 1966)	Exports (1966-72)					11 months (% Share in 1972)	
			1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1972
France	13,506	(42.1)	13,854	15,766	19,101	18,571	15,816	15,022	(33.1)
other EEC Members	10,463	(32.7)	12,145	17,104	24,169	25,159	22,945	18,757	(41.5)
United Kingdom	1,159	(3.7)	860	971	840	1,196	1,471	11,018	(2.2)
U.S.A.	5,146	(16.0)	5,120	4,856	3,479	6,119	5,157	4,915	(10.9)
Guinea	587	(1.9)	303	1	87	80	359	—	—
UDEAC Countries	809	(2.5)	535	3,111	2,915	3,298	3,697	3,749	(8.3)
Japan	369	(1.1)	209	335	792	1,828	1,754	1,826	(4.0)
Total	32,039	(100%)	33,026	42,161	51,283	56,251	51,199	45,287	(100%)

Source: Economic Commission for Africa, *Summaries of Economic Data—Cameroon*, Number 18, August, 1973.

50%) whereas the share of its total imports from France decreased from 70% in 1958 to only 50% in 1972 (a reduction of 20%). The implication is that during the period under review, Cameroon was more concerned with the diversification of its export trade from France whilst at the same time neglecting the import trade. As a consequence, therefore, a major proportion of the external trade of Cameroon, particularly in regard to imports) is still carried out with France. This is ironic, considering the fact that France has traditionally known to be a high cost producer and also France has consistently contributed to the trade deficits of Cameroon since 1960.

In the case of Cameroonian trade with the other EEC countries, their share of its exports increased from approximately 16% in 1958 to 41.5% in 1972, and their share of its total imports increased from 10% in 1958 to about 24.2% in 1972. To this extent, therefore, Cameroon exported more to the EEC countries (less France) than it imported from them. This can be explained by the institution of the preferential tariff for Cameroonian exports during the negotiations of the Rome Treaty in 1958 when an associate status was arranged for 'African Eighteen'. As a consequence, therefore, Cameroon consistently maintained a trade surplus with the other EEC member states, in contrast to the persistent trade deficit with France during the period under review.

With respect to the other countries, Cameroonian external trading relations were varied. However, in the particular case of the Sterling Zone there was in general a steady decline in both its import and export trade with that Zone between 1966 and 1972. For example, the United Kingdom's share of the Cameroonian exports declined from 3.7% in 1966 to 2.2% in 1972 and that of imports from 5% in 1966 to 3.9% in 1972. This decline, as noted earlier, can be explained by the institution of the UDEAC Common External Tariff against the United Kingdom, and by the loss of the Commonwealth Preference by West Cameroon. For the other trading partners, the period under review saw fluctuations in the Cameroon trade relations, notably with the United States, Japan and Guinea.

In the light of the analysis of the changing pattern of Cameroonian external trade between 1957 and 1972, the following policy

implications can be drawn for the future :—

- (i) To the extent that France remains a high cost producing trading partner, and in addition still accounts for some 50% of Cameroonian imports and only 30% of its exports, it would be in the economic interest of this country to further diversify its import trade away from France to other EEC members, the United States, Japan, the UDEAC and new partners. This would necessitate the strengthening of old trade agreements and the establishment of new agreements with countries which have the potential market for Cameroonian agricultural and semi-manufactured products.
- (ii) Because exports, to a large extent, are a major source of the foreign exchange needed for the purchase of capital goods and the financing of development programmes it will be rational for Cameroon not only to seek new trading partners but also to exploit these areas which are traditionally low-cost producers of the inputs which are now imported mainly from France. Some of these areas include Japan and most of the Asian countries, the United Kingdom and to some extent North America. Such a policy will ensure the efficient utilization of the scarce foreign exchange of the country and at the same time prevent the bottlenecks which usually arise in the course of implementing of Cameroon's development programmes and projects which are financed not only by France but also by other countries whose specifications of the type and quality of capital inputs are often not the same.
- (iii) Finally, considering the fact that Cameroon is fully committed to the success of the UDEAC and economic cooperation with the other African countries in general, the appropriate policy would be to intensify its trade with the other member states. Indeed the absence of inter-state tariff barriers in Central Africa should make inter-state trade within the UDEAC and with the other African countries, a very important catalyst which could foster the transformation of the economic structure of Cameroon

and the exploitation of potential products for exports in the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. Documentation Francaise, Notes et Etudes Documentaries, *Le Cameroun Sous tutelle Britannique a theure du Plebiscite*, Etude No. 2756, (Paris : March 1, 1961), p. 9. The reason for the U.K. as the dominant trading partner of West Cameroon was the existence of the Commonwealth Preference which the latter enjoyed as a member of the Commonwealth.

2. Victor Le Vine, "The Cameroon Federal Republic", G. Carter (ed) *Five African States*, (p. 288).

3. Federal Republic of Cameroon *Budgetary Estimates*, (Yaounde, 1963).

4. The schedule followed the Protocol Agreement signed by the Five Heads of State. (Chad, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville ; Central African Republic and Cameroon) at Bangui in 1961.

5. East Cameroonian exports to the other members of the Union increased from 678 million francs in 1964-65 to 882 million francs in 1965-66, whilst imports rose from 114 million francs to 300 million francs during the same period (see Federal Estimates, 1965-66).

6. Although during the period under consideration, data does indicate a large surplus trade balance with the EEC and France, this is certainly an exaggeration, since the lack of any custom barrier between the East and West Cameroon, makes it difficult to obtain statistics on the goods originating from the EEC countries and which are in turn reexported from East Cameroon to West Cameroon. Thus the large trade surpluses may very well be deficits. Indeed, the Presidential Ordinance No. 61-OF- 3 of 1 October, 1961 specified the goods of foreign origin that could enter West Cameroon free of duty. Some of these goods, which came from France into EEC, include drinks, wines, natural spirits, household utensils and consumption goods. Furthermore, many West Cameroon importers come from Douala (in Eastern State) and therefore no account is taken of the goods coming into the West through that port.

Dr Vijay Gupta **India & Africa**
QUARTERLY CHRONICLE
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Ambassador Joe Appiah Visits India

The Indian Council for Cultural Relations invited Mr. Joe Appiah Roving Ambassador of Ghana to deliver Azad Memorial Lecture. During his 15-day visit to India, Ambassador Appiah called on various Indian leaders. He met President, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Chief Justice, Mr. A.N. Ray, Foreign Minister, Mr. Y.B. Chavan. As he told the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi that he was highly impressed by the industrial development in India. Ambassador Appiah was impressed by the fact that this was one country where inflation had been curtailed from 32% to 2% in the past one year. Ambassador Appiah thought that Indian achievements were not known outside India because of the prejudice and hostility of vested interests in the international press. Ambassador Appiah particularly mentioned how impressed he was with India's achievements in Nuclear Energy Technology for peaceful purposes. He had not known earlier that Indian scientists were doing research in so many adverse fields of peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy.

Delivering this year's Azad Memorial Lecture at Azad Bhavan Mr. Joe Appiah, Ghana's roving Ambassador, riddled holes in the Western concept of democracy, questioning its relevance to the developing societies and hoped these countries would give to the world an "ideal democracy" which has eluded the West even after experimenting for thousands of years. He said, "The traditions which make possible the successful working of the British Parliament are old and have taken long to grow. They depend on an established ideology, and reflect the fundamental coherence of interests of a bourgeois State. No amount of legislation makes misuse of media

or corruption of officials impossible. It is only the existence of a moral consensus against these things—a consensus which is not yet within the West African traditions—that makes democracy work.”

Mr. Appiah’s subject was “The Role of Democracy and the Law in Developing Societies.” He began with a phrase-by-phrase examination of Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of democracy.

Mr. Appiah had no quarrel with a Government “of the people” “Who else is there to govern?” he asked. The phrase “by the people” is what the Ambassador challenged.

“It is not the Government of the people, by the people, but by representatives of the people, elected from time to time. And in that bastion of democratic feeling—Great Britain—a Government could again a majority of representatives without gaining a majority of votes, he said.

Analysing the content of the final phrase in Lincoln’s definition Mr. Appiah thought government “for the people” was hardly a claim. “A good Government is surely Government for the people or Government in the interest of the government.” he said.

Mr. Appiah, who spoke forcefully in a voice full of resonance and conviction, was certain that if “democracy” is to be relevant to developing societies, it must not mean, as it has sometimes been taken to mean, that majority rule, per se, is a sufficient condition for justice within the state.

He felt that elections held every five years led to an “inevitable” subordination of real economic problems to the political interest in getting reelected. In Britain and the US it is a recognised phenomenon for Governments to be challenged by elections. But it is damaging to the long term interests of the nation. They can afford it. The developing world can not.

Mr. Appiah said he sincerely believed that a good military Government in West Africa has advantages over the parliamentary process. He admitted, at the same time of “corresponding problems” “what is to be done about Governments which diverse from reflecting the interests of the governed? Popular rebellion against an army with modern weapons is unthinkable but not impossible.” It also raises the question of transfer of power.

The democratic model provides rules for an orderly transfer from one Government to the next. These do not work; they depend on a tradition of elections. But it is even more difficult to conceive how power is to be transferred from a military Government that is no longer acting in the general interest, he said.

Mr. Appiah confessed he did not know the answers to these questions. "But it does seem to me that these sorts of considerations have to be borne in mind when considering the role of democracy in the developing world. Part of the answer to these questions may come from the role of law," he said.

"If we had stronger tradition of judicial independence it would be possible to make use of a supreme court to protect the people from at least one possible form of dereliction of duty by the Government, namely, that of the unjustified suppression of civil rights. But even if the courts can be used to ensure that the Government intelligently serves the public interest.

Mr. Appiah felt that at the moment the most urgent political and legal needs of the developing countries cannot be simply institutionalised. "It will continue to be necessary for their Governments to scrutinise judicial and police actions as well as that of the public servant generally. It will continue to be important for the public consciousness to protect the courts in the sphere of civil liberties from the interference and arbitrary action of the Government."

He was emphatic that "really repressive and unpopular Governments cannot last. In this sense the consent of the governed which is seen as the special privilege of democracy is, de facto, the only condition for the existence of any government" he added. (February 29, 1976)

Tanzanian delegates to Indian National Congress session

The fraternal delegates from Tanzania, while addressing the AICC meeting called upon the countries of the Third World to unite and stand firmly against imperialist encroachment in the Indian Ocean and the dangers from racism and zionism.

They said that the Congress session was being held after the enemies of India made many attempts to sow seeds of confusion

and chaos in this country. The session will mark a new era in the progressive history of India they hoped.

Mr. Tabit Kombo the General Secretary of the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar, Tanzania said that India was able to defeat the forces of neo-colonialism and imperialism. (January 1, 1976)

African Students Meet

The Three-day 23rd Annual General Conference of All India African Students Association was inaugurated at Madras, by Hon'ble Dr. V.R. Nedunchezhiyan, Minister of Education and Tourism, Tamil Nadu Government. Before the inaugural address Mr. Princewell I. Nwachu, Chairman of Madras Branch of African Students Association introduced and welcomed the guests. In declaring the conference open the Education Minister hoped that African Students Association would work for strong ties between the Governments and people of various countries of Africa and India. He also assured the students that Tamil Nadu Government would be always ready to assist them in pursuing their studies in India.

Mr. Raphael Omolo Koraa, President of All India African Student Association addressed the gathering. While thanking the Education Minister for consenting to come and inaugurate the conference recalled that Indian Government has always been helpful to African Students in holding conferences. He thanked the Tamil Nadu Government for extending help to the conference. He reminded the delegates that African Students Association (ASA) was not to involve itself in any political activities. The primary function of the Association was to look after the welfare of the students and bring them to understand the Indian people. The conference adopted a number of resolutions and elected a new executive. The ICCR representation at Madras gave a reception in honour of the delegates. (January 3, 1976)

Call for Closer Afro-Asian Ties

Indian National Congress President, Mr. D.K. Borooah called for closer cooperation between the non-aligned nations in the Afro-Asian bloc, including more exchange of students, groups and youths.

He was addressing foreign delegates to the second preparatory meeting for the first conference of students from non-aligned nations.

Mr. Borooah met the students at a reception hosted by the All India Congress Committee.

The AICC, he said, would shortly set up an Arabic and a Swahili cell to translate its publications. This indicated the great importance the Congress party attached to these nations.

He called on Afro-Asian students to learn any one of the four languages, Arabic, Swahili, English or Hindi which were widely spoken and would reduce the problems of communication.

Afro-Asian solidarity, he said was of great importance as all these nations from the non-aligned block faced basically the same problems of consolidating the independence they had gained in the face of threats from neo-imperialism. (March 1, 76).

India Reiterate its Support to African Liberation

India and Tanzania "condemned" the aggression committed by the racist South African regime in Angola "in conjunction with other covert forces." They also expressed their "great concern" at the strife and continuing civil war in Angola in a joint communique, issued in New Delhi at the end of the five-day State visit of President Nyerere of Tanzania. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi reiterated India's "steadfast" support to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and "Its determination to join with Africa in all measures to end the shameful policy of apartheid to liberate Namibia and to end racist minority rule in Zimbabwe and South Africa". (January 21, 1976)

South African Intervention in Angola Condemned

Indian Deputy External Affairs Minister Shri Bipinpal Das said India supported the independence of Angola and condemned, without reservation South African intervention in that country's internal affairs.

Mr. Das was speaking to reporters at Nairobi airport when he stopped over on his way to Uganda to attend celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of the coming to power of the present Government.

Mr. Das said relations between India and Uganda continued to be cordial. (January 23, 1976)

Algerian Writers Visit India

Mr. Tahar Ouattar and Mr. Mouloud Achour of Algeria, were invited by the Indian Centre for Africa, ICCR to visit India for a period of 10 days. Both these writers are well-known authors of Algeria and have number of books to their credit. They are also members of Algerian Union of Writers. During their stay in India they visited Agra, Lucknow, Hyderabad and Bombay besides Delhi. In all these places they visited Centres of Hindu and Islamic Culture and saw historical places and met writers. Special visit to Hyderabad was organised to enable them to see the International Crop Research Institute, Andhra Pradesh Agriculture University and All India Co-ordinate Rice Research Project. Andhra Pradesh Agriculture University hosted a lunch in honour of the writers on 30th March, 1976. All India Radio, Delhi interviewed both the writers. (April 15, 1976)

India and Algeria Sign Trade Agreement

A one-year renewable trade agreement between India and Algeria was signed on 10th February in New Delhi under which both countries have accorded the most-favoured nation treatment to each other. A joint committee, consisting of representatives of the two countries, will meet at the request of either country to ensure trade development and review implementation of the agreement between the two countries. India and Algeria will also exchange all useful information relating to commercial exchange and extend facilities to organise trade fairs and exhibitions.

According to the agreement, the first of its kind, exports from India to Algeria will include tea, coffee, spices, *henna* leaves, tobacco, rice, sugar, industrial goods, machinery and equipment, jute manufactures, chemicals drugs and pharmaceuticals. plywood, cinematographic films, iron and steel items, cement and miscellaneous goods. Imports to India from Algeria will include olive oil, paper and paper goods, drugs and pharmaceuticals, metal engineering and mining and petroleum products crude oil, rock phosphate, mercury, fertilizers, cinematographic films, books and miscellaneous items.

Algeria's commerce minister, Mr. Layachi Yaker, and India's commerce minister, Mr. D.P. Chattopadhyaya signed the agreement on behalf of their respective governments.

Thanking the Algerian delegation for their visit, Mr. Chattopadhyaya said that the present agreement laid the foundation for fruitful trade between the two countries. Mr. Yakar also expressed the hope that trade between the two countries would now increase substantially. (February 10, 1976).

Indian Support to Angolan People

The All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation (AIPSO) reiterated the support of the Indian people for the freedom fighters of Angola led by the MPLA fighting against the West-aided mercenaries.

In a press note the AIPSO said that the issue before the OAU summit was not about the choice of the governments represented by the various liberation movements but whether the newly-born State should have an independently determined government or not.

"Angola which is one of the richest states in Africa can only be independent when it can have control over its own natural resources which are today being exploited by the multinational corporations of imperialist countries.

"The Indian people were happy to welcome Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who has exposed imperialists' aggression against Angola more than anyone else", the press note added.

It expressed its confidence that President Nyerere's visit would further strengthen Indo-African Solidarity for the defence of independence and the security of the region. (January 1, 76).

India Recognizes MPLA Government of Angola

India recognised the MPLA government of Angola, the External Affairs Minister, Y.B. Chavan, announced amidst cheers on 6 February in both houses of parliament in New Delhi.

Mr. Chavan informed MPs that the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, had sent a message of greetings and felicitations to President Augustinho Neto of Angola, pledging "our continued cooperation in the common task of consolidating the longstanding friendship between the governments and peoples of Africa and India and in the continuous struggle for a just and peaceful world order."

In his statement to parliament Mr. Chavan said : "The government of India has always given full support to the struggle against

colonialism and racism in Africa. We have been in full sympathy with the organisation of African unity (OAU) which has demonstrated the unity and determination of the continent in the struggle for emancipation. The house will recall that the OAU had recognised all three liberation movements in Angola—the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (National Unity for total Independence of Angola). With the rising tide of liberation movements and after the change of regime in Portugal, the OAU and African statesmen sought to bring about reconciliation among these three liberation movements. When Portugal decided to end its domination over the country, the government of India immediately recognised the independence of Angola and welcomed the determination of the people of Angola to preserve the territorial integrity of their country. The Government of India also condemned categorically the unlawful violation of Angolan territorial integrity by the racist regime in South Africa.”

Referring to the January meeting of the OAU summit on Angola, Mr. Chavan said that “even after several days of intensive discussions, the member states of the OAU remained evenly divided between countries which supported the recognition of the government of MPLA and others who wanted a cease-fire and reconciliation among the recognised liberation movements. Since then three more African countries—Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Togo—have accorded recognition to the government of MPLA based in Luanda, representing a clear majority of the 46-member states of the OAU. The MPLA government alone seems committed to preserve Angola’s integrity and independence and fight the South African armed intrusion”. Mr. Chavan also said: “We are confident that in keeping with its declared policy, the MPLA government will join to strengthen the fraternity of non-aligned nations and help to build a world based on equality and cooperation among nations.” (February 6, 1976).

Mrs. Gandhi’s Greetings to Angolian President

In a message of “greetings and felicitations” to President Dr. Agostinho Neto of Angola, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, said that it was a great pleasure for her, to “extend the formal recognition

of the Government of India to the government of people's Republic of Angola, formed under your distinguished leadership". Mrs. Gandhi said : "We have been deeply impressed by the sacrifices of the heroic people of Angola in the struggle to overthrow nearly five centuries old colonial rule. Your success in this struggle will form an idelible part of the history of the liberation of colonial peoples against imperialist domination.

Pledging "full support and cooperation to Angola in its task of national reconstruction which lies ahead," Mrs. Gandhi said, "we welcome the entry of the People's Republic of Angola to the comity of nations and look forward to our close cooperation in the cause of freedom and justice in Africa and for the strengthening of peace in the world. We strongly condemn the continuing aggression by racist regime of the South Africa against Angola and we fully support your efforts to repel this aggression," the Prime Minister said.

In his message of thanks to Mr. Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, Angola's minister for external relations, India's minister of external affairs, Mr. Chavan, said that he heartily reciprocated the "kind greetings" and was looking forward to continuing close cooperation between the two countries, "for our common objectives," Mr. Chavan said that "the government and people of India will continue to support fully the government and people of Angola in their struggle for social justice and for defending their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity". (February 6, 1976).

Fraternal Indo-Angolan Relations

India's recognition of the MPLA government of Angola constituted "a precious encouragement to the pursuit of our liberation struggle against invasion and aggression", said Dr. Augustinho Neto, President of Angola, on 12 February in his reply to the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi's message of 6 February extending recognition to his government. President Neto thanked the Prime Minister for expressing fraternal feelings and congratulations towards the "heroic Angolan people". He also emphasised the determination of the MPLA government to work for safeguarding "national unity and sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and policy of nonalignment to fulfil legitimate interests of the

Angolan people and contribute to the total liberation of the African continent.”

Dr. Neto said: “We highly appreciate your strong condemnation of aggression by minority racist regime of south Africa against Angola and your full support to our efforts to repel the aggressors. We are confident that establishment of fraternal relations, friendship, mutual solidarity and fruitful cooperation between our peoples and governments would further develop”.

India's New Envoy to Egypt

Ashoke Sen Chib a senior IFS officer, has been appointed India's Ambassador to Egypt. He succeeds A.B. Bhadkamkar who died recently.

Mr. Chib, who had acted as India's High Commissioner in Pakistan, was the head of the Pakistan division of the External Affairs Ministry for over four years during the post-Bangladesh period. He was closely associated with the negotiations with Pakistan since the 1971 December war, including the Simla summit. (January 4, 1976)

Hotel Management Training to Egyptians

The Oberoi School of Hotel Administration will train 10 Egyptian management trainees from Mina House Oberoi Hotel at the foot of the pyramids in Cairo. The trainees will undergo a two-year course in hotel management.

The School at present has students from five countries. The school imparts training in hotel technology on a pattern identical to that in the Cornell School of Hotel Administration in the USA.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of Tourism of Egypt were present at reopening of Mina House-Oberoi Hotel after extensive renovations. (January 2, 1975)

More Cotton From Egypt

India has agreed to buy about 15000 bales of long staple cotton from Egypt worth Rs. 120 millions. The contract for about 13500 bales has been already entered into and the balance will be bought by the end of the year when new cotton is available. In exchange Egypt will buy textiles, jute, tea and many other consumer goods from India.

Mr. Zakaria Taufiq Minister for Trade and Commerce government of Egypt has welcomed the agreement. Talking at a reception held in his honour by the Indo-Arab Society, the Egyptian minister said that this would pave the way for further such trade agreements. He hoped that the trade relations between India and Egypt would soon be normalised. (January 27, 1976)

Madam Sadat Admires Mrs. Gandhi

Madam Hihan Al Sadat, wife of the Egyptian President, has said that Mrs. Indira Gandhi, is among the women in history who have aroused her admiration.

Answering questions in a Cairo TV programme "Open Dialogue" on March 2, Madam Sadat mentioned Al Sayyeda Khadija (wife of the prophet), Joan of Arc, and Florence Nightingale and at the present time Mrs. Indira Gandhi who have aroused her admiration.

She said "I admire her particularly as I took around and find that she rules a continent with different languages and religions and with fearful economic and social problems. We have seen what difficulties she had to face at home last year which many men could not have found the strength to face. I mean, she has an iron will and personality which I admire very much. She has faced with courage (the difficulties) and has won". (March 6, 1976)

Need for Indo-Egyptian Closer Ties Stressed

The Egyptian Ambassador Mr. Zakaria El-Stli Imam, has said that there are many fields of modern endeavour which remain to be explored by the joint efforts of the new generation of scientists, technicians and economic strategists of India and Egypt.

These efforts in his view, will go a long way to enrich the closest and most cordial relations between the two countries existing since the dawn of history.

The Ambassador was speaking at a dinner hosted by him in honour of Mr. Ashok Chib, Indian Ambassador designate to Egypt. (March 6, 1976)

Ambar Charkha Goes to Africa

Export possibilities are opening up for the Rajkot and Coimbatore made new model six spindle Ambar Charkha (a Spinning

hand operated machine). Ethiopia and Mauritius have bought Ambar Charkha on a trial basis during the last four years. In 1971 Ethiopia bought 25 Ambar Charkhas and cotton pre-processing machine, Mauritius bought 50 Ambar Charkhas and ancillary equipment in 1974. (January 2, 1976)

India Greets Ghana

The President Shri Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, sent a message of greetings to H.E. Col. I.K. Acheampong, Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Ghana, on the occasion of the National Day of the Country.

"On behalf of the Government and people of India and on my own behalf I send to your Excellency and to the Government and people of Ghana our warm and sincere greetings on the occasion of the National Day of your country. I add to these my best wishes for your personal good health and for the progress and welfare of the friendly people of Ghana". (March 5, 1976)

India to Build Libyan Air-Port

India has bagged a Rs. 360 million contract for the construction of Libyan's Ghat airport in the face of severe international competition.

The Ghat airport is to be built in the desert south west of the Libyan capital tripoli. The project consists of one main runway strong enough to receive jumbo jets like the Boeing 747 a parallel taxi track and two aprones. While the designing, planning and technical supervision will be in IAAI hands, the acutal canstruction work will be done by the National Buildings Construction Corporation a public sector undertaking.

The Indian team made three visits in October, December and January. The final document was signed in Tripoli by the IAAI chair-man, Mr. B.S. Das, on January 25. (January 25, 1976)

Indo-Libyan Accord on Ties

The two-day talks held by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Bipin Pal Das, with Libyan leaders in Tripoli are expected to result in cooperation between the two Governments in various international organisations concerned with world economic problems. During

his three-day visit to Tripoli Mr. Das held extensive talks with Libya's Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Dourda, and his aides. The two Ministers have agreed that there was great scope for further development of Indo-Libyan bilateral relations within the framework of the guidelines set out by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers' conference in Lima.

Mr. Das and Mr. Dourda reaffirmed their Government's determination to support liberation movements in Africa and maintain cohesion within the non-aligned movement. Mr. Das also expressed India's desire to promote peace in the sub-continent. (March 18, 1976)

Mauritius to Get Indian Help in Fishery Development

Several areas of cooperation between India and Mauritius in fisheries development were identified when Mauritius Fisheries Minister Ramsoondur Modun met Union Agriculture Minister Mr. Jagjivan Ram.

Mr. Modun, who wanted crop varieties felt India could also provide machinery for fish feed processing and an expert.

India was asked to provide training facilities for Mauritius personnel for handling ships.

Mr. Jagjivan Ram assured Mr. Modun of India's readiness to assist Mauritius in these fields.

It was also decided to explore mechanisation of existing fishing boats in Mauritius and provide marine engines. (January 1, 1976)

India Welcomes Mauritius Prime Minister

India warmly welcomed Dr. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of Mauritius who arrived on 15 January in New Delhi on a three-day visit to India. Among those who received him at the airport were the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, minister of external affairs, Mr. Chavan and senior officers of the government of India.

Speaking to newsmen at the airport: Sir Seewoosagur said that this was a short visit. He said he was just coming from the OAU summit. 'We are very pleased to be here and I am sure the splendid performance—political, social and economic—of India, is a source of great encouragement to the other parts of the world and for the

democratic institutions of India, he said. Mrs. Gandhi told pressmen that she was very happy that the Prime Minister of Mauritius had come. "He is a personal friend as well as a friend of our country," she said.

According to press reports both Prime Ministers informally discussed the situation in Angola and the dangers of superpower rivalry in the Indian ocean. Dr. Ramgoolam also discussed with Mrs. Gandhi important bilateral, economic and political matters. He thanked her for the assistance given by India to Mauritius in its industrial development. There are six Indian assisted projects in the fields of textiles, steel rolling, garment and hotel industries in Mauritius.

He described India's assistance as "substantial" Besides a loan of rupees five hundred million and grants of Rs. 13 million for execution of projects under the Mauritian five-year plan, India has extended a commercial credit of Rs. 100 millions to be used for purchase of equipment and machinery from India.

Dr. Ramgoolam earlier called on President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and had separate discussion with the Petroleum Minister Mr. K.D. Malaviya, on expansion of economic cooperation between the two countries. (January 18, 1976)

President and P.M.'s Greetings to Mauritius

The President, Shri Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and the Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, have sent messages of greetings to H.E. Sir A.R. Osman, G.C.M.G. Governor-General of Mauritius and Dr. The Right Honourable Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of Mauritius on the occasion of the National Day of that Country.

President's Message

"The Government and people of India join me in sending to your Excellency and to the Government and people of Mauritius our most sincere felicitations and cordial greetings on the occasion of the National Day of Mauritius. Please also accept my best wishes for Your Excellency's personal health and happiness and for the continued prosperity of the friendly people of Mauritius."

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Prime Minister's Message

"The people of India and my colleagues in the Government join me in sending you our warm felicitations on the anniversary of the Independence of Mauritius. We have greatly admired your country's progress under your able leadership. Friendship between our two countries has grown and we look forward to its further development. Please be assured of our continued readiness to assist and cooperate with Mauritius in its plans for the future".

(March 22, 1976)

Mauritius for Improved Ties

Mauritius desires further strengthening of friendly relations with India through expansion of trade, cultural cooperation and exchange of delegations from the ruling parties of the two countries.

This was stated by Mr. Chandrajit Yadav, Minister of steel and Mines who returned to India after a week-long visit to the Indian Ocean island.

Mr. Yadav, who represented the Congress at the 40th convention of the Labour Party of Mauritius said the convention particularly mentioned friendly relations with India and spoke of greater possibilities of co-operation between the two countries.

Mr. Yadav told newsmen that Mauritius was exploring possibilities of collaboration with India in setting up paper and steel rolling mills in the island. India's assistance was sought for power generation. (March 8, 1976)

India to Support Mozambique

India has pledged at the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee along with other Commonwealth countries, its full support to Mozambique's sanctions against Rhodesia.

It has also agreed to provide all possible assistance to Mozambique in bearing the cost of the sanctions.

The Deputy High Commissioner of India in England Mr. Natwar Singh, who represented India at the meeting reminded the committee that they were all committed to liquidation of the illegal Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia and it was their duty to help to Mozambique President, Mr. Samora Machel, who had imposed

hardships on his own people by his action against Rhodesia.
(March 6, 1976)

Nigerian Students Evening

Nigerian High Commissioner, Mr. Soji Williams addressing guests at a cultural evening organised by the Nigerian Students Association, under the auspices of the Indian Centre for Africa and NSA, said that although Nigeria was a member of the non aligned group of nations, non-alignment did not mean neutrality, especially in the context of the present-day developments in Africa.

Referring the Angolan struggle, he said, Nigeria had faced a similar situation during its own civil war in 1967 when it became obvious which countries supported its stand on maintaining its own territorial integrity. These events marked a turning point in Nigerian foreign policy.

Ever since the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity Nigeria had identified itself with the liberation movements in Africa. It was also taking steps to increase its cooperation and economic transactions with other friendly nations, he emphasized.

Earlier, the President of the Nigerian Students Association Mr. S.A. Agba called for increased cooperation between India and Nigeria and a re-examination of their bilateral relations to achieve this goal.

He also stressed the need for integration of goals of African and Asian nations as most of them face same problems.

Later, Nigerian students presented a Cultural programme, including plays, songs and dances, followed by a film show on Nigeria. A Large number of foreign students, diplomats and guests were present at the function. (January 1, 1976)

Sudanese Deputy Army Chief Visits India

Major-General Mohamoud Abdel Rahan el Fakki, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Sudanese army, paid a 10 days visit to India.

He was received at Delhi Airport by Lt.-Gen. A.M. Vohra, Vice Chief Marshal of the Army Staff.

He called on the Defence Minister, Mr. Bansi Lal, and the Chief of the Army Staff, General T.N. Raina (March 12, 1976).

Indian and Tanzanian Economic and Commerce Ministers Meet

Mr. Amir Jamal Minister of Finance and Planning of Tanzania called on the Minister of State for planning Mr. I.K. Gujral. The two ministers discussed economic cooperation between India and Tanzania. Mr. Amir Jamal, showed keen interest in India's plans to meet the oil crisis. He was interested in India's experience of the use of energy for agriculture.

Mr. Rulegura, Minister for commerce of Tanzania, called on Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Commerce Minister, and had detailed discussions on matters of mutual interest and promotion of trade.

The discussions mainly related to trade and commercial matters, economic, technical and industrial cooperation between the two countries. (January 1, 1976).

Indo-Tanzanian Economic Cooperation

In a blueprint of cooperation drawn by India and Tanzania, the two countries have decided to set up a Tea Commodity Community and a Cardamom Community. They have also decided to forge a common approach for the marketing and processing of raw cashewnuts.

It is likely that an effort will be made to interest other countries in joining the two groupings, There have already been efforts by India and Sri Lanka to have a common approach to tea exports.

The common approach was worked out during the two-day meeting of the Indo-Tanzanian Joint Commission in which it was decided that the two countries will collaborate in the expansion of a salt project in Tanzania ; setting up of a water pumps manufacturing plant for agricultural use and establishment of prototype training cum-production centres for development of small scale industries in the field of agro-industries, educational supplies and metal based industries.

India will train commercial Tanzanian pilots and ground engineers and provide in-plant facilities for training the technicians. India will also assist in the training of railway experts, construction engineers and agricultural scientists.

A bicycle factory set up with Indian technical collaboration, with a production capacity of 150,000 bicycles a year will be commissioned soon in Tanzania. India has been helping Tanzania in setting up gobar gas plants and lime, vegetable oil and pottery industries. The ONGC has concluded an agreement with Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation for the exploitation of gas in the Songo-Songo island. A farm implements factory is also being proposed to be set up with Indian collaboration. The National Development Corporation, is providing consultancy services for the construction of Tanzania's capital at Dodoma. (January 3, 1976).

Warm Welcome to President Nyerere

A warm and cordial welcome was given to President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania who arrived on 16 January in New Delhi on a seven-day state visit to India.

Among those who received President Nyerere at the airport were President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, the external affairs minister, Mr Y. B. Chavan, the defence minister, Mr. Bansi Lal, and high civil and military officers. A large number of African students gathered at the airport and sang in chorus African songs as President Nyerere walked across the saluting base in the company of President Ahmed and Mrs. Gandhi.

Welcoming President Nyerere, President Ahmed said that as a world statesman President Nyerere had made a distinctive contribution to peace and understanding in the world for which the Jawaharlal Nehru award for international understanding, the highest award that India could offer, had been conferred on him.

During his stay in Delhi, President Nyerere called on President Ahmed. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi the vice-president, Mr. B. D. Jatti, and the external affairs minister, Mr. Chavan, called on the visiting President and had talks with him. President Nyerere met heads of African missions in Delhi on 17 January, and addressed African students the next day.

President Nyerere also visited the Bharat electronics, Indian telephone industries, and Hindustan aeronautics at Bangalore and the Bhabha atomic research centre at Bombay from 18 to 22 January.

In his farewell speech on 18 January at Delhi, President Ahmed said that "our joint endeavours to serve the cause of peace, freedom and human understanding" have been strengthened by his visit.

In reply, President Nyerere said : "The Prime Minister and I have had discussions which I found interesting and very useful in deepening our understanding of development in India and of the determined manner in which your problems are being tackled. Our exchange of views on international affairs has also been very valuable. It is imperative that our two countries should understand one another and should work together in harmony for our mutual benefit. We have been doing this in the past ; it is very clear that we shall continue to do so in the future".

During the talks, the Tanzanian President was accompanied among others, by Mr. Ibrahim Kaduma, minister for foreign affairs ; and Mr W. K. Chagula, minister for water, energy and minerals, and the Prime Minister of India by Mr. Y. B. Chavan, Minister of external affairs, and ministers of commerce, education and social welfare, and minister of state of industry ; and Mr. P. N. Dhar, secretary to the Prime Minister. (January 18, 1976).

President Nyerere Receives Nehru Award

At a solemn ceremony in Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi on 17 January. President Nyerere received the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for the year 1973 from President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed. The award consisting of a sum of Rs. 110,000, convertible into foreign currency, and a citation, is administered by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). New Delhi.

Presenting the award President Ahmed said that it was but fitting and proper that an eminent fighter against racialism and a staunch champion of Afro-Asian unity and cooperation should be honoured with an award in the name of another man who was a great emancipator of mankind and who relentlessly strove for the freedom and dignity not only of his countrymen but for all oppressed people of the world. He praised Dr. Nyerere as a "great teacher and thinker who expressed the most complex ideas about socialism in the simplest language and who is one of the foremost champions of human rights". President Nyerere's unique personality, President

Ahmed added, was a rare combination of two qualities—the moral fervour of Mahatma Gandhi and the vision of Jawaharlal Nehru.

Receiving the award, President Nyerere called for a deliberate transfer of wealth from the richer nations to the poor and a series of changes in the world system of finance and exchange to bring about a movement towards human equality. He said “until we have succeeded in creating a new economic order we shall not begin to move towards greater equality ; we shall continue to mock our own protestations about the unity of mankind.”

President Nyerere said that in countries like India and Tanzania the real supporter of democracy and political equality was the person who used democratic government for the orderly but speedy development of greater economic equality. “An elected government, which observes the rules of democracy developed in more prosperous areas and allows centres of economic power and corruption to remain beyond its grasp, is not serving democracy. On the contrary such governments; are digging the grave of democracy”, he said.

(January 17, 1976)

Vital Links of “Uburu”

Reading out the citation at the presentation ceremony of the Nehru award, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi said that President Nyerere had played a great part in the formation of her own personality, “I have watched him as a friend of my father, as a friend of India, but, above all, as one whose understanding of the problems which freedom and development bring is a lesson to us all who are still struggling. His concern for man to maintain his identity, to be able to live in harmony with his own environment and yet to build a better life—is as relevant to us as to his country and, indeed, to all developing world,” Mrs. Gandhi said.

The following is the text of the citation which was read out by the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi.

Great are those who harness the tides of change rather than succumb to them. Not afraid to challenge the old gods or make innovations in time-honoured custom or establishment, they themselves become forces of rejuvenation and rebirth. Such a man is Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Born the son of Chief Nyerere Banito, after completing his education, Julius Nyerere chose the academic life. But when he became the President of the Tanganyika African association, founded as a social organisation, he converted it into a political movement. As its undisputed leader, he successfully guided his country to freedom, becoming the first Prime Minister and later President.

According to President Nyerere, **uhuru** or freedom must have three vital links—**umoja**, **ujamaa** and **maendeleo**—unity, socialism and development. Throughout his career, President Nyerere has urged his people towards racial harmony and integration. The concept of African unity is a committed principle of action of the Tanzanian government. At the meeting of the organisation of African unity, President Nyerere has repeatedly stressed that their desire for unity is one common denominator binding African nations which can redeem them from the residual problems of their colonial past.

In an era when newly independent countries are baffled by difficult choices to arrive at a viable political and socio-economic order. President Nyerere has shown remarkable moral courage and intellectual audacity in evolving new methods and norms to press on with the tasks of economic development and socialism, without sacrificing human values and social justice. But the goals are determined by the social and economic conditions prevailing in Africa. It is in this context, and based on his convictions of a social ethic, that President Nyerere framed the famous Arusha declaration which became his party's manifesto in 1967.

Committed to the eradication of all forms of colonialism, racial discrimination and economic exploitation from the African continent, Julius Nyerere is a steadfast champion of African liberation movements. "All human beings are equal" President Nyerere has said : "This being so, we have to accept that the exploitation, the humiliation, the suffering of all men—wherever it takes place—means the exploitation, humiliation and suffering of mankind. All men are reduced by it." This deep concern for the oppressed makes him speak out against these evils in the councils of the world.

But his concern is not for Africa alone. It is for all those who are deprived and the underprivileged of the world. At the conference of the nonaligned nations at Lusaka. President Nyerere

made an impassioned plea to them to unite, to cooperate amongst themselves for mutual development so as to transform their individual weakness into collective strength. In the interest of international cooperation he extends a hand of friendship to all.

A man of vision, a man of action, a man of compassion, who would like to light a candle on the top of Mount Kilimanjaro to bring hope and faith to those in despair. In honouring him today, we dedicate once again to ourselves ideals of Jawaharlal Nehru. We believe that the message of Julius Nyerere like Jawaharlal Nehru's will endure through the annals of time. (January 17, 1976)

Mr. Chavan : Tanzania's March to Socialist Society

Earlier, in his welcome address, Mr. Y. B. Chavan, India's minister of external affairs, and president of the Indian council for cultural relations, which administers the award, said ; "President Nyerere, like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, belongs to those handful of men for whom life is a continuous struggle for emancipation of men and dedication to the service of mankind. President Nyerere has ceaselessly worked for the well-being of his people and emancipation of Africa. As in the case of India, Tanzania won its freedom without bloodshed or rancour. But freedom and reins of power were never the end for him. It was only the beginning of his commitment to his people. Since independence, Tanzania has marched ahead in its efforts to build a democratic and socialist society".

Referring to the African struggle for independence, Mr. Chavan said that, "with his firm commitment to human dignity and equality. President Nyerere has been in the forefront of the movement for liberation of fellow Africans who still remain subject to colonial, racist and minority regimes. He has never hesitated to speak forthrightly against the game of big power politics and injustice of the prevailing world order. He has never swerved from his faith in the right of all peoples to freedom—and independence of judgment—which is the essence of nonalignment. He has never doubted that man, in his labour, can reach for his own betterment and a more just world order".

(January 17, 1976)

Tunisian Poet Mr. Chorfi Visit India

A well-known poet of Tunisia, Mr. Abdel Mejid Chorfi, arrived on a fifteen-day visit on the invitation of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations.

Mr. Chorfi's poems have been published by the leading publishers in France and he is cultural editor of L'Action, a leading newspaper of Tunisia.

During his stay in Delhi, he met Indian writers and poets and visited places of cultural, historical and economic interest.

Mr. Chorfi also paid a visit to Agra, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Bangalore where also he met writers and poets.

Uganda Compensation for Indian Claimants

A Cheque for 1,627,114 U.S. dollars and 60 cents was formally handed over by President Idi Amin of Uganda to India's deputy minister for external affairs, Mr. Bipinpal Das, on 24 January in Kampala. Making a statement on the subject of compensation for properties left behind by Indian nationals in Uganda in 1972 on 29 January in both houses of parliament, Mr. Bipinpal Das said that the amount, equivalent of 13,415,414/16 Uganda shillings, was agreed to after a thorough joint examination of the claims by the delegations of the two countries and was paid to the Government of India for disbursement to claimants.

According to a press note issued by the ministry of external affairs, government of India, on 11 February in New Delhi, India has set up a special office in Bombay which will, after due scrutiny, disburse the amount to the individual claimants as admitted by the Government of Uganda.

In his statement in parliament, Mr. Das said that he visited Kampala from 23 to 26 January at the invitation of the Uganda Government, during which he also participated in the Ugandan national day celebrations.

Mr. Bipinpal Das further stated that, notwithstanding the fact that some items remain to be pursued subsequently, the amount now received represents a mutually satisfactory settlement for compensation for the assets left behind by Indian nationals. Mr. Das added that President Amin expressed to him not only satisfaction at this

settlement, but also his admiration for our Prime Minister and warm appreciation of the role which India has played in support of Africa and as a founder-member of the nonaligned movement. Mr. Das conveyed to President Amin India's appreciation of the spirit in which this settlement was reached and shared the hope that friendly relations and economic cooperation between the two countries can be developed further.

Earlier, in his statement, Mr. Das said that, on an invitation from the President of Uganda, an Indian delegation, led by Mr. J. S. Mehta, was sent to Kampala in October, 1975 to discuss the question. The Indian delegation and the Ugandan valuation committee jointly scrutinised in detail the claims of Indian nationals in the spirit of the Ugandan laws and decrees, and finally reached an understanding on the quantum of compensation payable to Indian nationals.

(January 25, 1976)

India to send Experts to Upper Volta

India has agreed to send experts to Upper Volta for preliminary study of the mineral resources of that country.

This decision was taken at a meeting of Minister of Commerce, Industrial Development and Mines of Upper Volta, Mr. E. Zoma with Minister for Steel and Mines Mr. Chandrajit Yadav when the former called on Mr. Yadav in New Delhi.

Mr. Zoma during the discussion evinced interest in seeking India's cooperation in the field of mining.

He suggested that the Indian experts be sent to his country to help survey, prospect and explore the mineral potentials in that country. He also expressed desire for help in setting up a data bank in that country. Mr. Zoma invited Mr. Chandrajit Yadav to visit Upper Volta. Mr. Chandrajit Yadav agreed to send experts to Upper Volta for this purpose and on their report further cooperation between the two countries could be explored in the field.

Earlier, Mr. Zoma called on Union Commerce Minister Dr. D.P. Chattopadhyaya who suggested that the delegation should study progress in the industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors in India and identify the specific areas in which India could extend cooperation.

Zaire Press lauds India's Progress

Newspapers of several countries, such as the USA, Zaire and Turkey, have published articles supporting the emergency measures taken by India.

A Zaire journalist, Mr. M. Yamana Mandala, in an article in weekly Zaire of 9 February expressed the view that great powers who covet India because of its strategic position, were behind "the political disorders which were on the point of shaking India." He argues that were it not for the courage shown by the heirs of Gandhi and Nehru, "there would have been disorders and serious repercussions on India's economy. Regarding the future, the article says that opposition leaders must acknowledge Mrs. Gandhi's position as the head of the government and one will have to wait several months to see if they are sincere in their profession. (February 9, 1976)

Zimbabwe Students Welcome Mozambique Action

The Zimbabwe Students Union (India) has welcomed Mozambique's action in closing down its borders with Rhodesia and confiscating all Rhodesian owned property in Mozambique.

In a press release the union said: "The reactionary and counter-revolutionary threats from Rhodesia against Mozambique cannot be looked at in isolation from the events in Angola." (March 5, 1976)

Books for Zimbabwe Freedom Fighters

The Government of India has presented 25,000 educational books to the Zimbabwe freedom fighters. The books were handed over by Indian High Commissioner to Tanzania Mr. K.D. Sharma to Mr. Laban S. Okaya, acting executive secretary of the OAU liberation committee at Dar-es-Salaam.

The High Commissioner said that the books were a token of India's continued support to the cause of African liberation. The Government and the people of India, he said, were firmly behind the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for independence and were confident that the Zimbabwean people would meet with success in their just struggle against oppression. (March 12, 1976)

Pakeeza Sultan

Africa Through Indian Eyes

A Documentation List
(October-December 1975)

AFRICA THROUGH INDIAN EYES is a Documentation based on coverage of Africa in Indian newspapers and periodicals. It is arranged in a classified order. However, subject headings are broad and under each subject heading entries are listed alphabetically under the name of author or title and for each entry a reference is made to the publication (name of publication is in italics in an abbreviated form) including its volume, number, date of issue and the page on which the article appears. Abbreviations employed for the names of publications are given below. The matter in brackets has been provided in order to make captions more clearly understood. Annotations have also been given to the articles and editorials wherever found necessary.

List of Abbreviations employed for the names of publications

A.	Administration	Ins.	Institute
Af.	Affairs	J.	Journal
Afr.	Africa	L.	Literary
B.	Bulletin	O.	Oriental
C.	Contemporary	P.	Political
D.	Democracy	Pr.	Proposals
De.	Democratic	Prob.	Problems
E.	Economic	S.	Social
Ea.	Eastern	Sc.	Science
Ed.	Education	So.	Socialist
Ex.	Express	Soc.	Socialism
F.	Foreign	St.	Studies
Fi.	Finance	T.	Times
Fin.	Financial	U.	University
G.	Gandhi	IATJ	Indo-African Trade Journal
Ga.	Gandhian	IICQ	Indian International Centre Quarterly
H.	Horizon		
He.	Herald	JLBSAA	Journal of Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration
Hi.	History		
Hind.	Hindustan		
His.	History	JNAA	Journal of the National Academy of Administration
I.	International		
In.	Indian		
Ind.	India		

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Book Reviews

'Ecology and Change' C. Gregory Knight, Academic Press
New York, 1974, pp. 300

This study on Ecology and Change set against the backdrop of the context of Rural modernisation in an African community, based on the specific case of the Mbozi area in South-Western Tanzania and the Nyiha people raises certain fundamental questions like, what is Ecology? What is Change? What is their inter-relation? How can one identify sources of change? How can change be modelled quantitatively? How can the implications of ecological change be studied and, if possible, how can past be projected into the future? These questions are not only challenging and fascinating in any society, in any part of the world at any time in history, but are all the more so, if the geographical setting is that of an area like the Mbozi in the region between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Malawi in Southern Africa through which pass the internationally significant examples

of external aid like the Petroleum pipeline linking Zambia with Dar es Salaam or the Tan-Zam Railroad linking the Copper Belt in Southern Africa to Dar es salaam. Here is an area in which some of the most outstanding examples of sophisticated construction of highways, railroads and pipelines has taken place, in an area which has been traditionally insular prior to these gigantic projects. What is the impact of these giant projects on the socio-economic fabric of this area? How did the petroleum pipeline, the Tan-Zam Railroad and the parallel highway affect either the agricultural productivity of the Mbozi area or altered the socio-economic modes of living of the people living in the area? There are tremendously fascinating questions and offers enormous scope for an innovative genius in the evolution of the methodology of identification of the parameters of change, of eco-

logical change and of the quantification of such parameters. And yet, it is precisely in the expectations that the proposed study raises that it fails to make a significant impact in the mind of the reader.

In the course of a perusal of the treatment of the subject, one would imagine that questions like the sources, the models and the implications of change have been dealt with in a fairly academic and scientific manner taking due account of the traditional agricultural systems and contemporary agricultural patterns. And yet it would become apparent, after a close and detailed study, that the basic questions which are raised in the study remain unanswered at the end. This inadequacy becomes understandable if one were to recall the nature of the parameters selected in this study to indicate and measure the change, as for instance, the increase in the number of bicycles, radios, the number of business establishments apart from ploughs.

Change, in this context, should be understood as change in the mode of production, change in the character of the

instruments of production, change in the social relations amongst the people in the process of agricultural production. How do we measure the productivity in the traditional agricultural system and how do we measure the same in the context of the contemporary agricultural patterns? Should we not evaluate and compare the total agricultural production? Or the productivity for unit area? If it is not possible to study the trend in the change in the total production for want of historic data, is it possible to study the production trends in select principal agricultural products, whether it is maize or cassava or beans or finger millets? Not only is there no data either of the old or the current periods which is understandable in itself because of the inherent difficulties but there is no effort even to approach the problem from this correct perspective. To some extent, the plough can be taken as an instrument of production and as a parameter for the measurement of modernization in agricultural production compared to the use of the hoe or the blade in

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the traditional system. But the same cannot be said of either the bicycle or the radio. 'The bicycle and the radio are part of the ecology' (p. 188) only in a figurative or metaphorical sense but not in a scientific sense. Nor can we treat the trader and the planter as the principal symbols of models for change (p. 188). What caused the transformation from the hoe to the plow? That is the crucial question in analysing change in the methods of production. In the matter of a study of change in the socio-economic pattern, what triggered the change from the traditional communal ownership and production to a rapidly evolving individualised capitalist mode of production? The answers to these questions would explain all the changes in the land tenure systems. What caused the change from the land as a commonly owned instrument of production to a commodity in the monetary market transactions like sale and purchase. That would constitute a fascinating aspect of study of change in the context of economic development in Africa. These are questions in the interface between socio-

logy and technology, concerned with the effect of technology on social change and the effect of social change on technology and production. An awareness of this inter-relation is significantly absent in this otherwise admirable study of change. The concept of rural modernization should mean modernization in the methods of production and not a secondary manifestation in either a bicycle or a radio. If one were to analyse the increase in the sale of TV sets in Delhi during the last 5 years, one would be nowhere near an analysis of change of agricultural productivity in the area.

But what comes out in a striking manner in the study is that, notwithstanding the growth of plantation agriculture in Africa in colonial times, with an emphasis on cash crop protection, there has been no basic change in the traditional agricultural pattern of the people of Africa as distinct from the immigrants or the settlers who owned or worked on the plantations.

"The traditional food crop production system still occupies the largest proportion of Nyiha time and land." "Change

has yet to totally transform Nyiha culture and cognition." (p. 238)

It is Pointed out that

"European political pressure succeeded in formulation of restrictions against African production of certain cash crops...he was prevented from growing many of the crops with which he has worked" (p. 183) and contrast this with the statement that "Christiant was a strong catalytic factor in the early acceptance of coffee (p. 175). Imagine a situation where it is admitted that the Africa was legally debarred from growing coffee and then there is an analysis of rate of acceptance of coffee amongst the Africans or an attempt to analyse their resistance change. Besides being a paradox, that becomes a cruel irony not only in the historical event but in the adopted methodology of study. The continuance of the traditional patterns of agricultural production side by side with large size plantations by immigrant planters brings out the fact that the forces of colonialism which operated in Africa during the last one hundred years did not work for increase in the basic agri-

cultural productivity but only perpetuated a backwardness under the thin veneer of development and modernization.

The thesis that increasing population pressure motivates change in the mode and pattern of agricultural production, however much may be valid in the relatively more densely populated parts of the world like India or China, needs substantiaion in the context of Africa with large areas of cultivable land and relatively smaller densities of population. The study of modernisation does not unfortunately examine this aspect of the dynamics of African demography with any semblance of scientific validity.

Notwithstanding these basic limitations, this study in rural modernisation does outline an interesting technique for the study of change taking the parameters of coffee defusion, commercialisation, the percentage of adopters, etc. and fitting S-curves to the data of these parameters. These are excellent examples of curve fitting and statistical treatment of socio-economic data. It is also interesting that a computer programme should have been

used to analyse the inter-relation between the various types of field data collected during the course of the survey.

The references to the basic policies enunciated and being promoted by the dynamic and progressive leadership of Tanzania, to the concept of African socialism outlined in the Arusha declaration, to the movement of Ujamaa which translates the basic socialistic content of the policy to the grass roots at the field level are halting and half-hearted. One would have liked to see a more realistic and deeper appreciation of the basic changes taking place in the economy of the African countries under the inspiring leadership of African leaders in the period after independence. Instead, there are references to what are called uneven development of Nyiha Ujamaa groups, 'land disputes between Ujamaa groups and local land holders', 'considerable misunderstanding of Ujamaa by other Nyiha', 'Justifiable concern over disposition of existing coffee farms' and inuendos like 'Ujamaa was neither new nor strange' (p. 253).

The policies followed by

the independent Governments of Africa undoubtedly give a new twist and thrust to the policies followed by the previous colonial governments. And this transformation cannot be easy and without apparent contradictions. "Since independence, Tanzania has rejected individual land ownership as one part of its broader development policy". The study points out "yet this is precisely the direction towards which Nyiha tenure has moved." (p. 241) A wider historical perspective alone would help a broader understanding of the transformation of a traditional communal ownership going through a process of individual ownership encouraged in the colonial period and its periodical return to communal or social ownership and production in the post independent period in the countries of Africa, or also, one would continue to wonder about the enigma of Africa being 'a riddle without an answer' (p. 204.)

The book is profusely illustrated with good quality photographs, maps, graphs and charts. The style of presentation is breezy and racy.

Book Reviews

The front and cover on the Mbozi area and the rear and cover on the vegetation of the area are excellent and point the way to better use of corresponding space in other publications. .

On the whole, the book which is based on a study supported by the United

States National Science Foundation, and the University of Kansas General Research Fund, in cooperation with other academic bodies in the U.S. and Tanzania provides some interesting, stimulating and though provoking reading.

. K.V. Krishnamurthy

Histoire de L'Afrique Noire d'hier a demain : Joseph-KL-ZERBO,
Paris, Editens Hatier, 1972

Africa, busy as it is with its development problems, has little thought to spare for revitalising its past; yet its history is an integral part of its development, even on the economic side. The man who would be concerned with the future needs must feel that he is the heir of the past; and african unity presupposes that africans should know about the whole of Africa. In 13 exiting chapters we are brought through the Africa of the early ages, and so onwards to the African problems of today, through a landscape of history in which the broad lines of the continent's development

stand out in stark perspective, sometimes unexpected and harsh. The author gives us an unsparing analysis of the obstacles and the grounds for hope, and calls for a version of modern society which will be specifically African, but nevertheless angled on international understanding and co-operation. Professor KL-ZERBO is an scholar of history and a Deputy in the National Assembly; and his lucid and poetical expression bears the authentic mark of an African who has retained his identity but taken inspiration from the methods of western science.

. .

The Boy in Between : Miriam Khamadi Were, Oxford University Press, Eastern Africa, 1969

This is a story for children which will repay even adults reading it. Mrs. Were, for all her training in science, is a raconteur of reckoning. The style and range of vocabulary at her command would commend the book to those who are seized of the problem of writing tales in English meant for rapid reading by children so as not only to enhance their awareness of the world around them linguistically and socially but also to sharpen their aesthetic sensibilities and humanistic concerns.

Amused and affectionate, the authoress launches upon the biography of a sensitive adolescent, Namunyu, whose frustrations and triumphs through school life offer a set of hilarious situations and painful experiences for the reader's delectation. With her subtle humour she unravels their small ambitions and playful tricks, links the characters of teachers Mr. Fume and Mr. Sly, Father Goodley and Nurse Gleam, and transports you to an uncharted world of children's

pains and pleasures.

Not only will children learn it from how to devise ever new games, but also a hint or two on how to improve their English through diligence and singlemindedness. The naive questions that curious Namunyu asked her mother will cause no end of laughter among children and adults anywhere in the world. How a little understanding from father, brother or teachers can light up the horizon of a child in dumps, how camaraderie involves give and take towards achieving something of common good or general interest and how rules of a compact bind a group could not have been told more simply and more effectively. That consensus and protest are valuable instruments of group solidarity asserting itself has been illustrated well without rancour attending it. That even personal tragedies in the lives of children can be lightened with friends around and that an enterprising spirit need recommended as a gift for the young ones.

A.S.V.

*In Person : Achebe, Awoonor & Soyinka, Edited by Koren Morell
African Studies Programme Institute Comparative and Foreign
Area Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, USA 19*

Talking comes before reading and writing. If a word may be thought of gestured meaning its written equivalent may be seen as a gesture of gesture. In origin talking and writing are unrelated. Any communication system, first of all, is informative latter expression of some image or thought.

Talking and learning, learning and enquiry is a continuous process between the talker and his audience. Writer is also in a manner a talker, who talks through his creative writings. But, of late a new type of direct study-cum-understanding dialogues has been undertaken at various levels in the form of seminars and sessions.

The "In Person" programme was organised during Spring Quarter 1973, as part of University of Washington's African Studies Programme as annual "Seminar". This seminar was more than instructive since it gave audience insight into working psyche of three widely known and recognised

writers of Nigeria, now writing in English. The informal atmosphere after each lecture permitted the writer to be philosopher, showman, chronicler, political commentator, and story teller, all at the same time.

Inclusion of Televised Discussion and Class Discussion further underscored the directness of communication between the speakers and the audience. The recorded material is a mine of views and review of some universal problems like the questions : art for the sake of art, compulsive writing and committed writing.

In this lectures seminar Chinua Achebe spoke on "Africa And Her Writers" Chinua Achebe is considered top novelist, who in early fifties contributed to the birth of Nigerian literature in English. Unlike urbane Wole Soyinka, who has easy grace and wit, Achebe's work has structural strength and architectural coherence unmatched by other novelists. His writings

reflect both a sense of traditional and modern in Nigeria and Africa and in the conflicts and contradictions between them.

Achebe speaks in an uninhibited manner about art, about other writers, their relationships with editors and readers. Communication gap is not felt by him, when he addresses his public. He is blunt and at times brutal when expressing his opinions on men and matter and in his evaluation of literature and writers.

Wole Soyinka's subject "*Drama and the Revolutionary Ideal*". He dwells upon experiences as a dramatist, reactions of audiences and his subjective observations. Black chauvinism and alienation, class consciousness and compromise are elaborated in the context of modern written by African playwrights. Discussing revolutionary ideal he seems not to concur with Trotsky whom he quotes: Culture is the organic sum of knowledge and capacity which characterizes the entire society. It embraces and penetrates all fields of human work and unifies them into a system. Individual achievements rise

above this level and elevate it gradually.

Soyinka refers to Brechtian theatre in context of revolutionary theatre and neither applauds nor rejects. He takes the middle path and refuses to be drawn in unnecessary controversies.

According to Soyinka art and drama should not take as starting point an extereorized notions of the mores and social culture of a society or impose upon its product the mores and idioms of a different set of values.

Kofi Awoonor spoke on *Tradition and Continuity in African Literature*. The lecture and discussion following were primarily before the regularly enrolled students and some African Studies faculty. During his talk and discussion Awoonor dwelt at length on the growth of African literature and underlined the role of writer as the instrument of necessary transformation and unification of the observable and unobservable world.

He discussed many writers including Achebe and Soyinka in his talk and candidly answered such questions as use of English by African writers.

The editor of present volume Karen L. Morell has amply succeeded in the attempt to convey on the printed page as many as possible of the phenomena experienced by the audience, as well as the degree

of relativity of writers' remarks, although the statements are not revealed truth, but a reflection of their minds in motion at a particular time, with a particular group of people.

Virendra Tripathi

*Journal of Southern African Studies : Department of Politics,
University of Bristol, published by Oxford University Press*

The continent of Africa has been increasingly attracting the attention of scholars in various disciplines the world over since one African country after the other started gaining independence from the yoke of European colonial powers. No doubt there used to be scholars in African studies even before the emergence of Africa into the arena of world politics but their number has considerably gone up during the second half of the 20th century, thanks to the establishment of institutes and departments in a number of countries for the study of African problems and the generous grants and other financial assistance that the Governments are now bestowing upon scholars to enable them to prosecute their studies on Africa. These scholars would naturally like to read not only the contributions made by other scholars in the

field but also to publish the fruits of their own enquiries and investigations for the benefit of larger community. The Journal of Southern African Studies, brought out by the Department of Politics, University of Bristol, is expected to serve this dual purpose.

The importance and value of the Journal lies in the fact that unlike most other journals dealing with Africa it is not intended to cover the entire continent but only those countries which fall in Southern Africa such as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia Malawi, Rhodesia, Zaire, Malagasy Republic and Mauritius. Africa is the second largest continent in the world with about 55 countries or so and, therefore, no journal can perhaps devote adequate attention to the entire continent.

Dealing with such a big continent it is always preferable to choose a particular area or a region and to concentrate upon it. The University of Bristol, Department of Politics, has rightly chosen the region of Southern Africa for the journal because perhaps this is the one region of the world which presents most challenging problems both for politicians and scholars alike. There is enormous scope for research and investigation in this area.

One of the merits of the Journal is that it aims at serving, at the same time, several disciplines in social science and its allied fields such as economics, sociology, demography, social history and natural sciences. This is why the two issues of the Journal that have so far come out contain a wide variety of articles in various disciplines. For example, the article entitled, "Industrial Workers in Rhodesia, 1946-72" falls in the field of Economics because its emphasis is upon the question why the wages of black industrial workers in Rhodesia rose markedly between 1945-62. Similarly, the article "Essay on African

Customary Law Research Techniques", strictly speaking, falls into the field of research methodology in law. The writer emphasises here that in order to form an accurate impression of a society's law, familiarity with political and economic factors operating at the grassroot level should also be acquired by the anthropologists and lawyers. This suggestion makes a departure from the average alwyer's approach of making generalizations of abstract nature in order to present a picture of customary law of an African country.

Practically all the articles so far published in the Journal are of high academic quality. Besides the two articles already mentioned, special mention may be made of Belinda Bozole's article "Origins, Development and Ideology of Local Manufacturing in South Africa" in which the writer has traced the delicate historical line along which the forces of economic interest on the one hand and political interest on the other, move together and has shown also how the balancing and translating function is performed by ideologists in the

Book Reviews

middle. Each of these articles goes into the depth of the problems taken up. Each article is well-documented and relies upon primary sources also besides others and, therefore, each makes an original contribution in its respective field.

Bristol University deserves to be complimented for having brought out such a useful journal. I am sure it will prove to be a great boon for scholars, research students and teachers devoted in the study of Southern Africa.

S.C. Saxena

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
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AFRICA QUARTERLY

- 1 The Concepts of Nationalism and Right to Self-Determination : Cameroon as a Case Study
Humphrey N. Nwosu
- 27 An Approach to Achebe's Fiction
Anne Ruggles Gere
- 36 Ujamma Villages : A Tanzanian Experiment in Rural Development
Mrs. Priya Mutalik Desai
- 56 The Nigerian Trade Unions and Politics (1945-65)
Edmund O. Egböh
- 69 India and Africa (A Quarterly chronicle for April - June 1976)
Vijay Gupta
- 88 Book Reviews

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Humphrey N. Nwosu :

The Concepts of Nationalism and Right to Self-determination : Cameroon as a case study

One of the major differences between the "hard" and "soft" (natural and social) science is the precision of language. While the former has developed more precise and definite terms, formulas, concepts, propositions and theories, the latter accommodates several loose and diffuse terms, elusive and persuasive concepts and propositions ; and abstract partial and grand theories with little operational relevance.

The Natural Sciences as areas of study allow little intrusion of motives, attitudes, values and ideological predispositions than the social sciences. For instance, the natural scientists no matter their countries or ideological perspectives have the same definitions for chemical formulas such as acid, water, salt and base ; but the social scientists do not have agreement on the meaning of such common concepts as freedom, justice, liberty, equality, rule of law, democracy or socialism.

If we must develop a social science which is cross-cultural in scope and relevance, there is greater need to refine and warrant our concepts and propositions, as they provide building blocks for our partial and grand theories. Theories with greater operational relevance to our empirical world are more likely to be built, when there is greater convergence in our conceptual frameworks, and when we assign more precise meanings to our theorems and terms.

The first section of this paper examines three "common" concepts :—nationalism, nation and self-determination which are in use in analysis of social life ; but whose precise meanings are often

elusive, as well as they are persuasive. We shall briefly discuss the various ideas that have been associated with "nation" and "nationalism": and then examine the concept of self-determination from the perspectives of both U.N.O. and O.A.U.

The second part of the paper discusses (a) the applications of the concepts of nationalism and self-determination to the peoples of Cameroon (b) the problems of nation building in that country. It must be noted that the assertion of right to self-determination and attainment of political independence through nationalism are only one step in the long road of the process of nation building. The task of moulding together into one nation, the diverse ethnic groups, such as the Bamileke, the Foulbe, the Bamoun and ethnic groups that border the Cameroon and Nigerian territories is not an easy one.

In Cameroon, the problem is exacerbated by the varying colonial experiences the people have had, first under German administration and later under the British and the French.

2. The Concepts of Nationalism and Nation

There is, perhaps, no political life more difficult to define than the concept of "nationalism". There have been as many definitions as there are writers with varying objectives and various audiences in mind. Noting the diverseness of 'nationalism' Kenneth Minogue states :

"Nationalism is a set of ideas, but as they travel from continent to continent, these ideas add up less to a theory than to a rhetoric, a form of self expression by which a certain kind of political excitement can be communicated from an elite to the masses. These ideas are chameleons that take the colour of the locality around them; we saw that German and Indian nationalists might use the same words and mean quite different things, and nationalism combined with socialist ideas in Africa is radically different from nationalism combined with religion or state worship in modern Europe."¹

Coleman warrants the concept of nationalism in a sense, that it is used in this paper. He applies it to those types of organizations

which are essentially political and which we have as their objective the realization of self government or independence. Writing about Nigerian nationalism, for example, Coleman states :

“Modern nationalism includes sentiments, activities and organizational development and independence of Nigeria as a nation. State existing on a basis of equality in an international state system.”²

In essence when the substantive content of any “nationalism” is delineated, it must include—

- (i) some ideas, values; attitudes and sentiments held by people ;
- (ii) activities or action : for it is not enough to nurse some ideas inwardly, these ideas or sentiments must be given expression in form of organized action.
- (iii) Organizational development or movement. This is again important, because without an institutionalized structure, a movement no matter the objectives easily fissles out. An organization is therefore essential to sustain a nationalist movement.
- (iv) Desire for Independence. Before any movement can be called a nationalist one, it must occur within an independent state or among a people who desire complete independence from an existing system.

Ernest Haas use of ‘nationalism’ agrees with the sense it is used here. To Haas, the most important indicator for denoting nationhood is the collective consciousness, as well as demand for independence. He states : that ‘nationalism’ is an ideology of specific groups of people wishing to create a nation where one does not exist, saying that it ought to exist. It is a political ideology which aims at the building of a nation. It is also an ideology of a people who have achieved nationhood.³ The relevance of this definition is that it can be applied to a colonial people wishing independence ; a people wishing to secede from an independent state as well as to those who have achieved independence, like Nigeria and Cameroon, but have yet to achieve higher degree of nationhood. The ultimate objective of all nationalism is the creation of an independent nation.

What then constitutes a nation ? Is the nation coterminous with the State ? Are the Yorubas, Ibos, in Nigeria, the Bamileke, Foulbe, Kirdi, Bamoun in Cameroon, the English and the Scots in Great Britain, separate nations or ethnic groups ?

Some political scientists would readily agree that each of the above ethnic group constitutes a nation. These political scientists can be said to belong to the "objective school" of nationhood, as contrasted to the "subjective school". Walker Connor, a member of objective school, in his recent article "Nation Building or Nation destroying", states : "what we have, thus far been calling self differentiating ethnic groups are in fact, nations' loyalty to the ethnic group should be called nationalism".⁴ Walker in essence equates ethnicity with nationalism. To Walker each of the Nigerian, Cameroonian and the British ethnic group constitutes a nation ; and what in fact we have been referring to as nation building should properly be referred to as nation destroying. According to him, the development of each of this people as a nation is retarded by compelling them to form "artificial" nation with different peoples. So far as he is concerned, the process of nation destroying is currently going on in all heterogenous states—both industrialized and non-industrialized.

Many other political scientists, especially those who belong to the subjective school differ from Walker's stance. Victor Olorunsola uses the term, "cultural sub-nationalism" for Walker's ethnic nationalism.⁵ He succinctly argued that equating ethnicity with nationalism could lead to "the perpetual fragmentation of sovereign states."⁶

This does not imply that a well mobilised ethnic group with enough internal and outside forces cannot fight its way to become a nation of its own. What then are the basic assumptions of both subjective and objective schools with regards to nationhood and its attributes. The objective school applies the term 'nation' to a people who have common ancestry and history, and possess group values or as John Stuart Mill expressed it, common sympathies. A people of the same nation according to the subjective school have a common nationality. They may be part of a nation states such as the Scots nation within Great Britain, or the Ibo nation within the Nigerian

State. People of the same nation can live in several States. The Yorubas for instance, live in both Dahomey and Nigeria. The Hausas are found in several States of West Africa. The Israeli nation lives in several parts of the world. The objective school argues that a nation is distinguishable by a number of empirical indicators. These include a high degree of social mobilization ; national character and history, language, common custom and habits, territory, economic and political institutions. Perhaps the best proponent of the "objective school is Stalin, who himself wanted a yardstick for processing the demands for autonomy made by the ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. Stalin's insistence on the presence of five criteria, deprived the Jews cultural and administrative autonomy as Stalin claimed that they have no territories of their own.

Without going into specific evaluation of the so-called objective criteria, examples of States which have achieved nationhood without meeting most of the criteria abound. These include Israel, Switzerland, Britain and United States. Even in Somalia, where all the empirical Indicators seem to be present, a Somali nation is yet to be fully realized out of the several Somali Clans.

While the objective school emphasizes several criteria for a nation, the subjective school emphasizes one to two criteria. Their position can be reflected in Ernst Haas definition of a nation. "A nation is a socially mobilized body of individuals believing themselves to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their own minds) from "outsiders" and striving to create or maintain their own State."⁷ The essential factor for nation building is the collective consciousness and desire for independence. Thus, socially mobilized people who think themselves different from others, whom they regard as "others" endeavour to have their own state. Haas' conception of nation which emphasizes mobilization of diverse ethnic groups agrees with that of Karl Deutsch who states that a nation emerges as a "result of transformation of people of several ethnic elements in the process of social mobilization". Deutsch defines social mobilization as a process by which old psychological and economic clusters are eroded and people are made available for new orientation."⁸

The subjective school contends, that while one criterion might be vital to the task of nation building in one state, a different factor might be the inevitable criterion in another. For an example the concept of "Somaliness" based on the common origin and history, has been the driving force in the building of a Somali nation ; race and centuries of deprivation are vital to Jewish nation ; language and religion mark the cravings of Irish nationhood. On the other hand, nation building in heterogeneous societies such as Nigeria and Cameroon is based primarily on common colonial experience. We should however not harp much on the differences between the objective and subjective schools with regards to their attributes to nationhood. While the subjective school's criteria of collective consciousness and desire for independence are essential to bringing a new nation into being ; eventually the nation maintenance requires common group values, a national character, and a set of political and economic institutions. These variables account for the differences between one nation and another, a new nation and an older nation. Deutsch provides us with a check list for measuring the level of nationhood of any State : These include :

1. The degree of internal social mobility, economic interchange and interdependence, intermarriage and commonality and the intensity of the level of social communication among the ethnic groups comprising a given territory.
2. The location of population clusters and 'core areas' as well as sub-national regions of more intense economic interchange or of cultural focus.
3. The powers and functions of subnational political institutions and degree of meaningful participation in them by educated masses.
4. The rate by which national institutions and activities are capable of attracting and absorbing new social strata from all ethnic groups into national life.
5. The centrality and nationalness of educational institutions, particularly the professional schools and the Universities.
6. The degree of mobilization in form of Urbanization, Communication and transportation facilities.

When these empirical indicators are applied to the new nations using older nations such as France and Britain as a comparative base their nationhood is highly constrained. We shall later discuss the problems that confront the Cameroon nation builders, meanwhile, it is in order to warrant the concept of self-determination.

The Concept of Self-Determination

It is not intended here to go into the history of the concept of self-determination, which has been as old as man has desire to be left alone to decide his destiny. We shall warrant the concept from the perspectives of both U.N. and O.A.U. The concept of self-determination refers to the right of a people to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.⁹ So far as the United Nations is concerned the practice of self-determination applies generally to non self-governing territories. Nation states scarcely apply the right to any national group within its territory. This notion agrees with that of Professor Emerson who states that a nation state claims the right to self-determination to itself but does not allow part of its people and territory to secede.¹⁰ How then did the United Nations come to accept the principle of self-determination? Toward the end of World War II, the Colonial system came increasingly under attack—Liberal opinions, especially in the United States desired a “New Deal” for all the colonial peoples and territories. It was hoped that the “New Deal” would eventually eliminate colonial rule. Ernst Haas succinctly states :

“The aspirations of the anti-colonial groups then called first and foremost of the realization ideology, the elimination for foreign rule and the speedy progress of colonial peoples toward a measure of Independent status.”¹¹

This liberal streak was therefore reflected in the charter of the United Nations, in a term acceptable to the major colonial powers. The Charter did not explicitly insert self-determinations as a “right” but did state it as a ‘principle’. Chapter 1 paragraph 2, of the charter states :

• •

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.¹²

The insertion of the principle of self determination in the United Nations charter, does not mean that it has universal application. The charter equally recognizes the principle of sovereign equality of all its members. What, it meant in this particular case was that trustees, such as Britain and France which had inherited the former German territories, accepted the ultimate responsibility of allowing the people of the trust territories such as Cameroon to exercise the right to self-determination.

Another international provision made in the United Nations charter, intended to enhance the process of decolonization and thereby enable the colonial territories to exercise the right to self-determination was establishment of the Trusteeship Council, which had almost the same function as the former League of Nations' Mandates Commission. The existence of the Trusteeship council ensured minimal international supervision of the political processes of the trust territories. The administering states were to send annual progress reports to the Council. The peoples of the trust territories had right to forward petitions directly to the Council. The Council also had right to visit the trust territories for fact finding purposes.¹³

The membership of emergent Asian and African States in the United Nations provided a new Catalyst to the United Nation's role in the process of decolonization. These new States saw the world organization as a suitable mechanism to speed up the elimination of colonialism. Although these States possessed little in terms of effective power to back their demands; they nevertheless influenced the United Nations to pass a number of resolutions which in no small measure influenced the process of decolonization. The most famous of these resolutions is the Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 referred as "The Declaration of Granting of Independence to colonial countries and people."

In assessing what the U.N. had done or has failed to do in promoting the exercise of the right to self-determination, it should

be borne in mind that the U.N. is an agent rather than the principal of sovereign States. One can safely argue that U.N. through its polemics has contributed to the demise of colonial territories, an exercise which took a speedy turn between 1946 and 1966.

The perspective of O.A.U. with regards to the exercise of the right to self-determination is not different from that of the U.N. The O.A.U. stance on the concept can be best discerned from the pronouncement of the Kenyan delegation to the Addis Ababa African Summit. It states: "The principle of self-determination has relevance where foreign domination is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is territorial disintegration by dissident citizens."¹⁴ So far as the African States and O.A.U. are concerned, the exercise of the right or principle of self-determination should only be used to eliminate colonial rule and should not be applied to the minority groups within their territories. Besides, the right to self-determination was not explicitly stated in the O.A.U. Charter. The nearest to it in principle, and of course intended only to speed up decolonization, is found in article 11 paragraphs d and 3 which state :

"To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the universal Declaration of Human Rights."¹⁵

The African States fearing that the application of the principle of self-determination to the ethnic minorities within their territories would exacerbate ethnicity and lead to disintegration of their fragile states, enunciated a principle which reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to Independent existence.

This perspective of the O.A.U. with regards to self-determination explains why most of the African States were reluctant to come to the aid of Biafra and why they insisted that any settlement of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict must be done under the framework of one Nigeria. Before we apply the concept to the people of Cameroon, we shall briefly state the conditions which make for success or lack of success of application of right to self-determination.

Factors that make for its Success or Failure

(1) The political status of the group or political unit demanding the right to self-determination: It is relatively easier for a colonial territory to demand and secure the right to self-determination, than it is for a Constituent part of an independent State. For instance, most of the independent African States were formerly colonial territories and successfully exercised the right to self-determination. Both the O.A.U. and the U.N. currently support the demands of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia to exercise the right to self-determination. On the other hand many of the independent African States did not support the exercise of the right to self-determination, by peoples of southern Sudan, Katanga, former Eastern Nigeria and Northern Ethiopia. O.A.U. has been equally lukewarm to the demands of autonomy by the Hutus of Burundi, where the minority ethnic groups lord it over the majority. However there are few instances where sovereign States agreed voluntarily to dismember themselves—Mali federation which broke into two states of Senegal and Mali; Malaysian federation, which formed two independent States of Singapore and Malaya.

(2) Strength of Nationalism: The extent of national consciousness and cohesion of the group demanding the right helps to determine the success or failure of its demands. This partly explains the success of Israelis, the Poles and Albanians.

(3) Force: Perhaps the most critical variable behind the success or failure of those that demand the exercise of the right to self-determination is the measure of coercive authority behind the demand. The failure of Biafra to secure independent existence was largely dependent on its military weakness, while on the other hand, the success of Israel, Bangladesh, East Germany, Poland and Korea in maintaining independent existence were attributable to superior force.

(4) The Intensity of foreign support: The amount of economic and military support from external environment can be decisive. The successes of Israel, East Germany, Bangladesh, South Korea, South Vietnam, Rhodesia in establishing themselves as Independent was largely dependent upon foreign support.

**Nationalism and Right to Self-Determination :
Cameroon as a Case Study**

Common Experience Under German Rule

On July 14, 1884, the present peoples of Cameroon, including the people in Saruana province of the Northeastern State of Nigeria, became, by proclamation, a German colonial territory.¹⁶ Like the French and the British, the Germans aspired to have important commercial and military bridgeheads in Africa. The Cameroon territory soon became commercially and militarily important to Germany. LeVine states :

“As the Cameroon become important to Germany for economic reasons, so did it also assume military importance in the light of the military and diplomatic fencing that preceded World War I ... and its possession added the element of enhanced prestige.”¹⁷

This was not to remain so for long. Following Germany's defeat in World War I, she also lost her territory of Cameroon, much to her regret. Noting Germany's attachment to her territory of Cameroon, LeVine states :

“Germany, shorn of her colonies by her defeat in 1918, continuously complained that her empire had been stolen from her and demanded the return of the Cameroon as a measure of the Third Reich's power and prestige.”¹⁸

As a result of the settlement reached at Versailles in 1919, Cameroon protectorate was allocated to Britain and France. The territory was arbitrarily divided into West and East Cameroons under British and French rule, within the League of Nations Mandate system. The two Cameroons, propelled by the force of colonial policies, often diametrically opposed to one another, developed in two different directions.

However, 32 years of German rule left memorable impacts on the two sections of Cameroon, and as a result, seeds for re-unification, which were to mature in 1961, had been sown and had taken firm root. Willard Johnson succinctly reported the German effort to establish the foundations of a modern state of Cameroon. The Germans had not only developed a railway system, still in use today,

but had constructed a network of roads which provide a direct link to the sea via Douala-Bafoussam road, which skirts the internal frontier on the East Cameroon side.¹⁹ Other German legacies include, 'sturdy old German forts and castles' and 'collections of agricultural plantations' that still dominate the economy of West Cameroons.

There is no doubt that the German presence in Cameroon contributed to the collective consciousness, and it is from this consciousness that came the level of mobilization attained by the people of Cameroon. Germany's colonial past to some degree still lingers today in the minds of some Cameroonians. One could posit, therefore, that the myth of a "German Kamerun nation" had provided the greatest ideological basis for the re-unification of the former British and French Cameroons. This myth helps to account for the coming together in 1961 of diverse people, with not only conflicting traditional political cultures, but also with conflicting colonial experiences.²¹

With the coming into existence of the United Nations in 1946, the two Cameroons became trust territories, still under the British and French administrations. This transformation speeded up the process of decolonization.

(II) Nationalism, Independence, and the Re-unification of the Two Cameroons

The first Nationalist Movement in the British section—which was administered as part of Eastern Nigeria—was the Cameroon Youth League (CYL), founded by P.M. Kale in 1940.²² But the tour organized by the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) roused nationalist feeling among the Cameroonians. They realized that under the Trusteeship system, they had alternatives of political action, hence they organized their own political parties and nationalist movements.²³

The parties which survived the re-unification in 1961, were, Endeley's, "Kamerun National Congress," (KNC); and John Ngu Fonch's, "Kamerun National Democratic Party," (KNDP). The only crucial issue that separated the two leaders, who formerly belonged to the same party, was the question of re-unification with the

French Cameroon. While Endeley favoured continued association with Nigeria, with West Cameroon as a state within the Nigerian federation, Foncha wanted secession and re-unification with French Cameroon.²⁴

In the French sector of Cameroon, a more militant nationalist protest was taking place. The protest was organized by the U.P.C.—Union des Populations du Cameroun—led by Dr. Felix Moumie as its president, and Um Nyobe as the executive Secretary. The U.P.C was created in April, 1948, and its expanded program included three key political goals :²⁵

- (1) The suppression of the artificial boundaries created in 1945 between the two Cameroons.
- (2) Abandonment by France of its policy of assimilation.
- (3) Fixing of a time limit for trusteeship, after which Cameroon would achieve independence.

The U.P.C. and its leaders had no patience with French administration. They wanted quick political evolution, which would not only terminate the trusteeship and the French administration, but ensure the independence and the re-unification of the two Cameroons. In 1952, U.P.C.'s secretary, Um Nyobe, sought and received the hearing of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, where he presented the Cameroon's case.²⁶ This was not enough. More militant actions of protest were to follow. In 1955, U.P.C. resorted to rebellion against continued French rule. It proclaimed a termination of the trusteeship, called for the immediate installation of a United Nations Commission to supervise the establishment of national institutions, and the immediate establishment of an African Executive Committee to serve as a provisional government.²⁷ The U.P.C.'s hasty declaration was followed by poorly organized, emotion-laden riots and attacks on government installations and European persons and property in the coastal towns and the towns in Mungo, Bassa and in Bemilake regions.²⁸

The alarmed French administration, fearing the 'communist tactics' of the U.P.C. leaders, banned the organization in 1955. Some of the leaders of the party fled to neighbouring British Cameroon and used it as an operational base to organize guerilla-type cam-

paings.²⁹ They engaged in selective terror—murdering, derailling trains, cutting telegraph wires, burning houses, blockading or otherwise cutting off roads and intimidating prospective voters.³⁰ The death of Um Nyobe at the hands of French paratroopers in 1958, and the defection of Mayi Matip, robbed the U.P.C. of much of its militancy and support. Nevertheless, the U.P.C. had helped to speed constitutional evolution in favour of African rule. In 1957, the first African government was installed with Andre Marie Mbida as Prime Minister.³¹ He was not to stay in office for long because of his opposition to the re-unification. He lost his office to an astute politician from the north, Ahmadou Ahidjo. The appealing personality of Ahidjo bridged the gap between the more advanced people of the coastal areas and southern region, and those of less advanced central and northern regions. On assuming office, Ahidjo announced a program which he summarized in terms of, Cameroon unity, Cameroonian nation, and Franco-Cameroonian cooperation.³² By 'Cameroonian unity,' Ahidjo meant not only the unity of French Cameroon—north and south—but the re-unification of the two Cameroons; by 'Cameroonian nation,' he meant that Cameroon, "Should achieve independence within a reasonable time limit." It was on this platform that Ahmadou Ahidjo led the French Cameroonians to independence on January 1, 1960.³³

In the British Cameroon events followed in rapid sequence, with the Nigerian attainment of independence in 1960. West Cameroon, in February, 1961, had a plebiscite to determine her future. John Ngu Foncha's party (KNDP), which had favoured, re-unification won the west but lost in the northern province which voted for affiliation with Nigeria.³⁴ The results of the plebiscite were as follows :

	<i>South Cameroon</i>	<i>North Cameroon</i>
For the Cameroon Republic	285,571	97,659
For Nigeria	87,741	146,296

With victories for the 'unionists' in both East and West Cameroons, the re-unification became possible. On October 1, 1961, the Federal Republic of Cameroon came into existence with the union of the former British and French Cameroons.³⁵ We shall, therefore, examine the problems involved in building up a Cameroon nation.

Problems of Nation-building in Cameroon

Although the state of Cameroon could view itself as 'the nation in a state of becoming' and derive its legitimacy from the concept of 'the Kamerun idea,' the real problem of national integration was posited in its most acute form following the re-unification in October, 1961. The most difficult problem that has faced every emergent African state, as in Cameroon, is that of nation-building. Aristide Zolberg remarked that :

"A nation does not merely happen as a result of historical forces ; it does not merely entail a liberation from oppression or from the cocoon of a false identity. It must be designed and the plan executed. This takes precedence over all other tasks, including economic development. Although the latter goal has usually been assigned a very high priority, typical economic policies often do not make sense except as economic means to political integration."³⁷

Cameroon nationalists are at present, through deliberate political action, endeavouring to create a nation out of the diverse ethnic groups that make up the state. This does not mean that, given the opportunity, the Bamileke cannot become a nation, nor does it mean that the national consciousness of the ordinary Faoulbe of northern Cameroon reaches the intensity of the average Englishman, nor that it must reach this intensity if the Cameroon nation is to emerge. As Coleman pointed out :

"It does suggest a closeness of contact with 'national' compatriots as well as with 'national' government. This closeness of contact on the horizontal and vertical levels has been a distinctly Western phenomenon, for the obvious reason that it is the result of modern technology."³⁸

Cameroon nationalists have encountered difficult obstacles in their process of nation-building. The most outstanding of the problems includes, first, ethnicity.

The campaign for re-unification and independence has been fought under the slogan of "Kamerun nation," yet apart from the collective demand for self-determination based on the myth of 'the Kamerun idea,' there are no strong vertical and horizontal linkages

to bind the heterogenous ethnic groups together into one nation. The main Cameroonian ethnic groups, Bamelake, Bamoun, Douala, Kirdi, Foulbe, Bamede, and the autonomous communities bordering Cameroon Mountain and the Cross River, had varied exposure to the western influences and modernization. The most expansive and modernized group are the Bamileke. They are scattered all over Cameroon and constitute over 14 per cent of the capital city, Younde. By 1956, the Bamileke outnumbered the Douala in the latter's home area.³⁹ The Bamileke have so spread out that in their bid for paid jobs and new opportunities they not only overtake but alienate the other ethnic groups they come in contact with. Noting the thrust made by the Bamileka to take advantage of modernity, Johnson states :

"The main point is that none of the southern towns of any size has been spared the influx of the resourceful Bamileke...massive migrations of them have occurred since the early 1930's. A hundred thousand emigrated from the traditional Bamileke areas between 1931 and 1958.⁴⁰

The Bamileke's movement and aggressiveness could be compared with the Ibo movement in Nigeria and Dorod movement in Somali. In each situation the ethnic or clan groups they came into contact with often expressed fear of domination. This fear of domination is embedded in the relationships among the Cameroon ethnic groups. First, in Cameroon as a whole, there is fear of domination by Bamilekes, then there is the fear of the relatively backward northern Cameroon ethnic groups of being eliminated by the considerably more modernized southern groups. Nor should one forget the fears of the peoples of the Western Cameroon that they will be dominated by the more numerous east. The problem of ethnicity in Cameroon, as in any other African states does not stem from the conflict between *traditional* and *modern* identities, but comes as a result of competition for scarce economic and political resources. Mercier has pointed out that in most countries; "Tribal nationalisms," are usually less concerned with the rejection of the political framework constituted by the territory than searching for equilibrium inside the system.⁴¹ Usually ethnicity is an urban phenomenon, and Wallerstein has stressed that..."ethnic rivalries became rivalries for

political power in a non-tribal setting.⁴² The problem posed by ethnic rivalries is how to reconcile and compromise the conflicting interests of the ethnic groups with the 'universal' interests of the nation. The task of nation-building is how to accommodate the various ethnic groups while strengthening the national identity and authority. This important and delicate task of balancing ethnic interests within the national framework is denoted by Geertz's remark, "The integrative revolution does not do away with ethnocentrism ; it merely modernizes it."⁴³ The nation builders of Cameroon have the difficult task of modernizing all the ethnic groups in such a way that the small groups, such as the Kirdi and Douala, can live together with the more modernized groups, such as the Bamileke. This process could be enhanced through equitable distribution of the economic and political resources of the nation. The resources must be shared in such a predictable manner that no ethnic group will feel neglected and therefore withdraw its allegiance from national authority. James Coleman has noted the positive aspect of ethnicity as "engineering blocks" for nation-building, by indicating that :

"The multiplicity of tribes within a state is not everywhere an obstacle to the creation of broader political nationality—indeed, the larger the number and the smaller their size, the better the chances for effective amalgamation."⁴⁴

The second factor that has tended to detract from the nation-building efforts in Cameroon is, *the varied colonial experiences of the Eastern and Western Cameroons*. The two Cameroons were formerly administered as one colonial state by the German for 32 years. Then came World War I and the German defeat. West and East Cameroons became trust territories under the British and French, and were administered separately for 45 years.

The varied cultural, institutional and attitudinal values the Cameroon state inherited following the re-unification in 1961, were a result of the varied colonial policies and practices by France and Britain. The French colonial policy was based on the doctrine of "assimilation"—the commitment to bring the subjugated subjects into full dignity and freedom of man through the acquisition

of French culture. On this basis there would be fraternal equality and the subjugated lands would be exploited into a fuller measure of wealth through union with France.⁴⁵ Traditionally, Frenchmen assumed the superiority of French civilization over African civilization.⁴⁶ In Cameroon, as elsewhere, the French administrator regarded it a sacred duty to bring up the Africans to the level of French civilization. The French colonial policy was direct and, in most cases, it created in the colonies political structures and regimes identical to that of France. Until 1944, France had hoped for eventual integration of her trust territory of Cameroon with the Metropole. Article 109 of the French constitution of 1848, which embodied this principle, stated that, "Colonies are French territories in the same way as the Metropole, and enjoy the same position in private and public law."⁴⁷

It should not be forgotten that it was the French policy of assimilation that Um Nyoba, the Secretary of the militant U.P.C. went to the United Nations to protest against in 1952.⁴⁸

On the other hand, the British colonial policy is consistently referred to as *empirical* in the sense that it is normally developed piece-meal in relation to specific situations or as a means of solving specific problems.⁴⁹ Britain never intended to assimilate the peoples in her colonies into the British culture and political institutions of her metropolises. The system of indirect rule was resorted to as a means of, not only achieving effective administration through indigenous institutions, but as a means of reducing the cost of administration. As a result of the pragmatic nature of British colonial policy, West Cameroon was administered as part of Nigeria. By the time the trust territoryship was terminated in 1961, the northern sector of Western Cameroon which never enjoyed separate administrative existence, had been assimilated into northern Nigeria, while the southern sector, which had known a separate administrative existence but had been administered as a part of eastern Nigeria, had inherited the British institutional and attitudinal values.⁵⁰

While common colonial experience elsewhere in Africa had aided nation-building, the varied colonial experiences of the West and East Cameroons under the British and the French respectively

had created integration problems for Cameroon nation builders. There is the problem of harmonization of legal, economic and political institutions inherited from the two colonial powers. Different legal codes and procedures are still potential areas of conflict. The former French Cameroonians were accustomed to direct administration, hence the system of prefectures which insured greater linkage between the center and the peripheries suited them. The former British Cameroonians, who until 1961 constituted a unit in the Nigerian federation, would prefer a loose center-periphery linkage. There is no doubt that Ahidjo's greater thrust toward a unitary system of government had alienated his former allies—such as John Ngu Foncha who recently dropped out of the government because of his opposition to greater centralization of the two Cameroons.⁵¹ It has not been easy to integrate the two economic systems, one which was tied to the Nigerian economy and the other having very close association with the French economy. At the period of unification, the per capita GDP of West Cameroon was of the order of 20,000 francs CFA (\$78), while that of East Cameroon was 30,000 francs CFA.⁵² Between 1960 and 1962, the French aid to Cameroon totalled over \$50,000,000.⁵³ Increasingly the former British Cameroon depended on the central government subvention to run its recurrent expenditures. This increased reliance by the West on Younde had strengthened Ahidjo's hand in pushing forward his political program for greater national integration.

This situation regarding the centre-periphery relationship is not unique to Cameroon. It is now a common feature in most of the emergent nations of Africa. For example, in the present-day Zaïre and Nigeria, the national government, through disbursement of national revenue, exercises much control over the peripheries.

Perhaps one of the most intractable problems left to the Cameroonians as a result of varied colonial experience is that of language. As Karl Deutsch aptly observed, common national language aids not only in social communication but in national integration. But Cameroon inherited, not one foreign language which serves as the official language, but two : French and English languages. The problem is even confounded by the existence of

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other languages spoken by the varied ethnic groups that make the Cameroon nation. French and English were adopted at the period of the re-unification as the official languages of the Republic ; but increasingly, French has been adopted as the language of the day to day transaction in both government and business. Knowledge of French, in addition to other academic achievements, is now pre-requisite for appointment to senior government positions in Younde and in the National University of Cameroon.⁵⁴ If the present tendency continues, although English will still be in use, the French language will be dominant language for all official and commercial transactions.

What emerges from the above analysis is the enormous problem posed to nation-building in an emergent African state where the center-periphery linkage is weak and where, until recently, the state consisted of loose association of ethnic groups with low levels of economic and political integration. Many significant structures remain loose with almost no institutional organization. As Professor Huntington pointed out, there is a need to create in an emergent state such as Cameroon, political and economic structures, such as political parties, government bureaucracies and agencies, which will not only serve as reservoirs for legitimacy for a national government, but for which behaviour will at all times be predictable.⁵⁵

Factors that can Aid Nation-Building in Cameroon

In a state like Cameroon, encompassed with diverse problems ranging from institutional through ethnicity to bi-lingual problems, there are a number of 'imperatives' which provide a guide to the action of nation-builders.

There is a need for adept leadership. Indicating the need for talented leadership in a pluralistic society, Carl Rosberg states :

"The task of African leadership is not to eliminate cultural diversity but rather to create an order in which ethnic and regional identities might co-exist in harmony with national interests and needs as a new national whole emerges. Such an order must rest in the beginning upon enlightened groups of national leaders and ethnic spokesmen who are perceptive

enough to know that, while ethnic interests do exist and should be heard, in any confrontation between ethnicity and nationalism that cannot be accommodated, the latter must be permitted to succeed.”⁵⁶

Ahmadou Ahidjo, the President of Cameroon since re-unification of the two Cameroons, has shown talents in adept leadership. Ahidjo, a ‘Foulba’ from the northern region with moderate education, has bridged the differential gap between the more educated and sophisticated southern Cameroon and the less modernized and relatively mobilized north. At the time he first assumed leadership, in 1958 as Prime Minister, his party—Union Camerounaise (UC)—could claim only 30 seats in the Assembly of 70 members.⁵⁷ But through skillful leadership and his political shrewdness he integrated a number of Cameroonian parties into his party. The first accretion to his party strength came when Charles Assale and his ‘Movement d’Action Nationaux’ joined UC, first in coalition and later in fusion, 1958 and 1960 respectively. Also, in 1960 the Bamileke deputies in the Cameroon National Assembly declared for Ahidjo.⁵⁸ The integration of the more modernised Bamileke group into his party was no small achievement, especially if one remembers that the militant U.P.C. had derived its support and vitality from the Bamilekes. Through well calculated tactics, he destroyed the rebellious & U.P.C. leadership by granting a total amnesty to all those in rebellion against his regime. The attraction of office and the desire to make a fresh effort in building a Cameroon nation lured home most of the leaders of the U.P.C. who were operating in exile. Ahidjo’s UC has moved from being a dominant party to being the only party in Cameroon.

If Ahidjo and his party will continue to provide the vanguard through which national integration can be achieved, he should be able to avoid elite-mass gap. Criticisms should be allowed within the party apparatus. He should particularly watch closely, party officials in the peripheries and ensure that they do not constitute themselves as local tyrants. The party should, therefore, direct its efforts towards building vertical and horizontal linkages among various peoples of Cameroon. This is even more important in the West Cameroon where there are still considerable attachments to the

institutions, values and norms inherited from the terminal British administration.

Another 'factor' that could assist in building a Cameroon nation is creating linkages through industrialization and modernization of agriculture. However, Cameroon, unlike states such as Nigeria, is not endowed with rich mineral resources and cannot, therefore, hope for a rapid industrialization. Perhaps her hope of achieving greater cohesion among the various ethnic groups lies in modernization of agriculture. A foundation for commercial agriculture was laid during the 32 years of German rule. At that time many plantations such as the banana plantations in the Western Cameroon were established. Barrington Moore had ably pointed out the possible consequences of modernization and commercialization of agriculture. Usually it is followed by disruption of the countryside and displacement of many peasants who are small land holders or tenants.⁵⁹ Modernization of agriculture in Cameroon should be carried out in such a way as to lead to land consolidation, improvement in farming techniques and productivity. Above all it should create new employment for high school students. The working together of people from various ethnic groups will not only create vertical and horizontal linkages but will lead to greater social cohesion, and thereby national unity will be strengthened.

Ideology : Equally important to the task of nation building is the role of ideology, or what David Apter refers to as political religion. An ideology entails belief in the rightness of a regime. It stems out of the moral convictions about the validity of a regime.⁶⁰ A political ideology consists two main components—the consummatory—which gives the vision of the new nation to be created; and the instrumental component which emphasizes the immediate and, practical advantages of supporting the regime. A political ideology which is also consensual has several uses. It calls for sacrifices and individual discipline, thrift and savings. It solicits ruthless capital accumulation in order to facilitate speedy industrialization commenting on the socialization function of consensual ideology, Apter states: "With the addition of political religion, the mobilization system becomes a prototype for what ought to obtain in other systems. The state is not only a teacher and guide for its

own citizens it is a religious heartland for the conversion of infidels abroad. The translation of political morals into political religion becomes a practical act."⁶¹ Ahidjo's brand of African socialism is an effort to evolve a consensual ideology in order to enhance the process of nation-building in Cameroon.

Although Cameroon is still far from being an integrated nation and cannot be expected within a few years to attain the level of mobilization and integration of such nations as the United States and Britain, the prospects for nationhood are embedded in the present Cameroon state. It has never been an easy task anywhere to mould diverse national groups—represented in Cameroon by such groups as the Bamilake, the Foulbe, the Bamoun and the Kirdi—into a single nation with a high degree of collective consciousness. As K.W. Deutsch said, "It took centuries to make Englishmen and Frenchmen."⁶² Pointing out the enormity of the problem posed by nation-building, Professor Emerson states :

"It is therefore acknowledged that achievement of a broadly based shared sense of national identity within each of the states is still largely a matter of the future. The bringing together of peoples within a common political framework was arbitrary and the period during which a sense of national identity might be acquired was short lived. It obviously could not reach further back than the beginning of the colonial experience, and ordinarily it was considerably shorter, because a period even of decades was often required before the colonial administration could consolidate diverse parts and peoples of the entire colonial territory."⁶³

Cameroon is a nation in the making, lacking national language, industrialization, and having a low degree of social mobilization—at least by the standard of Deutsch's indicators. Yet Cameroon has a collective consciousness and there is a determined effort from its people to build a nation. It also has an adept leadership in President Ahidjo, of whose regime Willard Johnson states, "...could claim with increasing effectiveness that it embodied the country's best hope for domestic justice, peace and progress."⁶⁴ To this one may add that Ahidjo also embodies his country's best hope for realization of a Cameroon nation.

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Dr Anne Ruggles Gere : **An Approach to
Achebe's Fiction**

West African novels of English expression appeared on the literary scene relatively recently (with the exception of a few early pieces all have been published since 1950), and critics are still searching for appropriate responses to this new body of literature. Some observers are withholding judgment or making tentative statements, waiting to see which African works will withstand the test of time. In the case of Chinua Achebe, however, critical sentiment is clear ; from the publication of his first novel, *Things Fall Apart* (1958), he has been hailed as an artist of high order. Achebe is often cited as the most important African writer, and his novels are described as archetypes of much of the fiction which has issued from Africa. James Olney, for example, groups three of Achebe's novels and describes them as a paradigm of African fiction showing how the theme and technique of each mirror the development of African fiction generally.¹ The novel which Olney does not include, *Arrow of God* (1964), has raised problems for a number of critics.

It is generally agreed that *Arrow of God* is Achebe's most complicated work ; its evocation of village life creates a rich texture which demands close reading. Yet this more difficult novel has much in common with Achebe's other works, and a more complete understanding of *Arrow of God* can enlighten our reading of all of Achebe's novels. As is true in the other novels, the central conflict is the cultural confrontation of African and British groups, and Achebe emphasizes the resulting cultural dislocation of Africans. Achebe gives greater attention to the British perspective here, and chapters portraying the colonial officers are interspersed with the account of traditional Umuaro life. Although the cultural conflict is clearly delineated, the internal struggles of Umuaro, which constitute a

major portion of the novel, are much less clear. Several critics have commented upon the ambiguity of Achebe's portrayal of the disharmony of Umuaro.² One aspect of Umuaro's internal conflict which has been largely overlooked is the frequent deliberation of the village group. Examination of the oratory of these deliberations provides insight into Umuaro's struggles and thus into the novel as a whole.

Umuaro's first internal problem, conveyed in a flashback, concerns a land dispute with the neighbouring village of Okperi. Ezeulu, the central character who is priest of Umuaro's most important god, argues against fighting for the Land :

My father said this to me that when our village first came here to live the land belonged to Okperi. It was Okperi who gave us a piece of their land to live in. They also gave us their deities...This is the story as I heard it from my father. If you choose to fight a man for a piece of farmland that belongs to him I shall have no hand in it.³

Ezeulu's words have the authority of the past, the supreme authority of Umuaro ; in Umuaro as in all of precolonial Igboland, elders are regarded as living representatives of the wisdom of the ages. This, coupled with Ezeulu's position as priest of Ulu and his assertion that Ulu will not support an unjust war, gives Ezeulu's statements tremendous power. Yet there is one who dares to challenge Ezeulu. Nwaka, a wealthy and powerful elder who is urged on by the priest of a rival god, takes issue with Ezeulu's claims :

Wisdom is like a goatskin bag ; every man carries his own. Knowledge of the land is also like that. Ezeulu has told us what his father told him about the olden days. We know that a father does not speak falsely to his son. But we also know that the lore of the land is beyond the knowledge of many fathers. If Ezeulu had spoken about the great deity of Umuaro which he carries and which his fathers carried before him I would have paid attention to his voice. (p. 7-18)

Nwaka undercuts Ezeulu's authority by suggesting that the priest's knowledge is not absolute and by making an oblique reference to the fact that Ezeulu's mother was from Okperi. In his effort to discredit Ezeulu, Nwaka strikes a blow at the authority which under-

girds all of Umuaro ; to suggest that the words of ancestors are relative calls all authority into question. Another elder who attempts to reconcile the differences between Ezeulu and Nwaka is attacked by Ezeulu for abrogating his responsibility as an elder by concerning himself with the minor issue of how the delegation should proceed and overlooking the major error in initiating the proceeding in the first place : "When an adult is in the house the she-goat is not left to suffer the pains of parturition in its tether." (p. 22) Ezeulu is enraged because sweet words of unity, rather than truth based on traditional authority, has been emphasized.

Ezeulu's claims are vindicated when the delegation to Okperi engages in a quarrel which results in the death of its leader. Umuaro is once again assembled to deliberate further action, and Nwaka speaks eloquently in favour of war with Okperi to avenge the death of their kinsman. Ezeulu, who speaks last, begins by reminding Umuaro of his earlier admonition, then he tells the story of the wrestler who vainly challenged his *chi* and states that the deceased leader had challenged his *chi*. He concludes :

But let the slave who sees another cast into a shallow grave know that he will be buried in the same way when his day comes. Umuaro is challenging its *chi*. Is there any man or woman in Umuaro who does not know Ulu, the deity that destroys a man when his life is sweetest to him ? Some people are still talking of carrying war to Okperi...If you go to war to avenge a man who passed shit on the head of his mother's father, Ulu will not follow you to be soiled in the corruption. Umuaro, I salute you. (p. 29-30)

In even stronger terms than his earlier speeches, Ezeulu attempts to establish a direct relationship between spiritual and temporal life, to relate the authority of ancestral and spiritual wisdom to the political decision facing Umuaro. Instead of the unity implicit in this combination, Ezeulu's words have the opposite effect. "The meeting ended in confusion. Umuaro was divided in two" (p. 30). In response Nwaka holds another meeting from which members of Ezeulu's village are excluded and makes an even more direct attack on Ezeulu.

My father did not tell me that before Umuaro went to war it took leave from the priest of Ulu.....The man who carries a diety is not a king. He is there to perform its ritual and to carry sacrifice to it. But I have been watching this Ezeulu for many years. He is a man of ambition ; he wants to be king, priest, diviner, all. His father, they said, was like that. But Umuaro showed him that Igbo people knew no kings.

We have no quarrel with Ulu.....But I will not see with these eyes of mine his priest making himself lord over us.....Let us not listen to anyone trying to frighten us with the name of Ulu. If a man says yes his *chi* also says yes. And we have all heard how the people of Aninta dealt with their deity when he failed them. Did they not carry him to the boundary between them and their neighbours and set fire on him ? I salute you. (p. 30)

Nwaka's words reveal his contempt for Ulu as well as Ezeulu. His reference to the people of Aninta is almost a threat to Ulu, which would be unthinkable for anyone who believed in the power of Ulu. Nwaka, in his drive for personal power, is willing to undercut traditional authority and risk the vengeance of a wrathful god. He is willing to do this because of the inspiration of his friend Ezidemili, priest of the lesser god Idemili, who constantly urges him on by asserting "that in the days before Ulu the true leaders of each village had been men of high title like Nwaka" (p. 49). It is the personal envy of Ezidemili, because Ulu is regarded as above his god, which underlies much of the divisive force in Umuaro.

The conflicts and growing indecisiveness of the elders is paralled in the younger generation when Obika, one of Ezeulu's sons is whipped by the British construction foreman and Obika's age group meets to determine its response to this great insult. Moses, a Christian convert and Umuaro resident who has knowledge of the ways of the white man, attends the meeting although he is not a member of the age group. His presence becomes a topic of discussion and Ofoedu argues that he should stay :

I want him to say before us all what he said before the white man about Obika's family. I want him also to say before 'us

all whether it is true that he incited the white man to whip our comrade. When he has given us these answers he may go away.....and take with him all his knowledge of the white man's ways. We have all heard stories of how he came by this knowledge. We have heard that when he left Umuaro he went to cook like a woman in the white man's kitchen and lick his plates..... (pp. 95-96)

The uproar which follows this speech is not entirely in Ofoedu's favour, members are as divided about the merits of his attack as all of Umuaro is by the contest between Ezeulu and Nwaka. Moses' counter-offensive, while vindicating himself, adds to the general confusion and he sustains the chaos by turning from an explanation of white man's law to proselytizing for Christianity. After lengthy speeches speculating on the nature and intent of the white man, "the only decision of the meeting was.....taken. The Otakagu ages group asked Unachukwu to find out, at a well chosen moment when it was safe to approach the white man, why he had not given them any money for working on his road" (p. 98). This conclusion is not only tentative and equivocal, but it has no relation to the problem which occasioned the meeting. Obika's mistreatment is lost in the chaos of conflicting opinions. Like their elders, the Otakagu age group is losing the capacity to use oratory as a unifying force; rather it diminishes members and divides the group, thus decreasing their effectiveness.

The divisions in Umuaro continue to grow and Nwaka's desire to limit Ezeulu's power and the British desire to control Umuaro are unwittingly united in a struggle which leads to greater factionalism within the village group. Ezeulu is summoned by the British who want to make him a warrant chief for the area, and before he goes Ezeulu calls the elders together to tell of his summons and concludes his speech :

That was what I woke up this morning and found. Ogbuefi Akuebue was there and saw it with me. I thought about it for a long time and decided that Umuaro should join with me in seeing and hearing what I have seen and heard; for when a man sees a snake all by himself he may wonder whether it is an ordinary snake or the untouchable python. So I said to

myself: "Tomorrow I shall summon Umuaro and tell them." Then one mind said to me: "Do you know what may happen in the night or at dawn?" That is why, although I have no palm wine to place before you I still thought I should call you together. (pp. 160-61)

Both the fact of calling the group together and the extremely conciliatory nature of Ezeulu's words seem calculated to unify Umuaro against any outside force. If the assembly had ended with this speech Umuaro might have faced the British from a united position, and, more important, the interrelation of religion and other aspects of life might have been preserved. Ezeulu, the spiritual leader, came to Umuaro with a secular concern, which implies the possibility of uniting the two. The immediate response to Ezeulu's speech is subdued conversation and his friend Akuebue assures him that "he had spoken all the words that needed to be said" (p. 161). Then Nwaka speaks. He begins by commending Ezeulu for calling Umuaro together and regretting his lack of palm wine, then he launches his attack:

Ezeulu has told us that the white ruler has asked him to go to Okperi. Now it is not clear to me whether it is wrong for a man to ask his friend to visit him. When we have a feast do we not send for our friends in other clans to come and share it with us, and do they not also ask us to their own celebrations? The white man is Ezeulu's friend and has sent for him. What is so strange about that...Did not our elders tell us that as soon as we shake hands with a leper he will want an embrace? It seems to me that Ezeulu has shaken hands with a man of white body. (p. 162)

Nwaka's play on the phrase white body and leprosy brings applause and laughter and the salutation "owner of words" to Nwaka who continues:

...a man who brings ant-ridden faggots into his hut should expect the visit of lizards. But if Ezeulu is now telling us that he is tired of the white man's friendship our advice to him should be : You tied the knot, you should also know how to undo it...Is this the first time Ezeulu would be going to Okperi? Who was the white man's witness that year we fought for our land-and lost? (p. 162)

Nwaka's use of rhetorical questions and his deft reference to Ezeulu's relationship with Winterbottom and his testimony at the trial reveal his consummate skill as an orator: he completely changes the atmosphere which Ezeulu had created with his words. Proverbs, reference to tradition and play on words are combined in a magnetic *tour de force* which turns the audience around. However, Nwaka's intent is derisive. He aims to discredit Ezeulu and thus force the audience to side with one or the other of them and, in so doing, he removes the possibility of conciliation of forces in Umuaro. The majority of the remaining speakers defend Nwaka's position, and those who side with Ezeulu remain silent. One elder makes a gesture reconciliation by suggesting, over Nwaka's objections, that Ezeulu should be accompanied by six elders. This attempt at appeasement enrages Ezeulu more than Nwaka's direct hostility :

When I called you together it was not because I am lost or because my eyes have seen my ears. All I wanted was to see the way you would take my story. I have now seen it and I am satisfied. Sometimes when we have given a piece of yam to a child we beg him to give us a little from it, not because we really want to eat it but because we want to test our child. We want to know whether he is the kind of person who will give out or whether he will clutch everything to his chest when he grows up.

Now I have told you and happiness fills my mind. This is not the time for many words. When the time comes to speak we shall all speak until we are tired and perhaps we shall find then that there are orators in Umuaro besides Nwaka. (pp. 163-164)

Animosity between Ezeulu and Nwaka, exacerbated by the British presence, forces everyone in Umuaro to take one side or the other and an elder later tells Ezeulu that most of them were completely confused after this exchange between the two. Umuaro has known disputes before: "Disagreement was not new in Umurao, the rulers of the clan had often quarrelled about one thing or another...But none of them (the disputes) had quite filtered down to the ground...like the present crisis." (p. 263) Deliberations designed to bring

Umuaro to speak with one voice have instead brought the village to the breaking point.

It is during this climatic meeting that Ezeulu, while he is listening to those who oppose him, plans his revenge upon Umuaro. When he returns from his stay at British headquarters, he withholds the New Yam Feast, effectively starving the people because they cannot harvest the new crop until after the feast. However, the result is the opposite of what Ezeulu intends. When Umuaro people are hungry and unable to harvest their yams, the Christian missionaries offer the alternative of a thanksgiving service to which the new yams can be brought for blessing, and on this basis Christianity takes a firm hold in Umuaro, replacing the worship of Ulu. The combination of this disloyalty and the tragic death of his son drive Ezeulu to insanity and the novel closes on a village where traditions have been significantly altered.

From Nwaka's introduction of the question of relative truth to Ezeulu's individualistic decision to punish his people, the deliberations portrayed in *Arrow of God* are increasingly divisive. It is in these scenes of open debate that the indecision of Umuaro becomes most evident; factions within the society are brought into open confrontation, and people are forced to choose between conflicting claims rather than accept the unifying voice of traditional authority,

The speaking voices of the orators, then, make the narrative of *Arrow of God* more comprehensible by illuminating Umuaro's internal conflicts. Achebe uses deliberative oratory to much the same purpose in his other novels; in each groups are frequently assembled—to decide upon village action in *Things Fall Apart*, to determine how the urban union of villagers can best support its members in *No Longer at Ease* or to listen to the claims of politicians in *A Man of the People*—to make decisions which will affect the whole group. The rhetoric of these gatherings reveals the essential values of the people while casting light upon the difficulties they face and adding a dimension to Achebe's portrayal of the society.

Achebe has stated that the finest examples of non-literate Igbo prose occur in oratory, not in the folk-tales, legends, proverbs and riddles which have been given much more attention.⁴ Achebe's

own fiction illustrates the truth of this statement. In evoking traditional Igbo life Achebe consistently uses orators who reveal the central concerns of each narrative in an eloquent style, befitting the collective wisdom of the society. Even in the corrupt world of *A Man of the People* where traditional life and language have been considerably debased, Nanga is portrayed as a master of words. The oratory of Achebe's fiction—and that of many other African authors—deserves more critical attention than it has received because it can provide insight into the essence of the author's themes and techniques.

FOOTNOTES

1. James Olney, "The African Novel in Transition: Chinua Achebe," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 70: 299-316.

2. See for example David Carroll, *Chinua Achebe* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1970) pp. 119-120, or. G.D. Killam, *The Novels of Chinua Achebe* (New York: Africana, 1969) pp. 95-97.

3. Chinua Achebe, *Arrow of God* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1969) p. 17. All future quotes cited are from this edition.

4. Chinua Achebe, *Foreword to African Prose*, by W.H. Whitely (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. viii.

Dr (Mrs) Priya V Mutalik Desai

Ujamaa Villages . A Tanzanian Experiment in Rural Development

Among the developing countries of East Africa, Tanzania is perhaps the only country which has consciously articulated the need to develop its rural sector. What separates her out from the rest of the countries which have undertaken some kind of rural development programme is the comprehensive nature of its rural development programme highlighting the urgent need to utilise the basic resource ; the vast majority of peasant population, in the task of development and nation building. Within a period of six years of independence and development planning, the country's leadership was able to spell out clearly the future path of development, the priorities and the policies needed to achieve the major development objectives, namely, self-reliance, socialism and rural development. This added uniqueness to the way the country set about to tackle the development task.

Tanzania has a large geographical area of about 342,171 sq. miles with a relatively low population density of about 40 per sq. mile. In general, population is concentrated in a few dense pockets widely scattered through the country. A vast majority of the people, about 95%, live in rural areas. Being a country with one of the lowest per capita incomes, Tanzania starts from a base of extreme poverty. The industrial sector in Tanzania contributes only 10 percent to the monetary income. During the period since independence, the country underwent some industrialisation, but almost entirely for domestic consumption and largely of the import-substitution variety. There are a few export-oriented industries such as plywood and meat canning ; while among the import substitution

A Tanzanian Experiment in Rural Development

industries, textiles is the notable one. During the Second Development Plan, projects such as fertiliser and cement production plants, oil refining and steel plants have received emphasis. But it is clear that Tanzanian economy has not achieved transformation if we mean by that development of industries for the production and export of manufactured goods. The agricultural sector accounts for 40 percent of monetary and subsistence gross domestic product and contributes almost 80 percent to exports. Agriculture, therefore, has a strategic role in Tanzania's economy.

Agricultural sector in Tanzania is characterised by the absence of shortage of land, evil of landlordism and fragmentation of land into microscopic holdings. While tribal system of land ownership continues, small peasants constituting a vast majority of the population maintain their own landholdings. Tea and tobacco estates operate as commercial enterprises. However since 1967, through the key sectors such as, sisal, wheat and sugar the Government started intervening in the agricultural sector through the instrument of state farms which have a limited but an important role to play. The state farms are capital intensive and do not propose to generate large employment in the rural sector. Since they are meant to subserve the export sector and earn valuable foreign exchange, their impact on rural areas is not expected to be large. Introduction of state farms is but one part of Government's effort to raise and diversify agricultural output through the process of socialisation of agriculture. The major programmes intended to create impact on the rural areas include diversification of production and its increased availability to rural population, mobilisation of unexploited resources, the improvement of the material, social and cultural situation of the rural population and the development of 'Ujamaa Villages'.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section traces the idea of the Ujamaa villages to the earlier approach of village settlement programme initiated after independence in 1961. In this background, the second section elaborates the concept and characteristics of Ujamaa villages. The third section explains some of the difficulties in this successful implementation of policy and also points out some of the positive aspects of the experiment.

I

Rural Development : 1962-67

The genesis of the idea of Ujamaa villages could be traced back to the approach to rural development programmes initiated immediately after independence in 1962. President Nyerere outlined the goals and programmes of TANU in terms of changing agriculture and life style of the overwhelming majority of Tanzanian peasants.

‘For the next few years Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities. And if you ask me why the Government wants us to live in villages, the answer is just as simple ; unless we do, we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools for our children ; we shall not be able to build hospitals or have clean drinking water ; it will be quite impossible to start small village industries ; and instead we shall have to go on depending on the town for all our requirements ; and even if we had a plentiful supply of electric power we should never be able to connect it up to each isolated homestead.’¹

He further emphasised the need to bridge the gap between towns and countryside before it becomes too wide and stressed that the government’s rural emphasis would be to establish more modern add more productive villages in the sparsely populated countryside. This was also in conformity with the ‘transformation approach’ suggested by the IBRD mission which visited Tanzania at the time of independence.² The outcome of the pronouncements was seen in the creation of Village Settlement Agency in 1963 and initiation of rural development programme based on village settlement schemes. Nyerere in his speech to the Parliament stated ‘Almost all the help which the Government can give in the way of tractors, improved houses and rural water supply will be concentrated on these new village settlement schemes. Volunteers coming to these new areas will be becoming modern farmers in every sense... We expect by 1980 to have about one million people living and working under these new conditions.’³

The village settlement schemes which were started in earnest intended to solve two major problems in agriculture, viz., land ten-

ure and unemployed agricultural labour. These were also considered to be an essential step in the establishment of a socialist society. Except in a few cases, these government sponsored ambitious and innovative schemes failed to achieve the expected results. In fact, somewhat unhappy experience with these settlement schemes led to the adoption of new methods of rural development since 1966. The new thinking on rural development was based on low capital investment and high peasant involvement and it culminated in the acceptance of the programme for the creation of 'Ujamaa villages' throughout the countryside. In this context, John R. Nellis pertinently observes 'But even more important was the implication that transformation projects such as settlement—in which government took the full initiative only served to increase dependence attitudes and the material demands of the people involved...And since the demands of the people involved in these projects were far in excess of the actual production increases, the Government could not meet their terms; instead, Government backed off and attempted to find another route to economic growth and political stability'.⁴

Emergence of the Concept of Ujamaa : 1967

Ujamaa had been the Central theme in Nyerere's thinking since 1962.⁵ But after a quinquennium's experience he utilised it to demand greater self reliance on the part of the rural people. In the famous Arusha Declaration of 1967, President Nyerere committed to build a socialist state and announced the new strategy for agricultural development as the Ujamaa village development strategy.⁶ The same was officially adopted in the Second Development Plan for 1969-74.

Similarly the policy paper 'Socialism and Rural Development'⁷ outlined a policy of interlinked self-governing village communities which are of the people and which therefore cannot be created for them or imposed on them. In the concluding part of the paper President Nyerere states 'what is here being proposed is that we in Tanzania should move from being a nation of individual peasant producers who are gradually adopting the incentives and the ethics of the capitalist system. Instead we should gradually become a nation of Ujamaa villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these small groups cooperate together for

joint enterprises.' The Arusha Declaration and Socialism and Rural Development together provide clear guidelines for the development of Tanzanian economy, which it is stated, cannot be achieved by depending on the industrialisation in the urban areas and capitalism in the rural areas. Achievement of the goals set before the country is possible as Nyerere states, 'if the basis of Tanzanian life consists of rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all.'⁸ The difference between the communities about which Nyerere talked in 1962 (village settlement scheme) and in 1967 was thus clearly visible. Under the new scheme the real burden of development is to be borne by the rural people themselves through a change in their work habits and a rearrangement of their social patterns. While monetary investment plays a secondary role belief is the core of this policy.

SECTION II

Ujamaa Villages : The Concept and Characteristics

The word Ujamaa connotes the idea of familyhood. It has been popularised in Tanzania to connote, firstly, the extended family of African communalism and secondly, to the creation of agricultural collectives. The traditional African community operated with three basic principles of joint production, egalitarian distribution and universal obligation to work. The policy of rural socialism based on the creation of Ujamaa villages as vehicles for change seeks to recapture these basic tenets of African communal life.⁹

The strategy of Ujamaa villages aims not only at increasing the wealth and output in the agricultural sector but has twin aspects—socialism and self reliance. Therefore, the policy does not foresee the creation of a few cooperative villages but represents Government's decision to introduce a frontal approach by starting Ujamaa villages, big and small throughout the country. To understand the importance of Ujamaa village policy, it is enough to note that it is not an alternate path to development but 'rightly or wrongly it is seen as the only way to development.'¹⁰ The existence of these rural communities is considered to be the only way to mobilise the masses effectively to build a socialist society in the long run. Additionally, they are the instruments to foster a much broader based, labour intensive development

of the agricultural sector and to promote the development of the internal market.

Certain important stages in the setting up of Ujamaa villages were outlined in the policy paper on 'Socialism and Rural Development'. First, the group of peasants should be persuaded to move their houses to a single village, preferably near a water source, and plant their crops in the vicinity. Then they should be persuaded to establish small communal plots, say about 10 family groups working together and sharing the proceeds at the harvest time, according to the work each one has done. If they succeed upto this stage, then the whole project can be turned into a community farm. The whole process is a gradual one and the last stage is the ideal to be strived for. There is not an established single set of practices to be followed in the setting up of an Ujamaa village. However one of the important features that distinguishes an Ujamaa village is the cooperative production activity. It is important to remember that no compulsory total communalisation of land is involved and farmers can continue to cultivate their private plots. The members of the village will put their extra labour in the communal plot and share the proceeds. This should normally be followed up by the introduction of producers and consumer cooperatives. Nearly 342 Ujamaa villages, which had advanced far along the road to cooperative production, were registered as multipurpose cooperative societies by March 1973. The emphasis on agricultural production is not the only basis of Ujamaa living; the Ujamaa principles can be applied to many other activities such as establishment of Ranching Association for the production of beef and other animals, establishment of village, industries etc. What is vital to any Ujamaa activity is the local initiative as the effective agent of development.

Ujamaa Programmes which Uma Lele¹¹ terms as the 'bottom up' programme also require practical advance preparations and cannot be formed hastily. The advance preparation covers various aspects such as good local leadership, adequacy of land with proved potential for development as well as expansion and availability of water for human and animal use. Additionally, awareness on the part of farmers about the technical improvements to increase the agricultural production and the resources to use the new techniques,

outlets for the disposal of surplus produce and reinvestment schemes for surplus earning are also essential ingredients in the Ujamaa village establishment programme.

By March 1973, Tanzania had established 5628 Ujamaa villages covering 15% of the population.¹² A recent estimate puts the total number of Ujamaa villages at 7500 with a membership of 3.5 million or about 1/3 of all peasants;¹³ Since biggest expansion in the number of Ujamaa villages took place only during and after 1971, most of these villages are very young. Regional participation in Ujamaa villages is very uneven. For instance, in Mtwara region participation was as high as 16% while only 1 percent of the population of Kilimanjaro and Shinyanga regions were living in Ujamaa villages. As the table on village statistics shows, 80 per cent of the people now living in Ujamaa villages are concentrated in 7 regions only.

Factors such as the prevailing land tenure system, scarcity of new land in the nearby area, cultivation of permanent crops on the area and the facility of selling the individual cash crop production through well developed marketing cooperatives since long, are responsible for the slow progress in the backward regions such as West Lake, Mwanza, Arusha etc. Crucial to the Ujamaa experiment in backward regions is the understanding of the potential value of working together for the upliftment of the entire society. Once the environment for the creation of Ujamaa spirit is created, questions such as the size of these villages, their organizational pattern, the extent of communal activity are secondary and experience suggests that these matters could be worked out in their details in the light of the given situation. What is significant is the priority accorded to Ujamaa villages in the allocation of Government money and skilled personnel for the development of schools, dispensaries, water supplies, agricultural advice etc. Thus nearly sh. 300 million per year are earmarked for education, health, input credit, feeder road building and various other types of support for these villages. Behind all this effort is the expectation that at the present rate of the proliferation of these villages, they will dominate the rural economy by 1980.

Operation Tanzania : 1973

With a view to achieving faster progress in various areas a policy was planned for mass involvement into Ujamaa villages. In 1973 a policy decision named "Operation Tanzania" was taken which made it compulsory for all Tanzanians to obtain membership (or enroll themselves in) of Ujamaa villages within the subsequent three years.¹⁴ It is easy to see that the inbuilt compulsion in this policy decision is hardly compatible with the spirit of Ujamaa.

Persuasion is the keynote of this unique experiment in the socialist nation building. Apart from ideological content, organisation and implementation are the two major aspects of the policy of rural socialism. The policy paper on 'Socialism and Rural Development' calls for 'leadership but not for orders to be given; it directs the people along socialist path but excludes any attempt to whip them into it.'¹⁵ Nyerere in an interview explained 'How can you compel people to go into Ujamaa, to share their labour and so on? We think it is a jolly good thing...but socialism is a matter of conviction. And you cannot convince by law.'¹⁶ In view of this liberal attitude of leadership, it is difficult to understand the basis and purpose behind the policy of 'Operation Tanzania'.

In fact, in this policy, the Government and TANU have been assigned important roles. Apart from clarifying the meaning of Ujamaa and its implementation aspects, they are responsible for ideological campaign and political mobilisation in rural areas. It is feared that peoples entrusted with this task may emerge as the rural elite thwarting the progress of Ujamaa or the principle of persuasion.¹⁷ Examples are also not rare when instead of persuasion, force was used as a medium to organise Ujamaa villages.¹⁸ However, R.H. Green¹⁹ maintains that a vast majority of villagers came voluntarily in the hope of a better life. Those who were compelled to join Ujamaa villages through force (a small fraction) or through exhortation (perhaps a larger one) normally left the villages within a short period. In defence of the Government policy, Green says 'Tanzania simply does not have the force to keep significant numbers of people in villages they wish to leave nor, indeed, to get them into them in the first place.'²⁰ Though the greatly elaborated Ujamaa village schemes and the policy framework for it, as outlined by

Nyerere appears to be sound, its actual implementation is ridden with a number of difficulties inherent in such a democratic cooperative experiment. The hardheaded thinking of Nyerere is evident in the detailed guidelines provided for the successful implementation of the ujamaa village policy; this is also reflected in papers such as 'Freedom and Development', 'Implementation of Rural Socialism' etc.²¹ Yet effective and good leadership at all levels as well as the requirement of voluntary mass participation might prove to be the two most important fallible aspects of the entire experiment.

In short, the role assigned to the Government and to TANU is to encourage and assist in the development of these village projects or to provide leadership and education for this purpose. Government, therefore, established a Planning Research and Training Unit for Ujamaa in the Ministry of Rural Development. Since the establishment of this Unit encouraging results have been obtained. Farmers have undertaken construction of homes, roads etc. on their own. Due to the receptive and progressive atmosphere in the new villages extension officers are enabled to introduce and spread the innovations practiced so far on individual as well as cooperative farms. Of special significance are the new innovations in the agricultural and non-agricultural fields and these include building of a cattle dip, establishment of a broiler unit etc.²² However, it is important to observe that considerable emphasis placed on the possibility of centrally administering agricultural development during early 1960's did not achieve the expected results. This is not to underestimate the critical role that the Government must continue to play and the encouraging results that is likely to achieve but to suggest that whether in the new villages mentioned above or otherwise the responses of the mass of small farmers are ultimately crucial to bring about expected results.²³ The greater importance given to the transformation approach with emphasis on ujamaa villages formation during the second and the successive five year plans would find these results specially useful to avoid setbacks.

Critics of the Programme

Nyerere's vision of rural development is based on very firm assumptions about traditional Tanzanian societies. Tanzanian

leadership views mutual assistance and cooperation as an essential ethic of indigenous African life. Some of the baffling issues in this connection are : Is the emphasis on traditional values really essential for the successful creation of these producer cooperatives? Is the principle of cooperation so obviously natural to the African peasants that its acceptance could be thought to be nearly axiomatic? Finally, are the traditional forms really capable of providing operational basis for ujamaa transformation?

A number of studies pertaining to these questions regarding traditional values and their relevance to cooperation in modern times debate the validity of the concept of existence of traditional society in Tanzania and its direct usefulness, in the present times.²⁴ In fact, *Holmquist* on the basis of the study of a cooperative framing scheme in Kisii District in Kenya conducted by him has gone to the extent of suggesting that participation in the money economy is incompatible with traditional social structures, i.e. modern agricultural cooperatives have nothing to do with the indigenous cooperative forms.²⁵ As far as peasant participation in cooperation activities is concerned Migot-Adholla does not attach much importance to lineage alliances and membership of Kinship groups. He further adds 'The appeal by the promoters of cooperation in East Africa to traditional ideals of mutual assistance may be expedient for mobilising the peasants and listing their participation in the development effort. But exhortation on the basis of such an ideology has to be complemented by real economic incentives to ensure continued participation'.²⁶ Lionel Cliffe while accepting that some form of mutual aid was almost certainly a feature of all pre-colonial society, feels it relevant to the planning of Ujamaa schemes to know whether these kinds of precedents regarding mutual aid were on anything but a family basis.²⁷ It is possible that tradition of mutual help could be still existing in certain villages. Yet it is difficult to ignore the differentiating, individualistic effects of the colonial economic impact. In his case study of Lushoto district, Cliffe found that the villages that took up production for market, mutual aid on something like the traditional basis had virtually died out. This is to emphasise the importance of regional differences in the planning of Ujamaa transformation. It is in this

context that Cliffe suggests the need for more empirical studies of 'existing rural societies' to make a success of the programmes of rural development.²⁸ In a similar vein Widestrand upholds the relevance of some aspects of traditional ujamaa to new kinds of collective modes of agricultural production but refuses to accept that they can suggest guidelines for the working of marketing cooperatives and advises the producer cooperatives not to rely heavily on the pre-existent socialism of the 'traditional' society.²⁹ David Feldman on the basis of his case study of farmers at Nduli in the Iringa District of Tanzania, where all the tobacco farms are highly commercial enterprises, states that it is extremely difficult to find any direct influence of traditional ujamaa work patterns.³⁰ His examination of the organizational structure brought out a number of contradictions between the ujamaa assumptions and the development of prosperous, technologically advanced rural economy. He found that effect of developing commercialisation in Tanzanian agricultural system has been to undermine communal features and encourage individualism. Factors such as environment, opportunities, individual and social aspirations played an important part too. One of his empirical conclusions was 'If socialistic relations are desired then they need to be new ones, to fit in with the needs of new economic processes. Appeal to traditional values will have little impact.'³¹

The general view regarding the emphasis on traditional values could well be summed up now: Tanzania does not show trends which are similar to those forms of traditional cooperation that existed. A more individualistic pattern of production is slowly emerging and a class system has also started spreading its roots in the rural areas.³² The response of elite-controlled local institutions to Ujamaa scheme has been to strengthen their own position through the mechanism of these villages. The fact that Ujamaa village draws more input materials than others has been an incentive for large farmers to advance their own interests under the sign-posting for Ujamaas. The emerging class differences or anti-ujamaa lobby and the resultant exploitation are found to be detrimental to the very spirit and implementation of the policy. To get the people adopt the practice of joint production for common good and its egalitarian distribution are the two key stages in the successful

implementation of Ujamaa villages. Nyerere's faith that it is possible to deliberately work for retaining of traditional values and still to take advantage of modern knowledge about advantages of scale and improved tools need constant testing.

SECTION III

An Evaluation : Fears and Hopes

The short period that has passed since the announcement and implementation of ujamaa village policy does not permit a true evaluation of its performance and its quantification as well. Similarly, there are other than economic motives behind its acceptance, major among them being initiation of certain social and political changes. It is believed, that relocation of sparsely settled and populated village communities would help increase the effectiveness of political mobilisation programmes. Additionally, it will help in evolving cooperative organisations in the place of less useful traditional social institutions. It will also promote the provision of infrastructural utilities. Looking to the comprehensiveness and multiplicity of aims, it is not far to see the lack of a single evaluation criteria to judge their success failure.

It is important to note that different types of villages are covered under the title Ujamaa. Where high productivity joint production communities on their own gather together to form an ujamaa village, its success is almost a foregone conclusion. On the other hand when Ujamaa are set up in poorer areas of the country either through rehabilitation of urban or rural destitutes or members being drawn from the poorer areas, they pose difficult cases and the chances of their failure do not remain small. At present, a large number of villages fall into the latter and therefore the category of unsuccessful villages. Increase in the level of public services, dissemination of modern techniques used for augmenting production, attitudinal improvements in the agricultural extension staff are some of the crucial pre-requisites needed to improve the performance of the heterogeneous groups of Ujamaa villages. It is hoped that establishment of a separate Ujamaa Section in the Prime Minister's Office would help solve some of these problems.

The success of Ujamaa villages also hinges on the resolution of policy questions such as whether collectivisation should be

introduced across the board or through persuasion. Indecisiveness in this matter has resulted in lowering the yields on collective as well private plots. The collective plots suffer from lower yields than the private plots due to the unwillingness of the farmer to allocate more of his scarce labour to collective plots. In Tabora and Sukumaland, mainly export crop growing areas, commercial small holders have strongly resisted collectivisation due to the potential losses involved by joining ujamaa villages. Uma Lele points out 'If collectivisation is to have a notable impact on the productivity and incomes of subsistence farmers and is to receive broad popular support, the critical organisational questions of who will do what, when, how, and at what wage rate, faced in managing collective farms, need substantially greater attention than they have received so far.'³³

Another equally important issue in the success of ujamaa policy is the need to improve the appeal of ujamaa within cash-crop areas. Barkar on the basis of his field research in two cash crop areas of Mbeya region (a coffee area and a rice area) concludes 'unless Ujamaa can gain a stronger presence in these, areas, it is likely to become a form of welfare for the most unfortunate majority who are unable to climb the ladder of success in cash crop agriculture.'³⁴ The class of farmers more hostile and resistant to the appeal of Ujamaa would be one whose interest and attitudes are transformed by capitalist agriculture and who are accustomed to great economic autonomy. Viewing the impact of Ujamaa policy as indicated by the statistical data relating to the number and population of Ujamaa villages, it is easy to see its inverse relationship with the importance of cash crops in the region. What factors explain this phenomenon? It is reasonable that the government should concentrate its resources on the poorer regions to achieve the objective of reducing inequality. Equally important is the fact that opposition to the policy and the capacity to oppose the policy are stronger in cash crop areas than elsewhere in the country. In view of this, if the policy is concentrated in the poorer subsistence-oriented regions, then there is a danger of it being equated as one for the disadvantaged and the backward regions. In times of agricultural crisis too, such a policy would be considered to serve the purpose of welfare function rather than useful method to enhance productivity. This would, on the contrary,

increase the pressures to channel inputs to those regions who have a successful record of increasing productivity—the expanding cash, crop farming areas. Important question then is: would it not be a direct blow to the avowed objective of reducing inequality and exploitation within the poorer areas where it is most advanced? This gives rise to the dilemma of finding an array of solutions to satisfy the needs of ujamaa implementation in the multi-situational cash crop zones and non-cash-crop zones as well. However one looks at it, fundamentally, it is a question of attitudes to land and process of production and the differing dynamics of local political economy. The wealthy farmers and the notables in the cash crop regions (large scale producers who are also important leaders in the new networks of influence such as TANU, churches, cooperative etc.) have developed strong systems of elite justification. A cogent appeal directed to arouse their sympathies to Ujamaa ideal and loyalty to TANU and oppressed classes' desire for economic gains through Ujamaa practices would greatly help in the active promotion and participation in Ujamaa experiment.

Sizeable new efforts are urgently needed in the provision of skills and services too. For instance, a village 120 miles south of Dar-es-Saalam, which had been established in 1972 had till now no running water, no medical provision and no teacher for the school they built.³⁵ Insufficiency of good personnel, at times bordering on non-availability, has been a daunting problem at various stages such as mapping out the villages, advising on crops etc. It is not difficult to comprehend the impossibility of providing the needed services to each village at the right time, particularly for a country which is groaning under poverty for a long time. Therefore, the decision to establish a cooperative college to train one book-keeper-cum-financial planner for each region is welcome as a major step in the direction of solving this problem. A number of health and construction programmes for these villages have been started but how far each village would be able to get at least one or more persons trained at para-professional level in numerous fields by 1980 is a difficult question to answer. Additionally, provision of health services also involves recurrent budgetary expenditure. Unless additional resources are mobilised for this purpose, the Government has to resort to

foreign assistance or diversion of resources from productive investment in other sectors of the economy, which frequently affect long term growth of the economy.

The important positive aspects of Ujamaa experiment are also noteworthy. Tanzania enjoys the advantage of long experience of cooperative organization and the awareness on the part of the Government of the variety of problems involved in this type of national experiment. The lessons learnt from the village settlement programmes have not been forgotten. An attempt to learn from earlier mistakes has resulted in careful planning, avoidance of spoon-feeding the farmers, democratic management and work organization as the corner-stone of the rural development policy. Ujamaa schemes do not hope to achieve dramatic transformation of agriculture ; what they expect is a gradual improvement of agriculture. It has also been realised that small scale peasant farming where improvement approach faces limitations will continue to characterise the agricultural scene. 'Thus by creating in the Ujamaa villages an environment within which the extension service can operate more effectively it is hoped to combine the advantages of both improvement and transformation approaches, and to obtain the results of transformation while using the methods and costs of extension. With a sound system of economic planning learned from the village settlement programme and a realistic form of social organization developed and tested in the early ujamaa villages, Tanzania faces the future with welformed optimism'.³⁶

Another moot question in this experiment is : should the Ujamaa village scheme be postponed until all the necessary services are made available or should the people first move to villages and do much of the needed infrastructural work without waiting for the needed facilities. This is a matter concerning the will power and the desire for harder work to attain the set ideal. If an attitude of contentment is adopted by the villagers who are no worse off by moving to Ujamaa villages from their isolated homesteads, the programmes will be able to make a good start. The towering personality and influence of a charismatic leader will be an important contributing factor to work out such a miracle. Influential Tanzanians among whom could be included the elite population in

the cash crop areas, the government and party officials, have an equally important role to play in sharing the values and dedication of their sincere leader and show preparedness to accept the goals and routes their leader has chosen to achieve the ideal of an equitable socialist state. This also needs to be tempered by a thought that no equitable society could be built within a matter of years.

Conclusion

Ujamaa village policy is a key to the development planning in Tanzania. The major objectives of socialism and self-reliance, it is felt, could be achieved through the decentralised, cooperative Ujamaa villages where the responses of the mass of peasants would be a vital factor determining the success of the ultimate objective. If establishment of Ujamaa villages results in transforming the traditional sector, subsistence sector and in diversifying the development of agricultural production then it would help greatly in liquidating backwardness. Along with the other two policy objectives mentioned above, it would also work towards achieving the aims of more equal distribution of income, greater employment generation and improvement in the standard of living of the people. However, unless this entire effort is complemented by some measured attempt at industrialisation to avoid undue reliance on imports and also to gain some immunity from high sensitivity to changes in the world market, it is feared that the very objectives of self-reliance and socialism might come in jeopardy. The success of this experiment in economic field hinges on the generation of surpluses to finance investment in the rural sector and avoidance of the diversion of resources from the industrial sector. It is heartening to note that even with its manifold difficulties, it has a potential for success. Rarely the use of a western model of development has generated significant growth either in quality or quantity or any equitable basis in developing countries. For several years, development theory emphasised the immediate industrialisation as a cure for the problems of developing countries. But opinion is now emerging in favour of paying more attention to rural development. Tanzania is a leading country which has undertaken this complex experiment of Ujamaa villages displaying greater realisation of the importance of employment and income considerations in development strategy and the need to improve the lot of the

VILLAGE STATISTICS

Region	Number of Villages				Number of Villagers				Percentage population in villages		Average size of villages in 1972
	Dec. 69	Dec. 70	Dec. 71	Dec. 72	March 73	Dec. 70	Dec. 71	Dec. 72	March 73	Dec. 72	
Arusha	20	25	59	92	95	5,200	14,018	19,818	20,112	2.7	215
Coast	46	56	121	185	188	48,300	93,503	111,636	115,382*	20.2	603
Dodoma	40	75	246	299	336	26,400	239,366	400,330	278,915*	50.0	1,372
Iringa	60	350	651	630	659	11,600	216,200	207,502	243,527	25.5	330
Kigoma	14	34	132	129	129	6,700	27,200	114,391	114,391	22.3	887
Kilimanjaro	7	9	11	24	24	2,700	2,616	5,009	4,934*	0.6	209
Mara	19	174	376	376	271†	84,700	127,371	127,370	108,168*	19.4	339
Mbeya	22	91	493	713	715	32,900	64,390	98,571	103,672	8.8	138
Morogoro	16	19	113	116	118	6,000	10,513	23,951	19,732*	3.2	206
Lindi	412	750	592	626	589†	70,673	203,128	175,082	169,093*	38.0	280
Mtware	10	—	748	1,088	1,103	173,027	371,560	441,241	466,098	61.2*	406
Mwanza	10	28	127	211	284	4,600	18,641	32,099	49,846	2.6	152
Ruvuma	26	120	205	205	242	9,000	29,430	29,430	42,288	6.5	144
Shinyanga	6	98	150	123	108†	12,600	12,265	15,292	12,052	1.5	124
Singida	12	16	201	263	263	6,800	51,230	59,420	59,420	12.1	164
Tabora	41	52	81	148	174	16,700	18,408	25,115	29,295	4.0	170
Tanga	37	37	132	245	245	7,700	35,907	77,858	77,957	8.8	318
West Lake	21	22	46	83	85	5,600	9,491	16,747	13,280*	2.3	202
Total :	819	1,956	4,484	5,556	5,628	531,200	1,545,237	1,980,862	1,928,062	14.4	357

* These figures have yet to be confirmed.

† At places small villages had to join bigger ones.

Source : Nyerere J.K. Progress Comes with production. The African Review, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1973., p. 539.

A Tanzanian Experiment in Rural Development

rural poor. Here arises the need to show tolerance to the Tanzanian development model and to look at the rural development as an important sizeable part of the total development effort in Tanzania.

FOOTNOTES

1. President's Address to the National Assembly, 10 December 1962, (Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer 1963), pp. 17-18.

2. International Bank of Reconstruction and Developments. 'Economic Development of Tanganyika', (New York, John Hopkins Press.

3. Tanganyika Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1964-1969, (Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1964), p. 10.

4. Nellis R, A Theory of Ideology—The Tanzanian Example. (New York, 1972), p. 130.

5. Nyerere J.K., 'Ujamaa—The Basis of African Socialism—A TANU pamphlet published in April 1962', in Nyerere J.K, Ujamaa Essays on Socialism. (Dar-es-Salaam, O.U.P. 1970), p. 1-12.

6. For the full text of Arusha Declaration refer to Nyerere J.K., *Ibid.*, p. 13-37.

7. Refer to Nyerere J.K.,—Ujamaa Essays on Socialism. *Ibid.*, p. 106-144.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

9. It is worth noting what G.L. Gunningham who was closely connected to the Ujamaa village movement throughout most of his ten years in Tanzania has to say in this matter 'This policy is uniquely Tanzanian, and is largely the personal creation of Julius Nyerere and has received virtually no help or guidance from China of any kind' 'Peasants and Rural Development in Tanzania', Africa Today, Vol. 20, No. 4, Fall 1973, p. 3-18.

10. Temu Peter, 'The Ujamaa Experiment. 'Series', July-August 1973.

11. Lele Uma. Designing Rural Development Programme : Lessons from Past Experience in Africa, a paper presented at the Second International Seminar on change in Agriculture, organised by the University of Reading and the Overseas Development Institute, Reading, England, Sept. 9-19, 1974, p. 26 (Mimeo).

12. Nyerere J.K. 'Progress comes with production', The African Review, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1973, p. 519-540.

13. Tanzania : July 1974, Saba Saba Twenty Years after ; Supplement to African Development July 1974, p. 1-21.

14. 'Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development' A paper presented at the 9th Conference of the East African Universities Social Science Council, held in Dec. 13-20 1973, Dar-es-Salaam, quoted by Ichiro Inukai 'African Socialism and Agricultural Development Strategy : A Comparative Study of

Dr (Mrs) Priya V Mutalik Desai

Kenya and Tanzania'. The Developing Economics. Vol, XII, March 1974, No. 1, p. 3-22.

15. 'Implementation of Rural Socialism' in J.K. Nyerere's 'Freedom and Development'; (Dar-es-Salaam, O.U.P. 1973), p. 5-11.

16. 'African Development. op. cit., p. t. 9.

17. Ichiro Inukai, *op. cit.* p. 15.

18. In a recent report of The Economist the correspondent reports 'in some regions, party bosses anxious to make their names as zealots, have acted too quickly and ruthlessly. There are authenticated cases of peasants being forcibly moved from their homes and dumped along a roadside where they have been told to build their villages'. 'Unlucky Ujamaa' April 12, 1975, p. 60. Also refer to Ichiro Inukai, *op. cit.*

19. Green R H. 'Ujamaa : Success or Failure'? African Development, January 1975, p. 12-13.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

21. For these papers refer to J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development ; A selection from writings and speeches 1968-1973, (Dar es Salaam, O.U.P. 1973.)

22. Ellman, A.Q. 'The Introduction of Agricultural innovations through cooperative farming : A Brief outline of Tanzania's policies' in East African Journal of Rural Development Vol. 3, No. 1, 1971, p. 1-15.

23. Feldman, D 'An Assessment of Alternative Policy Strategies in the Agricultural Development of Tanzania and their application to Tobacco Farming in Iringa' in East African Journal of Rural Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1971 p. 1-29.

Feldman in this interesting study demonstrates the strength and flexibility of the small holder farming system in Tanzania.

24. Refer to :

(1) Migot-Adholla, 'Traditional Society and Cooperatives' in 'Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa' by C.C. Widstrand (ed), (New York, 1970), p. 17-37.

(2) Lionel Cliffe, 'Traditional Ujamaa and Modern Producer Cooperatives in Tanzania' in C.C. Widstrand (ed), *Ibid.*, p- 38-60.

25. Homquist F.W., 'Community History and Reactions to the launching of a Cooperative Farming Scheme' University of East Africa, Social Science Conference, Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda 1968.

26. Migot Adholla, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

27. Cliffe, Lionel, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

28. Cliffe in his case study of Lushoto demonstrates how an outline for possible ujamaa producer cooperatives might be worked out on the basis of economies of production in a given physical and social environment and that

A Tanzanian Experiment in Rural Development

any remnants of pre-existing patterns of mutual labour exchange might be one useful element in such a plan, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

29. Widstrand, C.C. 'Efficiency and Cooperatives' in 'Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa' by Widstrand, C.C. (ed) *op. cit.*, p. 230-242.

30. Feldman David—The Economics of Ideology: Some Problems of Achieving Rural Socialism in Tanzania, in 'Politics and Change in Developing Countries' By Colin Leys, (ed.), (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 85-111.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

32. Nyerere J.K., 'Socialism and Rural Development', In *Ujamaa Essays on Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 106-144.

33. Lele Uma—*op. cit.*, p. 13.

34. Barker J.S. 'Ujamaa in Cash Crop Areas of Tanzania: Some Problems and Reflections' in *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1974, p. 441-463.

35. *The Economist*, *op. cit.*,

36. Ellman A.O., *op. cit.*, p. 13.

Edmund O Egboh ; **The Nigerian Trade
Unions and Politics
(1945-1965)**

Under the non-monetary traditional economy which was in existence in Nigeria before the emergence of British Colonial Administration, every Nigerian, slaves excepted, enjoyed economic independence in that he was not under the permanent employment of anybody. He owned his own farm which he cultivated primarily with his own family labour force. When he worked for others, he usually did so on a reciprocal basis and did not lose the self-employment position which was guaranteed to him by the possession of his own personal farm. He did of course offer his services on non-reciprocal basis to others for wages paid in kind. But this sort of wage employment was occasionally undertaken after he had completed his own farm operations. By offering his service to another for wages, he did not thereby lose his economic independence for without the wages received for the work done, for another, he could still live comfortably with his family. The point here is that he could do without wage labour and still survive.

Under such a prevalent economic system the role of Government in industrial and economic control is rather negligible, for under such a system, economics and politics apparently exist in isolation and the individual has no need to influence the Government in order to protect his means of livelihood.

But with the introduction of British Colonial Administration into Nigeria there emerged a working class depending completely on wages for existence. During the thirties and early forties, Nigerian trade unionism was in its formative stage: its organisation and finances were weak and only very little improvement could be secured through industrial action as there was not sufficient political

consciousness in the country to strengthen workers, position and claims through political action.

The situation changed during the Second World War (1939-1945) in which Nigeria played a very active part. The *Atlantic Charter* extolled democratic attitudes as the aim of civilized man, added strength to Nigerians nationalism.

The battle-cry of this post-war Nigerian Nationalism was "that political freedom was a pre-requisite of economic freedom".¹ This appealed to the dynamic and nationalist leaders of the young Nigerian trade unions and they cast their lot with nationalist movements for political freedom,² and "the workers, eager for freedom, conscious of their strength and convinced that there was no hope for any improvement in their lot under the colonial yoke took a very active part in the fight against colonialism".³

Under the banner of the nationalist movement came also a large majority of disillusioned demobilized Nigerian servicemen who because they could not find employment in Nigeria after the Second World War, felt that they had been betrayed by Government, and therefore joined the nationalist forces whose motto was that "the day of working-class solidarity and of the economic freedom of the workers depended not on parleys with employers, not on negotiating machinery for settlement of disputes but on the overthrow of imperialism."⁴

One of the National Political Movements was the leftist Zikist movement whose aim was to destroy the "less militant and too gentlemanly" Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC) and to establish an identity "between the trade union movement and all agencies of the national revolution."⁵

This aim was achieved in 1947 when the NTUC was affiliated to the National Council of Nigerian and the Cameroons (NCNC)⁶ which was then regarded as the most aggressive, most national and most popular political party in Nigeria.

But when Nigerian politics was poisoned with tribal jingoism and sectionalism and divisionalism, the argument that the future of Nigerian workers lay in a united action by workers and politicians, was shattered by the contention of many unionists that labour

associations with political organisation would introduce tribalism and disintegration into Nigerian trade unionism. In consequence, the NTUC by an overwhelming majority vote withdrew from the NCNC in 1948 and the "identity" scheme thus broke down.

After the NTUC had officially declared its political attitude towards the NCNC, a few radical trade union leaders who earlier had opposed the break with the NCNC, broke away from the NTUC and formed a rival central labour organisation to continue the alliance with the NCNC and thus maintain the identity of aims between politics and trade unionism.

The new organization called the Nigerian National Federation of Labour (NNFL) affiliated itself to the NCNC.

By now labour Unions had won a few victories. A series of labour agitations had increased wages during the forties. The wage awards, called the cost of living allowance (COLA), for the conciliation of workers had to be made during the war and post-war years to prevent or at least weaken any possible political alliance between labour nationalist 'agitators' as their combined opposition to Government might have subverted Britain's war effort and her political hold on the country.

When the war-time awards failed to satisfy workers, and they went on strike in 1945, Government, was alarmed and blamed the strike on "political demagogues because of the strong support given to the strikers by ultra-nationalist newspapers like the "West African Pilot",⁶ The British Government determined to see that nationalist "agitators" did not exploit in future working-class grievances for political ends."⁷

The British Government fearing political collaboration for subversive purposes between labour unions and nationalists took repressive measures to suppress labour during industrial disputes.⁸ The shooting of innocent coal-miners by police during the 1949 Enugu Colliery industrial dispute, is a case in point.

In 1949, serious industrial unrest occurred at the Enugu Colliery and led to shooting by the police, killing twenty-one miners and wounding fifty six-others." This unfortunate incident was followed by a spontaneous outburst of nationalist feelings which brought all the sections of the Nigerian society, the radicals and

moderates, the revolutionary, the stooges, bourgeoisie and the workers"⁹ together to face the threat created by the Imperialist British Administration, which was held responsible for the Enugu Colliery "massacre".

That the nation stood together after the shooting can be seen from the two nationalist groupings, the National Labour Committee of Nigeria and the National Emergency Committee, that emerged to face the National crisis brought about by the shooting and the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry appointed to investigate the whole national tragedy.

The National Labour Committee comprised representative of the NTUC and the NNFL, the Federation of Government and Municipal Non-clerical workers, the Nigerian Civil Service Union and the Federated Nigerian Union of Railwaymen.¹⁰ The other body the National Emergency Committee consisted of Nigerian leaders irrespective of their political or unionist or ethnic identity.¹¹ The National Labour Committee which was represented in the National Emergency Committee stood solidly by the National Emergency Committee of which it was a collaborating body and approved in general terms its working plans and the manner of handling the National tragedy.¹²

The National Emergency Committee (NEC) appointed its own Commission of Inquiry consisting of Messrs. Bode Tomad, H.O. Davies and Ozuomba Mbadiwe "to investigate and report on the Enugu shootings".¹³ After conducting an investigation of the shooting, the Commission of Inquiry (NEC-appointed) stated that "the official statement about the cause of shooting in which it was alleged that the miners were armed with all sorts of weapons and that they surrounded the police and attempted to disarm them is entirely without foundation and should never have been published by the Government".¹⁴ The N.E.C. also set up a defence Counsel to present the miners' case before the Fitzgerald Commission.¹⁵

The United front fizzled out within a year largely due to the "chronic dissension within the volatile labour-left and the inability of the radicals to work with the main body of the Nationalist Movement."¹⁶

After the failure of the United front experiment in 1950, the

N.N.F.L. officially merged with the NTUC to form Nigerian Labour Congress (NCC). Following the merger, the leftist leaders of the new NLC got the organisation (i.e. the NLC) affiliated to the NCNC and thus restored the old relationship with that political party.

It was as an special ally of the NLC that the NCNC in cooperation with the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the Lagos Market Women Guild, contested the Lagos Town Council election in 1950,¹⁷ but with the failure of the mercantile strike organised by the NLC in 1950, the leftist NLC leaders were excluded from holding strategic positions in the alliance and were therefore eclipsed.¹⁸ Since 1951, "the representation of organised labour in the NCNC Executive has been relatively minor and confined primarily to the conservative wing of the trade union leadership."¹⁹ In 1951 internal political conflict coupled with serious disagreement over affiliation with international labour organisations, led to the disintegration of the NLC. In 1953, the warring trade union factions came together and set up a new organization called the All-Nigerian Trade Union Federation (ANTUF). One of the objectives of ANTUF was "to establish and support the political wing of the workers movement (political party) with a view to realising a socialist Government".²⁰

This objective was accomplished in March 1956 when "the Nigerian Labour Party came into existence with M.A.O. Imoudu as President and S.U. Bassey, Secretary of the Municipal and Local Authorities Staff Union, as Secretary. Subsequently Bassey became the Secretary of the ANTUF and W.O. Goodluck, Secretary of the Lever Brothers. and Vandan Beighs Worker's Union and the Nigerian War Department Workers' Union, became Secretary of the Labour Party".²¹

The failure to accommodate the left wing labour leaders in the country's political party is explained as follows: *first*, by the existence in the labour wing of leftist elements who dominated the leadership of the defunct NNLF and the NLC and who, on account of their ultra-leftist tendency could not be accommodated by the NCNC whose leadership was relatively moderate; *second*, by the fact that only very few of the union leaders who won elections into the legislature in the country, were considered well qualified, acade-

mically, to hold ministerial positions ;²² *third*, by the claim by many unionists that Nigerian political leaders pay lip service to "socialism, the liberty ideology of the working-class"²³ and have failed to launch comprehensive "welfare programmes for workers".²⁴

The setting of a Labour Party was a big mistake for the left wingers. The Labour Party could not become a mass organization. The leaders of the Labour Party had failed to comprehend the political situation. Amongst them they had leader who opposed mixing of Trade Union with political parties.

There were others who instead of joining the Labour Party and building it up, chose out of personal interest, to be members of NCNC, the Action Group (AG) and the National People's Congress (NPC) which could sponsor their candidature for parliamentary elections in the country. The attitude of opportunist leaders towards the Labour Party, paralysed the interest of the rank and file who where with the Labour Party.

Dazzled by the success of a Nation-wide strike organised in 1964 by the Joint Action Committee (JAC) of Nigeria Trade Unions, the veteran Nigerian labour leader, Michael Imoudu revived the old labour party idea by launching "on behalf of the working classes of Nigeria"²⁵ a new Nigerian Labour Party to contest the 1964 General Elections to the Federal Nigerian House of Representatives, for according to Mr. Imoudu, "the workers of Nigeria have become conscious of the fact that it was only through political struggle that the toiling masses of Nigeria could build a new society for themselves and put an end to the exploitation and enslavement."²⁶

During the elections the Labour Party supported the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA)²⁷ formed by the Action Group (AG), the NCNC and the Northern Peoples Front (NPF), the Grand Alliance represented progressive and socialist forces while the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) formed by the rather feudalistic Northern People's Congress (NPC) led by the Sarduna of Sokoto, Sir Ahama-du Bello, and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)²⁸ led by Chief S.L. Akintola, represented the rightist forces.

The Trade Unions and Regional Politics with the attainment of internal self government in the fifties, and of complete political independence in 1960, the position of the working-classes and their

organisations in Nigeria's political history appeared to have been much strengthened. Political parties and their leaders whose fortunes now depended on a clear majority in parliamentary elections looked to the working class for support and so were favourably disposed towards labour leaders and their views on workers' general welfare. During political election campaigns, political parties made election promises of substantial wage increases to workers if voted into power.²⁹

In each of the Regions, where one specific political party was in power, the political party in power usually fulfilled its election promise by making an arbitrary award of ample wage increases to workers with a view to out-bidding its rivals in other Regions³⁰ and convince the workers in those other Regions that it alone had the interests of workers at heart and therefore the only political party qualified to receive their votes during elections.

The partition of the country into regions introduced tribal politics loyalties into Nigeria. The particularist sentiment whipped up by the Regional Governmental system, had dealt a mortal blow to the unity of trade union organisation in Nigeria. The separatist policy of the various Regional Governments had resulted in what had been described as the Westernisation, Northnisation, Midwesternisation and Easternisation policies, adopted by the West, North, Mid-west and East Regional Governments in respect of their separate regional public services. This policy according to Dr. Yesufu, "has resulted in mass dismissals from some Regional Services, of indigenes, of other Regions, irrespective of skills and efficiency, purely on political grounds".³¹ These dismissals motivated by political and tribal sentiments, instilled into the minds of workers, regional loyalties which led to the break-up of the hitherto centrally organised trade unions such as the Nigerian Civil Service Union and the Nigerian Union of Local Authority Staff (NULAS) and their reformation on a regional pattern.

To show the extent to which Regionalism had undermined trade union unity and solidarity in Nigeria and made it a tool of the Government in power, let us consider the relationship between the Regional Government and the trade unions with regional set-up since the introduction of the Regional system of Government.

As discussed elsewhere, the attitude of the NTUC in the forties was one of close affiliation³² with the NCNC which was then regarded as the most socialist and the most nation-wide political organisation in the country and so could at the political level use its National might to protect the interest of the Nigerian working-class at large. But when Regionalism injected the venom of tribalism into Nigerian politics, the majority of the unionists felt that the tribal virus might spread easily to the trade union realm if the labour unions maintained close alliance with any political party. In obedience to majority opinion, the NTUC terminated its alliance with the NCNC. Although splinter central trade unions continued this political associations with the NCNC, it is clear that such association had not the support of the majority of the trade unions.

When the idea of close collaboration with a political party was shelved, the Central Trade Union Organisation re-organised in 1953 as the ANTUF, adopted a policy of establishing an independent Labour Party in opposition to the old political parties. This party was intended to serve as a political rallying point for the working-classes throughout the country. The Labour Party if it had succeeded, would have prevented the old tribal and 'regional' political parties from luring into their fold the trade unions now organised on regional basis. The failure of the Labour Party probably removed the means through which labour could have applied some direct political pressure to prevent the old 'regional' parties in power in the regions, from dominating the regionally-based trade unions.

The trade unions in the Southern Regions were resistant to this political domination³³ because they appeared well informed and had sophisticated leadership which showed nationalist and leftist tendencies and adopted independent critical attitude towards Government.

The relationship between the trade unions and the various political parties in control of Regional Governments in the Southern Regions was based on a personal platform. This means that political relationship existed between individual union members and the party administering the government of a Region and not between the union and the Government Party. Any support given to the Government Party was by individual union members and not by the union as an organised body. Neither the Action Group Government

which ruled the West for a long time, nor the almost traditional NCNC Government of the East was in political alliance with any of the regional trade unions or deliberately re-oriented the trade unions as an instrument for the achievement of the government's tribal or regional policy.

In the North on the other hand, the position appeared different. The relationship between the NPC Government and the Northernised trade unions was not a personal matter but an affair embracing the whole organisational set-up of the unions which were used for the implementation of the Government's tribal and regional policies. Because of their relations with the Regional Government, the Northern unions unlike their Southern counterparts, were critical of government labour policies.

Richard L. Sklar supporting the views expressed above in respect of Northern unions says :

"In the tin mines of Jos Plateau, the largest aggregation of industrial workers in Northern Nigeria, indeed, in all Nigeria, have been organised by the NPC on the basis of an anti-southern appeal that is partially tribalistic and partially economic....."³⁴

Continuing, he points out that the Northern Mine Workers Union formed in 1954, "is listed by the NPC Central Secretariat as an affiliated organisation"³⁵ and that the Northern Mine Workers Union 'have never attacked the Government wage and labour policies, a standard tactic of the southern unionists'"³⁵

In the words of R.L. Sklar, "another typical case of working-class political orientation is that of the Lokoja Carriers Union, a river-port dock-workers organisation that is formally associated with the Lokoja Branch of the NPC (in Kabba Province). Most of the carriers are employed by the contract agents for the United African Company who support the NPC, and they are vulnerable to moral persuasion and economic inducements to join the party of their employers".³⁶

The information obtained by the writer from southern trade union leaders during his field work reveals that the Northern Federation of Labour (NFL) was a creature of the NPC Government to

serve as a Central Labour Organisation for the regional trade unions based in the North. The NFL therefore claims to do for the Northern unions what the Southern-based central unions do, such as the ULC and the NTUC claim to do for their unions affiliates all over the country. The creation of the NFL is thus in line with the isolationist policy of the NPC Government since the objective of the NFL is to prevent the northern unions from looking up to any southern-based central trade unions for leadership. This is the background of the bitter opposition between the Northern Branch of the ULC and the NFL.³⁷ The aim of the NFL is to undermine the ULC leadership of the NFL which in the opinion of its President Mr. E.A. Oje and other leaders, is the "only saviour of Northern Nigerian workers".

Conclusion

Although labour unions have not been able to organise a successful labour party to champion their cause by direct political action, they have nevertheless been able to exert some noticeable indirect political influence which has made them a potent factor to be reckoned with in the national life of the country. Before the introduction of responsible government into the country, the colonial authorities had recognised the social and political potential of organised labour in Nigeria and had always given some thought to labour agitation for improvements.

After independence the Nigerian trade union organisation sought close political alliance with political parties. But as has been shown, this close political association with political parties failed to achieve the desired goal, and the ANTUF had to try the experiment of going boldly into politics in direct opposition to the existing political parties. This too, for reasons already given, was also a failure. The trade unions now appear to be in a dilemma. There does not seem to be a definite trade union policy on the question of trade union relations with politics. And it is not likely that any is forthcoming soon, in view of the now traditional disunity which has bedevilled Nigerian trade unions.

Nigerian Trade Unions need a political programme to ensure independence and prevent them from being used as tools by Government or political parties for the propagation of tribalism which for

so long has postponed the attainment of social and political unity in the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. West Africa, August 25, 1962.
2. Some of the leaders of the trade unions in consequence became leaders of most political movements. M.E.O. Coker, Secretary of the Post and Telegraphs Workers' Union and M.A.O. Imoudu, President of the Railway and Ports Workers Union, were leading members of the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) Cabinet created by Dr. *Nnamdi Azikiwe* in 1946, See R.L. Sklar, "Nigerian Political Parties", (Princeton University Press 1963), p. 496; Nduka Eze, the Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of the United African Company (UAC) African Workers Union (UNAMAG) was the acting President of the Zikist Movement, a leftist youth wing of the NCNC; he was also a member of the NCNC Cabinet. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
3. Public Service International (PSI) Bulletin, No. 2. 1965 p. 2.
4. "West Africa", August 25, 1962.
5. Loc. Cit.
6. After the separation of Southern Cameroons from Nigeria in 1960, the NCNC changed the name to the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC).
7. *Op. cit.* p. 137.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-9.
9. Loc. cit.
10. R.L. Sklar, "Nigerian Political Parties" (Princeton Univ. Press 1963) p. 77.
11. Labour Champion, (Nigeria) February 23, 1950.
12. "West African Pilot, (Nigeria) Nov. 22, 1949. Officers of the National Emergency Committee were Dr. Akinola Maja (Chairman), Mazi Mbonu Ojike (Secretary), Dr. Akin Doherty (Treasurer), Messrs Adio Moses and P.O. Balonwu—trade union leaders were Assistant Secretaries. See West African Pilot (Nigeria) Nov. 23, 1949. It is now known that the NTUC "took little part in the work of the (National Emergency) Committee which failed to achieve any semblance of stable or permanent constitution" See "Dept. of Labour (Nigeria) Annual Report", 1950-51, par. 38.
13. The Labour Champion (Nigeria) February 23, 1950 *op. cit.*
14. "West African Pilot" (Nigeria) Nov. 23, 1949.
15. *Ibid.*, December 3, 1949. According to Government statement, "the situation at the Colliery had rendered it necessary to evacuate explosives from the mines in the interest of public safety. The Police were detained to carry out this precautionary operation. About noon on Friday, the evacuation of dangerous explosives from the Iva Valley and Obwetti mines commenced. Three lifts

were made without interference but in continuing the evacuation at Iva Valley Mine the Police were surrounded by a large number of Miners armed with crobars, picks, matchets and spears who rushed to the Police and attempted to disarm them and obtain possession of the explosives store. In spite of repeated warnings, the situation became so dangerous that the police were compelled to open fire in self defence resulting in casualties among the miners." *Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1949.

15. *Ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1949. See account by Sklar *op. cit.*, p. 77.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 84. The Alliance won 18 of the 24 seats. See also Annual Report of the Dept of Labour, (Nigeria) 1950-51 para 38. The NNDP mentioned here is quite different from Chief S.L. Akintola's NNDP of a later date.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-6. It may be observed here that the Political association which existed between the same Political party and the NNFL after its formation in 1949, and the political and socialistic interest shown by labour during this period, led the British Colonial Government to suspect every move made by labour unions and to regard articulate legitimate labour grievances and demands as groundless agitation fomented by communist-inspired political agitators for political ends. 'West African Pilot' (Nigeria) Sept. 3, 1949.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-6.

20. 'Ministry of Labour Quarterly Review', March 1960 p. 41.

21. Sklar *Op. cit.*, p. 496 n. W.O. Goodluck was previously the Secretary of the ANTUF.

22. Agwu "Akpolo, Prospects of Small Trade Unions in Nigeria" (Enugu 1963) pp. 28-9.

23. Sunday Express (Nigeria) August 16, 1964.

24. *Loc. cit.*

25. *Ibid.*, August 3, 1964.

26. *Ibid.* It is interesting to note that this was the third time Imoudu was associated with the formation of a Labour Party. In 1948 he founded a Labour Party which lived only on paper. See Sunday Express (Nigeria) August 16, 1964. Imoudu's second connection with the Labour Party occurred in 1956 when the unsuccessful ANTUF-backed Labour Party was launched.

27. 'Daily Express', (Nigeria) Sept. 11, 1964.

28. The Akintola NNDP is different from the NNDP with which the NCNC was alliance in 1950.

29. In the 1964 Federal Elections, for instance, Chief (Mrs) H.I.D Awolowo wife of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, announced on behalf of the UPGA that if elected into power the Alliance (UPGA) was "prepared to put into operation the erstwhile determination to raise the national minimum wage to 10/- per day for workers". See Daily Express Aug. 29, 1964.

30. The effect of this arbitrary political and regional wage fixing was that there were "variations, sometimes considerable between the Federal and Regional Government rates (of pay) in various areas"—Yesufu *op. cit.*, pp. 142-3. For a more detailed account of this Regional wage 'race' and its implications, see Yesufu, pp. 141-144. The NPC was supreme in the North, the NCNC in the East and Midwest and the AG in the West.

31. Yesufu, p. 145.

32. This close relationship did not destroy the independence of the TUC and its right to criticise the policies of its ally, the NCNC.

33. The Nigerian Union of Local Authority Staff (NULAS) in Western Nigeria protested in very strong terms to the West Regional Governor, Sir Odeleye Fadahunsi over attempts by the NNDP Government of Western Nigeria to make the NULAS an arm of the NNDP Government. See NULAS file, Ref. No. 261/Vol II/643 of June 27, 1964. See also NULAS Resolution of 12th March 1965 against obnoxious Local Government Regulations made by the NNDP Government of the Western Region for the control of NULAS.

34. Sklar, *Ibid.*, p. 337.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 378 n.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 337-8.

37. 'Daily Times' (Nigeria) April 20, 1965.

Dr Vijay Gupta : **India and Africa**
QUARTERLY CHRONICLE
April—June 1976

Mr. Chavan: Intensify Struggle Against Apartheid

India's External Affairs Minister, Mr. Y.B. Chavan has said that the struggle against racialism should be intensified and concrete measures undertaken to root out this evil from our planet once and for all. In a message to the U.N. Special Committee Against Apartheid, which met on 19 March at the U.N. headquarters in New York to observe the fifteenth anniversary of the international day for elimination of racial discrimination Mr. Chavan said that, in spite of the fact that nations of the world have, time and again, reaffirmed their solidarity with victims of racialism, racial discrimination still remains a harsh fact of life, particularly for millions of non-whites in southern Africa.

Mr. Chavan also said that the government and people of India have always been in the forefront of crusade against racial discrimination. Apartheid in South Africa, occupation of Namibia, and oppression of the people of Zimbabwe are all against the spirit of the U.N. charter which stresses the principle of respect of human rights, irrespective of race or colour. "We deplore all support, both direct and indirect extended by powerful foreign and financial interests, which enables the racist regime in southern Africa to continue its reprehensible policies", he added.

Concluding, Mr. Chavan said that the government and people of India took this opportunity to rededicate themselves to the task of working for a world order, based on human dignity and equality.
(April 5, 1976)

Greetings to O.A.U.

The Minister of External Affairs, Shri Y.B. Chavan, in a message of greetings to the Secretary-General of the Organisation of

African Unity on the occasion of the Thirteenth Anniversary of the OAU said that last year was particularly eventful for the continent of Africa. It was the end of the Portuguese Colonial Empire in Africa. Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome, Principe Cape Verde Islands and Comores became independent. The role of the O.A.U. in bringing about the liquidation of colonialism in Africa has indeed been historic. He expressed happiness at the repulsion of South African aggression by the new born State of Angola.

He added, the obduracy of the illegal racist regime in Zimbabwe, the illegal occupation of Namibia by the Racist regime of South Africa and the policy of apartheid by these Racist regimes in Southern Africa will surely be brought to a quick end. We are sure that majority rule in Zimbabwe will soon be won by the brave sacrifices of the people of Zimbabwe and that Namibia will win its freedom with complete territorial integrity and sovereignty. The pernicious policy of the racist regime of creating the so-called 'homelands' will also meet the fate it deserves because of the efforts of the African freedom fighters and the OAU.

The Government and people of India he said look forward to the day when all the brave people of Africa who are either languishing in the prisons of the Racist regimes in Southern Africa or are in exile, will live in dignity and freedom in their countries, free from colonialism, racism and apartheid. On this day we salute them and wish the Organisation of African Unity all the success in its noble task. The Government and people of India will continue to support the Organisation of African Unity in its work for the early completion of emancipation of Africa he added. (May 25, 1976)

Exhibition of African Arts and Crafts

An exhibition of African Arts and Crafts, which was organised by the Indian Centre for Africa of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, on the occasion of Organisation of African Unity day, was inaugurated by Mr. Mark Chona, Special Assistant to President Kaunda of Zambia.

The exhibition provided a glimpse of some aspects of rich African Culture. It included traditional art objects, crafts, material and also modern wood carvings, beads work, jewelry, dresses, musical instrument and the articles used in day to day life.

The exhibition organised at Azad Bhavan remained open to public for a week, till May 29, 1976. (May 30, 1976)

Indo-Romania Joint Venture in Africa

India has suggested joint venture projects with Romania in third countries specially in the countries in Africa and in the Middle East. It has been decided that the experts of both the countries would try to identify the areas where such projects could be launched.

This was discussed, when the visiting Romanian Minister of Metallurgy, Mr. Niculae Agachi called on Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Union Commerce Minister. (April 27, 1976)

Decisions at Cairo: Meeting of India, Egypt and Yugoslavia

India, Yugoslavia and Egypt have agreed that there is considerable scope for long-term tripartite industrial cooperation in several fields, and that tripartite joint ventures could be promoted. This is stated in a communique issued at the end of the Fourth Ministerial Tripartite meeting between the three countries held in Cairo on May 2 and 3, 1976.

The meeting was attended by Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma, Minister of Communications, on behalf of India, Mr. Zakaria Tawfik Abdel Fattah, Egyptian Minister of Trade and Supply and Dr. Anton Varatusa, Vice President of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council. The meeting agreed that it would be necessary to undertake a review of the commodities and preferences to be exchanged between the three countries with a view to considering suitable changes. (May 5, 1976)

Ayurveda Spreads to African Countries

Ayurveda Medicine system has spread to African countries like Ethiopia, Zambia and Nigeria, according to Mr. Durga Prasad Sharma, Secretary-General of All India Ayurvedic Council.

Talking to newsmen, Mr. Sharma said the Central Ayurvedic Research Council was thinking of setting up an institution to certify Ayurvedic drugs purity.

Replying to a question, he said that in Colombo many people preferred Ayurvedic medicines to allopathic drugs. Sri Lanka had 10,000 vaidyas compared with 4,000 allopathic doctors.

(April 7, 1976)

India Backs Africa's Freedom Fight Fully

Congress President, Dr. D.K. Borooah assured the freedom fighters in Africa that India's support to their struggle was "total", and India would be prepared to go in support as far as Africa can go".

Dr. Borooah was speaking at a public meeting organised jointly by the Congress, the CPI and the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation to observe Africa Day.

He said that India had always supported the liberation movements in Africa and West Asia. It was time to re-dedicate ourselves to the cause when the deprived nations euphemistically called the developing countries, continued to be denied the much needed assistance from the developed world for their progress.

The African nations, Dr. Borooah counselled, would do well to evolve unity of purpose and unity of will to fight against the "rich and prosperous nations". Imperialism of one sort was dead, but another kind of it had emerged from across the Atlantic which ought to be resisted by a United Africa he added.

Dr. Borooah noted that Africa represented a variety of people, with divergent faiths and languages, yet a United Africa was imperative. He cited the instance of India which, despite the diversity of languages, faiths and traditions of the people, was one nation.

India's support to the liberation struggle in Africa, he said, was not new. He quoted a document prepared by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1936 for an AICC session in which Nehru visualised that India's own freedom struggle was "but part of the wider struggle". All Asia, the document noted, from Islamic west to the Buddhist east, was striving to evolve a new concept of human equality. The Congress planned to publish its translations in various African languages. The party chief added.

There was an "Organic bond" between India and Africa and the Arabs in West Asia, as visualised by Nehru and Maulana Azad, and India shared the anguish of the African people over the new forms of colonial oppression, Dr. Borooah said.

Referring to the role of the non-aligned nations, he said the support of these nations was in fact for a system, which was a unique concept.

Mr. Indrajit Gupta (CPI) warned the African people against the conspiracy of the imperialists to divide them. The recent induction of a few black ministers in the Rhodesian Government of Ian⁵ Smith was a "crude deception", which, he hoped, the African people would realise.

He hoped that 1977 would witness a total and complete liquidation of colonial forces, and the way the freedom struggle was taking militant forms showed that the "radiance" of freedom would soon engulf the whole of the "Black Continent". (May 31, 1976)

India Condemns Soweto Killings

In a sharply worded statement India condemned the killing of many innocent Africans and wounding of hundreds by the South African racist regime in Soweto.

The statement stated that injury and damage caused at the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 had been exceeded by the present excesses of the South African regime.

Expressing its deep shock, the statement underlined the fact that many of the wounded and killed were children and students. It said this only exposed further the inhuman and racist character of the regime which had long denounced the calls of the United Nations and the civilised world to do away with apartheid and racism.

The Government of India expressed its deep concern at this bloodshed and conveyed its sympathies to the affected families. It reaffirmed its full support to South African freedom-fighters and hoped that before long South Africa would be free from the scourge of colonialism, racism and apartheid. (June 19, 1976)

Apartheid Regime Condemned

The All India Peace and Solidarity Council has condemned the Vorster regime for the mass killings of South Africans and the brutal repression against hundreds of freedom fighters struggling against the inhuman policies of the apartheid and racial discrimination.

In a statement the AIPSO said that the Government of South Africa could not defeat the growing defiance of the people who were now determined to achieve their freedom.

Their heroic struggle was merging with the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia, the statement added.

Dr Vijay Gupta

The AIPSO called upon all its units to observe 26 June as "South Africa Freedom Day". (June 24, 1976)

Cultural Pact with Algeria

India and Algeria signed a cultural agreement which External Affairs Minister Y.B. Chavan described as a "concrete expression of our shared desire to implement the programme of closer collaboration.

The agreement was signed by Mr. Chavan and Algerian Foreign Minister Abdel Aziz Bouteflika.

Mr. Bouteflika said the agreement would without doubt reinforce political relations and described it as a modest contribution towards strengthening co-operation between India and Algeria.

The agreement provided for the setting up of a joint commission to work out the details of the implementation of the accord, he said.

Mr. Chavan said in signing the agreement they were fulfilling the decision of all non-aligned and developing countries to strengthen their collective unity. (June 1, 1976)

Egypt to Sell Rice to India

Representatives of Egypt held negotiations with officials of the Food Corporation of India for the sale of 10,000 tonnes of rice to India.

The Egyptian team was led by Mr. Nehad Self Eldin, Commercial Counsellor of the Egyptian Embassy, and the Indian team by Mr. A.K. Dutt, Managing Director of the FCI.

The trend of the negotiations indicates that an agreement on the sale of rice would be signed shortly between the two countries.

(June 7, 1976)

Envoy to Central African Republic

Mr. Pacido Peidade D'Souza, Ambassador to Zaire, has been concurrently accredited as Ambassador to the Central African Republic with residence at Kinshasa, says official release.

Ambassador-Designate of Gabon

Mr. Barthelemy Mouapa-Beötsa has been nominated the next non-resident Ambassador of Gabon to India.

Born in 1943, Mr. Mouapa-Beotsa was educated at the Ecole Nationale Francaise des Impots of Paris and also attended lectures in the Faculty of Law at Mont Pallier. Before joining the Foreign Office he was in-charge of Economic Relations in the President's Secretariat. He has been Ambassador of his country successively in Israel, Spain and Congo. He has represented his country in various African and international conferences and Commissions. He was also Chairman of the Policy Planning Commission in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been a member of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party since 1973. (May 17, 1976)

Indo-Kenyan Project Finalised

An Indo-Kenyan industrial venture to manufacture industrial fasteners has been finalised. Mr. Raunaq Singh, representing Indian entrepreneurs has signed a letter of intent for the project.

The total capital to be invested in the project is estimated 40 million Kenyan shillings. The plant will start production in 18 months and will employ about 2,000 people when in full production.

The plant will attain its full production capacity in two stages. The amount of Kenyan private capital to be invested in the project is yet to be finalised.

Mr. Raunaq Singh also held a series of wide-ranging talks with the executive director of Kenya's Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation on the possibility of establishing large-scale joint ventures with KCDE partnership. Mr. Singh also met Kenya's Minister for Finance in this connection. (May 13, 1976)

Growing Cooperation between India and Libya

India and Libya emphasised the importance of bilateral cooperation in the context of strengthening the non-aligned movement. This was stated in an official handout issued on 22 March in New Delhi after a three-day visit by India's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Bipinpal Das to Libya on 15-18 March. In his meeting with the Libyan Prime Minister, Major Abdus Salam Jalloud, Mr. Das delivered to him a letter from the President of India. Mr. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, which was described by Prime Minister Jalloud "as a very important step in furthering cooperation between India and Libya". At the meeting, Mr. Jalloud expressed great satisfaction at the progress of

Dr Vijay Gupta

bilateral relations between the two countries and also expressed the hope for accelerating mutual economic cooperation.

(March 22, 1976)

Indo-Mauritius Agreement on Industrial Aid

India and Mauritius have signed an agreement on Indian assistance for developing small-scale industries in Mauritius.

According to information received in Delhi, the agreement signed at Mauritius tentatively identified industries needing Indian assistance. These were industries based on agriculture, forest resources and textiles besides light engineering. The two governments also agreed to establish consultancy services and set up common facility-cum-training workshops.

The Minister of State for Industries, Mr. A.P. Sharma, signed the agreement on behalf of the Government of India while the Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. Jomadar, signed on behalf of the Government of Mauritius.

(April 24, 1976)

Collaboration in Sports Mauritius Minister calls on Shri Netam

Matters relating to collaboration between India and Mauritius in the field of sports were discussed when H.E. Mr. D. Basant Rai, Minister for Youth and Sports, Mauritius, called on Shri Arvind Netam, Deputy Minister for Education and Social Welfare on June 16th 1976.

Mauritius is seeking India's assistance in the setting up of a National Institute of Sports on Indian lines. There are also a number of Indian coaches on assignment in Mauritius.

(June 16, 1976)

Moroccan Envoy Meets Indian PM

Special envoy of King Hassan of Morocco, Mr. Aberrahman Bouabid visited New Delhi to explain to Indian leaders his country's stand on the conflict with Algeria over the former Spanish Saharan territory.

Mr. Bouabid met President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and External Affairs Minister Y.B. Chavan. He told newsmen that he has come away with the impression that the Government of India understands well Morocco's stand on the issue.

He said he had not come to ask India to take sides on the issue but to explain the correctness of Morocco's case. (April 27, 1976)

Indian Assistance to Mozambique

As a mark of solidarity with the government of Mozambique, India has decided to extend economic and technical assistance to that country, said Mr. Bipinpal Das India's Deputy Minister of external Affairs, in a statement on 31 March in Parliament. The extent and form of such assistance, he added, will be determined "only after we hear further from the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-general of the Commonwealth as well as from the government of Mozambique about the priorities of their requirements." In the meantime, he further said, India has "as an immediate gesture, decided to make a grant of Rs. 900,000 as assistance to the government of Mozambique to be used for the purchase of some of its requirements from India. This grant will form part of the collective contribution to Mozambique by the commonwealth".

Referring to the "established policy" of the Government of India to extend unstinted support and all possible assistance to the liberation movements in Africa and to "oppose the obnoxious policies of racism and apartheid pursued by the white minority regimes in southern Africa." Mr. Das said that to the liberation movement in Mozambique, "we have had the privilege of giving moral and material support during the struggle for independence. Today, when Mozambique has taken the bold and principled step of imposing U.N. actions against Rhodesia, the sympathies of the government and people of India are wholly with Mozambique and the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe." (April 1, 1976)

Shiplink with Mozambique

The Shipping Corporation of India established passenger ship-link with Mozambique from May this year when the Indian ship "Harsha Vardhana" called at Beira after touching Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, the regional manager of the corporation Mr. Rajni Mehta said in Mombasa.

Mr. Mehta said the SCI will help trade between eastern seaboard and India and can also help Mozambique to become a leading trading partner for developing countries.

Cargo links between Kenya, India and Mozambique were established last year. The corporation has been able to get contract for the export of cashew nuts from Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique.

(April 16, 1976)

Death Sentences Awarded in Namibia—India Expresses Shock

The Government of India expressed its shock at the report of death sentence passed on two members of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), Aaron Mushimba and Hendrik Shikongo, by the illegal and racist South African regime in Namibia. Two women, Rauna Namibga and Anna Nghihoundjwa, have also been sentenced to seven and five years imprisonment respectively.

The Government of India the statement added joins the United Nations Council for Namibia in its strong condemnation of these sentences of death and imprisonment of the brave freedom fighters of Namibia.

The Government of India reaffirmed its full support to the freedom fighters of Namibia fighting under the banner of South West African People's Organisation and expressed its firm belief that before long the heroic struggle of the freedom fighter will be rewarded by the complete independent, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Namibia.

(June 4, 1976)

Nigerian Envoy Presents Credentials

The new High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Mr. A.G. Gobir, presented his letter of commission to the President, Shri Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed at Rashtrapati Bhavan, on April 27, 1976.

Welcoming the High Commissioner the President said that India would continue to support the struggle against colonialism, racialism and apartheid in Africa. He expressed the hope that Zimbabwe and Namibia will soon join the ranks of sovereign nations and that the policy of racism and apartheid in South Africa would come to an early end.

Earlier, presenting his credentials, the High Commissioner said : "India and Nigeria have a proud foundation on which to build. We share many things in common and this fact has enabled us to display

in our approach towards many international issues and problems the same degree of resilience and spirit of accommodation. It is gratifying to note that India and Nigeria are one in their resolve to do all in their power to help accelerate the process of liberation of the remaining enclaves, colonialism, oppression, apartheid, injustice and indignity in the African continent and on our planet”.

(April 27, 1976)

Indo-Somalian Shipping Service

Direct shipping service between India and Somalia was inaugurated with the arrival of S.S. Viswamarg in Mogadishu, according to an official release.

A reception was held by the Indian embassy and the Somali shipping agency jointly to mark the occasion which was attended by ministers and senior officials of the Somalian Government.

Indian ambassador B.P. Agarwal spoke of the revival of centuries-old contacts between India and Somalia, the identify of political and economic interests and the benefits accruing from direct shipping.

The Somali authorities welcomed the new service as a long-felt need and emphasised the ancient contact between the two countries and the potential for the future.

(April 20, 1976)

Ambassador-Designate of Somalia

Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal has been nominated the first Ambassador of Somalia to India.

Born in August 1928, Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was educated in Somalia and U.K. During 1945-59 he was Secretary General of the National League of the Somalilan Protectorate. In 1959 he became Head of Government Business Somali Republic, Minister of Defence (1960), Minister of Education (1961) and Prime Minister (1967-69).

(June 10, 1976)

Sudan to Benefit from Advanced Indian Railway Technology

H.E. Dr. Beshir Abbadi, Minister for Transport and Communications, Sudan who visited India was impressed by the tremendous progress made by India in various technological fields particu-

larly the Railways. But for this visit to India, he said he would not have known the scale and the scope of this vast industrial development as there was obviously an information gap abroad.

Dr. Abbadi visited the Research, Designs and Standards Organisation, Lucknow, Diesel Locomotive Works, Varanasi, Integral Coach Factory, Madras and the Howrah Yard, on the invitation of the Minister for Railways, Shri Kamalapati Tripathi. He expressed a very high opinion about the advanced technology developed at these production units of the Railways.

Dr. Abbadi said that there was great scope for cooperation between India and Sudan in the field of Railways, particularly rolling stock. He expressed the hope that his country would benefit from the Indian expertise in standardising their locomotives, wagons and coaches. He also said that his country would seek Indian technical consultancy for solving the problems being faced by the Sudanese Railways. There was scope in the field of training their personnel, he said. Dr. Beshir Abbadi, added that his country was about to launch the 6 year Development plan which would require a modern transport infrastructure. In this infrastructure Railways would have a pivotal role. He said that his country had been particularly impressed by the tremendous development made by the Indian Railways since Independence. This impression had been conveyed to his Government by the General Manager of the Sudanese Railways, Mr. Syed Abdulmoneim Wasfi, who had been to India twice earlier.

The visiting Sudan Minister accompanied by Mr. Sayad Abdulmoneim Wasfi, General Manager, Sudanese Railways, held talks with Shri Mohd. Shafi Qureshi, Minister of State for Railways, Chairman and Members of the Railway Board.

Dr. Abbadi said that as in India, the Railways played a central role in Sudanese economy. Because of the similarities in both the Indian and the Sudanese Railways, their problems were common particularly in terms of long distances involved. The Sudanese Railway system was highly centralised. For better efficiency it needed to be zonalised. He said his country would benefit from Indian Railways know-how in some specialised areas for improving the efficiency of the Sudanese Railways. One important aspect was

coping with heavier seasonal traffic because of the agricultural basis of Sudanese economy.

India assured the Sudan of full cooperation and assistance for the Sudanese railways. The assurance was conveyed by India's Minister of State for Railways, Mr. Mohammed Shafi Qureshi, to the Sudan's Minister for Transport and Communications, Dr. Bashir Abbadi at a meeting on 21 May in New Delhi at the end of his 10-day visit to India. (May 22, 1976)

Indo-Tanzanian Agreement for Small Industries

India Tanzania signed a formal agreement on 27 April in Dar-es-Salaam, which will enable the two countries to cooperate in expeditious establishment of 52 small-scale industries projects in the rural areas of Tanzania. According to an official press release issued on 29 April in New Delhi, Indian assistance will include supply, installation and commissioning of plant and machinery, training of Tanzanian personnel in India and deputation of Indian experts and technicians to Tanzania. The agreement states that small projects in Tanzania will also be established as early as possible. Measures will be adopted to establish common facilities and service centres for training of technicians to support industrial programmes of Tanzania.

India had also decided to gift six powerlooms and machinery for manufacture of spectacle frames, exercise books and pesticide formulations. India will help in the establishment of model small scale industries in these fields. (April 29, 1976)

Zanzibar Delegation in India to buy Equipment for Small Industries

A high-powered delegation from Zanzibar (Tanzania), led by Hon'ble Kassim Ali, Minister for Buildings, Government of Zanzibar, visited India for finalising contracts with Indian suppliers for various units in the India-assisted Industrial Estate at Zanzibar. The delegation explored the possibilities of setting up a building materials manufacturing plant and the purchase of a large number of tipper trucks and other transportation equipment.

The National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., a public sector undertaking under the Ministry of Industry and Civil Supplies are acting as the turn-key consultants for the Tujitemma Industrial Estate established on the island of Zanzibar in Tanzania which was inaugurated by H.E. Mr. Aboud Jumbe, the first Vice President of Tanzania, on January 9, 1976. This industrial estate has been set up with technical know-how and equipment supplied from India.

The Industrial Estate includes several industrial units whose products would include bread, processed foods, safety matches, tyre retreading, wire products, card-board articles, etc. The first three units of the Industrial Estate, comprising the Wire Product Unit, Tyre Retreading Unit and Corrugated Board Cartons Unit have already been commissioned. There is a 'Common Facilities and Training Centre' in the Estate for which the entire equipment has been gifted by the Government of India. The Estate, when completed, will have a total of 22 industrial units. (April 25, 1976)

Tanzanian Prime Minister Commends Indian Assistance

India's assistance to Tanzania in the development of small-scale industries was warmly appreciated by the Tanzanian Prime Minister, Mr. Rashidi M. Kawawa, when Shri A.P. Sharma, Minister of State for Industry and Civil Supplies, called on him at Dar-es-Salaam on April 24, 1976. Shri Sharma, who was leading an Indian delegation, explained to Mr. Kawawa the constructive steps being taken by India to promote close cooperation with Tanzania in the development of small-scale industries. Mr. Kawawa told him that Indian assistance in the setting up of small-scale industries in Tanzania had benefited a large number of people in that country which was a valuable contribution to Indo-Tanzanian friendship. He further said that both countries were striving to provide a better life for the weaker sections of their people. Mr. Kawawa had high praise for the commendable role played by Indian experts in the development of village and rural industries in Tanzania,

Begum Mohsina Kidwai, U.P. Minister for Small Scale Industries and the Indian High Commissioner to Tanzania, Shri K.D.

Sharma, were also present during the talks, (April 26, 1976)

IBP to set up Drums Plants in Zanzibar

Indo-Burmah Petroleum Company Limited, a public undertaking under the Ministry of Petroleum, has signed in New Delhi an agreement for turn—key job for the supply, erection and commissioning of a plant in Zanzibar for manufactures of 30,000 drums, 1,20,000 tins and 7,50,000 cans per annum. The contract is worth Rs. 32.28 lakhs. The agreement was signed with the visiting Zanzibar Minister for Buildings, H.E. Mr. Kassim Ali.

Indo-Burmah Petroleum-Balmer Lawrie Group are pioneers in the drum manufacture business in India and have two large plants in Calcutta and Bombay meeting 70 per cent of India's demand. For the last several years they have also been exporting barrels and drums to several West Asian countries. They have set up ICC's Drum Plant in Madras and this will be their first overseas venture for supply of a complete plant. (May, 1, 1976)

Indian Aid for Spinning Mill in Tanzania

A six-man export promotion delegation sponsored by the Indian Textile Machinery Manufacturers' Association, which had a four-day visit to Dar-es-Salaam, has signed an agreement in principle with the National Textile Corporation of Tanzania for setting up a 25,000 spindle spinning mill at an estimated cost of Rs. 6 crores, an official press release said.

The agreement envisages participation of the Industrial Development Bank of India for the provision of export credits.

Further discussions to work out technical, financial and other details are scheduled to be held in Bombay and Dar-es-Salaam within the next few months.

The Indian offer will cover not only supply of machinery, but also erection and commissioning, project engineering, management of the mill and training of local personnel. (May 30, 1976)

Indo-Tanzanian Cooperation to be Broadened

The Economic Adviser to the President of Tanzania Mr. J.P. Rweyemanu, called on Shri A.C. George, Minister of State for Indus-

Dr Vijay Gupta

try and Civil Supplies. The possibilities and prospects of further strengthening and extending economic and industrial cooperation between India and Tanzania were discussed in a very cordial atmosphere. Shri George offered India's full cooperation in setting up major industries of basic importance in Tanzania. These included electricity generation and transmission, railway track and signalling equipment, various engineering industries and electrical lamps industry for the manufacture of G.L.S. lamps and fluorescent tubes. The Tanzanian team expressed keen interest and welcomed the offer made by Shri George.

The progress of the Indo-Tanzanian Technical Economic Cooperation Programme was also discussed. It was disclosed that 52 projects being set up in Tanzania with Indian assistance through the National Industrial Development Corporation had made great headway. The Tanzanian team expressed its admiration and appreciation of the work done by the Indian experts. Among the other India-assisted projects making good progress in Tanzania, particular mention was made of exploration for oil and natural gas and the civil aviation training programme under which 10 Indian pilots and 6 maintenance engineers are imparting instructions to Tanzanian trainees. (June 5, 1976)

Seventeen Railway Coaches to Tanzania

Tanzania received its first instalment of five coaches from India in June and the remaining 12 were exported in July.

The supplier is the Integral Coach Factory (Perambur, Tamil Nadu), a public sector undertaking. The order valued at Rs. 2.15 crore had been received from the East African Railway Corporation (Tanzanian region) nine months ago.

Of the 17 coaches, two are second class and 15 third class passenger, all for the metregauge.

The Integral Coach Factory entered the export market in 1968. Since then it has supplied 66 bogie trucks to the Union Burma Railways, 196 bogie trucks to the Taiwan Railway Administration and 45 bogie trucks to the Royal State Railway of Thailand.

The factory has also exported 113 commuter cars to Taiwan, four inspection coaches to Zambia and 25 economy class passenger

cars and five sleeper coaches to the Philliphene National Railways.

(June 8, 1976)

Ambassador-Designate of Zaire

Mr. Nzau Makunga has been nominated the next Ambassador of Zaire to India.

Born in 1929, Mr. Makunga studied Administrative and Commercial Sciences. He has also participated in special courses in Diplomacy, International Organisation, and Political Economy specially conducted for senior officials of Zaire.

He joined the Colonial Service in 1951. He was Deputy Secretary in the Governor General's Cabinet in 1959 and later Secretary and Director in the President's Cabinet upto 1959.

He was appointed Director in the Foreign office in 1967 and Minister Counsellor in Bonn in 1969. He is Ambassador in Belgrade since 1971.

Mr. Makunga has also participated in various international conferences including OAU summits. (April 29, 1976)

Zaire Appreciates India's Efforts

The Central African weekly "ZAIRE" in the leading article stated that "India today is a force whose presence is felt not only in Asia but also—and above all—on the world chess-board." The author Djate Nkoy says that this is so because the people of India are not content with re-living their past heritage, but are moving towards modernism, and their efforts to eradicate the evils hindering their march towards progress, have already borne fruit.

The columnist writes at length about India's successful efforts at economic development within the framework of self-reliance. He gives details of the achievements in the agricultural and industrial fields and notes the enormous potential for exploitation of natural resources in particular of nuclear energy, which places India "among the most advanced nations in this field".

Dr. Djate Nkoy describes India's foreign policy as one of peace, "inspired by the policy of positive neutralism...dedicated to the improvement of relations with its immediate neighbours as also with other foreign partners".

Regarding bilateral relations, the journal says that India was one of the first countries to recognise Zaire, and "in the darkest moments of our post-independence history, did not hesitate to send its troops, within the framework of the U.N. operations, to help us to maintain the unity of the country." It adds that relations between Zaire and India—"this great country with immense possibilities"—have since developed extremely well.

Copiously illustrated with photographs of various aspects of India, the journal has a sketch of the life and personality of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who, it says "surprises world opinion by the manner in which she acquiesces her responsibilities."

The journal ZAIRE has a print-order of 20,000, and is sold not only in Central Africa but also in Europe in particular Belgium.

(May 11, 1976)

Nine Indian Railway Experts Leave for Zaire

A team of 9 Indian Railway experts left for Zaire to man responsible posts on the Zaire National Railways.

The experts have gone to Zaire under a contract signed last year between the Zaire National Railways and the Rail India Technical Economic Services (RITES), a Company under the aegis of the Railway Ministry.

The Indian Railway experts are required to provide consultancy services in the fields of traction and equipment, signalling and telecommunication, railway track and works, transportation and traffic and data processing. The experts would stay in Zaire initially for two years.

(May 25, 1976)

Zambian President Lauds India for Assistance

Speaking at a funeral service in Lusaka on May 6 for nine Zambian Air Force officers who died in an air crash in Zambia on May 3, President Kaunda referred to India which had "joined hands with us to train young Zambians to be what they should be".

Among those killed in the air crash were two retired IAF officers, Mr. V.K. Saxena and Mr. R.D. Lal, who were employed on private contract with Zambian Air Force. The President said the Indians had set a fine example by their work and dedication. The mortal remains of the two men were cremated in Lusaka on May 8. President Kaunda attended that ceremony also when he lauded the Indian Government for its assistance to Zambia.

There are about 3,000 Indian experts in Zambia, including about 100 retired officers and NCO and 15 serving officers from the Indian armed forces. (May 10, 1976)

India's Economic Cooperation with Upper Volta

India and Upper Volta signed on 22 March in New Delhi a memorandum of understanding on economic, technical and scientific cooperation, said Mr. Bipinpal Das, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, in reply to a question in Parliament on 15 April.

Giving the salient features of the memorandum, Mr. Bipinpal Das said that India has agreed to extend cooperation to Upper Volta for setting up of small and medium scale industries such as extraction of vegetable oils, tanneries, textiles, sewing thread, garment making, food processing, ceramic, sheet glass and glassware, builders' hardware and sanitaryware. In the field of agriculture, India would cooperate in community development, fruit and vegetable cultivation and manufacture of agricultural tools and implements. India is agreeable to cooperate in exploration of petroleum and other minerals and provision of technical experts, Mr. Das said.

(April 16, 1976)

Book Reviews

The Institution of Slavery in Zanzibar and Pemba by Abdul-Aziz Y. Lodhi. Research Report No. 16. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies Uppsala. 1973.

Within a brief span of thirty pages this booklet brings to the researcher fresh, first-hand information about the 'slave culture' of Zanzibar and Pemba. Being a Zanzibari himself, the author was able to collect much oral information from elders. He interviewed an eighty-five year old ex-slave trader who claimed to have worked in one of the last caravans of Tippu Tib. Another was a retired farmer who had experienced slavery. An eighty year old 'Khadim' or serf of the ruler of Dubai also related to Lodhi his experiences. The writer's mother had worked as a midwife, or *mkunga*, and his father was a circumciser, or *mtohara*. Both of them gave the writer much insight into the elaborate rules governing Swahili society. It is his personal understanding of a culture, already ancient when the Portuguese first landed on the Swahili coast, that

makes the research report so valuable. He has also drawn heavily on two major sources of material—(1) *Swahili Prose Texts*. Edited by Lyndon Harries. Oxford 1965. They were originally collected by Carl Velten from 1893 to 1896 and published in two separate works *Safari za Wasuaheli* (1901) and *Desturi za Wasuaheli* (1903) in Gottingen. (2) *The Swahili—Speaking Peoples of Zanzibar and the East African coast* by A.H.J. Prins London 1961.

The writer points out that these titles do not betray the wealth of information they hold on the institution of slavery.

The report does not cover the well-known history of the slave-trade on which there is a vast literature. But it gives the reader a much more valuable glimpse into the little known aspect of slavery as a social institution, embedded in Afro-Arab society for centuries.

It was encrusted by numerous rules, customs, usages and laws, and these are reflected in the complex vocabulary that describes every subtle shade of difference between one slave and another, between one relationship and another. Slaves were classified as follows :

- (i) "Watumwa Wa nyumbani"—household slaves, or domestic slaves.
- (ii) "Watumwa Wa Shamba"—plantation slaves or agricultural slaves.
- (iii) "Watumwa Wa maji"—Ship's slaves.

The first group also included the "masuria" or concubines and their children, the "besar". There were also slaves holding special positions of trust and responsibility, each described by a special Swahili word. The highly-evolved nomenclature distinguished between—

"MZALIA"—born slave ;
 born into the household "MJI-NGA" raw, unskilled slave
 "MATEKA" prisoner of war
 "MTWANA" man slave
 "KITWANA" boy slave
 "MJAKAZI" woman slave
 "KILJAKAZI" girl slave
 "MTORO" runaway slave

It seems odd that slaves had socially recognized rights too—rights of a sort. They had cultivation rights and land rights. As there were ranks among them, a slave of rank could sit down to a feast with the free men, while a concubine could dine with free women. They could attend classes to learn the Koran. Crowther records how a Roman slave could learn writing calculation, trades and agriculture and buy his freedom with his *peculium* or payment. (J.G. Crowther, *The Social Relations of Science* London Macmillan & Co, 1941. p. 110.) This was kept in the custody of his master even as in Zanzibar, a woman's bride-price or turban fee was kept by her master. Ancient Rome has a few cases of slaves who were richer than their masters and who became doctors, captains and teachers. Both societies were finely graded into castes and there were ranks among the slaves. Section 4, page 10 of Lodhi's report is entitled : "The social rights of slaves". But, by a strange oversight, it catalogues only the lack of them. The institution in Zanzibar appears mild in comparison with that

Book Review

in Rome. There is no doubt that it was devoid of the horrors of trans-Atlantic slavery. It must be noted that the relationships between the whites and their negro slaves were not governed by a system of laws, conventions, rules and customs. There was no *institution* of slavery as such. It was a sudden swooping down and a grabbing of helpless peoples to feed the moloch of capitalistic greed. In Zanzibar, on the other hand, we see a time-worn institution. This does not mean that it was wholly or largely humane. It certainly involved exploitation and violence against the spiritual dignity of man. Yet it made room, a little room, for rights of a sort for the slave. There are no grounds at all for a comparison between the institution of slavery as it obtained in Africa, at all times in the past, and the brutalities perpetrated by the white man on the African peoples.

The psychological effects of slavery remained long after freedom was granted a slave. A freed slave was usually made a "brother" or a "son" by the former master and he continued to be attached to the house-

hold of the master. The descendants of freed slaves continued to be attached in some sort of bondage to the master's household; they had obligations during weddings and funerals and had to observe special duties of etiquette. Though a legally emancipated slave was not bound to consult his master about his marriage, custom obliged him to inform him about it. The former master would usually supervise the wedding and act as his father. After the abolition of slavery, a majority of the freed slaves became landless destitutes and went back to work for their old masters. Attitudes are slow to change even in modern enterprises; for instance, Swahili sailors often refer to the shipowner's firm as their "mlango" or extended family.

The writer's interest in the institution of slavery was roused by a handwritten manuscript giving the autobiography of an ex-slave, entitled *Maisha ya Mtumwa* or *The Life of a Slave*. This rare document of human experience was destroyed by fire during the Zanzibar Revolution. Such first person accounts are conspicuous by their absence in

ancient Rome. Crowther mentions a Greek writer in the second century A.D., Dio Chrysostom, who asserted that slavery was a violation of the law of nature. He was the first Greek writer to do so. He said that the chief characteristic of slaves is that they are quite incapable of helping themselves. Crowther feels that this lack of initiative is reflected in the remarkable fact that a "class which comprised three quarters of the subjects of Rome has left no autobiographical account of its mode of life. Many slaves had sufficient means and literary skill, but none believed that his life was worth describing." (Ibid., p. 114). In this context the Zanzibar manuscript presents contrary evidence that is puzzling. Moreover, we have Olaudah Equiano's famous autobiography: *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah*. There is also no dearth of initiative when we consider his efforts as an abolitionist, travelling, lecturing and publicizing his book throughout Britain. We also have in Uncle Tom's account of his own life the raw material of what became one

of the great classics of our time. Instance are not wanting when slaves have risen in revolt to free themselves from bondage. Such initiative was displayed by Cinque who, in 1839, led fifty-two African slaves to mutiny aboard the *Amistad* and won their freedom.

The institution of slavery, as it prevailed among the Swahili, is not edifying to a modern mind, but it was not brutal like negro slavery. In Adu Boahen's opinion, African rulers would not have cooperated in the shameful trade if they had known about the horrors awaiting their people both on the passage and on the other side of the Atlantic. (Dr. Adu Boahen, "The coming of the Europeans" in the *Horizon History of Africa*, New York, American Heritage Publishing Co. p. 318). In African society slaves were treated like human beings and they could own property, marry and have children. In the interior of Africa a chief's young slaves had the same status and were barely distinguishable from the royal princes. Lodhi does not give any hint as to the treatment

Book Review

meted out generally to the slaves. Only section 7, page 14, on *Pawning and hiring out slaves* mentions the detailed rules in case a pawn-broker beats, starves, tortures or kills a slave in his charge. This is perhaps because it was an accepted institution in East African society and one whose utility had been tested by time. Everything was to be gained if a slave was healthy and happy. Slavery seems to have been a relatively mild institution in Africa and in the Muslim world. By contrast, the ancient Romans used punishment and force to control their slaves. They believed that slaves could not tell the truth unless they were put upon the rack ; "so torture was the normal method of their legal examination." (Boahen page 111). There is an interesting sequel to this attitude. Crowther says that slaves were often trusted with large sums of money and big transactions because torture could be used on them, and not on freemen, and they could be made to confess. This reminds one of the way slaves were used as a buffer all round the person of the

Nyamwezi King because they could never even aspire for his position. These slaves formed the royal bodyguard and the ritual officers—the most important men in the polity—and they were called the *banyikulu*. (R.G. Abrahams. *The Political Organization of the Unyamwezi*, Cambridge, 1967) In this African example, it is the powerful "myth"—in MacIver's sense of the term—that confers high responsibility on the slaves. In the Roman example it is the threat of torture that does the same thing. The brutal lack of feeling for slaves expressed by Cicero and Cato (Crowther page 115) is in striking contrast to African attitudes ; yet, strangely, both societies knew slavery was a time-worn institution.

As slavery was embedded in the social structure it took on the features peculiar to African social organization. Thus, it was the status of the mother that decided whether a child was slave, half-slave or free. If both parents were slaves, the child was also one and could be sold. If a free man married a slave woman, their child was a half-slave ;

he could not be sold and he could gain his freedom easily. Half slaves did not have the right to inherit their fathers. If a free woman married a slave, their child was free. The children of concubines could not inherit their fathers. Just as a woman's father or brother would receive bride-wealth on her marriage, the owner of a woman slave received the turban fee of five

dollars.

The research report has a very useful select bibliography on the subject. Appendix I, which gives categories of Africans and Arabs, and Appendix II, which gives Swahili words connected with Slavery: are very informative. The work would be particularly useful for students of sociology, law and history.

SMT. PADMA SRINIVASAN

Rural Organization in the Bukoba District, Tanzania by Jorgen and Karen Rald Published by Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975

The book entitled "Rural Organization in Bukoba District, Tanzania" is based on research done in Tanzania from January 1968 to July 1971 by two scholars, Jorgen and Karen Rald. As the authors admit in the very first sentence of the Preface, the book is about people living in the rural areas in Bukoba District of Tanzania, describing in particular as to how the people of Bukoba District organise their life in society with regard to space and time. If that is so, I feel that the title

of the book is inaccurate and inapt. By reading merely the title of the book one gets the impression that the book probably deals with the administrative organisation of Bukoba District whereas actually it deals with the varied aspects of the life of the Bukoba people. It would have been a more correct description of the book, if the authors had used the word 'life' in place of the word 'organization' to make the title read 'Rural Life in Bukoba District, Tanzania'.

The book may be divided into two halves. The first half of the book is devoted mainly to a study of the land use, land tenure and agricultural extension in Bukoba District. The second half of the book deals with the question of allocation of time and labour and income expenditure for selected households in Nshamba ward. The book concludes with a short outline of the social and political aspects of the farming system prevailing in Bukoba District.

The book is profusely illustrated as is obvious from the fact that it contains 31 pictures, 56 tables, 24 diagrams and 6 maps besides five appendices, a good bibliography and footnotes after each chapter. From diagrams, tables, and maps and also from the authors' own statement it appears that they have adopted modern techniques of investigation, research and data collection. Every study of rural life should rightly begin, as the authors have done, with a study of land because the entire rural life centres round the land available and the uses to which it is put. The life of villagers cannot be seen

in isolation from land which is the primary source of their living. In order to collect all the relevant information about land in Bukoba District the authors have relied upon the land use maps obtained from the authoritative sources. Without these maps it would not have been possible for the authors to collect authentic information on changes in cultivation techniques, results of extension service, wide-ranging standards of living, the composition of labour force and the variety in the size of land-holdings. The authors also tried to collect useful information on socio-economic aspect of the farming system and rural society through personal interviews but they admittedly did not succeed much in these efforts for reasons not disclosed by them. Nevertheless, the book contains lot of factual material and data collected with painstaking labour.

The question now arises of the value and usefulness of all this data. As far as the scholars are concerned, the study sets an example before them as to how they should go ahead with the study of life in a rural area in all its aspects.

To others this study may perhaps be of little interest or use. However the Government of Tanzania might derive some advantage from this study since it is seriously implementing the policy of *Ujamaa Vijijini* as enunciated by President Nyerere. Under this policy the Tanzanian Government aims at establishing *Ujamaa* villages which are intended to be socialist organizations created by the people and governed by those who live and work in them. The *Ujamaa* concept puts lot of stress upon the development of people and the building up of socialism and democracy upward from the grass-root level. In these gigantic efforts the studies such as the one under review might be of some value inasmuch as they place before the Government the problems that are to be tackled to make the *Ujamaa* concept a reality.

The book, in my opinion,

suffers from two major defects. Firstly, the authors have not provided the readers with their 'conclusion' either after the end of each chapter or after the end of all the chapters in a consolidated form. The readers are left to draw their own conclusions. Secondly, the last chapter of the book entitled 'The Social and Political Aspects of the Farming System' which, I think, is the most important part of the whole book is not as exhaustive as it ought to have been. Moreover, there is lot of ambiguity in this chapter which, I think, is due to insufficient space being devoted to the subject. For example, the writer talks of close relationship between social status and crops in the Bukoba farming system but does not define it in clear and unambiguous terms. In other respects the book meets the requirements of a standard analytical book.

Dr S.C. Saxena

Book Review

Gertzel Cherry, *Party and Locality in Northern Uganda : 1945-1962*,
University of London, Published for the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, 1974, pp. viii+100, price : £ 1.25.

The Institute of Commonwealth Studies, of the University of London, have from time to time given to us some good studies of the Commonwealth countries, and this work is 16th in the series. It is in the nature of a longish essay concerning political developments in a few districts of Northern Uganda, thus filling up a widely felt gap in this regard. In the Ugandan context the monograph also attempts an enquiry into the reasons for the North-South conflict and the prominence that Northern Uganda achieved around the time of independence. The colonial administration had for long been occupied with the developments in Buganda, a southern province which had been the focal point of its operation. The preferential treatment of the Ganda, and their comparatively faster economic advancement had led to a feeling of having been left behind in the minds of the people in the North. How then in a short span of less than a decade, during the

1950's the northern people gained significantly in political stature and successfully countered any Ganda move to have special status for Buganda in independent Uganda needed an explanation. A study of political developments at national level did not provide complete explanation without a depth study of the rise of African nationalism and political parties at the grass-root level. Gertzel has, therefore, done very well to concentrate her researches on Lango and Acholi districts of the North to show how the leadership there often referred to local issues to win over the sympathy and confidence of the people ; and soon it occupied front ranks in the national politics.

The study is fully documented. Professor Gertzel has not merely consulted National Archival materials, at Entebbe, to give us an insight into the development of local institutions like District and Provincial Councils, but also put to best use the hitherto unearthed

district records. Besides, she has done enough home work and spent sufficient time amidst the Langi and Acholi to have a perspective of the political scene in the interior region.

Professor Gertzel argues that even when the political parties had not yet established country-wide organisations, "In the two districts local party branches successfully challenged both Protectorate government and chiefs for recognition as the legitimate political leaders" (p. 77). She attributes this to the institutional arrangements like the democratisation of the district council which was "an important contributory factor to the growth of a new district political leadership and to the emergence of support in the rural areas for the parties to which that leadership belonged... Thus the control of local government institutions was generally critical for party politics, particularly in the period 1960-1964, when competitive party politics was at its height" (p. 81). As regards rapid political advancement of the northern people, Professor Gertzel points out that "As Buganda increasingly isolated itself from the rest of

the country there was a corresponding hardening of attitudes against the kingdom and the concept of a 'state within a state' (pp. 82-83). And once direct elections for the country as a whole had been decided on, the focus shifted even more rapidly from the province to the district and to the parliamentary constituency, within a unitary state. Professor Gertzel further refers to the leadership qualities of Dr. Milton Obote which were in no way less important for the coming into prominence of Northern Uganda. Since 1952, Obote had been critical of the way in which Northern Uganda had been left behind. He stood firmly in the centre of the younger nationalist tradition. The author rightly mentions that Obote might have initially got a political lift in the Lango politics due to family link-up with Yakobo Adoko who was one of the dominant county chiefs in the late 1940s and early 1950s. But, once he was elected as Lango member of the legco "it is unlikely that Obote owed his subsequent dominance in the district to kin support... Lacking any strong 'charismatic' appeal, he won

his dominant position by hard work and an intuitive awareness of how to appeal to local people" (p. 49).

These are no doubt important plus points of the study, but looking at the wider range of the subject matter, the essay attempts to achieve more than what the shorter description permits. There is surely considerable scope to look into the materials in further depth to uncover the whole story of inter-party rivalry and the

attempts of chiefs to gain control of the emerging political parties. There is also need of more comprehensive account of the rise to power of the former President Milton Obote.

All said, the book is surely a contribution in the field of local level politics in an African situation around the time the 'wind of change' was sweeping the continent during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Dr. R.R. Ramchandani

*South African Voice : A Collection of [South African Poems
Ed. by Bernth Lindfors. Published by African and Afro-
American Studies and Research Centre. The University
of Texas at Austin 1974.*

This collection of poems is titled, "South African Voices". But it could easily have been called 'African Voices ; for there is a lot that is common in the verse of practically all African countries. South African poetry, for instance, is curiously reminiscent of Palestinian poetry. Many of the South African poets are living in exile like their Palestinian counter-parts. The same mental agony and nostalgia and craving for home is felt in the poems of the South African poet, Denis Brutus, as it is, in the poems of the Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish.

I have been bedded in London and Paris Amsterdam and Rotterdam in Munich and Frankfurt Warsaw and Rome—and still my heart cries out for home !

Writers Denis Brutus. The recurring theme of many of Darwish's poems too is the sense of homelessness.

The sense of alienation in African poetry is linked closely with the conditions prevailing in that continent. African poetry is cutting through the bounds of the purely personal and becoming what can be termed 'communal'. This is another characteristic common to all African poetry. The alienation is not a personal phenomenon, the destiny of an individual : it is the alienation of a whole nation, an entire race. It is not the lovely voice of an alienated soul ; it is the voice of a nation that has been deprived of its rights. The poets thus are deeply involved in their people, in their future, in their struggle. Their verse has therefore all the poignancy of suffering and also of faith. Its anguish is charged with the determination to win what the people have been deprived of. No wonder then that Denis Brutus exclaims :

"I am a rebel and freedom is my cause."

And in the same vein writers
Keorapotse Kgositsile :

“Wonderer, with embers
on your tongue
These voices gather to
tame

Or feel the furnace in your
eye

On the long road that will
nourish soul

And purpose with a simple.

THIS LAND IS MINE

Because we now know—

To know our sorrow

Is to know our joy.

(For Zake & Dennis)

The note of protest is one
of the forms in which their
present mood is expressed. It
would not be wrong to character-
ize the present day African
poetry as protest poetry, with
this difference that it is not
protest for its own sake, but
protest directed against con-
crete issues and with a clear,
fiery objective.

Anger and disillusionment
with the Imperialist and neo-
colonialist powers or times is
expressed in satirical verse.

“They are making lunar
orbits how an’

I bet you pretty soon.

They’ll be building their
dark gbettons on

‘The backside of the moon.’

(Cosmo Pietarse)

The African poet takes
pride in Africa, a new sense
of elation characterizes Afri-
can poetry today born of a
new recognition of the grand-
eur of Africa. A surging love
for the soil, for the people and
a sense of pride in its tradi-
tions, of music and dance and
folk-love. He calls it now the
‘mother of continents’ and
‘variegated paradise.’

‘A salute to the first earth

A salute to the first children

Who found a continent

and strange sounds A salute

to the breath of the wise

birds

Who inhabit the echoings

of a variegated paradise’.

(Mazisi Kuenene)

The poems, though origi-
nally written in English, are
yet different from the poems
in English written by English
or American poets, They carry,
through their images, similes
and idioms, an aroma that is
characteristically African. Per-
haps in this regard Mazizi
Kuenene is typical.

It is a valuable little book.

Dr. Bhisham Sahni

Richard D. Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism : Britain and Kenya, 1930*. (Yale Series in Economic History).
New Haven and London, Yale University Press,
1974. XV+203 pages ; abbreviations, notes,
bibliography, index, tables, and maps.

Of late economic historians and political economists have been re-examining some of the events and interpretations of the European colonial era. They are coming to the conclusion, which will however not startle the colonized, that the "white man's burden" was a self-serving cloak for economic and political subjugation of the technologically weak peoples of the world.

Wolff's analysis, which focuses on the development of the economic structure in Kenya during the period 1870-1930, is one such valuable addition to the growing body of literature on the economics of colonialism and imperialism. Confronted with "stark realities of colonialism" (p. xii) during his visit to East Africa he wanted to comprehend the reasons for the sad economic plight of Kenya. He has been eminently successful in unravelling the "why, how, and

with what concrete economic consequences the colonial administration pursued specific economic goals in Kenya derived from British perceptions of the specific economic needs of the empire" (Introduction, p. xv).

Based on his Yale doctoral dissertation, Wolff's book follows the Marxian tradition of social science, by hypothesizing that Britain's economic activities in East Africa were within limits responses to her contemporary economic problems and opportunities (p. 2). After giving a sketch of the imperial economy for the period 1870-1914 (chapter 1) to demonstrate the economic, financial, and strategic importance to Britain of her new empire, he discusses in the next five chapters how there was a total transformation of the pre-existing Kenyan economic-behaviour through the period 1870-1914, and points out the

causes and consequences thereof. Through an analysis of the structure and trend of Britain's trade with her colonies, Wolff has been able to demonstrate that the economic advantages which Britain derived from her new empire would not have accrued to her in the absence of direct control of her colonies.

The prime problem after the acquisition of the East African Protectorate was how to make it productive, and how to pay for the Mombasa-Victoria railway line. This problem was resolved by a massive program of land alienation for exclusive settlement by the whites. Eliot, then Commissioner of the Protectorate, wrote in 1904 :

"White mates black in a very few moves...There can be no doubt that the Masai and many other tribes must go under. It is a prospect which I can view with equanimity and a clear conscience" (p. 66).

The economic policy adopted for Kenya centered around (1) land alienation ; (2) the creation of a wage-earning

class ; (3) the creation of an elaborate state aid program to European agriculture ; and (4) the creation of a fiscal system to maintain the whole economic structure (p. 67).

Thus, what to produce was decided in 1905-1910 through an interdependent sequence of white settler and British official actions and the European plantation emerged as a policy.

The imperial goals in the protectorate included "(1) making the colony pay its way, which meant finding exportables for the European settlers; (2) getting the best possible return on the capital invested to produce the exportables ; and (3) producing those commodities whose availability for import into Britain would lessen or remove what British businessmen and authorities deemed a dangerous dependence on foreign sources of supply." (p. 71).

Also, by restricting the Africans to reserves and by imposing hut taxes, the Africans were forced to become wage earners on European farms. African labor was augmented by legally allowing

"squatting" privileges to the Africans on European land (1918). Several other measures and events favoured the development of an African wage-earning class. After analyzing these the author speaks of the consequences for the Africans thus :

"The combined effect of government and private measures designed to overcome the labor shortage—comprehensive and high taxes, an all-inclusive pass-system, government "encouragement" of Africans to work, forced labor, support of squatting measures leading to overcrowded reserves, encouragement of Africans to immigrate from neighbouring territories, the use of the labor of women and children on farms, and carefully promoted labor-saving innovation—taken together these measures proved successful—perhaps even oversuccessful." (p. 130).

The last chapter reflects on the significance of British colonialism in Kenya. He is critical of the European settlers because "the evidence

indicates that.....(their) farming could only barely survive, even when land, labor, and capital were furnished as cheaply as was 'normal' in the 1920s" (p. 146), and categorizes them, as a class, as landed aristocracy rather than a capitalist entrepreneurial group. The author quotes Frankel with approval in this context :

"The real task which now faces Kenya is that of considering objectively whether the types of production it has fostered are best suited to the advancement of the country, and therefore of both the European, and the non-European population" (p. 146).

(From S.H. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 269)

The author highlights the fact that, as of 1950, Europeans cultivated less than 10% of the "White Highland" allocated exclusively to them. He also quotes from more recent studies to the effect that European agriculture around late 1920s was "an inefficient, artificially protected, and, in strict accounting terms, even private-

ly unprofitable use of resources" (p. 146).

Wolff concludes by pointing out that the main imperial objective of Britain was to protect her international economic relations, especially those with India. Another equally important concern was to reduce, as much as possible, dependence on extra-empire sources for food and raw material. While the acquisition of Kenya was for the fulfilment of the first objective, in actual fact, Kenyan economy and polity was developed in such a way that the second objective was achieved. During this transformation African land, labor, and capital was allocated to the European settlers. The current economic, political, and social situation in Kenya is a legacy of the

foregoing British colonial policy.

While much of the above is known in broad outline to students of East African economic history, Wolff has made a very factual, cogent, and convincing case study of Kenya to delineate the details by assembling data from primary and secondary sources. He has a felicity of expression, weaves his facts to the analysis in an integrated fashion, and draws his inference from the data reasonably well.

There is a very extensive section on notes (or references), a useful classified bibliography, and an index at the end of the book.

Prof. Parbati K. Sircar

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AFRICA QUARTERLY

- 5 France and Morocco: The 1894 Origins of the Colonial Protectorate
James J. Cooke
- 21 Road-Building during the Italian Fascist Occupation of Ethiopia (1936-1941)
R. Pankhurst
- 64 Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan—Philosopher of the Century
Tone Mwenifumbo
- 69 Venison and Violence : Ritual and Social Conflict Among the Effutu of Southern Ghana
R. W. Wyllie
- 80 Big Power Rivalry in Indian Ocean—Tanzanian View
A. D. Hassan
- 87 India and Africa (A Quarterly chronicle for the Quarter July-September 1975)
Vijay Gupta
- 103 Book Reviews
- 116 Africa Through Indian Eyes—A Documentation List (January-June 1975)
Miss Pakeeza Sultan

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James J. Cooke

France and Morocco : The 1894 origins of the Colonial Protectorate

By 1882 France held sway over two of the three states of North Africa. In 1830 she annexed the coastal areas of Algeria into the French empire, and four decades later France's soldiers had pacified most of the vast hinterlands of the state. By the 1881 Treaty of Bardo, Tunisia became a Residency under the control of France, and there remained only Morocco as an independent country in the Maghrib. Ruled by a series of Sultans, bolstered by the Maghzen, the ruling elite, Morocco had avoided colonial penetration by the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Ottomans, the British, and the French. Recognized as a country rich in natural resources and human material Morocco became for the European powers a much sought-after prize, but after 1870 the watchword in the capitals of Europe, as far as Moroccan sovereignty was concerned, was the status quo. France, because of her North African empire and growing interests in western Africa, was determined that eventually she would break the hold that the concept of status quo held over the Moroccan question.

From 1887 to 1894 a three-way coalition, which grew out of the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887, of Britain, Spain, and Italy kept France from making any move toward Morocco. In February 1887 during the height of the Boulanger scare in France, but much to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's displeasure, Italy secured in the renewal of the Triple Alliance some very definite anti-French references to Italian claims in Tripoli and Morocco. After 1887 Morocco existed in a vacuum created by the insistence on the *status quo*, it was clear that at some point in time one or several of the

European states with vital interests in the western Mediterranean would seek to alter the existing situation. This alteration came in 1893 with a deadly confrontation between Spanish and Moroccans at Mellila, where several Spaniards were killed. The Moroccan question was reopened as a result of the violence when Spanish diplomats announced that there was a real possibility of war between the two states.

Sultan Moulay Hassan sat on the throne in 1893; a strong ruler, Hassan had been able to ward off any European attempt to penetrate his country. At his disposal, Hassan had a fairly well developed administrative apparatus modelled after European bureaucracies, headed by the Maghzen, an-educated and mostly urban Moroccan elite.¹ The Maghzen had as a primary goal the survival of their class, and they felt that to do this Morocco must remain independent of European control, but they had no hesitation in adopting modern techniques to their particular brand of rule by violence and intimidation. As long as the Maghzen remained loyal to the Sultan and the state, both institutions remained intact. Moulay Hassan, who had ruled Morocco since 1873, was faced in 1893 with two unpleasant prospects : the Spanish demanded a huge indemnity for the dead at Mellila and he himself was a sick man. Hassan's son, Moulay Abdel Aziz, was a child of thirteen and the heir to the throne but had not manifested any of his father's tendencies toward political energy. Also, there was no real guarantee that when Hassan passed from the scene, the Maghzen, dedicated as they were to their class, would support Abdel Aziz.

The fear of a Moroccan-Spanish war over Mellila was widespread in late 1893, and Hassan needed allies to fend off the demands and the aggressiveness of the Madrid government. It was France, no friend of Moroccan sovereignty, that intervened to assist Morocco when Casimir-Périer, president of the council of ministers and chief of the Quai d'Orsay, recognized the benefits which France could derive from entering into the conflict between Spain and Morocco. Casimir-Périer received word that England had offered to Hassan a sum of 30 million francs at 3½ per cent interest. He countered by instructing his consul in Tangier to offer to the Sultan the same sum

and interest rate with one exception : the loan would be fully guaranteed by Paris.² D'Aubigny, consul in Tangier, informed the chief of the Quai d'Orsay that when talks opened between Spain and Morocco in Marrakesh in early 1894, he would be there to advise the Sultan's finance and foreign ministers and to impress upon them France's interest in the Moroccan state.³

Périer began to work on the Spanish, informing Leony Castillo, Spain's Francophile minister to Paris,⁴ that Paris considered Madrid's demands to be excessive.⁵ But, despite Périer's manoeuvres, he knew that France had taken the position of leadership in the Moroccan question by winning a position at the Sultan's court. So impressed was Moulay Hassan with French aid, albeit for definite national purposes, that he invited the well known Dr. Linares, a member of the French military mission, to inspect the Royal Harem.⁶

While the direct talks took place in Marrakesh between Muhamud Torres, the Moroccan foreign minister, and General Martinez Campos, Spain's delegate, d'Aubigny and Linares worked behind the scenes, advising the Sultan's ministers and countering Spain and England. Périer had done what no French foreign minister had been able to do in a decade—crack, but not break, the stranglehold of the *status quo* over the Moroccan question.

In Britain there was no desire to embroil England in any open confrontation over Morocco. England was engaged with King Leopold of Belgium in some very serious negotiations over the Congo question, and these discussions led to the signing of the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of May 12, 1894, which ceded to Britain a small strip of east African territory, but, more importantly, it gave to the Belgium monarch a life lease on the Barel Ghazal territory on the left bank of the Nile.⁷ Done to keep France away from the Nile, this treaty caused a storm of protest in Paris which was in the midst of a serious governmental crisis with the fall of Périer's government. Lord Rosebery, Foreign Secretary in Gladstone's fourth cabinet had a pressing situation in Uganda with the moribund British Imperial East Africa Company, which, under William Mackinnon, was having its serious financial and administrative difficulties.⁸ Without actually

informing the liberal government, Rosebery continued to aid the company and to involve Britain deeper in east African affairs. Rosebery also had to deal with the ever present problem of the Tunis trade agreements which had festered between England, Italy, and France for several decades with France demanding a free commercial hand for herself in her colony. Lord Salisbury, in 1890, had flatly refused to barter away any British commercial rights in Tunis for French interests in Egypt, and, in fact, Salisbury also refused to tie the Tunis question to the Anglo-German Zanzibar Agreement of 1890 or to the Anglo-French West African Accords of August 5, 1890.⁹ Rosebery, despite his Liberal Party connections, maintained something of a continuity in British colonial policy, and while he had no desire to see France take the lead in any area of Africa, he could not afford to become bogged down in yet another question, especially when he had reconfirmed Britain's position on Morocco quite clearly as regards the status quo.

Despite Rosebery's feelings about France and Morocco, it was clear that Perier was indeed making some inroads in western North Africa. In late January, 1894, the chief of the Quai d'Orsay instructed d'Aubigny to press the loan issue with Moulay Hassan and to indicate to the Sultan that the loan was to preserve the *status quo*. However, in Périer's eyes, the British were to be carefully watched.¹⁰ During the Moroccan-Spanish talks at Marrakesh in February 1894, General Campos indicated that Madrid believed that war between Spain and Morocco was a distinct possibility. D'Aubigny, who also appeared convinced that hostilities were possible, informed Paris that the situation had reached a crisis point and that the Quai d'Orsay needed to act.¹¹ Périer, on the other hand, learned from Theodore Roustau, France's Ambassador to Spain, that Sigismond Moret, the Spanish Foreign Minister, wanted to discuss the Moroccan question with Paris.¹² Périer wisely deferred on the question of talks with Madrid but kept the possibility open.

Perier, in middle February, had lengthy discussion with Leony Castillo over Morocco and detected a very definite anti-British tone. In fact the Spanish Ambassador seemed to think that Britain had interjected herself into the Moroccan question unfairly by the offer

of a loan, and he told Perier that Spain was thinking of fortifying the heights around Gibraltar. The chief of the Quai d'Orsay promised nothing but could take satisfaction in knowing that Spain at least at that point looked to France for assistance in the discussion over the Mellila issue.¹³

In early May, Hassan, a dying man, instructed his treasurer to pay the indemnity to Spain, but at the same time he called for all European powers to reduce their military missions to Morocco. D'Aubigny wrote to P  rier that to do so would be a setback for French policy in Morocco, and in the margin of the dispatch the foreign minister registered his agreement, refusing to consider any reduction in the size of the mission. France, in P  rier's mind, had taken the lead in Morocco in 1894 and would not relinquish any hold over the direction of that policy.¹⁴

Unfortunately for P  rier, in May 1894 there was a governmental crisis over labour legislation and as a result of an interpellation in the Chamber, the P  rier government fell, replaced by one headed by Charles Dupuy, who was faced with the possibility of replacing a foreign minister and maintaining diplomatic continuity. The new Premier had two possibilities—Theophile Delcass   and Gabriel Hanotaux. Delcass   was known as a militant expansionist who had just finished a distinguished term at the colonial undersecretariat, but it was feared that Delcass   at the Quai d'Orsay would exacerbate Anglo-French feelings, especially over Africa.¹⁵ Dupuy's choice fell to Hanotaux, a professional historian and a recent member of the Quai d'Orsay's African branch.¹⁶ Hanotaux, like Delcass  , was an aggressive expansionist, and like P  rier, was determined to maintain French pressures in Morocco.

Firmly behind Hanotaux was a newly created and very vocal Colonial Party in the Chamber which could be counted upon to support the Quai d'Orsay's drive to expand the French North African empire. Founded in 1892 by Eug  ne Etienne, deputy from Oran who was the acknowledged chief of the colonialists in parliament, the party announced their support for Hanotaux. Outside the Chamber, there was the activist *Comite de l'Afrique fran  aise*,

which was formed in 1890 to act as a pressure group in French politics as it affected colonial and foreign policy.¹⁷ No other foreign minister in the last three decades of the nineteenth century had as much organized support as did Hanotaux, and this support would help the bushyhaired chief of the Quai d'Orsay to be bold as far as Africa was concerned.

After Hanotaux was in office only a few days, the Moroccan question took on new and serious dimensions when it was reported that Moulay Hassan had died on June 7. The Maghzen, with characteristic silence, kept the news from the foreign diplomatic colony for fear of international complications. Abdel Aziz, the heir to the throne, a weak child of fourteen, had no real base of power within the ranks of the Maghzen, and the fear of violence became in June, 1894, a very clear and present danger.

On June 11, 1894, d'Aubigny informed Hanotaux of Hassan's demise and the Consul stated that apparently Abdel Aziz was the heir to the Moroccan throne.¹⁸ Frankly, no European representative in Morocco knew whether Abdel Aziz would be able to win the full support of the Maghzen or the Moroccan people. But Hanotaux knew that the unsettled situation might work in favour of France if the Quai d'Orsay could seize the moment and take the lead in the recognition of Abdel Aziz as the new Sultan. Hanotaux informed d'Aubigny that he would personally come to Mers-el-Kébir, Algeria, to watch over the initial stages of the new French offensive. First he would talk to the Spanish Ambassador and assure Madrid that actually France's interest in the western Maghrib was the maintenance of the status quo.¹⁹

Since 1887 there had existed in the Mediterranean a coalition between Spain, England, and Italy which effectively blocked French moves toward either Tripoli or Morocco. During the 1886-1887 negotiations between Bismarck and Italy's militant foreign minister, Francesco Crispi (who held the post in 1894), Italy had extracted some very definite references to Italian claims in Tripoli and some very clear anti-French statements in respect to Morocco. Hanotaux was well aware of the substance, if not the extent, of the

February 20, 1887, Italo-German Accords, but he knew that they would have to be altered if France was ever to take the undisputed lead in Morocco. Hanotaux's plan was simple: line up England and Spain behind French policy of withholding recognition from Abdel Aziz until it suited Paris to move. Hanotaux had to act quickly because he learned that Britain had dispatched several naval vessels to Moroccan waters to protect British subjects and trade.²⁰

In discussions with Lord Dufferin, the British Ambassador to France, Hanotaux learned that Rosebery and Kimberley, the foreign secretary, were unsure of what action to take in respect to the recognition issue. Hanotaux, seizing the opportunity, informed Dufferin that there was no clear evidence that the Moroccans had ever established rules for succession and that there were other claimants to the throne. Prudence, cautioned the chief of the Quai d'Orsay, was the best, possible policy to pursue in respect to the new question. It would be best, as Hanotaux pressed the ambassador, to await events until the issue became clear and Dufferin, speaking for his government, assured the French minister that London would act with France on the issue.²¹ Hanotaux, correct in urging caution, knew that the method of proclaiming a new Sultan, region by region, town by town, Mosque by Mosque, was not a set procedure, and there were a number of claimants ready to raise their candidacy. As one British subject reported, there were attempts at Rabat and other cities to bring a rival into the field against Abdel Aziz.²²

Once the cooperation, however momentary, between Paris and London was assured, Hanotaux turned his attention to Spain. Hanotaux feared that the March Accords between Spain and Morocco contained secret clauses of an anti-French nature,²³ and he was vitally interested in bringing Spain in line with what was now Anglo-French policy over recognition. Theodore Roustan informed Hanotaux that the German government was quick to give advice to Madrid on the new *Marokkafrage*, and that the Spanish foreign minister might talk against French leadership.²⁴ Hanotaux quickly informed Roustan that France's plan was simply to wait until the Islamic leaders of Fez, the Muslim holy city, had accepted Aziz and that Aziz was master of his own capital. At any rate,

Madrid would soon learn of Rosebery's agreement with Paris' plans, and they would probably, despite Berlin's gratuitous advice, fall in line with the Quai d'Orsay and Whitehall.²⁵ Hanotaux's perseverance was rewarded when Moret unenthusiastically supported the policy directed from Paris. Hanotaux had gone one step further than did Perier and pushed French policy to the forefront of a very serious question in Morocco with agreement from Madrid and from London. Also Hanotaux knew that Italy, one of the most vocal anti-French voices in the Mediterranean, was enmeshed in severe internal problems with a rebellion in Sicily which forced Crispi, himself a fiery Sicilian, to mobilize troops to restore civil order. The Italian Premier, once France's greatest antagonist, was forced to devote his attention to Italian internal policies, and by the time Abdel Aziz was recognized as Sultan, France had proven her point and had emerged from a decade of frustration as far as Morocco was concerned.²⁶

Once the recognition issue was settled in late June and Aziz was Sultan, Hanotaux had no intention of allowing the French leadership to die on the vine. There were internal problems for Aziz and the Maghzen in certain areas of Morocco known as the *Bled es Siba*, where Maghzen control did not extend. One major difficulty was the flow of contraband arms into Morocco to be sold to tribes who remained in a state of dissidence against the Sultan and the Maghzen. Hanotaux proposed a joint Franco-English-Spanish naval surveillance of the Moroccan coast line to interdict the supply of weapons into Morocco.²⁷ At the same time Hanotax urged d'Aubigny to pay an official visit to the Sultan at Rabat since Dufferin had communicated London's basic agreement with the trip. While the initial Moroccan reaction to the Rabat visit had been disapproval, by the end of June, England and Spain agreed with the trip.²⁹

The arms issue became Hanotaux's next project in Morocco, and by July, Spain, Britain, Portugal, and even Italy had agreed to a joint surveillance of the coast line. European consuls in Morocco got the right to visit the homes of those suspected of smuggling arms, but this clause was not particularly approved of by d'Aubigny, who stated that Abdel Aziz was selling his authority over internal affairs too cheaply.³⁰

France's victories in the spring and summer of 1894 did not mean that the process of penetration had begun in earnest. Hanotaux knew that actual colonial expansion into Morocco still faced a number of roadblocks as far as England, Spain and Italy were concerned. Any internal violence could bring about a crisis which would interject the great powers into direct confrontation over the western Maghrib. In late July, for example, de Reverseaux, the new French minister in Spain, reported that bloodshed in Morocco was the topic of discussion in the Spanish cabinet, and there were reports circulating in Madrid to the effect that if violence continued in Morocco, the London and Madrid governments might have to intervene.³² De Reverseaux, knowing Hanotaux studied policies vis a vis the North African question, urged his chief to continue to proclaim the status quo in order to maintain Paris' lead in Morocco. Hanotaux knew that despite the accession of Abdel Aziz the situation continued to deteriorate, especially in Casablanca and in the hinterlands around Marrakesh,³³ and it came as no surprise to Hanotaux when Moret dispatched two Spanish cruisers to Mazagan and to Tangier.³⁴ As long as Rosebery did not act and send a British squadron to Moroccan waters, the situation remained relatively calm.

Feeling perhaps stronger than at any time since the Moroccan question was opened, Hanotaux decided on a move designed to alter the status quo and weaken the Sultan without involving a massive protest from the European powers. Simply, Hanotaux decided, after conferences with Linarés and others, to dispatch a Christian diplomat to the Holy City of Fez to replace an Algerian Muslim who had handled France's affairs in the city. When the Quai d'Orsay proposed such an action in August, it was viewed as Hanotaux had hoped—with acquiescence by the British, Spanish, and Italian consuls in Tangier. Never had there been a resident Christian diplomat in Fez before. Europeans entered the city for only brief periods to do homage to the Sultan. With the Quai d'Orsay's plan, Fez would be inhabited by an infidel, a non-Muslim.

The Maghzen and Ba Ahmed, Abdel Aziz's black Vizier, protested France's actions and saw the Fez Consul issue for what it was, an

alteration in the status quo. Muhummud Torres, the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a note of protest to the President of the Republic, and Abdel Aziz, influenced by the strong leadership provided by Ba Ahmed, informed the French diplomatic legation that the presence of an infidel in Fez caused great popular unrest. Souhart, a consul in Tangier, cautioned Hanotaux that violent protests could indeed occur, but the best policy was one of patience and waiting for the expected storm to subside.³⁵ Sigismond Moret was one of the first European foreign ministers to recognize that in the long run France had dramatically altered the status quo, but Moret also indicated that Madrid considered the rather hysterical protests of the Maghzen to be an overreaction. Hanotaux was left with the impression that Madrid would not try to bring pressure on France to withdraw her diplomat from Fez.³⁶

At the same time the French stepped up their pressures on Morocco by demanding the right of pursuit against so-called Moroccan bandits who raided across the border into Algeria. The Maghzen did not respond to the note.³⁷ The only country to take note of the French actions and sound a protest was Germany. In regard to the border pressures being exerted by France, the German foreign minister informed the British Embassy that Berlin watched the situation carefully and viewed it with alarm.³⁸ However, Rosebery and Kimberley had already decided on a policy of quiet support for the Fez policy and most probably had decided to dispatch a British Christian to the city.³⁹ In fact, Kimberley hoped that an opening on Morocco might bring about a series of Franco-British discussions on most African questions except, of course, Egypt.⁴⁰ When the Fez issue first appeared, the British were, in their official correspondence, sympathetic to the French position.⁴¹

The French position on the Fez issue was agreed to by both England and by Spain,⁴² but there was a definite feeling within the Quai d'Orsay that both states wanted to follow France's example and send a Christian into Fez.⁴³ The Italian legation in Tangier even announced a desire to move the entire legation to the Muslim Holy City, but in the long run the Francophile Italian Consul was persuaded not to take such action as it could totally unbalance the

delicate situation. The German Consul in Morocco, Count von Tattenbach, did not share his colleagues' enthusiasm for the Fez project and informed the other consuls that Germany did not consider the project worth the risk of danger to the consul's life.⁴⁴

The British government followed France's example to dispatch a Christian to Fez,⁴⁵ and in response to German criticisms of the Fez issue, the British representative in Tangier stated that the whole project was indeed worth the risks involved. Hanotaux, still wishing to maintain the French lead in Morocco, advised de Monbel, his Consul in Tangier, that Britain should wait a while and see how de Marcilly, the Christian in Fez, fared in his dealings with Abdel Aziz, Ba Ahmed, and the Maghzen.⁴⁶ When it was proposed that a joint Franco-Spanish-British mission be dispatched to Fez, Hanotaux vetoed the idea.⁴⁷

In October, de Monbel pressed the Christian issue with the Maghzen, and he could get no response from them. As was the case, the Maghzen simply refused to reply to de Monbel's inquiry as to the diplomatic effectiveness of de Marcilly. In a dispatch to the Quai d'Orsay, de Monbel wrote, "As you can see, the Maghzen usually remains mired in their apathy, which is habitual, disinterested in everything concerning even the most important matters."⁴⁸ In the same note, the Consul wrote, "I do not think that we have anything to gain by making common cause with any other power. In order to act in Morocco we have need of no other power."⁴⁹ As de Monbel and Hanotaux saw, the Moroccan question was one which favoured France, and that France was in a position to push even harder for a settlement to the question. Hanotaux agreed with his consul and urged him to maintain outwardly the now outmoded concept of the Moroccan status quo.⁵⁰

Hanotaux had the support of London on this particular colonial issue, and in late October, 1894, British sentiments were confirmed when Leon y Castillo stated to Hanotaux that the London government asked Madrid to follow France's lead since the foreign office was certain that Paris would take no unilateral action in respect to Moroccan sovereignty.⁵¹ This was easy for Hanotaux to promise, and in talks with Moret, the chief of the Quai d'Orsay restated his

position assuring Moret that France would not take any steps without consultations with her colleagues.⁵² When the Maghzen asked Madrid to intervene and request that France and Britain alter their positions on the Fez issue, Leony Castillo drafted a reply which stated the impossibility of such an action by the Spanish government.⁵³ At the same time, Hanotaux scored another victory when he impressed upon Spain that France did indeed have authority over several contested cases on the southern Algero-Moroccan border, including the important oasis of Tuat. The Spanish Ambassador agreed that the Sultan had only religious dominion over the inhabitants of the oasis, implying that France had the political and administrative authority over the area.⁵⁴

Baron de Courcel, the French Ambassador in London, approached the Foreign Office over the Tuat issue, and he believed that England would take basically the same position that Spain did in respect to the oasis area.⁵⁵ Kimberly started a month later that Her Majesty's government did indeed wish harmony with France in dealing with Morocco, but that the British Ambassadors to Spain and to Italy should make it clear that London intended no action which would be detrimental to Spanish or Italian claims in Morocco.⁵⁶ Italy, again under the guiding hand of the militant Sicilian Crispi, disputed Britain's claims of neutrality and argued that France was making inroads which threatened all other European states with interests in the western Maghrib.⁵⁷ Certainly France had to fear pressures from the members of the Triple Alliance, but she had created in 1894 for herself something of a free hand in dealing with the future of Morocco, albeit slowly.

As 1894 drew to a close, Hanotaux, who had been in office only seven months, could see a definite change in France's position vis à vis Morocco. When the year began, there was the threat of war between Spain and Morocco over the Mellila incident, but through Périer's diplomacy the situation was subjected to mediation with France aiding both sides. It fell to Gabriel Hanotaux, the bushy-haired historian-diplomat, to carry this work to a point where it could be said that France did indeed have a lead in Morocco. Certainly, Hanotaux proclaimed his adherence to the concepts of

the status quo, but the imperial minded chief of the Quai d'Orsay had little intention of upholding a concept which in reality he did not believe in. All of his efforts, such as the Christian diplomat for Fez and the recognition of Abdel Aziz, aimed at altering the status quo.⁵⁸ It would take another decade for the Entente Cordiale of April 1904 to settle between England and France the issue of Egypt-Morocco barter, and after that another eight years before the Treaty of Fez brought Morocco into the empire ; but 1894 was the year that France broke with the concepts of the status quo and moved toward a general recognition of her predominant position by other European powers. While actual annexation was almost twenty years away, the groundwork for the protectorate was prepared in 1894.

FOOTNOTES

(1) The Maghzen a peculiar Moroccan institution. There are several works of recent vintage which describe it. See : John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful : The Moroccan Political Elite* (New York : Columbia, 1970), pp. 15-32. John P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation : The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944* (Boston : Harvard Monograph Series, 1967), pp. 11-25. A classic study which cannot be overlooked is the two-volume work by Henri Terrasse, *Historie du Maroc des origines a l'etablissement du protectorat francais* (Casablanca, 1949-1960).

(2) Dispatch from Périer to d'Aubigny, Paris, January 23, 1894, France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques Français* Series 1, XI (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), 27-28.

(3) D'Aubigny to Périer, Tangier, January 3, 1894, *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

(4) There is an interesting contemporary account of Leon y Castillo and Spanish policies vis a vis France, see : Marquis Ramirez Villa Urrutia, *Palaque Diplomatico : Recuerdos de un Ambajador* (Madrid : Libreria Espanola y Etranjera, 1923).

(5) Note by Périer, Paris, January 10, 1894, *Documents Français*, p. 10.

(6) Alf Heggoy, *The African Policies of Gabriel Hanotaux* (Athens : University of Georgia Press, 1972), pp. 25-26.

(7) *Ibid.*, pp. 29-41. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians : The Climax of Imperialism* (Garden City : Doubleday, Anchor, 1968), pp. 330-333. Frederick D. Lugard, "The New African Crisis with France and Germany," *Blackwood's Magazine* 156 (July-December, 1894), 145-158.

(8) For a new, excellent study of the question of Uganda see : John S. Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895 : A Study in New Imperialism* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972). Also : James J. Cooke, "God, Glory, and Expansion : The British Missionary in East Africa", *Studies in English*, Winter (1972), pp. 97-109. For a classic study see Frederick D. Lugard, *The Rise of Our East African Empire* 2 vols. (London : Cass, 1893, reprint 1968).

(9) Arthur Marsden, *Britain and the End of the Tunis Treaties, 1894-1897*, Supplement I to the *English Historical Review* (London : Longmans, 1965). pp. 1-5. Heggoy, *Gabriel Hanotaux*, pp. 87-91.

(10) Dispatch from Périet to d'Aubigny, Paris, January 28, 1894. *Documents Français*, pp. 45-46.

(11) Dispatch from d'Aubigny, to Périet, Tangier, February 7, 1894. *ibid.*, p. 54.

(12) Dispatch from Roustan to Périet, Madrid, February 8, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 55.

(13) Note by Périet, Paris, February 14, 1894 *ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

(14) Dispatch from d'Aubigny to Périet, Tangier, May 7, 1894, *ibid.*, pp. 149-152.

(15) Gabriel Louis Jaray (ed), Gabriel Hanotaux, "Carnets," *Revue des Deux Mondes* (April, 1948), pp. 389-391. Also see : Marcel Blanchard, "Théophile Delcassé au Pavillon de Flore, 1893-1894," *Le Monde Français* XII (1949), pp. 3-34.

(16) Hanotaux, "Carnets," pp. 389-391. Heggoy, *Gabriel Hanotaux*, pp. 7-8, 30-31.

(17) There are two works which bear on these two groups, see : Henri Brunschwig, "La Parti colonial français," *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, XLIV (1959), 49-83, and Henri Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités de l'Imperialisme colonial français, 1871-1914* (Paris : Colin. 1960). James J. Cooke, *New French Imperialism : The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion, 1880-1910* (Newton Abbot, England : David and Charles Ltd., 1973), Chapters 3 and 4.

(18) Dispatch from d'Aubigny to Hanotaux, Tangier, June 11, 1894, as found in France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 70, Maroc 1894.

(19) Dispatch from Hanotaux to d'Aubigny, Paris, June 12, 1894, *ibid.*

- (20) Dispatch from Hanotaux to d'Aubigny, Paris, June 12, 1894, *ibid.*
- (21) Dispatch from Hanotaux to Roustan, Paris, June 22, 1894, *ibid.*
Dispatch from Hanotaux to d'Aubigny, Paris, June 12, 1894, *ibid.*
- (22) Walter B. Harris, "The Accession of the New Sultan of Morocco," *Blackwood's Magazine* 156 (July-December, 1894), 474-475. Walter B. Harris was a man who knew Morocco quite well and wrote several classic accounts of his travels in Morocco.
- (23) Dispatch from Roustan to Hanotaux, Madrid, May 31, 1894, *Documents Francais*, pp. 185-186.
- (24) Dispatch from Roustan to Hanotaux, Madrid, June 13, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Rome 924, Espange 1894.
- (25) Dispatch from Hanotaux to Roustan, Paris, June 14, 1894, *ibid.*
- (26) Telegram from Roustan to Hanotaux, Madrid, June 16, 1894, *ibid.*
- (27) Response to Hanotaux by Roustan, Madrid, July 4, 1894, *ibid.*
- (28) Dispatch from Hanotaux to DeFrance, Paris, June 18, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 70, Maroc 1894.
- (29) Telegram from d'Aubigny to Hanotaux, Tangier, June 14, 1894, *ibid.*
- (30) Dispatch from d'Aubigny to Hanotaux, Tangier, July 6, 1894, *ibid.*
- (31) Dispatch from d'Aubigny to Hanotaux, Tangier, July 10, 1894, *ibid.*
- (32) Dispatch from de Reverseaux to Hanotaux, Madrid, July 25, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 924, Espange 1894.
- (33) Dispatches from Souhart, Consul in Tangier, to Hanotaux, August 10, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 70, Maroc 1894 (There are two dispatches sent on August 10.).
- (34) Dispatch from DeFrance, Charge in Madrid, to Hanotaux, Madrid, August 21, 1894, *Documents Francais*, p. 350.
- (35) Dispatch from Souhart to Hanotaux, Tangier, August 24, 1894, *ibid.*, pp. 335-336.
- (36) Dispatch from DeFrance to Hanotaux, Madrid, August 28, 1894, *ibid.*, pp. 343-342. Dispatch from de Reverseaux to Hanotaux, Madrid, July 22, 1894, *ibid.*, pp. 296-297. In this dispatch de Reverseaux confirms that in his opinion Moret was indeed occupied with the situation in Morocco.
- (37) Dispatch from de Monbel to Hanotaux, Tangier, September 11, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 70, Maroc 1894.
- (38) Dispatches from Gosselin to Kimberly, Berlin, September 14, 1894, Great Britain, Public Records Office, *Foreign Office Archives Africa* (London,

England), FO 413/22. (There are two dispatches in this series, both dated September 14.).

(39) Dispatch from Phipps, Chargé in Paris, to Kimberely, Paris, September 12, 1894, *ibid.*

(40) Dispatch from Kimberely to Lord Dufferin, British Ambassador to France, London, July 17, 1894, *ibid.*

(41) Dispatch from Satow to Kimberely, Tangier, August 27, 1894, *ibid.*

(42) Dispatch from de Monbel to Hanotiaux, Tangier, September 13, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 70, Maroc 1894.

(43) Dispatch from de Monbel to Hanotiaux, Tangier, September 14, 1894, *ibid.*

(44) Dispatch from de Monbel to Hanotiaux, Tangier, September 16, 1894, *ibid.*

(45) Dispatch from de Monbel to Hanotiaux, Tangier, September 19, 1894, *ibid.*

(46) Note from Hanotiaux to de Monbel, Paris, September 23, 1894, *ibid.*

(47) Dispatch from Hanotiaux to de Monbel, Paris, September 24, 1894, *ibid.*

(48) Dispatch from de Monbel to Hanotiaux, Tangier, October 17, 1894, *Documents Français*, pp. 375-376.

(49) *Ibid.*

(50) Dispatch from Hanotiaux to de Monbel, Paris, October 17, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 70, Maroc 1894.

(51) Letter from Leon y Castillo to Hanotiaux, Paris, October 20, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 925, Espagne 1894.

(52) Dispatch from Hanotiaux to de Reverseaux, Paris, October 29, 1894, *ibid.*

(53) Note from Leon y Castillo to Abdel Aziz, Madrid, October 30, 1894, *ibid.* A copy of this note was deposited with the Quai d'Orsay sometime in November, 1894.

(54) Dispatch from Quai d'Orsay to Monbel, Paris, November 9, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 70, Maroc 1894.

(55) Note from de Courcel to de Reverseaux, London, November 27, 1894, *Correspondence Politique*, Tome 899, Angleterre.

(56) Memorandum from Kimberely to Sir Clare Ford, London, December 20, 1894. *Foreign Office*, PRO, FO 413/22.

(57) Memorandum from Kimberely to Ford, London, December 24, 1894, *ibid.*

(58) For an interesting firsthand account of these early efforts see: Maximilien de la Martinière, *Souvenirs du Maroc : Voyages et Missions, 1882-1918* (Paris : Plon, 1920).

Richard Pankhurst

Road-Building During the Italian Fascist Occupation of Ethiopia (1936-1941)

Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, a vast, semi-mountainous empire of 350,000 square miles, over three times the size of Italy, and the subsequent Italian fascist occupation from 1936 to 1941, was a major event in the country's transport history. The invaders, who regarded communications from first to last as a matter of cardinal importance, and indeed a prerequisite for almost all other activity, devoted their greatest energies to it, their work in this field being indeed the principal achievement of the occupation regime, causing Adolf Hitler to remark that had his fellow dictator "but been given ten years in Ethiopia, the Italian road constructors would have turned it into a model colony."¹ No survey of Italy's road-building aims and achievements has, however, thus far been attempted.

Communications in Ethiopia, a land-locked African state, in 1935, the year of the invasion, were still in a rudimentary form. Road-building, which had not been traditional had for practical purposes began only in the 1890's during the reign of Emperor Menilek II who had established the first rough road from Addis Ababa to the frontier of the Italian colony of Eritrea, granted a concession for a railway from his capital to the French port of Jibuti, and begun road-building in Addis Ababa and its immediate vicinity, as well as a road from the old commercial city of Harar to the then new railway town of Dire Dawa. Later, in the decade or two prior to the Italian invasion of 1935, Emperor Haile Sellassie had continued this important work, by brining the railway to the capital, introducing the aeroplane, creating a Public Works Department, laying the foundations of an

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embryo road network based on Addis Ababa, and improving the capital's road to make them serviceable for motor cars, several hundreds of which then began to arrive².

Road, and railway, construction in the nearby Italian colony of Eritrea had also started in the late nineteenth century, but by 1935 was still in its infancy, for it had received but modest attention from the Italian Government until the eve of the Ethiopian war. Communications in the colony were based on a road and railway line from the port of Massawa to the capital, Asmara, and thence westwards towards the Sudan, as well as on three north-south roads aimed, for strategic reasons, directly at the frontier of Ethiopia against whom the Italians had long had ambitions of conquest.

Road Building in Eritrea as a Preparation for war

Eritrea, the principal Italian springboard for the invasion, was at that time entirely unequipped for such a role. Emilio De Bono, the fascist Minister of the Colonies who visited the territory in 1932 to investigate military preparedness, was gravely concerned with the transport situation which he found. Describing the road network as "inadequate" he explains :

"All the roads, including the main artery from Massawa to Asmara, could not be classed, according to our ideas, as practicable for mechanical traffic. True, they were used by a few score of motor-cars which represented the normal traffic; but not one of the roads was asphalted, all had dangerous turns and steep gradients, while only certain stretches were wide enough for vehicles to pass. There were a few small bridges with a span of twelve or fifteen feet, but none that really deserved the name of bridge; so that during the rains there were often lasting interruptions, and to cope with these it was necessary to resort to various expedients which would have been impossible in the case of intensive traffic."³

The above report was confirmed by another Italian military observer, General Pietro Badoglio, who stated that the Eritrean roads were "extremely poor". He describes the all important Massawa-

Asmara highway as "a single track of varying surface" with "wretched, dusty, winding roads with very short bends and steep hills, while a subsequent British traveller Polson Newman agreed that this road was "for the first twenty-five miles little more than an inferior path with a natural foundation of rock, earth or sand, more often than not impassable even for light motor transport; while for the remainder of the distance it was a mere mountain track about six feet wide"⁵

South of Asmara three roads, each of strategic importance, ran southwards to the Ethiopian frontier. One to the east travelled southwards through Decamere, Saganeiti and Adi Caieh, to Senafe; another further west ran by Decamere and Gura to May Aini; and the third, still further to the west, went via Asmara and Adi Ugri to Adi Quala. There were also two strategic transverse roads from east to west, one from Decamere via Corbaria to Teramni, and the other from Adi Caieh via Coatit and Mai Aini to Adi Ugri. All these roads, Badoglio explains, "were single track only, and were not so much real roads as rough tracks, unsuitable, both in surface and foundation, for motor traffic; uncertain and insecure, owing to bad planning, where they had watercourses to cross, especially during the rainy season."⁶

In view of Mussolini's decision to invade Ethiopia De Bono decided that it was "necessary to pass without more ado from the stage of inquiry to that of execution."⁷ King Vittorio Emanuele of Italy, who visited the territory shortly afterwards, also expressed concern at "the lack of roads and the insufficiency of the railway," and discussed these matters personally with the fascist dictator.⁸

To strengthen the colony's strategic position De Bono proposed that funds earlier budgeted for the westward extension of the railway to Om Agar on the Sudan frontier, a project which was "not of a military character," should be reallocated to road-building. It was decided that the money should be spent "partly on the construction of a strategic line running east and West, which would permit of rapid movements behind the southern front," and partly on widening the key road from Massawa to Asmara along which

Italian soldiers, their equipment and supplies had to pass.⁹ Additional funds were also allotted for road-building. To avoid "discussion and gossip," which "might have resulted in alarming not only to the enemy, but also the people at home," it was laid down that the work should be carried out in secrecy. Since it was therefore "out of the question to think of sending out Italian workers" employment was restricted, De Bono states, to "black labourers," whose "output was low, but...cheap."¹⁰

To execute these plans a road department, the Ufficio Autonomo Strade, was established on August 17, 1934, and actual construction work began on November 10 of the same year. Some 6,000 "native labourers" were engaged, but, according to an official Italian publication *Gli Annali dell' Africa Italiana*, they proved lazy and disinterested.¹¹ Funds, De Bono says, were at first applied "exclusively to the resurfacing of the Massawa-Nefasit-Asmara road, *which would have to be the channel of supply for the whole Colony*,"¹² but interest soon shifted to the Nefasit—Decamere road which by passed Asmara in a southerly direction, and could thus provide the basis for a faster and more direct thrust on Ethiopia.

Road-building at first made but slow progress, as *Gli Annali dell' Africa Italiana* admits.¹³ De Bono, who returned to the colony as its Commissioner in January, 1935, to make final preparations for the invasion which was planned to begin towards the end of the year recalls that he was greatly concerned with the speed of operations, and declares:

"Only a few days after my arrival I wished to convince myself of the progress of the work.... I had already heard it stated here and there that it was impossible to complete such a Cyclopean task in the ten months available. Such rumours had even reached Italy, where they were eagerly swallowed by many defeatists. I was by no means discouraged; I must confess, however, that having inspected the work on the road, I too found that it was greatly in arrears, although the task had been vigorously attacked."

The High Commissioner accordingly sent for the engineer officer in charge and the contractor's representative "who explained why the

work was progressing so slowly. Essentially, the delay was due to an insufficiency of labourers, and to the small output of the black labour employed." Another difficulty was that "the natives were being gradually called up by the military authorities, while many of them deserted their task in order to enlist." De Bono also sought the opinion of various engineer officers all of whom were "doubtful of the possibility of finishing the work by October," the date fixed by Mussolini for the opening of hostilities. The High Commissioner was, however, undaunted, for, he says: "I was *bound* to redeem the promise I had given, *without reserve* to the Duce."¹⁴

The fascist dictator, anxious to have the work completed in time, wrote to De Bono on February 29, in characteristically bombastic terms, declaring that "in the period of preparation you must only *do*, because the same canons of ordinary administration' *cannot* work in times which are *not* ordinary, that is to say exceptional."¹⁵

Spurred on by such pressure De Bono ordered that the "native labourers" be grouped in semi-military formations, subject to military discipline "as if they were under arms,"¹⁶ and, abandoning the earlier policy, of secrecy, decided on the large-scale import of Italian workers. Describing this latter development he says that he had at first "not thought it possible to send for Italian labourers" and therefore restricted himself "to asking the Chief for three battalions of Blackshirts, to be employed as labourers. They were granted to me immediately and were the first Italian troops to arrive in the Colony. They were set to work at once. A fortnight later it was obvious to me that these 2,500 Blackshirts were like a mere drop in the ocean. I then took the fence, and asked without further preamble for another 10,000 labourers.... The Chief assured me by telegraph that I should have the labourers within a month."¹⁷ The presence of these Italian road builders was, he says, also of considerable strategic importance, for "masses of white labourers in the rear of the troops were a guarantee against any attempt at revolt"¹⁸ by the local population. The advent of large numbers of Italian workers, many of whom were badly selected and unaccustomed to manual labour, nevertheless created several major problems, and, as De Bono admits gave "trouble in various directions."¹⁹

Despite such difficulties a large force of well-equipped Italian labourers were put to work at various points on the Massawa-Decamere road in April, 1935, and orders were given on the sixteenth of the month that all efforts should be concentrated on that road and on its extension from Nefasit to Asmara. Some 5,500 Italians and 4,400 "natives" were employed on the two projects. The number of Italians rose by the end of the month to 10,000; and thereafter remained at between 9,000 and 11,000; the Eritrean labour force, on the other hand, soon dropped to a little over 2,000, largely because of the call to arms; there were also just over 1,000 other "natives", mainly Libyans, Sudanese and Yemenites, who were required in the lowlands which were considered too hot for Italian workers. The Libyans in particular were described by De Bono as "good workers" and "very useful." The number of Italian road workers in the colony as a whole had meanwhile risen from 10,000 in February to 50,000 in October. The result, according to the Commissarian, was an "immediate speeding up of the work," and he adds; "I no longer had any doubt that we should have by the time appointed a road capable of taking any amount of traffic in both directions."²⁰

The road from Nefasit southwards to Decamere, which was, built by the Societa Italiana Costruzione Lavori Pubblici or S.I.C.E.L.P., was opened on September 16 a couple of weeks before the beginning of hostilities. The ceremony was carried out, De Bono says, "amidst the cheers of the labourers," and, significantly enough, "in the presence of the Minister Galeazzo Ciano, who had come to Eritrea to take part in the war as a captain of the Air Force."²¹ A subsequent well publicized ceremony, on October 28, commemorated the inauguration of the entire stretch of road from Massawa to Decamere. This 135 kilometre road was by then covered with asphalt, and was sufficiently wide to allow of two columns of traffic. The track had eight large and 537 small bridges, and had cost 105,000,000 *lire*. This road after the Ethiopian war came to be known in fascist terminology as the Strada della Vittoria, or "road of Dogali" because it passed through the latter village, the site of a previous Italian defeat in 1887 which, it was claimed, had now been avenged.²²

To assist the arrival of men and supplies from the coast an attempt was also made to improve the old mule track up the Haddas valley which had been used by the British expedition of 1867-1868 and subsequently by Italian troops during their war with Menelik in 1896. Work on this track began at the end of 1934, apparently without much forethought, with a view to making it suitable for wheeled traffic, but operations were discontinued beyond the bridge over the Haddas, for, De Bono says, "the labour involved was stupendous," and completion "would have cost an enormous sum, out of all proportion to the advantage."²³

Efforts were next directed, as Badoglio notes, to the improvement of "all the roads running from Asmara to the southern front," as well as "the indispensable cross-roads" required for "the strategical logistical, and tactical needs of the army." These roads comprised two double track highways running southwards from Asmara to Decamere and from Asmara to Adi Ugri to Arresa, and from Adi Ugri via May Aini and Coatit to Adi Caieh.²⁴ Work was entrusted to two large Italian road-building firms, S.I.C.E.L.P. which built the Decamere-Nefasit, Guila-Adi Ugri, and five single track roads namely from Nefasit to Asmara, from Decemere via Saganeiti and Adi Caieh to Senafe, from Adi Ugri to Adi Quala, from Adi Ugri, Adi Ugri-Aresa, and Adi Caieh-Adi Ugri roads, and Puricelli, which was responsible for the Asmara-Saganeiti, Asmara-Guila, Decamere-Mareb, Decamere-May Aini and Saganeiti-Dembe stretches.²⁵

Such road-building, though of crucial strategic significance, could not be easily achieved in the general confusion of war preparation. Work on the southward arterial from Asmara to Adi Caieh and Senafe in particular was hampered, as De Bono explains, by having to be "carried on simultaneously with the influx of troops from the Motherland and the traffic which this involved."²⁶ In the spring of 1935 the highway was under especially heavy transport pressure, and "involved a daily coming and going of carts and motor-cars which the existing road, narrow and poorly ballasted, and terribly crooked (for instance, between Adi Caje and Senafe—a distance of 18 miles—there were 1,200 turns to the road) was quite incapable of carrying."²⁷

Growing awareness of such difficulties caused De Bono to realise that "despite the continual arrival of labourers" from Italy "the need for additional labour was becoming more evident each day." Arrangements were accordingly made for detachments of infantry to take turns on the roads, for the engineer troops "were never sufficient". The Army Corps, which included masons and other specialised workers, was told off to improve communications from the southernmost town of Senafe, May Aini and Adi Quala to the Ethiopian frontier. Three roads were thus prepared for the invading forces: one, from Senafe via Barakit to Gunna Guna, was designed to service a drive on Adigrat; a second from May Aini to Belese was planned for a thrust on Enticho; and a third from Adi Quala via Enda Giyorgis to the Mareb was to serve the assault on Adowa. This latter road, significantly enough, was improved to permit of a double line of automobile supply columns.²⁸

Such road-building, carried out as it was in difficult conditions and with great haste, is said to have resulted in a remarkable amount of corruption which despite fascist censorship gained considerable publicity. As early as August 20, 1931, an anonymous informer had written to Mussolini declaring that De Bono, then Minister of the Colonies, making use of his permanent secretary, Colonel Butturini, had given a monopoly of contracting work to Salvatore Scalera of the construction firm of S.I.C.E.L.P.²⁹ A subsequent report of March 22, 1935, at the height of road-building work, informed the Duce that "in various Roman circles, as well as in popular quarters," there was talk of the "almost monopolistic" position given to Scalera and of the "exaggerated" sums allowed to him for his work. The author held Colonel Butturini responsible for this, asserting that the latter took a percentage of 10% to 20% on all contracts, as a result of which people spoke of the Commissioner "in coarse terms," thus discrediting both "the Party and the Regime,"³⁰

Mussolini, who was little interested in matters of financial rectitude, seems to have ignored these reports. Later, however, it transpired that Scalera, whose firm had a paid-up capital of only 5,000,000 lire, had contributed no less than 300,000 lire to the

fascist party's Asmara newspaper after which he had been selected as contractor for the Massawa—Nefasit—Asmara road."³¹ The contract was then examined by the Italian Minister of the Colonies, Allesandro Lessona, who, finding that it had remarkably little relation to actual construction costs suspended further payments,³² and attempted to scale it down from 120 to 67 million lire.³³ Scalera thereupon appealed to De Bono who accordingly wrote to Mussolini, on September 9, 1936, recalling the contractor's "great fascist and patriotic merit" and generous contributions to fascist party funds, and appealed to the Duce for "justice, your justice."³⁴ The fascist dictator advised De Bono to avoid becoming involved in the case, but the latter refused to listen to such advice, declaring it his "sacred right" to do so.³⁵

While the dispute smouldered on several observers began remarking that De Bono's earlier road-building in Libya had also been particularly expensive, and the fact that subsequent construction work was substantially cheaper was pointed out by Lessona's patron, Marshal Balbo, in an article in the journal *Nuova Antologia* which was later summarised in the Rome daily *Il Messaggero* of February 26, 1937. Such statements and the publicity afforded to them, greatly incensed De Bono, who, abandoning the pose of unity among the fascist leaders, wrote an indignant letter to the *Messaggero* of February 27 in which he somewhat naively complained that Balbo's assertions had led the public to believe there must have been much "swindling."

Tension between De Bono and Lessona became so intense that there was talk of their resolving their differences by means of duel. Mussolini found himself obliged, on February 27, to appoint a "jury of honour" composed of four fascists to determine whether Lessona had been guilty of any offence of a "personal kind", i.e. whether the matter should be settled by a duel, but expressly forbade them from inquiring into Lessona's actions as Minister or into the facts of the road contract under dispute.³⁶ On the latter question the Duce declared that De Bono was "outside and above all suspicion," and added, "If the Massawa-Asmara road was leased out without bure-

aucratic formalities, this was through my orders, as it was necessary to do this quickly in order to win the war.”³⁹

The jury succeeded in avoiding the threatened duel, but a long investigation into the original S.I.C.E.L.P. contract had meanwhile been set in motion in the course of which there were many charges of fraudulent evidence and intimidation of witnesses, as well as bitter remarks as to the political reliability or otherwise of the various parties to the dispute. Scalesa, backed as he was by De Bono, one of the founders of fascism, in due course won its case, and Lessona agreed on October 4, 1937, on Mussolini's direct orders, to pay the sum earlier agreed upon.³⁸ The long-drawn-out dispute, the publicity which it received, and the open talk of corruption in high places nevertheless did much to discredit the regime and its road-building operations.

Road-Building in the course of the campaign

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia, which was begun under De Bono's direct command on October 3, 1935, resulted in the immediate transfer of road-building activity to the newly occupied territories where work started on the tracks on which the invading troops and their supplies were to pass. Attention was at first concentrated on two roads from the frontier southwards. Joining up with those from Senafe and Adi Quala they led to Adigrat and Adowa which were occupied on October 5 and 6 respectively. An east-west transverse road between these two points was shortly afterwards constructed, thus, as De Bono says, linking the various wings of the front.³⁹

Such construction was effected, he recalls, by the “cruel labour” of workers and soldiers, both of whom “worked away indefatigably,” thus enabling “motor-vehicles, although at considerable risk, to reach in the course of a few days, the positions we had conquered.”⁴⁰ Ten days after the outbreak of hostilities De Bono travelled by car to Adowa. In his diary for October 13, he exclaimed, “What a rotten road to Addi Ugri”,⁴¹ but in his published memoirs he proudly declared that the use of the track to Adowa had been rendered possible by “the miracles which had been accomplished” on the

track. Four days later he reported that the road to Adigrat was "without comparison" better than to Adowa : "Its course was easier, and the solidity of the ground had prevented any subsidences...the work done in less than ten days was surprising. The road could be quite *comfortably* traversed in a motor-car."⁴² Muriel Currey, a sychophantic British journalist who accompanied the Italian forces not long afterwards, claimed that the road to Adi Quala was "rapidly becoming an auto *strada*," while across the old frontier "the narrow, winding track" to Adowa had "widened out into quite a passable military road", and she adds : "It was a tremendous engineering feat to have driven the road over the mountains in little more than a few days."⁴³

Despite such enthusiastic accounts much road-building was very provisional. De Bono who noted in his diary on November 7, "It's raining like hell!...we hope this deluge will not wash out the roads",⁴⁴ admits in his memoirs that the surface was "deteriorating day by day as the traffic increased,"⁴⁵ while Major-General Fuller, an Italian sympathiser, observed on November 9 that as a result of "an unexpected deluge of rain" tracks which had been "abominable" a few weeks earlier were "in many places impassable, except by pack animals and light cars."⁴⁶ Crowded traffic conditions led moreover to many accidents, which, Fuller records, "were frequent. Not only were there many head-on collisions, but not a few lorries had the misfortune to run over the side. At one hair-pin bend I remember seeing four or five smashed to match-wood and lying in the valley a thousand feet below the spot from which they took their death plunge. How this actual accident happened was obvious : a lorry column had passed along, each machine throwing up a blinding cloud of dust; one had not seen the bend, and had gone over and three of four others had followed it to destruction."⁴⁷

The gravity of the situation at the beginning of December was described by Badoglio who records : "On the road from Adigrat to Macalle numerous labour battalions and companies were at work, but the track was far from being in a condition to sustain the immense traffic necessary to provision that sector. 'Miracles have been accomplished under De Bono's direction,' I telegraphed on Decem-



ber 2nd to the Minister of the Colonies, 'but that road is nevertheless still my main anxiety.' The road to Adowa was in the same sort of state, and had, moreover, to be constructed over much more difficult ground...The two lines of communication, moreover, were as yet only partially organized and insufficiently garrisoned and protected."⁴⁸ Another major problem, according to the observer, was that the absence of efficient transverse roads rendered the transfer of troops from one scene of operations to another time consuming. Thus "the lack of a proper strategic road between western Tigrai and Agame-Enderta - so distant, and in such rough country that it took about a fortnight to transfer a division from the one to the other-made it difficult, perhaps impossible, and certainly inopportune, to move large units should the necessity arise."⁴⁹

Badoglio, who replaced De Bono as Italian military commander on November 30, devoted much of his attention to road-building, which, he said, then had three distinct objectives. Firstly, the extension of the two southward roads which constituted the main lines of entry into Ethiopia, i.e. the Senafe-Adigrat road which was to proceed via Bue to Amba Alagi and beyond, and the Adi Quala-Adowa road which was to go via Selaclaca to Halda south of the Takaze river. Secondly, the construction of three less important north-south roads : the May Aini-Entichio-Adowa-May Canetta—Abbi Addi-Gaela-Feraroa road in the centre of the front, the Adowa-Adi Rassi road to the west, and the Enda Takla Haymanot-Hawzien-Addis Zubbana-Waru road to the east. Thirdly the creation of east-west transverse roads, the most important being from Adigrat to Adowa.⁵⁰ This latter road apparently aroused the special interest of the Duce who telegraphed to his commander, on January 1, 1936, "I consider urgent the construction of the road, Adigrat to Adowa."⁵¹ Work was also accomplished on a track in the east from Antalò to Tzellari,⁵² while in the west Menelik's old road from Om Ager in western Eritrea to the Ethiopian provincial capital of Gondar was improved : Badoglio claims that his men found it smothered by vegetation, but that Italy's "invincible troops" restored it with "their proverbial skill and speed."⁵³

Such operations entailed the utilisation of considerable numbers

of workers. On April 14 Badoglio reported that on the northern front he was employing 170,000 men on the roads, of whom 120,000 were soldiers,⁵⁴ while in the south his colleague Graziani had a further 30,000 men on road work.⁵⁵

Despite such massive allocation of labour the Italian advance on Addis Ababa in April was substantially handicapped by transport problems on the crucially important road from Dessie to the capital. An Italian writer of this time Sam Benelli, who argues that the rains were Italy's greatest enemy," recalls that sections of the road were "entirely under water,"⁵⁶ while Badoglio admits that "serious difficulties were caused by the state of the road." Describing the problems faced by his men, he adds :

"Often, and in some parts at every few hundred yards, the column was obliged to halt, while the troops dismounted and the battalion of engineers, which marched with the advance guard, had to take steps to improve the trace of the road, to build bridges and to make passable fords and long stretches of marsh, tasks which were assisted indefatigably and with the utmost zeal by the troops of other arms. Even heavier and more exhausting work had been required in the passage of the marshy strip near Borchenna, which was some hundreds of yards wide and of the deep Robi ford forty or fifty yards wide and through a turbulent stream. Across these, on temporary foundations which, however skilfully placed, soon sank in the muddy ground or were overtuned by the force of the water, the lorries filed slowly one at a time, carried, rather pushed, by the soldiers."⁵⁷

A further somewhat romantic account of the road-building of this period is afforded by an American observer, E. Wiese, who, travelling along this road, reports :

"Motorised troops under General Badoglio had carved out this route...under the enemy's fire, using tractors and tanks instead of steam-plows, handgrenades instead of dynamite, a simple compass instead of the surveyor's instruments. Five mountain ranges, all towering over 9,000 feet, had to be traversed with zigzag paths; at least ten cascades required stone dams. Following the troops

came the first engineers and squads of road-labourers to transform the trail into a crude dirt road over which, a few days later, columns of heavy supply trucks were to travel...I was filled with astonishment at the speed with which these white soldiers and workers had accomplished their well-nigh impossible task. Toiling twelve and fourteen hours a day, often in double shifts, they were able to build as many as ten miles of a road each week."⁵⁸

The road was, however, only just passable. Louise Diel, a Nazi German journalist, states that in certain areas "the rain had washed away every sign of a path," and that cars and other vehicles kept on breaking down whereupon to prevent them from blocking the road they would be "simply toppled over the nearest precipice, regardless of the fact that each would cost 100,000 lire to replace."⁵⁹ The road, for all its difficulties, nevertheless played a decisive role in the campaign, and enabled the invaders to occupy Addis Ababa on May 5, 1936, well before the main outbreak of the rainy season.

Work on the Asmara-Addis Ababa Highway

After the occupation of the Ethiopian capital road-building, for obvious strategic reasons, received the highest possible Italian priority.

A decree was issued, on May 19, 1936, declaring that the Duce had "delineated the plan of the Ethiopian road network" and had "given instructions" so that construction work might "rapidly be put into operation." The network announced for immediate construction consisted of five roads : (1) Om Ager-Gondar-Dabra Tabor-Dessie, a distance of 600 kilometres, (2) Dabra Tabor-Dabra Marqos-Addis Ababa, 500 kilometres, (3) Adigrat-Dessie-Addis Ababa, 850 kilometres (4) Assab-Dessie, 500 kilometres, and (5) Addis Ababa-Jimma, 300 kilometres, or a total of 2,800 kilometres. A second stage of operations envisaged the construction of a 1,100 kilometre long road from Addis Ababa via Alata and "Negelli to Dolo to link the Ethiopian capital with the Rift Valley lakes and thence with Italian Somalia, and the building of a network of feeder roads."⁶⁰

Road Building During Italian Occupied Ethiopia

Such plans were, however, initially overshadowed by efforts to keep the Asmara-Addis Ababa highway, the Ethiopian capital's only direct means of contact with Eritrea, in functioning order. The coming of the rains in July led to the rapid disintegration of the road surface, and the virtual suspension of further road work for several months. The *Sunday Times*, remarking that the "first consideration" of Italian road-building in occupied Ethiopia had been speed rather than long-term efficiency, reported that "when the rains came a great deal was washed away and the forces occupying Addis were dependent on the Djibuti railroad for their communications with the outside world."⁶¹ This was confirmed by Evelyn Waugh who observed in August that "for weeks" the road from Addis Ababa to the north had been "impassable", and that the railway was therefore the capital's "sole means of communication" with the outside,⁶² while Patrick Roberts of the British Legation reported towards the end of the year that there had been "steady sniping by insurgents" on the road, and added: "This line of communication was completely interrupted for motor transport during the rains, by reason not only of insecurity but also the impassability of the unmetalled road."⁶³

The need to develop an effective transport system was, however, so great that Mussolini insisted on a rapid resumption of road-building activity at the end of the rains. On September 16, 1936, he called his Minister of Public Works, Cobolli Gigli, and instructed him to leave for East Africa on October 3 to get a move on with the road-building. Four days later the Duce gave orders that the Asmara-Addis Ababa and Asmara-Gondar highway had to be usable by June 30, 1937, and that the first basic 2,800 kilometre long road network should be completed by the end of 1938. After the poor Minister's arrival in Ethiopia the dictator telegraphed somewhat melodramatically to him on October 17, 1936, "You will not return to Italy until you have made a real beginning, on a vast scale, with the road work. There is not a moment to waste." The first Italian road-builders recruited for service in the new empire sailed in three steamers, the *Italia*, *Colombo* and *Ogaden* which docked at Massawa on November 9, 1936, and at Djibuti on November 11, towards the end of the month. The Minister was thus allowed to

return home at the beginning of December (though he paid later visits in April 1937, the winter of 1937-8 and February 1939)⁶⁴. The number of workers employed on the roads meanwhile continued to rise. By January 1937 the Italian workers had increased to 30,000 and by the beginning of June to 63,530 by which time 43,720 "natives" and 10,680 Yemenis and Sudanese were also engaged on road-work in Italian East Africa. The principal contractors were Puricelli, Parisi, and Vaselli.⁶⁵

Activity at this time was still mainly concentrated on the road from Eritrea to Asmara. Wiese, reporting in November 1936, declared that this highway was being built at tremendous expense, for "every mile of asphalt" cost "the Italian equivalent of a hundred thousand dollars."⁶⁶ Security was moreover a major problem. The Italian road-builders, according to the same observer, were all "armed and uniformed, organized in military units and lodged in wooden barracks or encampments of canvas tents." Herbert Mathews, another American observer, likewise remarks that "every camp was protected by barbed wire, and soldiers, and every worker armed with a rifle".⁶⁷ Describing the workers' camps of this period he adds :

"On the road to Addis Ababa have sprung up almost overnight large settlements of Italian soldiers and workers which are to form the basis for future colonies. Out of temporary tent encampments have grown veritable cities of barracks built of lumber imported from Yugoslavia. Open-air repair stations for trucks have spread until acres are now covered with warehouses for spare tires and machinery...In especially dangerous districts the workers' settlements, like military encampments, are surrounded with employments for machine guns, with sentries on guard all night and control of the gates even in daylight."⁶⁸

Turning to the portable metal houses of the road builders, he continues :

"These metal houses which have sprouted along the road to Addis Ababa will probably become the symbol of the Italian pioneers...To build a house the Italians simply load a truck with

forty sheets of corrugated iron for walls and roof, with asbestos panels for inner walls and with assorted bolts and a couple of metal doors. Send a hundred trucks so loaded to the spot where the settlement is required and in a few hours ordinary soldiers can put up a brand new town. To be sure, the sun beating down on the metal makes the interior something of a furnace during the day, and the night winds whistling through the unwelded walls provide too much air-conditioning for comfort, but the houses keep out rain, insects and wild animals. Even more important they can be moved wherever they are needed. Beyond Adigrat were thousands of khaki-uniformed Italian labourers, hard at work.....On the way to Addis Ababa I was to pass more than forty such settlements.”⁶⁹

Notwithstanding the continued lack of security the Italian road workers seem to have preserved their morale, as was noted by Wiese who declares that “in spite of the strain of having to be constantly on the alert, ready to drop pickaxe and shovel and take up the guns stacked for instant use against Ethiopian attackers they appeared in good spirits and ever ready to lend me a hand over a bad stretch of road.”⁷⁰

The Fascist Ideology of Road-Building

Road-building, and above all the strategic implications thereof, held a central position in fascist thinking on the empire, and the need for an efficient system of communication was a constant theme in fascist writings. The prevailing view was summed up early in the occupation by *Gli Annali dell' Africa Italiana* which declared that roads were needed in the empire “to consolidate military control” as well as for all necessary objectives of development,⁷¹ while, Guiglia, a fascist writer of the period, frankly noted that “where the road arrived it became relatively easy to maintain security” and that “to construct a vast network of good motor roads” was “to break at the outset any attempt at guerilla activity and prevent its extension to other regions,” for local rebellions would thereafter be “easy to suppress” and would “never extend into vast regions.”⁷² Colombi, another Italian author who recalled the straight roads in Paris which Napoleon III had built to curb popular

insurgency, made a similar point when he argued that "good roads" were "a powerful means to ensure the maintenance of order" and that in Mussolini's empire "the first impulse for the immediate construction of a network of good roads was given by urgent economic necessities and preoccupations for security."⁷³ Contemporary sympathisers of fascism echoed these views, Polson Newman declaring that "if the Italians were to maintain law and order in a newly conquered country, and to perform efficiently their task of development," it was "imperative" to find "a radical solution" for the "fundamental problem of road communications,"⁷⁴ and Louise Diel that if the country was to be "successfully colonized" it must be "equipped with good roads."⁷⁵ It was therefore not surprising that the American journalist Wiese should have reported that "good communications were the first and principal concern of the conquerors" and that "Italian colonial experts were well aware that without highways or railroads in a partly hostile country there could be no military security, no effective administration, no profitable economic development."⁷⁶

Such thinking applied not merely to the immediate aftermath of the invasion, but, because of continued resistance by the Ethiopian Patriots, to the entire occupation period. On April 18, 1938, for example the Italian commander of the armed forces stated in a personal report to the Duce that "the secret of effective domination of the country is communications,"⁷⁷ and a subsequent report to the Viceroy, the Duca d'Aosta, on the "pacification" of the empire stated that "the entire problem of Amhara is still and always a problem of communications."⁷⁸

These views were appreciated by neutral observers, Stonehewer-Bird of the British Consulate in Addis Ababa remarking for example on February 2, 1938, that he felt the Italians were "justified in spending all they can afford on this work", and he adds: "The need for good roads is twofold: to help in the final pacification of the country (the 'grandes routes de penetration' in Morocco did as much for the foreign legion to help France pacify Morocco) and secondly to keep one part of the country in touch with another economically as well as militarily during the rains."⁷⁹

Considerations of foreign policy and the need for self-sufficiency also played major role in the formulation of fascist road policy. The Italian Government was much concerned at its empire's dependence on the French-run railway to the French Somali port of Jibuti which constituted Ethiopia's sole easy means of access to the sea. To reduce this dependence the Italians came to an agreement with the British Government on January 27, 1937, for the construction of roads to link Italian East Africa with the British Somaliland ports of Berbera and Zeila. Three roads were envisaged: from Jigjiga via Hargeisa to Berbera, from Jigjiga via Buramo to Zeila, and from Aisha to Zeila. The agreement, valid for two years but renewable by mutual consent, took the form of an exchange of letters between Enrico Cerulli, the Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of the Colonies, and Clifford Plowman, the Secretary of the British Somaliland Government. These letters specified that Britain would build roads on its side of the frontier suitable for lorries not exceeding two tons, and that Italy would make annual payments to Britain to meet the expenses involved. The first payment for the Berbera-Hargeisa road was to amount to £ 6,000, while these for the other roads were to be based on experts' estimates. Britain further agreed to improve the ports of Berbera and Zeila to enable them to handle 250 tons of merchandise a day, and expressed itself willing to construct additional wharves, warehouses and other works at Italy's expense. All goods passing through British territory were to be subject to transit dues "probably not to exceed 1 per cent a valorem," but were exempt from customs tax. The establishment of a British-Italian transit consortium was also envisaged.⁸⁰

On the conclusion of this agreement the Italian Government gave orders for the construction of roads designed at least partially to replace the Djibuti railway. On February 10 the Italian Minister of the Colonies Lessona accordingly sent Graziani, the Italian Viceroy of Ethiopia, a telegramme to be decoded in person, in which he drew attention to deteriorating relations with France and urged him to develop the Massawa and Mogadishu roads to the utmost, as well as to employ "the maximum energy" in following up the agreement with Britain so as to prepare the fascist empire to meet "the eventualities"

lities that must be faced in a crisis in relations with Djibuti.”⁸¹ On receipt of these instructions Graziani telegraphed to General Nasi, the governor of Harar, on February 14, declaring it “necessary to give the maximum impulse” to improving the roads between Harar and Jigjiga and Harar and Dire Dawa so as to provide the maximum communication with Berbera “in the eventuality that a changed attitude of French politics towards us put us in major difficulties in regard to our access to the sea through Djibuti.”⁸²

Once constructed the roads of the empire, symbols of fascist power and at this stage the only positive achievements of the regime, received effusive praise. Thus Graziani declared their construction “the first great monument of fascist civilisation in the Empire,”⁸³ while Cobolli-Gigli claimed that they “recalled the grandeur of ancient Rome.”⁸⁴ Rocks and walls in the vicinity of the roads were therefore copiously plastered, as Diel records, with numerous fascist slogans, proclaiming, “Long live the Duce,” “Long live the King,” “Long live His Excellency Graziani,” “Long live the King and Viceroy,” “God, family, and country.”⁸⁵

Road-Building in the Empire 1937-1940

The original Italian road-building programme which had been conceived in the heat or immediate aftermath of the war soon proved to have been over-ambitious, for by the spring of 1937 it became apparent that the fascist government was in no position to construct roads with the speed originally envisaged. The Italian economy was suffering from the heavy expenditure incurred in the Ethiopian war and the effects of League of Nations sanctions, and F. Guarneri, the fascist minister of economic affairs, warned the Duce in the most unequivocal language on July 9 that the economic situation was “critical” and “disquieting.”⁸⁶ Mussolini, who was evidently alarmed by this report, wrote to Lessona on the following day informing him that the expenses then being incurred on the empire could “no longer be supported without endangering the country’s services” and that “immediate and radical measures were necessary”, among them the slashing of public works programmes in Italian East Africa to an “indispensable minimum.”⁸⁷ Mussolini

also wrote on the same day to Cobolli-Gigli ordering him "drastically to reduce" expenditure in East Africa, by cutting down and as soon as possible terminating the employment of "coloured labour not belonging to the empire." The Minister was also instructed to provide his chief with "concrete proposals eliminating or postponing everything that does not correspond to immediate and unpostponable necessity."⁸⁸

Deteriorating conditions in Italy subsequently led to further economies. On September 20 Lesson telegraphed to Graziani that "H.E. the Head of the Government has ordered that workers' contingents in Italian East Africa be reduced to 20,000 or even less if possible", and on the following day the Viceroy instructed his provincial governors to reduce such works as "cannot be continued with native labour."⁸⁹ Reliance on local labour was, however, by no means easy, for, as a correspondent of *The Times* observed, "the Ethiopian is no navvy" as a result of which Italian labour had to be employed at "inflated wages."⁹⁰

The difficulties of this period were apparent to Helm of the British Consulate in Addis Ababa who noted on September 22, 1937, that the road construction programme initiated by the Italians was "ambitious and already straining their resources,"⁹¹ while the British Consul in Naples quoted an Italian business man in East Africa on June 7, 1928, as declaring that although the roads already built were "kept in a fairly good condition" they were a "continuous source of anxiety owing to being constantly in need of repair."⁹²

Road-building had moreover to contend with immense difficulties of the terrain which, as *The Times* correspondent remarked, presented "every natural obstacle from mountains thousands of feet high to plains flooded in the rainy season."⁹³ The result, as Diel noted, was that many thoroughfares had to "wander along the edges of precipices" and "tons of rock" had to be "blasted away to clear the path", and she adds:

"In many cases the workmen had to be roped together, as without that precaution it would have been impossible for them to work in any degree of safety. Many bridges were built in

circumstances of real peril. As stones cannot tell of the frightful human sufferings which occurred near them, the Italians have honoured the dead, who sacrificed their lives that the work might go on by inscribing on an arch of one of the bridges (the words... 'Whatever the cost, we had to do it!'"⁹⁴

Construction costs, despite instructions for economy, often reached astronomical proportions. An official Italian publication of this time quote the figure of 950,000 lire per kilometer⁹⁵ through Poggiali, a visiting journalist of the *Corriere dellasera*, noted in his diary that they sometimes reached as much as 1,200,000 lire⁹⁶, while another Italian observer, Consul-General Bonacorsi, noted in a secret report that one and two million" and sometimes more" had also been paid. Costs in Italy were then only about 350,000 lire.⁹⁷ Road work, as in De Bono's day, therefore earned vast profits for the larger and more corrupt contractors who were among the principal beneficiaries of the fascist regime. Smaller firms, on the other hand, were less successful. A British Government report of 1939 records that because public works were being "hurried forward on a scale out of all proportion to the state of public finances, transport and road contractors are forced to wait long periods, owing to the Government's inability to pay them. Large firms can usually withstand the strain and manage to extract payment in the long run but small independent men frequently go unpaid, and many have, in fact, lost their capital in this way and are now unemployed."⁹⁸ The more successful firms, however, did remarkably well, causing Bonacorsi to remark that "throughout the Empire the fortunate have been those contractors who have worked exclusively for the State," and that "people who came out to Africa without a cent have gone home multimillionaires (cf. Astaldi, Leoni and the rest.)"⁹⁹ Data for 1937, at the height of construction work, state that there were then forty roadbuilding firms in the empire, operating no fewer than 453 camps.¹⁰⁰

Road-building, despite all difficulties, continued throughout the great part of the occupation period, and, particularly in view of continued Patriot resistance, was a ceaseless source of interest among Italian officials: A correspondent of *The Times* noted on November

20, 1938, that "at least half of all conversations in the Empire turn on the roads finished, a half-finished or lacking and, emphasising the immensity of the task, he added: "Those who knew the miserable bridle-paths before the war or drove over the hastily constructed military tracks will regard what has been accomplished with deep respect." Notwithstanding this praise the correspondent could not help adding that "thousands of miles" of planned road still existed "only on paper," while the Aden correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* remarked on February 21, 1939, that progress was "by no means fast," The Italians," he added, "certainly seem to be in a desperate situation financially and economically. In some districts they have had to abandon their great road-building programme. Some of the roads built after the war have deteriorated most seriously because there are no funds for maintenance and repair work." The poor quality of much of the work was confirmed by a British Government report for 1939 which declared that though roading was "being pushed ahead regardless of expence" experience was "showing that the work has hitherto been executed too rapidly for efficiency. Many stretches of asphalted road have begun to break up, and, in several cases, bridges which were completed, or nearing completion, have collapsed through structural weakness and before they had been subjected either to strain of water pressure or of heavy loads."¹⁰¹

The roads constructed nevertheless did much to open a new era in transport, and were accompanied by a substantial increase in the number of cars and other vehicles. By the end of 1936 these amounted to about 15,000 in the Italian East African Empire, by April of the following year it was reported that 15,267 motor lorries were registered, 6,327 of them of American make, the rest mainly Italian.¹⁰² "Many Italian officers," according to Diel, also had motorcycles which were particularly useful in "straggling cities" such as Addis Ababa, while bicycles were "also very popular," and were indeed "often the only practical means" for Italian workmen to get to work.¹⁰³ Spare parts, however, was often scarce, the Aden correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* reporting on February 2, 1938, that vehicles and other machines were crippled because of the lack of spares, and no repairs were possible.

import such items were difficult to obtain. The state of the roads was moreover so poor, Diel admits, that a tyre which lasted 12,000 to 20,000 miles in Italy would have to be changed in the empire after only 2,500 miles.¹⁰⁴

The Development of a Road Network

Italian road-building operations for all their difficulties led to the creation for the first time of an East African road network which embraced Ethiopia and the adjacent Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia. Eight distinct areas of activity may be discerned. These comprised, firstly, the improvement of the already existing Eritrean roads to link the newly established empire with the Red Sea coast. Secondly, the upgrading of the road to western Eritrea in order to consolidate the Italian strategic position on the Sudan frontier. Thirdly, the southward extension of the "Road of Victory", to facilitate communications between Addis Ababa and Asmara thus linking the Ethiopian capital with the port of Massawa. Fourthly, the construction of a road from Asmara to Gondar to integrate Ethiopia's northern provinces with Eritrea, and to provide them with access to the sea. Fifthly, the extension of the Asmara-Gondar road southwards to join up with Addis Ababa, with a view to consolidating control of the west, and the building of several other roads based on Gondar. Sixthly, the improvement of pre-war roads based on Addis Ababa to strengthen the capital's communications with Lekemti, Jimma and Adama, and the political domination of the intervening country, as well as the development of subsidiary roads from those centres. Seventhly, the extension of the Ethiopia's pre-war roads to create a virtually new road network with the object of bringing the greater part of the country under effective rule from Addis Ababa, as well as the building of other roads based on Harar and several lesser centres. Eighthly, and lastly, the establishment of a road from Assab to Dessie to provide Addis Ababa and the central portions of the empire with more convenient access to the sea than afforded by Massawa or Jibuti. Each of these operations requires examination.

I. In Eritrea work continued during the occupation period on

both the Asmara-Massawa and Nefasit-Decamere roads which had together become the northernmost end of the Italian East African road network, and, throughout most of this time, empire's main means of access to the sea. Systematisation of the the Asmara-Massawa road entailed an expenditure of 33,000,000 lire between January 1, 1937, and June 30, 1938, and maintenance a further 4,200,000 lire; the whole operation involving 191,100 days' work by "native" and 163,800 by Italian workers. The Nefasit-Decamere road, which involved considerably less effort, cost 8,296,000 lire on systematisation and 730,000 lire on maintenance, and utilised 36,981 days's labour from Italians and 14,675 from "natives."¹⁰⁵

These two roads, particularly the stretch running down from the plateau to the lowlands, were among the most impressive as well as the most important in the empire. Stonehewer-Bird, who travelled on the Asmara-Massawa road in February, 1938, declared it "a triumph in road construction", but added, "I never want to travel over it again". Describing its difficult terrain, he continues:

"I saw one lorry go down about 300 feet, the two drivers being killed, and was told that such was an almost daily occurrence. As a hair-raising experience I have never known the like...

"Yet the traffic is enormous. All supplies for Eritrea and Ethiopia, except those which enter at Jibuti go by this road. Lorry transport predominates. On the downward journey from Asmara we met at least 700 lorries which take five hours for the 120 kilometres—too quick for safety. The upward journey is done in the afternoons and a moderate estimate seems to be that a thousand lorries do the journey daily.¹⁰⁶

This road, like others built by the fascists, was decorated at frequent intervals with repetitious political symbols. Captain Ellsberg, an American traveller who used it in 1941, recalls :

"What struck me most...was the decorations with which the Fascists had lined that mountain road. Every hundred yards at least on some prominent rock or cliffside, where it could not escape attention, was carefully painted in large letters, *W il Duce!*' which my driver assured me meant '*Viva il Duce*'. Very carefully spaced,

one to every ten 'W il Duces,' was 'W il Duces', was 'W il Re' and again, roughly in the ratio of one to every hundred 'W il Duces', was 'W il Duca de Aosta!'"¹⁰⁷

II. Still in Eritrea the road from Asmara westwards via Keren, Agordat, Barentu and Tessenie to Sadberdat which had hitherto been little more than a track, was substantially improved. This road, running as it did to the Sudan frontier, was regarded by the fascists as of considerable significance in view of a possible armed conflict with Britain as well as of value in facilitating development in the western lowlands. Work on this road cost 265,105,000 lire, and was based on 4,172,476 "native" and 503,254 Italian day's labour.¹⁰⁸

III. Across the frontier in Ethiopia the southward extension of the "Road of Victory" involved the entire rebuilding of the original wartime track across northern and central Ethiopia to link the Asmara-Decamere and Nefasit-Decamere roads with Addis Ababa by way of Adigrat and Dessie. This road, some parts of which had been built by the Ethiopian Government prior to the invasion, was generally considered the most important in the empire and thus, as we have seen, had from the outset received the highest priority in the road-building programme. Wiese reported that by November 1936 "a little more than one-third was paved," while Polson Newman claimed that by April 1937 "large sections" were "finished with asphalt and were as good as any first-class road in Italy; other sections were finished except for asphalt, while others had a rough surface."¹⁰⁹ Although most of the bridges were finished, there were still fords to cross where bridges were still in course of construction."¹¹⁰ A year or so later a British traveller Mrs. C. Fanin declared the road "a superb feat of engineering which can rank with any in Europe" and added, "The road is tarmaced and very good in patches and has also rough patches where it is being reconstructed", while *Times* correspondent reported on November 29, 1938, that the highway was "tarred" from Asmara as far as Termaber, some 160 kilometres north of Addis Ababa, "where a tunnel 500 yards has to be driven through...to avoid the worst passes."¹¹¹

Construction costs on this north-south axis were considerable.

In Eritrea they amounted by the end of June 1938 to 51,560,000 lire and maintenance an additional 11,237,000 lire, both operations entailing a total of 938,813 "native" and 360,177 Italian days' labour, while in Amhara province, where a tunnel and 24 large and 606 small bridges were built, there was an expenditure of 217,050,000 lire, besides a further sum in Shoa. The southern stretch of this road, from Combolcha to Addis Ababa, used up 20,065,000 men days' by "natives" and 4,380,000 by "white" workers, and necessitated the construction of 52 large and 1,347 small bridges, as well as three tunnels, the most of which was 703 metres long, cost thirty million lire, and was called after Mussolini.¹¹²

The importance of this road is apparent from the amount of traffic using it. Polson Newman, describing the early period of fascist rule, notes that "sometimes there were conveyances of ten or twelve wagons almost empty on the return to Massawa to fill up. At other times we were overtaken by streams of lorries full of petrol tins or large cans of tarmac for the roads. Even the traffic of ordinary cars was considerable, and so was the speed of the driving...Unfortunately many lorries have gone over the precipices and hurtled their way right down on the bottom, and quite a number of drivers have lost their lives."¹¹³ A year or so later Mrs Fanin recalled, "On this road I passed a stream of immense lorries, military columns, petrol columns, soldiers being transported, native troops on the march,"¹¹⁴ while Diel reported:

"The fact that large parties of workmen are frequently in the way, does not disturb motorists in the least—they just keep their hands on the horn until the way is clear...Any one who has not seen the traffic here can have no idea of its extent. Hundreds of lorries, large and small, follow each other in a long procession and very unwillingly give way to the equally large number of private motors which want to pass them. Any one who has had to follow behind a close column of roughly a hundred and fifty lorries, and been forced to swallow their dust, knows how maddening it can be. And here it happens everywhere, every day, and at every hour."¹¹⁵

The journey from Addis Ababa to Asmara at this time usually took two or three days, though the nazi woman reports that people claimed it could be done in "a bare twenty seven hours,"¹¹⁶ but for that it was probably necessary, as Poggiali says, for a traveller to change cars at every halting place as in the days of the stage coach.¹¹⁷

An interesting feature of this road was that it was the first upon which a regular coach service was operated: The first coach arrived in Addis Ababa on April 21, 1937, almost a year after the Italian seizure of the capital. The vehicle, which had been taken off the roads of Rome, was described by Poggiali in his diary as "most comfortable with red leather seats", but he adds, "evidently no one had dared to tell the Duce that in truth the roads were not yet ready for the service," for the passengers found it necessary to travel with "an abundance of rifles and hand-grenades", while at every five kilometres along the road there was a fortified camp, as the engineers and workers had to "save their skins from rebellion."¹¹⁸ Polson Newman, writing as a propagandist for Italy, nonetheless describes the coach service as "excellent," and explains that each vehicle carried twenty-six passengers and was "fitted with wireless, cocktail bar and lavatory."¹¹⁹ Coaches travelled twice a week, with three main stops at the way, at Dabra Sina, Dessie and Quiha, but, as Diel notes, were "exclusively for the use of white people."¹²⁰ The "natives", according to a Swedish observer A.B. Svensson, were mainly herded into big lorries which travelled very fast and were usually crowded, the passengers sitting on their luggage and on each others' laps.¹²¹

IV. In the north-west of the empire another strategically important highway, referred to as the "Tana road", was constructed to link Asmara and Gondar. Making use of the track from the Eritrean capital via Adi Ugri to Adi Quala it was extended by way of Adowa and Aksum to cross the Takaze river, and thus traversed difficult country necessitating extensive blasting. Polson Newman claims that this throughfare was "one of the most difficult to construct"—a statement echoed by Guiglia—as the builders "practically had to blast their way through solid rock" and in some places "had to work suspended by ropes over precipices,"¹²² while a correspon-

dent of *The Times* described the road as "the greatest engineering feat in the Empire," for the track had "to climb the sheer face" of a mountain of over 7,000 ft.¹²³ Extensive bridge building was also required, and led to the erection of 21 major and 1,193 minor bridges in Eritrea, and 52 large and 686 small ones in Amhara, the most notable being over the Tazake at May Timkat. Expenditure amounted by the end of June, 1938, to 29,043,000 lire for construction and 10,503,000 for maintenance, and involved 216,536 "native" and 210,319 Italian days' labour.¹²⁴ By November of that year *The Times* reported that the surface was tarred from Eritrea as far as the Takaze gorge, while from there to Walcheft there was "a good macadam surface" which would resist the rains.¹²⁵

V. To the south of Gondar work was begun on a continuation of the above road from Asmara which was to lead southwards to Addis Ababa by way of Gorgora, the western coast of Lake Tana, Darghila, Bure and Dabra Marqos. Though the "rapid" construction of this road had been ordered by Mussolini as early as May 19, 1936, progress in this mountainous area, which was largely in the hands of the Ethiopian Patriots throughout the occupation, was, however, slow. By 1939 only the first stretch from Gondar to Cherkos had been completed through the employment of 103,000 Italian and 47,000 "native" days' labour, but the road had still to be taken right across Gojam and was therefore uncompleted at the end of Italian rule.¹²⁶

Further south the Addis Ababa-Blue Nile road, which had been built shortly prior to the war, was improved and expanded with a view to linking up with the above strategic road from Gondar.¹²⁷ Work was also initiated on the several other tracks based on Gondar, notably one from Cherkos eastwards to Gorgora which was built at an expense of 2,000,000 lire, and the employment of 30,000 "native" and 3,600 Italian days' labour.¹²⁸

To the south-east of Gondar plans were drawn up for a road via Dabra Tabor to Dessie to link Gondar with Assab. Construction began at both the Gondar and Dessie ends, but operations in the central portion, which was largely Patriot-occupied, had for that

reason to be postponed. Operations on the Gondar side, from Azozo south-eastwards, cost 22,000,000 lire, and 235,437 Italian and 102,250 "native" days' labour, while at the Dessie end expenditure ran at 15,000,000 lire, and involved 740,000 "native" and 25,000 Italian days' labour.¹²⁹ A number of military tracks were also opened in the Gondar area, and the north-west generally. One ran north-westwards along the old route to Om Ager, a second westwards via Azozo and the airport at kilometre 14 to Matama, and a third from Om Ager along the Sudan frontier also to Matama. Tracks were likewise improved between Azozo and Gorgora, and from Gondar via Ifag to Dabra Tabor.¹³⁰

VI. Three pre-war roads based on Addis Ababa were substantially improved and extended. Menilek's old road to Addis Alam, extended before the war well beyond Ambo¹³¹, was continued via Ghedo and Bako to Lakampti a track to Yubdo was opened to facilitate exploitation of its goldmines. It made use of five wooden bridges, and was also served by a short-cut by way of Haru.¹³²

The pre-war road to Jimma was likewise improved, between December 1936 and October 1938,¹³³ and two new roads from Jimma were also initiated.¹³⁴ One, designed to provide access to Kaffa and Gimirra, was constructed as far as Negelli to make contact with Mogadishu.¹³⁵

The old road to Adama, which ran roughly parallel with the railway and passed through Akaki, Dukam, Bishoftu and Mojo, was similarly improved. This was done in part to supplement the railway's facilities, in part to avoid payment of foreign dues required by the railway company, and in part to link the capital with Harar and other places not on the railway line.¹³⁶ The journey from Addis Ababa to Dire Dawa could, however, be effected only with great difficulty, for R.E. Ellison of the British Consulate in Harar observed as late as April 22, 1940 :

"The road...was in a dreadful state. The surface on the level parts was fair, but all the plain is seemed with hundreds of 'tugs' of water courses, with or without water, hardly any of which are

bridged, though more are being built. Every one of these had been swept away by torrents during the recent rains...

"We were stuck once or twice, but not for long, until about sunset, a mile from Afdem, we were suddenly faced by a torrent 25 yards wide and 6 feet deep. I have heard since that this 'tug' is a notoriously bad one. After three hours (during which a lorry tried to cross; and stuck in a hole) we were able to wade across, and reached Afdem on foot."¹³⁷

From Adamco a road was also built southwards via Asella as far as Carra with a view ultimately to join up with a road from Mogadishu,¹³⁸ while another was constructed eastwards from Adama along the railway to Awash whence a dry weather track was cut to Aisia on the frontier of French Somaliland. This latter route, which was constructed between February and August 1937, cost 93,800,000 lire and involved the use of 265,000 "native" and 150,000 Italian days' labour besides a further 82,000 days' work from the army.¹³⁹

To the east of Addis Ababa efforts were also made, in accordance with Lessona's directives, to improve the roads based on Harar, where Polson Newman reported: "feverish activity in 1937."¹⁴⁰ Menelek's old road between Harar and Dire Dawa was improved in February and March 1937 by the efforts of 2,000 "native" and 750 Italian labourers and 250 soldiers, and involved the construction of 4 large and 5 small bridges, the entire work costing a total of 30,000,000 lire.¹⁴¹ Improvements were also effected on the pre-war track from Harar to Jijiga where 2,000 Italian labourers were put to work between February and October 1937 at an expense of 18,000,000 lire.¹⁴² An extension from Jijiga to Garbailek, on the borders of British Somaliland was completed by July 1937 at an expense of 4,570,000 lire, having involved 115,000 days' work from "native" and 76,000 from Italian labourers.¹⁴³ The fascist author V. Statera patronisingly wrote in the main Addis Ababa newspaper, the *Corriere dell'Impero*, of December 20, 1938, that this road "would enable British Somaliland to participate in the great development" resulting from the "creation of the fascist empire," but, the road was also of strategic importance for the subsequent Italian seizure of the British protectorate. To reduce dependence on Djibuti, the Italian

firm of Gondrand also succeeded, in 1938, in opening a rough track from Dire Dawa to Tendaho, thus linking up with the Assab-Combolcha highway. Two tracks were also cut in the Chercher highlands. One ran from Mieso via Asba Littorio (formerly Asba Tafari) and Kunni to Ghelemso; the other from Dandako via Karsa, Warabilli, Kolubi, Chalanko, Deder, Burka and Hirna to Kunni.¹⁴⁴

Work was also initiated on a southward road which was to pass through Giah on the Ninth Parallel to join a road built in the Ogaden and Somalia from Dagabur via Gorrahei to Ferfer, Belet Wen, Villabruzzi and Mogadishu. This route, sometimes called the "Oceanic road" because it was to reach Indian Ocean, involved the construction in Somalia of 16 large and 673 small bridges and was considered, as we have seen, of strategic value on account of a possible difficulties with the French at Jibuti.¹⁴⁵ Two other southward tracks were also opened up in Arussi and Bali. One ran from the railway town of Adama via Maltasa, Hera, Assela and Kara to Goba and other from Hera via Galata Borara to Tichio.¹⁴⁶ Work on roads in the governorate of Harar up to the end of June 1938 comprised 364,000 "native" days' labour, 55,000 "native" soldier's labour, 53,000 Italian soldier's labour and 1,220 Italian worker's labour.¹⁴⁷

Communications between Ethiopia and Somalia were also to be based on a more westerly road to Mogadishu. Work began on this road in March 1937 and by the end of the year had been completed from Negelli via Filtu to the Ganale Doria.¹⁴⁸ North of Negelli several military tracks were likewise opened with a view *inter alia* to link the town north-westwards with Wondo and thence northwards to the airport of Dalle and, further north, Adela.¹⁴⁹

VIII. The last major undertaking of the Italian road-builders was the construction of the so-called "Dankalia highway" from the Eritrean port of Assab to Dessie, or, more precisely Combolcha. This 535 kilometre road, designed to provide more convenient access to the sea for the central provinces than that afforded by Massawa, was based at each end on two already existing rough roads: 1) the track from Assab to Sardo which had been improved to supply Italian irregulars who occupied the latter place in March, 1936, and

2) Emperor's Haile Sellassie's pre-war road from Dessie to Batie, a market town of some importance.¹⁵⁰ The Italian labour force on the highway reached its peak in January 1937 when there were 16,080 such workers, as against only 5,609 "natives," but the latter soon predominated, and rose to a maximum of 33,730 in May 1938 as compared with 7,883 Italians.¹⁵¹ The road ran from Assab by way of Sardo, Tandeho and Mille, and joined the Asmara-Addis Ababa road at Combolcha a little south of Dessie. Work on the road, most of which ran through the hot waterless plains of the Dankali desert, with temperatures often of 70° Centigrade in the sun or 55° in the shade, began in December 1936, when operations started at Assab, Dessie and Wodaito near the Awash river. The Assab-Sardo stretch was the responsibility of the firm of Vaselli, the stretch from As Coma via Betie to Combolcha and southwards to Addis Ababa, that of Puricelli, and the most difficult central strip from Sardo to As Coma of Martino—Ceratto.¹⁵²

The problems confronting these road-builders were graphically portrayed by a correspondent of the *Sunday Times* who reported on April 18, 1937, that "great difficulty" was being experienced as construction materials had to be brought a considerable distance, and since this was "practically impossible" by lorry it had been found necessary to make use of aeroplanes which carried fifty quintals of stone, mortar or concrete on each two-hour trip. Such flights, the correspondent explained, had been "regularly undertaken twice daily and sufficient material is dumped down to ensure the work being carried on without interruption."

The Assab road, which had a gradient of never more than 7%, was eventually completed in July 1939, and consisted of a 7 metre wide stretch of asphalt plus two further metres of dirt track, as well as 80 large bridges, one of them over 60 metres long, 1,504 small bridges, and a 36-metre long tunnel. The work cost 675,000,000 lire in Eritrea and 240,000,000 lire in Ambara, and involved 15,685,000 day's labour by "natives" and 1,354,000 by white workers.¹⁵³ Building activity, according to *The Times* Rome correspondent, "never stopped, even during the hottest and most insalu-

brious months, and the death roll among Italian workmen from sickness is understood to have been heavy."¹⁵⁴

The opening of this road was important in that distance from Addis Ababa to Assab was only 861 kilometres as against 1,173 kilometres to Massawa; the journey to the coast was thus reduced from four days to three, and in August 1939, the eve of the outbreak of the European war, the traffic was stated to average 100 lorries and 28 cars daily.¹⁵⁵

The Last Period of the Occupation and the Road Legacy of Italian Rule

On June 10, 1940, less than four years after the beginning of Italian road-building in Ethiopia, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France, thereby precipitating Italy into World War II. This entry into the European conflict brought a virtual end to Italian road-building in the empire as was noted by T. Konovalov, a White Russian refugee, who remarked that "almost all works were stopped."¹⁵⁶

Subsequently, in the Spring of 1941, the Italian defeat and the advance of Allied forces caused the fascists to embark on an extensive programme of sabotage and destruction on their strategic roads in an attempt to halt or delay the armies of liberation. A British officer, J.C.D. Lawrence, writing in May, 1941, describes the bridge over the Awash, "one of the most imposing sights imaginable," as "blown by the Italians,"¹⁵⁷ while a post-war Ethiopian publication, the *Ethiopian Review*, subsequently reported that "the enemy had systematically destroyed all important bridges in the course of his incessant retreats." Christine Sandford a British observer, describing the desolation of this period, affirms that "broken bridges and abandoned transport met the eye wherever one went."¹⁵⁸

The destruction of so many key points in the newly established road network constituted a major problem for the restored Ethiopian Government which in the immediate aftermath of independence was acutely short of funds and therefore in no position to maintain the relatively extensive roads which fascist Italy had constructed at great

expense, in most cases for strategic as much as economic ends. These roads, which were a subject of pride, and propaganda, for fascist Italy,¹⁵⁹ thus constituted a heavy burden on the post-war Ethiopian Government whose viewpoint was later expressed by the *Ethiopian Review* which noted that "many" roads had been "constructed for purely military reasons" and were "hence of no practical use." Discussing the difficulties encountered by the Ethiopian Government in the early 1940, the article explained that "a large maintenance crew" was needed to keep Mussolini's roads in operation, and went so far as to comment that they represented "an accomplishment of a temporary nature," for "many of them are not usable, while those in use demand a disproportionate amount for repairs and maintenance." The Italian road network, the author concluded, was therefore "in reality a heavy load on the Imperial Government, a load far out of proportion to its usefulness," and "not the 'God-send' a superficial examination of the figures and the subtlety of the Italian propaganda would have one believe."¹⁶⁰

The extent of the road burden inherited from the Italians was recognised by the then British Minister to Ethiopia, Robert Howe, who noted on September 6, 1942, that no less than one million pounds would be required to restore the roads and bridges then in existence.¹⁶¹ This figure made no allowance for recurrent maintenance costs. The Ethiopian Government, unable to enter at that time on a commitment of that magnitude, attempted to obtain the necessary funds from its British ally, on which occasion a British Foreign Office memorandum archly commented :

"the Ethiopians want, and who can blame them for trying, H.M. Government to keep up for them the elaborate and costly structure set up by the Italians without regard for the fact that the Italians were animated by their intention to make Ethiopia a land fit for Italians to live in—not for Ethiopians."¹⁶²

Howe's remark as to the initial purpose of the road-building is of course most pertinent, for it illustrates the point that the fascist roads can in no sense be regarded as a "gift" by the invaders to the people they had oppressed, but rather constituted a kind of booty

which the former could not take away with them, and which the latter therefore acquired, albeit as part reparation for the war and temporary loss of national independence. That said there is no gainsaying that the roads constituted a major event in the history of Ethiopian transport, for, as Konovalov declared, they had for the first time "given the possibility of mechanical transport in many directions", and thus served to eliminate the age-old isolation of many provinces.¹⁶³ After the liberation entirely different development priorities were, however, required.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. Hitler, *Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944* (London, 1953), p. 575. See also V. Calderini, "Dalla Pista Abissina alla prime strade militare dell' Impero," *Le Vie d'Italia* (1937), XLIII.
2. Pankhurst, "Transport and Communications in Ethiopia, (1835-1935)", *The Journal of Transport History* (1961-2), V, 69-8, 166-81, 233-54.
3. E. De Bono, *Anno XIII The Conquest of an Empire* (London, 1937), pp 2,9.
4. P. Badoglio, *The War in Abyssinia* (London, 1937) p. 5.
5. E.W. Polson Newman, *Italy's Conquest of Abyssinia* (London, 1937), p. 65.
6. Badoglio, op. cit., p. 5.
7. De Bono, op. cit., p. 9.
8. ibid, p. 9.
9. ibid, pp. 9-10.
10. ibid, pp. 20-1.
11. Lector, "La strada della Vittoria", *Gli Annali dell' Africa Italiana* (1938) I, No. 1, p. 183.
12. De Bono, op. cit., p. 20. See also D. Fossa, *Lavoro italiano nell Impero* (Milano, 1938), p. 329.
13. Lector, op. cit. pp. 183-4.
14. De Bono, op. cit., pp. 63-5.

Road Building During Italian Occupation Ethiopia

15. Oxford, St. Antony's College, Captured Italian Documents, 034485, 034463.
16. Lector, op. cit., p. 183; De Bono, op. cit., p. 65.
17. De Bono, op. cit., pp. 64-5.
18. *ibid*, p. 159.
19. *ibid*, pp. 65, 67.
20. Lector, op. cit., pp. 185, 201, 207; De Bono, op. cit., p. 67. See also Fossa, op. cit., p. 329.
21. De Bono, op. cit., p. 203. See also Badoglio, op. cit., p. 5; C. Battaglini, *Con S.E. De Bano: Nel turihino di una prepazazione* (Roma, 1938), pp. 80, 186, 305-6; F. Quaranta, *Ethiopia, an Empire in the Making* (London, 1939), pp. vi-vii.
22. Lector, op. cit., pp. 182, 186, 197; Badoglio, op. cit., p. 5; "Le opere pubbliche", *Glt Annali dell' Africa Italiana* (1939), II, No. 4, p. 326.
23. Lector, op. cit., p. 115. See also Fossa, op. cit., p. 330.
24. De Bono, op. cit., pp. 22, 69.
25. Battaglini op. cit., p. 186. See also *Ethiopia* (1937), I, No. 4, pp. 21-8, (1938), II, No. 3, 30-1.
26. De Bono, op. cit., p. 69.
27. *ibid*, p. 122.
28. *ibid*, pp. 206-7. See also Fossa, op. cit., p. 331.
29. Oxford, St. Antony's College, Captured Italian Documents, 03460, 03467.
30. *idem*, 034526.
31. *idem*, 034485.
32. *idem*, 034487.
33. *idem*, 034718-20. See also 034724, 034733.
34. *idem*, 034483-6.
35. *idem*, 034482.
36. *idem*, 034646.
37. *idem*, 034643.
38. *idem*, 034785-6, 034788-9.
39. De Bano, op. cit., p. 246. See also Badoglio, op. cit., p. 126; Fossa op. cit., pp. 332-3, 358-9.
40. De Bono, op. cit., pp. 246-7.
41. G. Bianchi, *Rivelazioni sul conflitto italo-etiopeo* (Milano, 1967), p. 105.

42. De Bono, op. cit., pp. 264, 268.
43. M. Currery, *A Woman at the Abyssinian War* (London, 1936), pp. 148, 159. See also H. Matthews, *Eyewitness in Abyssinia* (London, 1937), pp. 280, 289; 291.
44. Bianchi, op. cit., p. 110.
45. De Bono, op. cit., pp. 246-7.
46. L. Farago, *Abyssinian Stop Press* (London, 1936) p. 21.
47. ibid, p. 19.
48. ibid, p. 22. See also Polson Newman, op. cit., pp. 225, 228-9.
49. Badoglio, op. cit., p. 40.
50. ibid, p. 126. See also Fossa, op. cit., pp. 331-5.
51. A. Del Boca, "Mussolini sulla guerra d'Etiopia", 14.11.1968.
52. Badoglio, op. cit., p. 130.
53. ibid, pp. 132, 134. See also A. Starace, *La marcia su Gondar* (Milano, 1936), pp. 50, 53, 56; Fossa, op. cit., p. 335; K. Gandar Dower, *Abyssinian Patchwork* (London, 1949), pp. 194-5.
54. Farago, op. cit., pp. 42-3. See also E. Bastico, *Il ferreo III corpo in A.O.* (Milano, 1937) pp. 230-5; J.F.C. Fuller, *The First of the League Wars* (London, 1936), p. 45.
55. Farago, op. cit., p. 45. See also pp. 89, 95.
56. S. Benelli, *Io in Africa* (Milano, 1936), p. 196.
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Road Building During Italian Occupied Ethiopia

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Road Building During Italian Occupied Ethiopia

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Road Building During Italian Occupied Ethiopia

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Tone Mwenifumbo

Dr. Servapalli Radhakrishnan— Philosopher of the Century

Any Malawi student returning from India talks about the intellectual profundity of Dr. Radhakrishnan, the former President of India and, anyone who has had the chance of meeting him speaks of the unforgettable experience that his words had on his mind. His death, although at ripe age is a loss to the whole world that can hardly be measured.

I am sorry to say that those who expect an objective treatment of Dr. Radhakrishnan's philosophic contribution will be disappointed. I will speak with emotion and my assessment of him will be purely subjective. This is because Dr. Radhakrishnan has been my intellectual patron during the last years ; I owe him an unpayable debt for the contribution he has made to my undertakings. His loss is, therefore, a personal one. As a humble seeker for The Truth, Dr. Radhakrishnan has been a guide who has helped me through remote valleys, his intellect was powerful enough to subdue any doubts in the mind ; all the pains involved in existential despair were dismissed and he showed me the path I was seeking in life.

Dr. Radhakrishnan was born in Southern India in 1888. He had his education there and at an early age he found himself within the academic world. His precocious mind made him succeed very quickly and as a college teacher he served with distinction at various universities including as a Professor of Philosophy at Oxford and the University of Chicago. When India became independent, he served his country and in 1952 became the vice-President of his country. From 1962 to 1967 he was President of India whilst Nehru was Prime Minister. As Head of State, he symbolised powerfully the spirit of India and the golden words that flowed like

a felicitous torrent from his lips when he spoke at world gatherings left most foreign dignitaries some what dazed and spell bound.

I was recently reading the "Anti-Memoirs" of Andre Malraux, the former Minister of culture under Charles De Gaulle and who is one of France's intellectual giants. In these memoirs, Malraux talks at length about his encounter with Nehru and his response to the inquiries on Oriental religion posed by Malraux. Later on, he refers to his having had lunch with the President, Dr. Radhakrishnan; there is just a sentence about his meeting Dr. Radhakrishnan. Why did Malraux not pose the questions on religion to Radhakrishnan—the world's foremost expert on Oriental religion? The implication of this response by Andre Malraux justifies some of my conclusions I had reached about Dr. Radhakrishnan: that he was much underrated in life. The West much appreciated Gandhi and Nehru and another famous Indian, Rabindranath Tagore, was even awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. Of course, Radhakrishnan also got recognition but lesser men than him are getting much more attention than he did.

It is my contention that Radhakrishnan was the greatest philosopher of this century. In making this claim, one is automatically challenged to explain the criteria and standards he uses in his assessment of philosophic ability. My definition comes from the etymology of the word "philosopher"—namely, "philo", love; "sophia", wisdom. A real and genuine philosopher is the guardian and promoter of wisdom. He is not a man who only weaves ornate theories and enjoys baffling the ordinary man with his so-called super-human intellect. He is also not the one who wants to show off his aptitude for abstract theorizing. So, by calling Radhakrishnan the greatest philosopher of this century, I am calling him the most eminent defender and promoter of wisdom.

Radhakrishnan tells us "To know the Truth, to apprehend reality, we have to get rid of (avidya) ignorance and its intellectual moulds, which all crack the movement we try to force reality into them." If we ask to reason why there is avidya, or maya, bringing about a fall from vidya or from being, the question cannot be answered."

As opposed to the modern western trend of thought, a trend advocated by Bertrand Russell which is concerned with logical

problems, Radhakrishnan in conformity with Oriental tradition, poses and resolves the problems relating to man and his place in the world. Even though involved, in his philosophic contemplation of profound problems he did not lose sight of the man of today. This is where his greatness lies, the ultimate end of the attainment of truth can be realized only through action in the sensible world.

Dr. Radhakrishnan, in his lucid and poetic language also surveyed this lurid world of despair like Sartre. But, he went further—he proposed solutions. Dr. Radhakrishnan revealed to the modern man how Hindu religion could solve the dilemmas bedeviling modern man. In the process of knowing himself, Socrates felt man would be liberated and would lead a higher state of existence. Radhakrishnan felt that the intellectual experience one would undergo through a profound encounter with the thought of ancient Hindu thinkers would be a process of psychic liberation; that man would be saved from reaching that stage which made Job accuse God of having betrayed him; man would be rescued from problems he faces as a result of his being guided by his absurd nature; impulses that have led modern man into killing six million Jews and enslaving other races would vanish. He started with his book "The Hindu View of Life" in which he defended Hindu religion against distortions from western thinkers and through his masterly penmanship, the tremendous insight imparted to sages in India centuries back proved to be of indispensable value in solving the problems that confront modern man.

One may say he was not an original thinker since he was concerned with elucidating the obscure thoughts of the past to modern man. But, he was dealing with a philosophy which claims to train the mind of man in the art of being an original thinker—in other words, Radhakrishnan was a tutor in the art of originality itself.

To many outside India, the Hindu philosophical thought is very difficult to appreciate. Many regard it as irrational. And the psychic experiences that constitute Hindu religion seem to be quite remote to them. But, to make these remote intellectual experiences relevant to non-Hindus is a task which only a man like Radhakrishnan with tremendous intellectual faculties could have done.

Radhakrishnan told the world, "Philosophy in India is .

essentially spiritual. It is the intense spirituality of India and not any great political structure or social organization that it has developed, that has enabled it to resist the ravages of time and the accidents of history...the history of Indian thought illustrates the endless quest of the mind, even old, ever now. The spiritual motive dominates life in India, Indian philosophy has its interest in the hearts of men and not in Supra-lunar solitudes. It takes its origin in life, and enters back into life after passing through the school...the founders of the philosophy strive for a socio-spiritual reformation of the country...Religion in India is not dogmatic. It is a national synthesis which goes on gathering into itself new conceptions as philosophy progresses. It is experimental and provisional in its nature, attempting to keep pace with the progress of thought".

The scintillating intellect of Radhakrishnan shined over the obscurities of these ancient Hindu thinkers. He repaired aspects of their thoughts which had been damaged through distortion; he straightened out parts which looked vague and polished them thoroughly. He had to confront cynics who wanted to belittle Hindu thought. One of them was Albert Schweitzer. And Radhakrishnan adeptly exposed the logical inadequacy and metaphysical superficiality of their observations.

One could see super-patriotism as the main motive behind Radhakrishnan's commitment to Hindu thought. But, he propagated his Hindu religion with convincing reasons—he felt it was most suited for modern man because it was a synthesis of the religious experiences of many minds and that every man on earth would find something spiritually enlightening through encounter with these minds. He felt it adequately fulfilled the standards of rationality. And this made him at war with bigotry. "Religion, by propagating illusion such as the fear of hell, damnation, and arrogant assumptions of invillable authority and exclusive monopolies of the divine word, and politics, by intoxicating whole peoples with dreams of their messianic missions, by developing in them megalomania or persecution complex, destroy the sense of oneness with the world and divide humanity into narrow groups which are vain and ambitious, bitter and intolerant." Hindu Religion, he also felt, would unite the human race and wipe off meaningless barriers between people. "What we need is a religion of freedom, which stimulates faith not

fear, spontaneity not formalism, abundant of life not the monotony of the mechanical, the mechanization of mind which is dogmatism, the mechanization of ends which is conformity.”

Although Dr. Radhakrishnan devoted his life to Hindu Philosophy, this does not mean he looked down upon the philosophic thought of other lands. Through his writings Dr. Radhakrishnan promoted the philosophic thoughts of others. He liberally used other people's ideas to elucidate his own points and he masterly demonstrated how knowledge of others could be applied to the problems of his country. Radhakrishnan made the subject very respectable and nobody who has read him can ever question the importance of philosophy in solving the problems of modern man—even those found in a developing country like Malawi.

Other philosophers spent much time in other subjects. The man whom we can say devoted almost the whole of his life to Philosophy in the way Albert Einstein spent on Mathematics and Physics, is Dr. Radhakrishnan. Of course, Philosophy is a subject that is related to every other subject and nobody could be a philosopher without now and then deviating into other intellectual realms. But, when Radhakrishnan deviated, it was to give the impression that the other subjects were ancillaries to philosophy.

Many people, however, were most astounded by not Radhakrishnan the intellectual giant but him as an individual and the humanity that flowed from it. He was an educator to every man on earth and he had something positive to say to everyone. Any man seeking peace and comfort for his soul, will definitely find an answer in the writing of Dr. Radhakrishnan. With his passing away, the world has lost one of its most articulate defenders of the truth, an uncompromising soldier against injustice and a genuine advocate of the nature of a cultured mind.

R. W. Wyllie **Aboakyer Festival among
the Effutu of Southern
Ghana**

The Effutu are a Guan-speaking people occupying a small territorial enclave in what is generally Akan territory on the coast of Ghana, some fifty miles to the east of Cape Coast.¹ To commemorate the founding of their capital, Winneba, they perform an annual communal ritual known as *Aboakyer* (literally, "the catching of an animal"), which has gained a place as one of Ghana's most popular and publicized festivals. Despite its popularity, however, this event has long been associated with rancour and conflict among the towns people of Winneba and on several occasions violence and the threat of violence have proved so disruptive that it has been banned. In this article we examine the kinds of conflict situations which have arisen in the past and try to show why those tend to become magnified during the period of the *Aboakyer*. We will also try to show why it is that, in spite of the known risks of violent conflict, most Effutu eagerly look forward to the event each year. First, however, it is necessary to provide a brief sketch of the event itself.²

The Aboakyer

Since we are dealing here with a type of drama, it may be appropriate to begin by introducing the principal actors:

The *Omanhene*—Paramount chief of the Effutu people.

Penkye Otu—Chief of the Effutu deities.

Akyeampon—A god who is food servant to *Penkye Otu*.

The *Asafo* companies—Formerly warrior regiments and now primarily concerned with ritual activities and the performance of certain communal tasks, e.g. road-clearing, fund-raising, etc. No. 1 company is *Tuafo* (scouts) and No. 2 is *Dontsife*

(main body). Both are organized on the patrilineal principle (a person joins his father's company) and have women's sections.

In its present form the *Aboakyer* is a ritual complex which has four, fairly distinct, phases:

1) *Preparatory*: Preparations usually begin in March when the *Omanhene* meets with *Asafo* company leaders and the priest of the god *Akyeampon* to fix the date of the deer hunt, which is the centre of the ritual. They then seek the consent of the District Commissioner and the *Omanhene* imposes a ban on deer-hunting until the morning of the *Aboakyer*. Agreement is then reached between *Asafo* leaders on the colours and regalia to be used by the companies during the ritual, the parties being required to sign a bond of agreement to keep the peace.³ During the following weeks *Asafo* company members meet regularly at their respective headquarters, where they consult the company gods, seeking advice on how to ensure success in the hunt. On the Friday evening prior to the hunt the rival companies parade their gods through the streets of Winneba, each following a pre-arranged route which avoids their meeting.

2) *The Hunt*: At dawn on Saturday morning the hunters, comprising the most of the able-bodied men and youth of the companies, take a purificatory bath in the sea. After this they breakfast and, led by their captains, proceed to the hunting ground just outside the town. Each company has its own portion of ground within which it may legitimately hunt and, after preliminary invocations and liberations, the hunters dash off in search of a deer. The competition is keen, for only the first deer caught will be offered in sacrifice to *Penkye Otu* and the other Effutu deities.⁴ Moreover, the animal has to be taken alive and with the bare hands, otherwise it will be unacceptable as a catch.

When one company succeeds in catching a deer in this fashion, it is rapidly conveyed to the *Omhene*, who sits at the edge of the field. From here it is borne aloft through the crowded streets of Winneba to a place called *Abosomba* (the meeting-place of the gods) in the centre of the town. Here waits the priest of *Akyeampon*, who kills the animal by administering three sharp blows to its neck with a stout wooden club. The deer is then carried by the hunters to

the grove of *Penkye Otu*, where it will lie until the following day. Meanwhile, the other *Asafo* company continues to hunt, hoping to catch a deer so that its shame may not be too great.

3) *The Festival*: Normally all hunting has ceased by noon and the people have retired to their homes to prepare for the afternoon parade. This is headed by *Tuafo* company, its members clad in blue and white uniforms and pushing a large white wooden horse. Behind is the *Dentsifo* company, whose members wear red and yellow uniforms and push a huge wooden gunboat, from whose mast flutters a Union Jack. Towards the rear of the procession is the *Omanhene*, who is carried along in a palanquin shaded by large colourful umbrellas. Alongside there streams a shuffling, swaying dancing mass of women, spurred on by the sound of drums and tambourines. As the parade passes people appear at the doors of the *chop* (food) and beer bars, spilling out into the street to shout their approval. This carnival atmosphere prevails throughout the afternoon and evening, which culminates with a special dance featuring a nationally famous *high-life* dance band.

4) *The Ebisatsir*: Sunday morning is quiet and uneventful, most people taking the opportunity to rest after the previous day's exertions and excitement. At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, however, they assemble at the grove of *Penkye Otu* to witness that part of the ritual known as *Ebisatsir* (literally, "seeing into the future"). The deer is decapitated and skinned and the carcass is cut into seventy-seven pieces.⁵ These pieces are boiled in a large pot and then strewn around the grove as offerings for the gods. Empty of its contents, the pot is placed upside down on the ground upon which several radial lines are drawn from the pot as hub. These lines are made with a number of different substances, each with its own predictive significance: chalk (drought, famine, sickness); salt (abundance); charcoal (rains); and red ochre (bloodshed and strife). A ball of iron ore is placed upon the upturned base of the pot and the Winneba priests and priestesses dance around in a circle until the ball falls to the ground. Should it fall to land on one of the lines the process is repeated until, in this manner, the forecast of *Penkye Otu* is received.

Conflict and the Aboakyer

- Throughout the *Aboakyer* the spirit of competitiveness between

the *Asafo* companies runs very high. The various rules and procedures agreed to by company leaders prior to the event are designed to prevent this competitiveness, known to the Effutu as *mpiresi* from getting out of hand. This has proven to be a notoriously difficult task, for it appears that the *Aboakyer* often sets an intolerable test of people's patience and forbearance. In the highly charged atmosphere, minor breaches of the rules, or imagined slights and insults, are often sufficient to spark off violence between the companies. In 1962, for example, some fourteen people were injured, two of them seriously, in an inter-company conflict which erupted when a body *Tuafo* members carried their god's image too close to the *Dentsife* headquarters during the traditional Friday evening activities. Some *Dentsife* members were so enraged by the action of their rivals that they rushed outside and a violent disturbance took place, ending only with the arrival of the police. Over two hundred persons were arrested and the *Aboakyer* was banned on orders from the Regional Commissioner at Cape Coast. It was staged a few weeks later when tempers had cooled sufficiently.

Despite the violence, disputes springing from such irregularities in the conduct of the *Aboakyer* tend to be resolved fairly quickly and the event staged a few weeks later without incident. This pattern of reconciliation is not so apparent, however, in disputes which have their source elsewhere, but which are thrown into sharp focus during the *Aboakyer*. In 1957 the *Aboakyer* had to be cancelled by Mr. P.W. Thorgood, government agent in Winnoba, because of a dispute between the *Omanhene* and leaders of *Dentsife* company, who were dissatisfied with the *Omanhene's* conduct of a land sale. *Tuafo* company was willing to hunt alone but Thorgood feared (with some justification) that this would only worsen the situation and refused to allow it.

By far the most serious *Aboakyer*-related conflict occurred in 1941 and this provides us with a good illustration of the way in which the ceremony can offer an arena which major grievances can be aired. In December of 1940 the *Omanhene*, who was a member of *Dentsifo* company, raised recruits on behalf of the British army. This action, described in an official report as "proper and businesslike," was fiercely resented by members of the companies.⁶ When a notable sub-chief, the *Apamfohene*, spoke in defence of the

Aboakyer Festival among the Effutu of Southern Ghana

Omanhene's actions, he was formally deposed a few days later. This was followed by an incident during the *Aboakyer* on May 3rd when A.K. Ghartey, a captain of *Dentsifo* company, donned a brass helmet in contravention of an agreement that no company captains would wear such regalia. Because of Ghartey's helmet the *Tuafo* company refused to take to the hunting field and *Dentsifo* went on ahead, contrary to the traditional battle order. The *Omanhene* then sent a personal message to A.K. Ghartey requesting him to obey the agreement, finally succeeding in persuading the *Dentsifo* captain to remove the offending helmet. At this, *Tuafo* company displayed remarkable tolerance by agreement to follow *Dentsifo* to the hunting field although this was a slight to company pride. The hunt took place without further trouble but in the afternoon Ghartey was carried in triumph through the town by his *Dentsifo* comrades, again violating customary procedure.

Meeting after the *Aboakyer* had ended, the *Omanhene* and his councillors decided that Ghartey should be fined the sum of 16L and provide three sheep and a case of gin as "pacification" for the great trouble he had caused. When this decision was conveyed to him Ghartey sent his company's *Okyeame* (spokesman or linguist) to inform the *Omanhene* that he would no longer serve him unless certain (unspecified) grievances were resolved. Meanwhile, his comrades in *Dentsifo* appeared to be rallying behind him to such a degree that this company absented itself from a meeting held on May 30th to discuss compulsory military service. At this point the *Omanhene* and his councillors decided that Ghartey had gone too far. The following day they summoned him to appear before them to answer charges of continuous breach of custom and open revolt against the *Omanhene*. On June 3rd *Dentsifo* company leaders sent a letter to the District Commissioner in which they formally stated their withdrawal of allegiance to the *Omanhene* because of his earlier recruiting activities. This was followed, five days later, by another letter from the same source which admitted the error of withdrawing allegiance, but reaffirmed the grievance against the *Omanhene*. On June 9th Ghartey wrote to the District Commissioner, informing him that a complaint against the *Omanhene* had been lodged with a sub-chief, the *Adontenhene*, and three other sub-chiefs. On all four sub-chiefs the oath of *Simpa Wukuda* (an oath which prevents

persons from participating in affairs of state until a grievance is resolved) had been sworn.

On June 13th Ghartey appeared before the State Council (the *Omanhene* and his councillors), which included all of the sub-chiefs on whom the oath had been sworn. Ghartey pleaded not guilty and the case was adjourned until June 17th, with Ghartey being permitted bail. At the second hearing of the State Council, two of the four oathed sub-chiefs were present and Ghartey left the dock, without explanation, to the shouts of his supporters in *Dentsifo* company. Next Ghartey paid the fine and pacification fee set some six weeks earlier, but did so through the District Commissioner, an action which greatly annoyed the *Omanhene* and his councillors. Ghartey was supposed to appear before the State Council on July 4th, but on this particular morning the drum of *Dentsifo* company was sounded (a call to arms) without permission and Ghartey's case was postponed as a result. Six days later *Dentsifo* leaders asked for the support of the Secretary for Native Affairs in their dispute with the *Omanhene*, although this time the grievance set forth by them related to the acquisition of stool (i.e. royal) lands several years earlier.

At about this time in the conflict the District Commissioner was transferred and his replacement took over in Winneba on July 18th. His first step was to arrange a meeting with Ghartey for July 22nd but on the day before this meeting was to take place the "gong-gong" (a metallic summons-bell) of *Dentsifo* company was sounded. The District Commissioner therefore issued a notice prohibiting any assembly of *Dentsifo* company until further notice. On July 24th he met the leaders of *Dentsifo* and rebuked them for unconstitutional behaviour and the next day found this company's members absenting themselves from a meeting called to explain the new Air Raid Precautions Measures on the grounds that the *Omanhene* was to be present.

By the middle of August the *Omanhene* had made it clear to the District Commissioner that he was not prepared to listen to *Dentsifo* grievances against him until after Ghartey's case had been finally dealt with. As a result, the District Commissioner met with Ghartey on August 14th and told him that he was defying the system of native administration, adding, as a warning that "govern-

Aboakyer Festival among the Effutu of Southern Ghana

ment would not support him while he defied his natural rulers." Three days later the ineptness of the colonial authorities was revealed when, once again, the District Commissioner was transferred in the midst of a crisis. This time the place of the departed official was taken by the Assistant District Commissioner.

On August 14th a new figure emerged in the conflict, one Kwesi Ackotey, a leader in *Dentsifo* company. On this day Ackotey was summoned to appear before a tribunal (the *Omanhene*, his councillors, and the Assistant District Commissioner) to answer charges of usurping the authority of a headman by styling himself such in a letter he had written, on July 30th, to the Provincial Commissioner. In this letter he had made several complaints against the *Omanhene*. Ackotey tried unsuccessfully to secure an adjournment and then fled to Swedru, a town about fourteen miles to the north of Winneba. There he was arrested on August 17th and placed in Winneba prison on a detention warrant signed by the *Omanhene* and counter-signed by the Assistant District Commissioner. He was brought before the tribunal the next day. His appearance there was brief, the case being adjourned for one day and he was released on bail. Early on the morning of August 19th, the *Omanhene* received information from certain (unnamed) members of *Dentsifo* company that Ghartey had held a meeting in his house, in which it had been agreed to cause a disturbance while Ackotey was before the tribunal. It was arranged, as a result of this information, that three policemen should patrol the area of Commercial Street in which the tribunal was to sit.

Ackotey's trial began shortly after 11 a.m. on August 19th. Hardly had it begun, however, when a group of *Dentsifo* members rushed into the tribunal room and carried Ackotey off. The *Omanhene* then left for his palace. Not long after this Ackotey returned, apparently worried about having broken the terms of his bail; he sat in the tribunal room, although the tribunal had risen after his unexpected departure. Soon he was joined by a crowd of *Dentsifo* members, who easily broke through the police patrol. When he learned of this, the *Omanhene* telephoned the Assistant District Commissioner, asking him to provide additional men at the scene of the tribunal. The Assistant District Commissioner returned to Commercial Street, where he stayed just long enough to see that

R. W. Wylie

the situation was rapidly deteriorating. A noisy crowd surrounded the tribunal hall, dancing and chanting to the accompaniment of the *Dentsifo* drum. He quickly returned to his office, where he wrote out a proclamation according to section 365 of the Criminal Code and went back to the scene.

By now the crowd had grown even larger and some people had armed themselves with stones. The Assistant District Commissioner then called the company leaders before him and read out the Riot Act, ordering them to return home. Ghartey and some others then called out something to the crowd—whether to comply with the order or to defy it, we do not know. Some company leaders tried to push the crowd back, but in this they were unsuccessful. The Assistant District Commissioner then went to the palace, from where he telephoned the Provincial Commissioner and also the Sub-Inspector of Police at Swedru. When he returned to Commercial Street, some people in the crowd were already throwing stones at the police and were shouting for the release of Ackotey, who was still sitting in the Tribunal room (and apparently not under restraint). The Assistant District Commissioner then tried to explain to the crowd that the meeting was in contravention of his Prohibition Order of July 22nd, but this too failed to disperse them.

After he had finished speaking, the crowd suddenly rushed the tribunal hall from two directions, sweeping aside the police cordon (which now consisted of eleven men) and removed Ackotey for the second time. *Dentsifo* company then departed, in formation, up Old Fort Street. Now the Provincial Commissioner, when he spoke on the telephone to the Assistant District Commissioner, had advised him to tell the Assistant Superintendent of Police *not* to make any arrests until he (the Provincial Commissioner) arrived in Winneba the next day. However, after consulting his immediate superiors, the Assistant Superintendent made fifty-four arrests on the evening of the 19th and a further ten on the following morning.

At 7.30 a.m. on August 20th the police detachment in Commercial Street saw a group of approximately two hundred and fifty young men approach them, armed with stones, sticks and cutlasses.

Aboakyer Festival among the Effutu of Southern Ghana

As they drew near they hurled stones at the police, who fell back slowly and re-formed at the bottom of Old Fort Street. The Assistant Superintendent, who had been struck by stones thrown by this crowd, now indicated to them to advance no further. They came on and the Assistant Superintendent produced his gun and fired five warning shots on the ground directly ahead of the crowd. They stopped, but continued to direct a hail of stones at the police, thereby making a baton charge extremely difficult. The Assistant Superintendent then ordered seven of his men to load five rounds each and to stand, with fixed bayonets, at the rear of the baton party. A reserve party, without fixed bayonets and with ammunition in their pouches, waited outside the tribunal hall in Commercial Street. Then the Assistant Superintendent left the scene to telephone Accra and Cape Coast for reinforcements; on his return he appealed to some of the spectators, including Mr. W. Dadson, a local schoolmaster, to ask the crowd to disperse or else "drastic action" would be taken. The crowd was addressed, but without results.

The next step was a baton charge upon the crowd which proved totally ineffective, the baton party being swallowed up and completely surrounded by the crowd. After this the Assistant Superintendent was called to the Post Office to answer a telephone call from Accra. In his absence the crowd made a rush on the armed policemen, who showed their ammunition to the crowd and retired fifteen paces. A corporal, who was now in charge of the firing party, then ordered his men to fire upon the crowd in Old Fort Street and Queen Street. At this point the Assistant Superintendent appeared on the verandah of the Post Office and ordered his men to cease firing. The crowd broke and began to disperse. Apart from the five warning shots fired earlier, the police used twenty rounds of .303 ammunition. Six persons were killed and an unknown number injured. The *Aboakyer* was prohibited from 1941 to 1949. It was reintroduced primarily because the colonial administration wished to aid the new *Omanhene* in his struggle against his predecessor, the man who played a leading part in the events we have just described. In a letter to the Senior District Commissioner, the Assistant District Commissioner of Winneba shrewdly suggests:

"I also believe that the restoration of the Deer Hunt would greatly strengthen the position of the *Omanhene* and correspondingly weaken the efforts of the ex-*Omanhene* to re-establish himself."⁸

Conclusion

Despite fears of violent disturbances, the people of Winneba show great consternation over the possibility that the *Aboakyer* may not take place as usual. In part this is due to their belief that *Penkye Otu* has to be propitiated and consulted in the time-honoured manner if all is to be well with their community. Quite apart from this consideration, however, are a number of factors—all of which stem directly from the spectacular, mass character of the event—which tend to exert pressures toward its continuation. As spectacle, the hunt and the festival attract thousands of visitors to the town and this invariably results in the stimulation of trading and business activity during the week-end of the *Aboakyer*. Sellers of food and drink undoubtedly benefit most from the influx of visitors, but others—particularly women who make and sell necklaces in the colours of the rival companies—take advantage of the opportunities to earn some extra money.⁹ Several prominent businessmen in Winneba have been astute enough to recognize the commercial advantages afforded by the event and have actively promoted it by offering prizes to the victorious hunters and even supplying the uniforms sported during the parade. National politicians are usually in attendance to make speeches and reward the hunters with prizes. For the general public the *Aboakyer* is an occasion of great interest, much in the same way as national sporting events are in western societies. It receives wide and detailed coverage in the national press, radio and television and, for a few days at least, Winneba is at the centre of national attention. In these various ways the national ritual has been surrounded by a modern superstructure fashioned by the interests of commerce, politics and the mass-media and which serves to bolster and perpetuate it.

Aboakyer Festival among the Effutu of Southern Ghana

Notes

1. The Effutu are surrounded by Twi-speaking, Akan peoples, notably the Fanti and Gomoa.
2. For a more detailed account of the *Aboakyer*, see R.W. Wyllie, "Ritual and Social Change : a Ghanaian Example." *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 70, 1968, pp. 21-33.
3. Each party is required, at this point, to deposit 100L as a surety with the District Commissioner.
4. The Effutu pantheon is believed to consist of seventy-seven deities, although even the most knowledgeable of our informants could only name about half of these.
5. One for each of the deities.
6. *D538 Report of Commission appointed to enquire into the Disturbances which occurred in the Winneba (Effutu) State of the 19th and 20th August, 1941.* Public Archives, Cape Coast.
7. Ibid.
8. Letter, dated 29th March, 1949.
9. Interviews with proprietors of food bars, chop bars and small stalls suggested that the volume of sales on the day of the hunt was four times greater than normal for a Saturday.

A.D. Hassan **Big Power Rivalry in Indian
Ocean—A Tanzanian View**

The United Republic of Tanzania is one of the Eastern African countries bordering the Indian Ocean for 500 miles. It also comprises the islands of Pemba, Zanzibar and a number of small islands. Tanzania's inherent position in the Indian Ocean makes it greatly dependent on it in matters of communication, navigation, sea food, living resources and non-living resources found in the Ocean. Like other littoral states bordering the Indian Ocean, it can be said therefore that Tanzania, by virtue of its position, has a vital sovereign stake in the matters of security vis-a-vis its land and ocean space. In this connection any infringement on the United Nations General Assembly resolution passed at its 26th session¹ declaring the Indian Ocean as a peace zone stands to be opposed by Tanzania just like other littoral states and the peace-loving nations which voted in favour of this resolution.

Historically, it has been noted that the Indian Ocean was primarily used for peaceful purposes. Tanzania and India, for example, have been using the Indian Ocean to travel to East Africa and back to India and traders particularly from India and Persian Gulf states have been well-acquainted with the to and fro movements in the Ocean upto the time when some countries outside the region started getting involved in the Indian Ocean. As it is known to everybody that some of these alien powers are now creating a new phenomenon unknown to the littoral states and that is, they are making the Ocean the arena of big power confrontation.

The present alarming situation in the Indian Ocean is part and parcel of the global tension and is not an isolated situation. Unfortunately, the Indian Ocean has been the victim of circumstances of

this global tension and that is why it has become at the moment the centre of gravity. The Indian Ocean, by virtue of its position, is situated at the centre of the most explosive and most vulnerable areas of the Third World.

A number of theories have been advanced substantiating the legality or morality of the Big Power involvements, such as the intended withdrawal of British created a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean, the intensive involvement of the Russian naval fleets threatens the interest of other big maritime nations in the area. China's growth in military capabilities, particularly in the field of nuclear power, makes that country potential aspirant in the area and consequently might threaten also the maritime interests of super powers etc. Unfortunately, all these theories do not pay attention to the interests of littoral states nor to the interests of the developing nations as a whole. The theories centre on big power and super interests and confrontations. This kind of thinking is detrimental to the security and interests of littoral states and to the developing countries as whole. It is high time that emphasis is given to the interests and security of littoral states.

Tanzania's position in the Indian Ocean has got to do with the security of its people and Tanzania regards any disturbance in the peace of Indian Ocean as a threat to its own security. To avoid this threat it demands :

- (1) Eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa and from the Indian Ocean islands ;
- (2) Change in the Laws of the Sea Convention ;
- (3) Consolidation of the Declaration of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace ; and
- (4) Withdrawal of super-power military presence from the Indian Ocean.

Eradication of all forms of colonialism: Colonialism managed to live long in African and Asian continents mainly because of our disunity. The present situation therefore calls to repulse the neo-colonial and imperialist manouvres which are now forming shape in the Indian Ocean. Everybody is now talking the language that the

super-power military involvement in the Indian Ocean is motivated by their interests in the area but nobody has tried to define clearly in concrete details as to what these interests are or what are the motives behind these so-called super power interests. It will be even dangerous to think that because one super power has done 'X' thing, then the other super power should be sympathised with for doing 'Y' thing. In October 1973, the United Republic of Tanzania strongly rejected "the reason advanced by the United States authorities that if the Russians increase their fleet in the Mediterranean then the Americans must increase their fleet in the Indian Ocean." This reasoning to Tanzania was untenable because it was very unlikely that the American could use the same argument to send aircraft carriers to the Baltic sea. It is the weakness of the littoral states which let the Americans come into the Indian Ocean and act with impunity without a slight respect for the security of India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania to mention only a few littoral states. In a similar manner, Tanzania opposes the setting up of the Anglo-American naval and air base at Diego Garcia.

Some scholars have tried to give the impression that "China has a missile tracking ship and a missile recovery ship based at Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and is also installing telemetry equipment for monitoring the final phase of entry of its ICBM which will probably be launched across India into the Ocean for the test flight". This kind of unfounded rumours will not help in knowing the realities of super-power military involvement in the Indian Ocean. This kind of rumours without much research stands to misdirect the international community as a whole. After having scrutinised this vital problem, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution^a calling upon the U.N. Secretary-General to prepare a factual statement of the great powers military presence in all aspects in the Indian Ocean. The word 'factual' is the key word because without facts our endeavours to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace will fall into shambles.

South Africa borders the Indian Ocean and the activities of this racist regime have always been aimed at violating the peace of the Indian Ocean. The voice of Africa was neglected and is still

Big Power Rivalry in Indian Ocean

being neglected regarding the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. South African racist regime has been using Indian Ocean ports to squash the United Nations arms embargo to South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Ocean has been used by South Africa's and Rhodesia's minority regimes for the transportation of lethal equipment which are of great threat also to the lives and property of the people of Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania. Therefore security of the Indian Ocean and littoral states is linked with the security of the black people of Zimbabwe and South Africa who are still under racist colonial regimes, as well as to the independent countries in the area. To ignore their security is to ignore humanity and human rights and thereupon contravening the United Nations principles which are acceptable to the entire international community. The powers which help Rhodesia's white minority regime to suppress the fights of majority black Africans, and the powers which help South African white minority regime in developing its military capabilities are not only disregarding the U.N. arms embargo but are purposely violating the security of the independent African countries and the Indian Ocean. All these powers, by assisting these minority racist regimes in Southern Africa, are jeopardising the security of littoral states and are directly violating the principles which are already accepted by the United Nations of making the Indian Ocean a peace zone.

France is using the Indian Ocean islands she controls by neo-colonialist links for the so-called protection of French interests in the Indian Ocean. This, therefore, should be taken as a declaration of intention to use these islands for military purposes. This is again a straight forward violation of the principle of making the Indian Ocean a peace zone in a manner similar to the U.S. British collision in building up a military base in Diego Garcia.

Change in the Laws of the Sea Convention: Many nations of the world share the Tanzanian feeling that the present Law of the Sea Convention is inadequate to protect the interests and security of the developing countries. No doubt, the present chaos in the Law has led to the unilateral actions and decisions by the super-powers, colonial powers and the racist regimes like what is happening in the Indian Ocean without the least regard to the integrity of the

littoral states. The inadequacy of international law has prompted the developing countries to realise the need to regulate state practice in ocean space in order to restore equity and justice to all nations of the world, but top priority is to be given to the interests of the developing countries. The littoral states feel it necessary to examine the inadequacy of international law and its repercussions on the present development in the Indian Ocean. The developments have already reached an alarming stage and are threatening the security of the Indian Ocean littoral states. An immediate step is required to bring about a change in the Laws of the Sea Convention so that the interests of the developing countries are protected. Current contacts on the question reveal that the developing countries all over the world maintain identical views and the forthcoming U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea is of vital importance to the Third World maritime interests and security.

Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: The U.N. General Assembly in its resolutions of December 16, 1971 and December 15, 1972 has declared the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Both these resolutions pertaining to the Peace Zone concept were adopted by overwhelming majority without any opposition, though the two super powers and some other nations abstained from voting. The spade work for these resolutions was done during the Lusaka Conference of the Non-aligned countries in 1970, Singapore Conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 1971, Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned countries in Guyana in August 1972, and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference at Blantyre in October 1972.

The first resolution was influenced by the need "to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free of nuclear weapons." It was considered desirable to ensure "the maintenance of such conditions in the area by means other than military alliances."

The General Assembly was concerned at the extension of arms race in the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the area. It therefore

Big Power Rivalry in Indian Ocean

declared the Indian Ocean within the limits, to be determined together, with the air space above and the ocean floor sub-jacent thereto as a zone of peace. The General Assembly called upon the great powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean with a view to (1) halting further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; and (2) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations, disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction etc. The second resolution, after recalling the first, noted that the consultations envisaged in the first, resolution did not take place and agreed that further steps should be taken towards the implementation of the first resolution. An Ad Hoc committee was appointed to study the implications of the resolution. The nature of this Ad Hoc committee was mostly exploratory.

Littoral States Oppose Military Presence in the Indian Ocean:

The recent development which took place in the Indian Ocean, particularly the super power military involvement in the area, has prompted the littoral states to oppose severely these moves. The United Republic of Tanzania has also on its part issued a couple of statements protesting against the increasing U.S. military fleet in the Indian Ocean. The littoral states are clearly aware that the super-power military rivalry is being introduced in the Indian Ocean in a big way now than ever before. This is a new phenomenon as far as the Indian Ocean is concerned. The so-called super-power interests should never in any way jeopardise the interests of littoral states. At the same time, the super power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean should not be looked upon as an isolated incident; but it should be looked upon as part and parcel of global neo-colonial and neo-imperial manouvres. Littoral states have the obligation to check this development. In their task they seek the cooperation of all the peace-loving nations of the world.

The problem of super-power military build-up in the Indian Ocean is serious. A great amount of realism is needed to study it and come to conclusions. The Diego Garcia situation which has sparked yet another concern, is just one of the series of super-power provocations to the littoral states. Had colonialism been abolished Diego Garcia could not have been turned into a military base.

Dr. Vijay Gupta

India and Africa

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE
July-September 1975

Afro-Asians back Mrs. Gandhi

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) has expressed its "whole-hearted support" to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and said "at this hour of crucial battle against fascist forces and imperialist conspiracy, AAPSO stands with you and the great people of India."

In a message to Mrs. Gandhi, Egyptian Minister for Culture, Youssef Ensebat who is also AAPSO Secretary-General has conveyed the best wishes of AAPSO and all patriotic anti-imperialists and anti-facist forces" for success in your struggle for social transformation, economic development of India, your progressive policy of non-alignment and unity of all peace loving nations". (July 4, 75)

Lectures on ancient Africa

Dr. Vijay Gupta, Editor, Africa Quarterly gave a series of lectures on Ancient Africa covering the following topics :—

1. Origins of African Societies
2. African Empires of Western and Central Areas
3. Africa Before Colonisation.

The Delhi State Institute of Education had arranged an orientation programme for its teachers. Delhi school teachers of history, who have to teach under a new course, pre-colonial African history in their schools benefited from these lectures. The new course on History of Mankind has been started at the instance of N.C.R.T. The course gives a correct and proper picture of ancient African history. (September 3, 75)

African-Arab youth leaders hail Indian emergency

Youth leaders of African countries have welcomed the declaration of national emergency in India and are convinced that the country is taking the correct stand against the right reaction. imperialism and colonialism. All-India Youth Congress president P.R. Dasmunshi, MP, said at a press conference on Wednesday.

Narrating his experience about the recently concluded conference of youth organizations of Africa and Arab countries Mr. Das Munshi said that the conference was unanimous in supporting India's stand on the question of making Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

(September 4, '75)

Indian Cultural Performance in Africa

A fourteen-member Cultural Troupe led by Dr. Vijay Gupta, Editor, Africa Quarterly visited Tunisia, Kenya, Malawi and Ethiopia. The Troupe had artist from different parts of India i.e. Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras. The troupe was composed of Manipuri, Bharat Natyam and Kathakali dancers and sitar, flute, tabla, sarangi, and mridangam players besides a classical vocalist.

The artists gave 29 performances during 40 days which included public performances, television interviews and dance demonstrations.

In Tunisia the Indian Cultural Troupe participated in Eighth International Festivals of Popular Arts at Carthage where about 1500 artists from 23 countries took part. The Indian Cultural troupe got thunderous applause all over Tunisia and at Carthage Amphi Theatre on the last day about 30,000 people witnessed the programme with great awe and enthusiasm. Mr. Indranil Bhattacharya, our sitarist bagged the first prize as the best instrumentalist which was a great honour to India.

From Tunisia the Troupe moved to Kenya and performed at Nairobi, Kisumu and Mombasa. In Nairobi Dr. Kiano, the Kenyan Minister for Commerce and Industry was the chief guest. The proceeds of the programme were donated to the Charity Fund.

From Keyna the Troupe moved to Malawi and presented programmes at Blantyre, Lilongwe and Salima. The performance

at Blantyre was witnessed by Miss C. Kadzamira, the Official Hostess of the Government of Malawi. The Lilongwe performance was attended amongst others by the Minister of Finance, Trade, Industry and Tourism. The Malawi Press and Radio gave wide coverage to the programme of the Indian Cultural Troupe. The repeated ovation which the artist received depicted the genuine interest and liking of the Malawians for these performances. From Malawi the Troupe moved to Ethiopia and presented, two performances, the proceeds of which, Ethiopian 25000 dollars, went for the relief work in Ethiopia. The artists almost conquered the hearts of many and created a very strong impression of India's cultural heritage. This was evidenced by the spontaneous editorial which appeared in the Ethiopian Herald on the day of the Cultural Troupe's departure. The editorial states :

Venerating one's culture

"Indian musicians have been providing a rare treat to their Ethiopian brothers and sisters in the field of oriental culture in the course of the past few days. Music is an inseparable part of oriental mysticism. The body, the soul and sound merge into such a harmonious whole in Indian music to produce an effect which is more profound than anyone can imagine. The performance staged by the Indian musicians was in fact ballet at its best.

At a time when our own continent is being contaminated with the scum of outside musical heritage, it is quite comforting to note that something good and beautiful is still alive in Africa and Asia. India is certainly unequalled in the soul-searching profundity of its musical tradition. However, it is a pity that at a time noise is masquerading as music in much of the world, what is genuinely beautiful is being buried under a pile of rubbish.

Ethiopia can learn a lot from countries like India in many fields. The Indian people are well-known for venerating their own culture and tradition. Centuries of foreign rule have not quite succeeded in obliterating the national identity of India. What we saw of the performance in the city recently was spiritually and materially Indian.

Ethiopia has its own rich musical tradition, Kirar, maenoks, and begena music is also the best loveliest that we possess. However,

Vijay Gupta

it is a pity that many people are looking down on their own musical tradition. What we must learn from countries like India is the veneration of one's own culture and tradition."

The Cultural Troupe was successful in creating genuine interest and liking for the Classical Indian Dance and Music.

(August 19, 75)

Big rise in exports to Africa likely

Mr K.G. Khosla, president of the Association of Indian Engineering Industry, who led an Indian trade mission to Kenya, Zambia, Egypt and Libya, said here today that the 10 member mission had already succeeded in securing orders worth about Rs 1 crore from Kenya and Zambia. He expected firm orders to the tune of another Rs 4 crores from these countries before the end of this year.

Mr. Khosla said if Kenya and Zambia could be given five to seven year credit facilities it would be possible for India to secure orders to the tune of about Rs 29 crores. He pointed out that these countries at present imported only about two per cent of their total imports from India. There was keen interest in these countries in import of goods, technology and in setting up joint ventures.

Mr. Khosla said the mission had also suggested that IDBA should provide credit facilities to the tune of Rs 25 crores for Kenya and Zambia. (September 16, 75)

India recognises Comoro-islands

India has recognised the Comoro islands.

The Prime Minister has sent a message to Mr. Ahmed Abdullah, President of the island, saying: "Please accept our sincere congratulations on the Comoro island becoming a fully sovereign and independent state and a member of the Organisation of African Unity". (July 29, 75)

Ethiopian team keen on Indian know-how

The Ethiopian trade delegation, while touring India evinced keen interest in handmade paper, cottage match, fibre, non-edible oil and soap, gohar gas and beekeeping industries.

The delegation led by Mr. A.B.W. Semayat, Secretary-General Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce, held discussions here with Mr. Ghanshyam Oza, Chairman, Khadi and Village Industries Commission, regarding the scope of starting rural industries for which raw materials are available in abundance in their country.

In view of the present economy and urgent need for developing industries based on intermediate technology for augmenting employment and production in that country, the possibility of exporting technical know-how made use of in the improved equipments produced by the Commission to Ethiopia is rated high. (July 24, 75)

Raymond Woollen's Kenya Centre inaugurated

Raymond Woollen's Management Training Centre at Eldoret (Kenya) was declared open by Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, Vice President of Kenya.

Opening the Centre, he said this step was in line with the declared Government policy of Kenyanisation and training technicians. He said that he would not like to continue the import of technicians from overseas and soon Kenyans should be able to man industries in Kenya. The Vice President also said that he wanted the quality of products manufactured in Kenya to be equal to that of international standards and that industries in Kenya should try to promote exports.

Mr. Gopalkrishna Singhania, Chairman of the company, who welcomed the Vice President, said that the training of technicians was a long process. He said that the cost of training facilities would be Shs. 2 million (Rs. 22 lakhs), Raymond has obtained the services of a training officer with 25 years experience from India, who will start their technical training and sandwich courses by which the pre-technician will be exposed both to theory and practice.

He pointed out that Raymond Kenya's turnover has increased from Shs. 12 million to Shs 40 million and that they are on the threshold of further growth. (July 24, 75)

Kenyan historian visits India

Dr. Harper Johnson, an eminent historian of Kenya, was invited to visit Delhi as a guest of the Indian Centre for Africa. Dr. Johnson is presently engaged in writing a book concerning African history in

Vijay Gupta

which he wants to emphasise the African contacts with India through centuries.

All necessary assistance was provided to him in obtaining the material for his book and in this connection he visited Aligarh, Agra, Madras, Bombay, Aurangabad, Daultabad and Ahmadnagar.

Secretary, ICCR hosted a lunch in honour of Dr. Harper Johnson on 18th August 1975 at Azad Bhavan. (August 19, 75)

Indian firm to supply 26 oil tanks to Kenya

The state-owned Kenya Pipeline Company has accepted the tender of an Indian firm for the supply, fabrication and erection of 26 oil storage tanks in Kenya. The contract worth Rs. 3.6 crores, was signed in Bombay.

The managing director of Kenya Pipelines, Mr. C. Kahara, told newsmen that his organisation had received a number of tenders from other countries but it found the Indian firms offer the most acceptable from technical, cost and other points of view.

The tanks to be set up range in capacity from 200 to 11,500 tonnes. The project is a turnkey one and will be executed by Indian personnel at the Nairobi pipeline terminal and the Embakasi airport. The work on the storage tanks will begin in February 1976 and will be completed in June 1977.

Mr. Kahara said there was much scope for collaboration between India and Kenya. (September 22, 75)

Libyan job for NIDC

The National Industrial Development Council, a Government of India Undertaking, has been awarded a consultancy tender worth Rs. 12 lakhs for Libyan Industrial development plan 1976-80.

This is the first time that the Libyan Government has awarded a major consultancy project to an Indian organisation. (July 19, 75)

Indo-Libyan move for joint shipping body

India and Libya have agreed to consider the possibility of forming a joint Indo-Libyan shipping company according to a memorandum of understanding signed in Tripoli between the Shipping Corporation of India and the General Maritime Transport Company of Libya.

India would provide training facilities and technical assistance to Libya in the field of shipping.

The signing of the memorandum of understanding followed an hour-long meeting between the Libyan Minister for Maritime shipping and an Indian delegation. (August 1, 75)

Libya entrusts plan to NIDC

The National Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., a public sector consultancy organisation, has been commissioned by the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic to prepare a 5 year industries development plan of that country for the period 1976-80.

The plan will not only evolve the strategy of development and identification of industrial fields, but will also lay down comprehensive techno-economic bases for individual projects. It will examine the rationale for public and private investment and determine the time schedule for implementation.

The corporation has already been acting as consultants to the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic on a turnkey basis for a steel melting and billet-casting plant at Tripoli. (September 6, 75)

Indian participation in Libyan pipeline project

The Government of India is considering the possibility of participating in a major joint project for the construction of a 400 km. long pipeline from the Libyan desert to a new shore terminal on Libya's Mediterranean coast. The pipeline is to be laid from Bu Attifel, one of the richest established petroleum deposits situated in the desert.

This is among the many other proposed joint projects which are now engaging the attention of both the Indian and Libyan Governments. At the request of Mr. Babrouk, Libya's Petroleum Minister, India has agreed to conduct a techno-economic study for the establishment of a methanol derivative plant. The two countries will also be conducting detailed studies for the establishment of fertilizer, caprolactum, DMT, pesticide and drug and pharmaceutical units in Libya. A substantial part of the production from these proposed plants will be bought by India to meet its requirements.

Libya has already invited the Oil and Natural Gas Commission to undertake oil exploration. There is an agreement providing for

the training of Libyan technicians by India and the supply of Libyan crude to India. An Indo-Libyan oil service company for the maintenance of oil equipment and training of qualified cadres in Libya will soon be set up. (September 17, 75)

Ahmed's message to Mali President

President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, has sent a message of greetings to Moussa Traora, President of the Military Committee of National Liberation, Chief of State and President of the Government of the Republic of Mali on the national day of the country. (September 23, 75)

Mozambique Independence hailed

Mrs. Gandhi, who was cheered several times by a large gathering of African diplomats assembled to hail the independence of Mozambique said, "We welcome Mozambique's entry into the comity of free nations." Mrs Gandhi sent her greetings to the President and people of that country and hoped that freedom would mark the beginning of a bright future through hard work, unity, and the support and sympathy of its people and friendly countries. She said that problems coming up later might be more formidable than winning freedom but these would have to be faced to give the people a better life. India, she said, always stood for freedom and considered freedom indivisible.

Besides Mrs. Gandhi, the Congress President, Mr. D.K. Baroo, the CPI leader, Mr. Rajeswara Rao, representatives of Mozambique and the High Commissioner of Ghana, Mr. Paul Boakve Duah were present. The sponsors of the function were the Indian National Congress, the Communist Party of India, the All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation, the Indian National Trade Union Congress, Indian Youth Congress, All India Youth Federation and the Indian Centre for Africa. (July 10, 75)

Namibia Day observed in Delhi

Shri B.D. Jatti, Vice-President of India presided over the meeting and delivered the presidential address on the occasion of Namibia Day i.e. 26, August. The meeting was addressed by Shri Bipinpal Das, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Dr. S.D.

Sharma, Minister for Communications, H.E. Mr. Ileka Mboyo, Ambassador of Zaire (on behalf of African Missions in India) Mr. Moola, representative of South African National Congress in India and Mr. Z.O. Geda an African student.

A special Commemorative stamp on Namibia was also released by the Vice-President. The function was followed by a film on Namibia. An Exhibition on Namibia was also on view on this occasion.

Mr. Jatti said that "The imperialist rulers of South Africa are not content with practising the policy of apartheid in South Africa alone. They export these abominable practices to other countries and this creates a perilous situation for peaceful co-existence. The territory of Namibia, contiguous to South Africa has become a pathetic victim of the South African Government's policy of apartheid and colonial domination. Apartheid has been introduced in Namibia, a country over which South Africa continues to maintain its stranglehold, despite the condemnation by world opinion on the subject, and contrary to the just aspirations of the people of Namibia". He stated that the Indians "re-affirmed their full support to all positive and concrete measures taken by the U.N. to achieve the withdrawal of the illegal administration and transfer of power to the people of Namibia" and added that "India has been happy to give continued economic and material support to the people of Namibia through SWAPO, the UN Fund for Namibia and the OAU Fund against colonialism and apartheid. During the visit of the Mission of the Council of Namibia, we agreed to provide training facilities to 150 persons from Namibia immediately and to send experts, professors and technical personnel to the Namibia Institute proposed to be set up in Lusaka. India will be happy to give additional facilities which may be required by the brave people of Namibia, to herald the dawn of independence there".

He ended his address by saying that "Freedom for Namibia is a historic necessity and we are sure that very soon it will be a reality. On this day we renew our pledge to the people of Namibia to help them attain their "Swaraj"—their birth-right".

Dr. S.D. Sharma, the Indian Minister of Communications thought it to be tragic that instead of vacating the illegal occupation over Namibia, South Africa has been flouting the call of United

Nations with impunity and has been taking steps to dismember Namibia by creating the so-called 'Bantustans' or 'African homelands' designed to promote intertribal rivalries and destroying its national unity and territorial integrity. Such attempts to hold Namibia illegally will never succeed". He hoped that the pressure of world opinion will compel South Africa to honour the directive of the UN and terminate its illegal hold over Namibia.

The gathering, which was organized by INDIAN CENTRE FOR AFRICA, was attended by a large number of Diplomates and dignitaries beside hundreds of people from all walks of life. (Aug. 26, 75)

Seychelles Chief Minister in India

India gave a warm welcome to Mr. James Mancham, Chief Minister of Seychelles, on his arrival on August 13 in New Delhi on a four day official visit to India. Mr. Y.B. Chavan, India's Minister of External Affairs, and senior Officers of his ministry were among those who received him at the airport. Soon after arrival, Mr. Mancham visited Rajghat and laid a wreath at the Samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi. He called on the President. Mr. Ahmed, Vice President, Mr. Jatti, and the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, the next day. On August 15, India's independence day, Mr. Mancham attended the functions at the Red Fort in Delhi. Later he visited Agra to see the Taj Mahal and the Fort.

At a social function held in his honour on August 13 in New Delhi, Mr. Chavan said that India greatly welcomed Mr. Mancham's statement that the only sensible policy for his country would be to steer clear of great power manoeuvres and pursue a policy of "protective pacifism". Along all the other overlapping links, Mr. Chavan added, Seychelles has a special identity with the Indian ocean. "Your country is located almost in the heart of this vast expanse of water", he said. "We are neighbours around the Indian ocean. Our peninsula juts into the Indian ocean; all our maritime trade flows through these waters. Like other littoral countries along the waters of the Indian ocean, we are committed to keep this ocean as a zone of peace. We have been gratified that not only the countries which border the ocean but the United Nations and the nonaligned group have endorsed the imperative necessity of keeping this ocean free from foreign military bases".

Indian Support to Seychelles

Referring to Seychelles' close traditional links with Africa, Mr. Chavan said that as far as India is concerned it has been second to none in its dedication to the progress of the African continent. Even before our independence when our horizons should have been restricted, he said, India was in the vanguard in her support for the African people in their struggle to rid the continent of colonialism and all forms of racialism.


"We rejoice with Africa at the emergence of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau as sovereign nations. What we are witnessing now is an end of centuries of European colonialism in Africa", Mr. Chavan said, "we, like you, are however, aware that residuary problems such as the independence of Namibia, end of the white minority rule in Rhodesia and the pernicious system of apartheid in South Africa still persist as a defiant outrage on human rights and political liberties. These indignities, too, will one day come to an end, we hope, peacefully. For our part, India will continue to give Africa its consistent support in the final tasks of obtaining freedom and dignity for the whole continent."

Extending wholehearted cooperation and support to Seychelles, Mr. Chavan said: "India for one, not only pledges its goodwill but also its willingness to cooperate in every possible way to realise your plans for development and progress which will give substance to your independence. We have noted that even at this stage you have declared your intention to join the community of non-aligned countries and to oppose military alliances (August 18, 75)

NIDC consultancy service for Zanzibar

The National Industrial Development Corporation, which has pioneered the export of Indian consultancy services and technical know-how, has been appointed turnkey consultants for the establishment of industrial estates on the island of Zanzibar and at Dodoma in Tanzania. The NIDC, a public sector unit is now engaged in the export of know-how for small-scale industries.

A delegation from Zanzibar has, with the help of the NIDC already placed orders totalling Rs. 1.3 crores on Indian manufacturers for supply of technical know-how, machinery and plants for some of the units of the first industrial estate in Zanzibar. The



delegation was on a ten-day visit to India.

Fourteen of the proposed 20 units will be put up with the help of Indian experts. Arrangements have been finalised for erection and commissioning of these plants. Orders for the remaining units are also likely to be awarded to Indian firms. The estate will go into production in January 1976. This will set an example of co-operation and sharing of technology among developing countries (September 9, 1975)

Tanzanian paper supports Mrs. Gandhi

Tanzania's government-owned newspaper, Daily News, called on the world's progressive forces' to sympathise with the Indian Prime Minister in the face of the west's attack on her latest political measures.

'Evidence is beginning to shape that this attitude of the west in the driving force behind the current barrage of abuse, denunciations propaganda being directed against Mrs. Gandhi', the newspaper said in an editorial.

The newspaper said there was justifiable evidence that the people Mrs. Gandhi had imprisoned were mostly did-hard rightwing capitalists.

The worst fears of the west were that because of the attitude of Mrs. Gandhi another Asian giant may go socialist, the newspaper added. (July 12, 75)

Tanzanian order for locomotives

India has made a breakthrough in Africa by concluding a Rs 12 crore export contract with Tanzania for sophisticated railway rolling stock.

The contract signed by the Projects and Equipment Corporation an STC subsidiary with the Tanzanian Government envisages supply of 15 diesel locomotives, five steam locomotives, 17 passenger coaches and 30 wagons and spare parts. Bulk of the deliveries will be completed in 10 to 12 months.

This is for the first time that diesel locomotive and passenger coaches will be exported to that country.

The agreement follows the 15 day visit to India of a Tanzanian delegation led by the principal secretary to the Ministry of Commu-

nication and its discussions with PEC Railway Board and the Commerce Ministry.

The team visited industrial engineering units at Bombay, Calcutta and the Integral Coach Factory in Madras and the diesel locomotive works in Varanasi. It was greatly impressed by the type and range of products manufactured in the units.

Under the agreement, Tanzanian railway engineers will be given training in India for the proper maintenance of equipment supplied.

Indian engineers will be deputed for proper commissioning of the equipment. (July 25, 75)

Credit to Tanzania

India has agreed to consider the question of providing additional credit to Tanzania for the development of an integrated agricultural and industrial project in that country.

The question came up during the talks Tanzania Finance Minister, C.D. Msuya had with Finance Minister, C. Subramaniam and high officials of the Finance Ministry in New Delhi.

They discussed matters of mutual interest during their 45 minute talks.

Mr. P.K. Mukherjee, Minister of State for finance, Mr. A.D. Hassan, Tanzanian High Commissioner in India, and Mr. M.G. Kaul, Secretary, Economic Affairs, Finance Ministry were also present at the meeting.

India had extended a credit of Rs. 10 crores for the Kagera-sugar project in Tanzania.

Mr. Msuya said that Tanzania was keen to implement a second-sugar project. He requested for further credits from India for the second project which was to be an intergarated project for agricultural and industrial development. (September 25, 75).

India to help build railways in Zaire

Possibilities of cooperation between India and Zaire in the development programmes of Zaire National Railways were discussed at a meeting in New Delhi between the Indian Railways Board and a two-member railway delegation from Zaire.

The discussions covered provision of consultancy service equipment and technical personnel.

Vijay Gupta

The state owned Rail India Technical and Economic Service (RITES) has already received an intent for undertaking a feasibility study for a 450-kilometre railway line in Zaire. (September 4, 75)

New Zambian Envoy

Mr. Axson Chibeka Chalikulima has been nominated as the High Commissioner of Zambia to India.

Mr. Chalikulima was ambassador of Zambia to the then democratic republic of the Congo and Congo (Brazzaville) from 1969-73. Thereafter, he became a member of Parliament and was appointed cabinet minister—(July 17, 75).

India lauds Zambia's role in freedom stir

Mr. Zulu was given a warm and affectionate welcome when he arrived on a three-day visit to India. He was received at the air port by Vice President of India, Mr. B.D. Jatti ; the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Bipinpal Das, members of diplomatic corps and senior civil and military officials.

After inspecting an inter-services guard of honour, Mr. Zulu accompanied by Mr. Jatti, drove-in-State to Rashtrapati Bhavan, where he was staying. Mr Zulu was accompanied by Mademe Zulu and 23-high ranking officials.

Speaking at a banquet in honour of Mr. A.G. Zulu, Secretary General of the United Nations Independence Party and member of the Zambian Central Committee. The Vice-President, Mr. B.D. Jatti said that non-aligned countries must remain in the vanguard of the movement to create a better socio-economic world order and to enrich the content of human life, recalled how the Lusaka conference held five years ago had added a new dimension to this movement which was acquiring great significance in these difficult times.

Mr. Jatti lauded the effective role Zambia had been playing for the liberation of countries in southern Africa. This had won it universal acclaim.

He said India followed with admiration President Kenneth Kaunda's efforts towards a negotiated settlement in Zaimbabwe. He said the situation was complex but not entirely pessimistic. The process for independence of Zimbabwe started at the Victoria Falls recently would ultimately bring success.

India supports Zimbabwe cause

Mr. Jatti said: "Our support and sympathies are for the rights of the African majority of Zimbabwe to have an independent government" India wished a peaceful solution to this problem. He, however, expressed regrets at the break down of President Kanunda's diplomatic progress to achieve independence.

He said India was proud to be associated with different liberation movements in Africa. India recently celebrated the Namibia Day and rededicated ourselves to the independence struggle of the people of Namibia and others in Africa". India hoped the objectives of national and racial emancipation in southern Africa would be achieved in the very near future.

Mr. Jatti said the establishment of Zambia's first diplomatic mission in India constituted another milestone in the friendly relations between the two countries.

There was increasing co-operation between India and Zambia in all economic fields and under various agreements Indian technical personnel were serving in Zambia in the common task of economic development.

He said President Kanunda's visit to India in January this year had strengthened the bonds of friendship between the two countries.

Speaking at the dinner Mr. Zulu said that India was one of the few friendly countries which came to his country's aid in the "darkest hour of our history as a newly independent country amidst the vexing problem of southern Africa.

Mr. Zulu said: "I want to take this opportunity, on behalf of the party government and the people of Zambia to thank the government and people of India for the assistance. We much appreciate this and your sympathetic understanding of our position."

Mr. Zulu said his country viewed with considerable concern the mounting super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean areas.

Mr. A.G. Zulu, said that the main purpose of his visit to India—consolidation on the friendly relations between the Governments and the people of India and Zambia—had been fully achieved.

Speaking to newsmen at Delhi airport at the conclusion of his three-day visit, Mr. Zulu, He thanked the Government of India and the Congress Party for the hospitality extended to him,

Vijay Gupta

Mr. Zulu and Madame Zulu drove to the airport along with the Vice-President, Mr. B.D. Jatti. Others present to bid them farewell included the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Bipinpal Das, diplomats and high-ranking officers of the three Services.

The 24-member Zambian delegation included the Minister for National Resources and Tourism, Mr. J.C. Mapoma and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. O.B. Silwizya.

The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi hosted a lunch in honour of Mr. Zulu. (September 3, 75)

Book Review

Government and Politics in Africa: By Anirudha Gupta ; Vikas Publishing House, Delhi ; Rs. 35.

Reporting Africa : By Anirudha Gupta ; People's Publishing House, New Delhi ; Rs. 25.

The colonial powers at the time of parcelling out of the "dark" continent among themselves did not follow any geographical, or political alignments. It was a question of grab anywhere, as best and as much as you could. Dissimilar ethnic groups with different social structures and having no tradition of inter-tribal intercourse were thrown together in the melting pot of colonial conquest. Hence the artificiality of the borders of the newly independent African States, which had never existed in the form of territorial States before being colonised.

Dr Anirudha Gupta does not, however, want us to look at the "artificiality" of the African States from the angle of their unnatural borders alone. "What is more pertinent here to note," he says,

"is that during the colonial period social distances between different ethnic or tribal groups increased not because the rulers wanted so but because of the different levels of acculturation of these groups with the Western mode of economic production. Owing to the concentration of European commerce and industry in the coastal areas, the inhabitants of these parts had greater access to European education and skills than had the people in the interior regions."

The concentration of modern activities in urban areas widened the distance between peoples living in towns and those living in the countryside. However, the imbalances created by the colonial impact on the African continent began to surface only at the time of its decolo-

nisation. With the transfer of power, Africa's new rulers inherited an administrative machinery which had the following characteristics—a centralised executive, an overconcentration in the capital and a highly bureaucratised provincial and district administration and a small force of armed constabulary or soldiers.

This paradox of disparity in the African syndrome has been dealt with at some length by the author in the first book. Referring in this connection to the problem of integration in Africa, Dr Gupta draws a parallel with India but sees an essential difference between the two. He says: "In India there are a great number of cultural, linguistic, religious and caste groups which have not—and the experience after independence has not given any indication to think otherwise—become sufficiently integrated to make a national society. Nonetheless what is important in this connection is that, over a period of time, through the spread of culture, religion and unified political system, Indians have by and large come to share a dual personality. That is to say,

when an Indian meets another Indian he tries to identify himself in reference to the group to which he belongs and, also, as an Indian. A Brahmin for, instance, may take pride in the origin of his caste, but he is also aware of his existence as an Indian. Similarly, a Bengali of north-eastern India may be most fanatical about the superiority of his language and literature, but his fanaticism takes meaning only in relation to his other self as an Indian. It is the absence of this duality in the African personality that gives rise to an altogether different set of problems. For, even there may be social intercourse between different groups within national boundary, it takes place essentially in terms of one group *as a whole* in relation to another group *as a whole*. In other words, they do not seem to share a consciousness in common."

In addition to discussing the problems of independence (Chapter Two), Dr Gupta has devoted separate chapters to the discussion of the institutional order, one-party regimes in action and the role of the military in the new States.

In less than a decade since independence, says the author,

the various constitutional arrangements bequeathed by the colonial rulers to their successors have undergone such vast and frequent changes as to make them largely unrecognisable. Institutions such as executive and legislative bodies, organised parties and associations, judiciary and local bodies are there but the manner of their functioning has little relevance to the conception we have of them in free democratic countries.

There is a tendency towards executive supremacy which is being reinforced by an equally strong tendency towards the consolidation of one-party dominance in politics. Indeed, says the author, the two tendencies have become so inextricably mixed that it would be difficult to say which caused or preceded the other. The opposition parties in most African States have been banned or otherwise made ineffective thereby giving the party in power complete monopoly over the state machinery.

The formal powers of the President, where the Presidential system is in vogue, are formidable but the informal powers he exercises can neither

be enumerated nor defined. It is he who lends legitimacy to the political system and makes it a going concern. As such the personalized aspect of the system cannot be exaggerated. Nevertheless, he functions under several constraints which may derive their origins from the peculiar socio-economic and political conditions of each country.

Discussing the role of the military in African politics, the author points to the rash of coups that overtook the continent from the middle of 1965. In rapid succession seventeen civilian regimes fell victim to *coups d'etat*, and of these eight fell within less than twelve months starting from September 1965. This shows that in the post-1965 period, the African armies have become politically important—indeed decisive—in a large number of States. It is, however, difficult to see any uniform pattern in the behaviour of the military. Sometimes, as in Ghana, the army struck in order to put out of existence an arbitrary and corrupt regime. At other times, it simply stepped in because there was a political vacuum which the politicians failed to

fill. No generalisation of this aspect of the African scene is possible.

Summarising the discussion, Dr Gupta comes to the conclusion that what the African States face is acute scarcity of national resources, administrative structure and trained personnel. Nonformation of an educated elite has accounted for extreme paucity of personnel resources which is by and large at the base of other scarcities. The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that whereas the States assumed, after independence, new roles to promote national integration, build a viable economy and reconstruct society, they failed to invent an apparatus and train skills to accomplish the minimum task of routine administration.

The author, towards the end of his study, raises a fundamental question: what can the Africans really achieve? He answers it by posing another question; how can they match their political aspirations with capabilities? In other words, they must strike a balance between their aims and resources.

Dr Gupta takes care to avoid stereotypes in his

analysis. He also rejects "short-term models" of the behavioural school in favour of an integrated historical approach. This has invested his arguments with a freshness and originality rarely found in such works. Besides, he does not aim to formulate a general theory but confines himself to examining some of the influential concepts that have become current in the study of African politics. The book is a scholarly work bound to interest all those who are interested in Africa and its development. It is of particular interest to post-graduate students studying international affairs, especially the course of events in Africa.

Reporting Africa is an extremely fascinating account of the author's travels in Africa in 1965-66 and 1968, his interviews and discussions with African politicians, economists and scholars. It also contains Dr Gupta's critical assessment of the African scene as based on the speeches and policy declarations of leaders whom he could not meet, such as Jomo Kenyatta, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere. Besides discussing in some

detail the situation in the UAR, Tanzania, Kenya, Rhodesia and Zambia, the author has surveyed the African situation in its totality in his 40-page introduction. There are, however, some obvious contradictions in his views. For example, at one place he says, "the phase of political restructuring of Africa seemed to be nearly over. "This he follows by declaring, only a couple of paragraphs later that "the struggle for independence and racial equality has not come to an end in Africa: indeed, one may say that the actual and perhaps the more decisive battle has yet to be waged."

What is more disappointing, from India's point of interest, in this 340-page volume is the inadequate manner in which the Indo-African relationship has been discussed. There is no denying the fact that the question of the Indian settlers is one of the most irksome issues

so far as this country is concerned even though some States in Africa have almost "solved" it by throwing out the helpless "outsiders". For this Dr. Gupta has roundly blamed the policies of the Government of India and the alleged incompetence of its diplomatic missions in Africa.

But for these shortcomings, Dr Gupta's book is a valuable addition to the growing literature on Africa. It is a mine of information packed as it is with relevant documents and detailed references to source material.

Taken together, the two books give the impression that a brighter future awaits Africa and its seeds "lie hidden in the womb of the present turmoil." The Africans, however, will have to make tremendous efforts before they are able to draw level with the Westerners, says Dr. Gupta.

K.N. Sud

Land-Locked Countries of Africa: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala 1973, ps. 369. Sweden.

Of the 28 land-locked countries in the world, 14 are in Africa. (P. 17) "15 out of a total of 28 land-locked countries are also among the 25 hard core least developed countries" according to UNCTAD index. This underlines the importance of land-locked countries in the world in general and in Africa in particular. And yet, the relation between "land-locked ness" and economic underdevelopment seems to merit discussion. Are the land-locked countries underdeveloped because of geography? Are other countries more developed than land-locked countries? It is unquestionable that a majority of the land-locked countries are underdeveloped but it is the casual relationship that is obscure. If the land-locked countries in Europe like Switzerland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia are remembered, it is seen that they are by no means underdeveloped, even in the context of Europe. In fact, it should be said that Switzerland and Austria are

more developed than several other European countries like Portugal or Spain or Turkey and it is common knowledge that Czechoslovakia is one of the most advanced in the East European block.

The initiative taken by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in convening a seminar in September 1972 on the African land-locked countries is commendable. Besides discussions on the problems of land-locked countries in the forums of the UNCTAD, any such non-governmental initiative is to be welcomed as a valuable supplement to an inter-Governmental initiative such as the one represented by efforts of agencies like the UNCTAD. Moreover, the convening of the seminar and the publication of the seminar papers is an indication of the newly growing interest of the Scandinavian countries in the problems of Africa.

The compilation is edited by Cervenka who is the Research Director of Scandinavian Institute of African

Studies at Uppsala, Sweden, and who prefaces the compilation with an over-view of the "limitations imposed on African land-locked countries" and concludes by an interesting and instructive summing up of the results of the deliberations by emphasising "the need for a continental approach to the problems of African land-locked states".

Cervenka outlines certain principles that should be embodied in a continental convention covering issues of transit, trade routes and access to the sea. These principles are also of interest to other continents like Europe or Asia or Latin America.

Can we measure, in a quantitative or semi-quantitative manner, the extent of "land-lockedness"?

Evolving certain parameters, classified into political economic and geographic indicators, Douglas Anglin comes to some interesting conclusions, such as

- (i) "Zambia alone is 'double land-locked',
- (ii) "Botswana emerges as the most land-locked state and Rhodesia as the least",
- (iii) "variations among

southern African countries in the extent to which they are land-locked is not great",

- (iv) "rank congruency is low; Zambia is less land-locked politically than it is economically or geographically, while Swaziland is the opposite",
- (v) "the bargaining power of the coastal countries is invariably great and often decisive, but it is rarely absolute. Even in a hegemonic relationship a client state may have some scope for manoeuvre". (P. 117).

'Landlockedness' immediately brings out the importance of transit routes for the concerned states. While the problems of road and air traffic have been dealt with in the seminar, railways and inland water transport problems do not seem to have received adequate attention.

The most recent spectacular development in the field of African transportation network is the construction of the Tanzam Railway which opens out a completely new prospect for Tanzania (a transit state) and Zambia (a land-locked state) and, in fact,

Book Review

Botswana (also a land-locked state) because of its geographical continuity with Zambia (notwithstanding South Africa's protest on this score). In a stimulating analysis of the implications of the Tanzam Railway, firstly as a challenge to the white south, secondly as opening out new development prospects for Tanzania and Zambia and, thirdly, as an aid to liberation and African Unity, Lionel Cliff rightly points out that "the problems of land-locked countries are inseparable from the cause of Pan-Africanism. Political and economic freedom are pre-requisites for the solution of this and any other development problem". (P. 298). This almost sounds prophetic particularly judged in today's context of the impending liberation of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism, a new mention which changes the geo-politics of the land-locked countries of black Southern Africa.

Helge Hveem is the only one who points out that there are certain advantages of being land-locked, whereas other contributors refer to it as a sort of unfortunate but

inevitable handicap. For instance, Hveem points out that "the land-locked states on the whole seem to be a little less dependent on the over-seas countries than are the coastal states" (P. 282), "do not seem to be poorer or less developed than the coastal states" (P. 283) and, in fact, "for geo-political reasons land-locked communities are in a particularly advantageous position to initiate horizontal, inter-African trade relations". (P. 283).

While Colin Legum reviews the confrontation between independent Africa on the one hand and the minority regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal on the other, there are separate and more detailed analysis of the political, economic and other factors in the individual countries like Rhodesia, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland.

As far as South Africa is concerned, Larry Bowman rightly points out that "the presence of foreign labour interested only in earning income for a definite period of time inhibits the development of political and economic consciousness among workers •

in South African industry. In the labour-exporting countries, patterns of dependency are established that deter development of African solidarity"... "Being land-locked is a contributory factor, but the overriding cause is underdevelopment, and this is brought about by many factors". (P. 234).

It is interesting to note that according to Larry Bowman "it has been easier for Rhodesia to succeed with U.D.I. because it is land-locked than if it had not been. For instance, if Rhodesia had its own ports, the United Nations could have effectively monitored the movement of Rhodesian goods." (P. 186).

Arne Ström makes suggestions for reducing the economic dependency of Lesotho on South Africa by

- (i) increasing efforts to supply goods and services to the local market from local sources and to use indigenous materials;
- (ii) reducing efforts to export to the world market; and
- (iii) import substitution supplying the necessary motivation for the introduction of new techno-

logy appropriate to the country's need and resources. (P. 259).

The suggestions of Arne Ström are comparable to Gandhian prescriptions in the Indian context in the pre-independence days of the Swadeshi movement, boycott of foreign goods, emphasis on Charkha, etc., as an economic antidote to colonial exploitation.

The position of Uganda as a land-locked country assumes a different character, in view of Uganda's membership of the sub-regional grouping called the East African Community in terms of which this "pearl of Africa" owns the harbour installations and flies a flag over some merchant vessels on the East African coast of the Indian Ocean. In a thought provoking treatise on the transit problems of Uganda, Yash Tandon makes a reference to recent action of Uganda in stopping transit of goods through its own territory to Rwanda, because of certain recent political developments.

Both Pierre Alexandre and Louis Sabourin cover in a lucid and sharp manner the problems of the land locked countries "d'expression fran-

caise", the former particularly dealing with the problems of Mali, Upper Volta and Niger, and the latter with these three besides four others namely the Central African Republic, Chad, Rwanda and Burundi. Pierre Alexandre draws attention to an interesting specific feature distinctive to the west African geographical context in that 'the lack of direct access to the sea...does not enable...coastal states, to dictate their will to inland countries, since, due to the size and the geographic locations of the former colonies, there is always the possibility.. of finding another more or less devious route to the sea (a situation wholly different from that in South Africa)". (P. 145).

Louis Sabourin notes with interest that 'the main pre-occupation of those (in French west Africa) who conceived the existing system was to furnish these countries with access to the sea that was independent of the English speaking countries surrounding some of them". (P. 153).

The international attention to the problems of land-locked countries and the role of UNCTAD in this sphere have

been outlined by Robert McKinnell. It is surprising that McKinnell should have listed Sikkim as one of the independent, land-locked and least developed countries in his tabulation on Page-310. Even before Sikkim recently became an associate state of the Indian Union, it was never an independent and sovereign country.

It is obvious that while various aspects connected with the political and economic problems of the land-locked countries of Southern Africa like Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have received concentrated attention in the seminar, there seem to be a number of other countries like the Central African Republic, Chad, Rwanda, or Burundi which could have received greater coverage. This is, perhaps, inevitable in a context in which the problems of Southern Africa involving racial conflict and confrontation overwhelm and dominate the problems of the entire continent of Africa. The statement that "to be black and land-locked in Southern Africa is a lonely and expensive experience" is, indeed, a misleading summary of the

prevailing situation.

The value of the compilation would have been enhanced if, besides the papers contributed to the seminar were also included a broad indication of the sections into which the problems of the land-locked countries of Africa was divided in the seminar and a gist of the discussions under each section.

In spite of a very careful editing and high quality printing, it is surprising that there should be a number of printing mistakes; as for instance, "South Africa's military budget rose from \$ 472 million in 1972 to \$ 360 millions in 1973"! as on p. 28 or "Kigali in Uganda" on page 322 when, in fact, Kigali is the capital of Rwanda!

K.V. KRISHNAMURTY

Joel Samoff: *Tanzania: Local Politics and the Structure of Power*: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974, pp. 283.

Tanzanian experiment in nation-building has attracted world wide attention of scholars and statesmen. And one of the basic problem stated by President Nyerere about the Tanzanian path of development was of "building socialism where much of the leadership is not socialist." The most important political instrument of building socialism in Tanzania is the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party about which much has been written. TANU would remain the focus of attention of scholars for quite sometime.

One myth created by the western scholars that the 'one party systems' are monolith in character is disproved by the present study. Samoff's study definitely shows that the decisions taken at the top, get diffused in the process of filtering down. TANU accommodates many factions which are in the process of competition and struggle for power.

This study which has been conducted at the micro level of local party politics of Moshi throws many important facts about the political life of Tanzania. Some of the

important findings of the Author deserve to be highlighted.

(i) "The search for what the party does in Moshi has made it abundantly clear that for a wide range of political outcomes the direct role of the local TANU organization is very modest indeed."

(ii) "Party cadres spend a good part of their time securing for individual and for groups the specific allocations which they are interested. For some, it is jobs; for others, medical care and education, for still others, licenses and assistance in business."

(iii) "the local party organization clearly reflects an anticenter orientation."

(iv) In fact, it was found that Moshi was historically a focus of opposition to central control in Tanganyika, and that the widespread support for TANU notwithstanding, several factors seem to be forging an alliance among opponents to central direction."

(v) "It should be stressed, that TANU in Tanzania is best described as a national assembly, bringing together a number of locally

based party organizations. TANU at the Centre cannot exercise clear and direct control over its local units in matters about which both the centre and local unit care a great deal. In practice, the centre cannot really order, nor can the local units directly refuse, and neither can disregard the constraints on the other, but there is a filtering process that often distorts what passes between them."

All the above findings clearly show that in Tanzania the political system is still in the making, and TANU forms the umbrella under which much local conflict takes place. As the author states :

"The picture of the local party organization in Moshi that emerges from the discussion thus far is one of Congeries of formal interest groups and informal alliances, a set of relatively fluid networks in which different elements prevail in different circumstances."

To make TANU a more cohesive instrument of social change, a leadership code alongwith Arusha Declaration were expected to vitalise the party. The emphasis of

'leadership Code' was to make the activists of the party more dedicated in the tasks of nation-building. A pertinent question is : What was the impact of the leadership Code ? The findings of the author are that the impact was of a mixed character. He writes :

"The impact of the leadership code seems to have been slow but steady in Kilimanjaro. Leaders diverted themselves of prohibited sources of income only when it became clear, in some cases not until more than two years after the announcement of the Arusha Declaration, that they would lose their leadership positions if they did not. Some Kilimanjaro leaders, like several prominent national figures, ultimately resigned rather than comply."

He further observes :

"But while the leadership code may thus far have had some success in limiting leader's incomes, leaders have been able to ensure access to education

to their children, thus guaranteeing that they too will be in a favoured position in Tanzania, where education remains the major key to advancement."

The above findings show the serious difficulties the Third World is facing in achieving its goals. The newly created institutes cannot be made to work in the same direction as desired by the national leadership. The functioning of political institutions is subject to the various social forces which are entrenched in power. The Third World has to combine social transformation with economic development, and the political leadership has to show the capacity for innovativeness and responsiveness. How do they face this challenge would determine the future of the Third World.

This study is quite sympathetic to the problems faced by Tanzania in the process of nation-building. A comprehensive bibliography had added value to the book.

C.P. BHAMBHRI

Pakeeza Sultan

Africa Through Indian Eyes

A Documentation List
(January-June 1975)

AFRICA THROUGH INDIAN EYES is a Documentation based on coverage of Africa in Indian newspapers and periodicals. It is arranged in a classified order. However, subject headings are broad and are in alphabetical sequence. Under each subject heading entries are listed alphabetically under the name of author or title and for each entry reference is made to the publication (name of publication is in italics) in an abbreviated form including its volume, number, date of issue and the page on which the article appears. Abbreviations employed for the name of publications are given in the end. The matter in brackets has been provided in order to make captions more clearly understood. Annotations have also been given to the articles and editorials wherever found necessary.

AFRICA : GENERAL

AGRICULTURE

1. Shanti, S. A. Africa's food problem. *In. Ex.*, 22 June x :6.

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

2. Ayoade, John A. Wage politics in Africa : A theoretical methodology guide. *Afr. Quarterly.*, 13 (3 & 4), Oct: 1973-Apr. 1974 : 31-45.
3. Bhattacharya, R. Trade barriers & the developing countries. *E. St.*, 14 (10), Apr : 473-75.
4. Hall, Richard. World's oil hunt. *E. T.*, 1 May : 5.
5. Mutalik-Desai, Priya. Industrialization of Africa. *E. T.*, 7 Feb : 5.
6. Perlo, Victor. Raw materials, people, and the third world. *So. World*, 2 (21), 1 Apr : 21-22.

CONFERENCES

Bandung Conferences

7. Historic Conference of Bandung and its importance today. *F. Af. B.*, 15 (12), 23 Apr: 85-86.

8. Principles of solidarity and co-operation: 20th anniversary Bandung Conference. *So. World*, 2 (8), 1 May : 3-5.
- : **Commonwealth Conference, Kingston, Jamaica :**
9. Commonwealth (Conference of commonwealth Prime Ministers in Jamaica). *Patriot*, 29 Apr : 2.
10. Commonwealth: What future ? *Thought*, 17 (18), 3 May : 3.
11. Commonwealth Summit concord at Kingston (To condemn the illegal white regime of Rhodesia and the racist government of South Africa). *In. & F. Review*, 12 (15), 15 May : 10.
12. Gandhi, Indira. Speech after the return from the conference, May 4. *In. & F. Review*, 12 (15), 15 May : 5-7.
13. Gandhi, Indira. Speech at the opening of the conference, Kingston, Apr. 29, 1975. *In. & F. Review*, 12 (15), 15 May : 7-8.
14. Henderson, Michael. Translating concern into actions, commonwealth meeting. *Himmat*, 11 (27), 2 Feb : 11.
15. Nyereres ultimatum (To the white minority regime in Salisbury to solve Rhodesian problem). *In. Ex.*, 3 May : 6. Editorial.
16. Parsuram, T. V. C'wealth head way on economic racial fronts Tighter screw on Rhodesia. *In. Ex.*, 4 May : 1.
17. Parsuram, T. V. The calypso society. *In. Ex.*, 12 May : 6.
18. Sagar, Eswar. Commonwealth step up pressure for change in Rhodesia. *Hindu*, 7 May : 1.
19. Smith under fire (The commonwealth conference in Kingston reflected the growing awareness and determination of the African people and deep sympathy with their case). *Patriot*, 3 May : 2.
20. United action on Rhodesia : Commonwealth conference. *Himmat*, 11 (28), 9 May : 7.
21. Welcome consensus. *T. Ind.*, 8 May : 4.
- Non-alignment**
22. Chavan, Y. B. Non-alignment and Indian Ocean, *So. Ind.*, 10 (22). 3 May : 11.

23. Chavan, Y. B. Statement concerning arms induction into Indian Ocean, given at the Non-aligned bureau meet, Hawana, Mar. 18. *In. & F. Review*, 12 (12), 1 Apr : 5-6.
24. Impact of Nonalignment on world events. *In. & F. Review*, 10 (22), 3 May : 11.
25. Need to strengthen nonaligned camp : Yugoslav delegate's speech at 10th congress: *New Age*, 16 Feb : 14.
26. Nonaligned meeting at Havana. *In. & F. Review*, 12 (13), 15 Apr : 24.

Organization of African Unity

27. Akinyemi, A. B., Organization of African unity—The practice of the recognition of government. *In. J. P. Sc.*, 36 (1), Jan-Mar: 63-79.
28. Akinyemi, A. B. The organization of African unity—perception Neo-colonialism. *Afr. Quarterly*, 14 (1 & 2), Apr-June and July-Sept. 1974 : 32-52.
29. Nyerere, Julius K. Speech at the opening of the special session, Dar-es-Salaam, Apr. 4. *So. Ind.*, 10 (22), 3 May : 30-31.
30. OAU concern (The 24th ordinary session of the OAU). *Link*. 17 (29), 2 Mar : 28-29.
31. Pande, N. K., O. A. U. delegation in India (A high power delegation of liberation committee of the OAU five day visit to India led by the Tanzanian foreign minister). *So. Ind.*, 10 (18), 5 Apr : 32.
32. Striving for unity (Delegation's visit to India). *Link*. 17 (33), 30 Mar : 30.

CULTURE & CIVILIZATION

33. Dikshit, Om and Henry, J.T. Colonialism and social change and cultural conflicts in Africa. *Afr. Quarterly*, 13 (3&4), Oct-Dec. 1973 and Jan-Mar. 1974: 5-12.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

34. Africa : From political freedom to economic growth. *Century*, 5 Apr: 1.
35. Das Gupta, Jagdish. Some aspects of the economic prob-

- lems of the 'Third World'. *So. Perspective*, 2 (3), Dec. 1974: 1-15.
36. Howe, Russell Warren. Outlook for Africa: Acquiring a new importance. *Statesman*, 19 Jan: 4.
37. Multinational monopolies in the Third World. *Century*, 12 (44), 8 Mar: 3.
38. Multinational monopolies in the Third World (About one-third of the total foreign investments of these corporations goes to the developing nations). *So. Ind.*, 6 Feb: 5.
39. Mutalik Desai, Priya. Africa : Problem of development. *E.T.*, 6 Feb : 5.

ECONOMIC POLICY

40. Alavey, Enrid. Developing countries : New researches, regional planning. *S. Scientist*, 5 (4) (18), 1974: 155-164.
41. Ijomaah, B.I.C. Foreign aid and its impact on the developing countries-A Nigerian view. *Afr. Quarterly*, 13 (3&4), Oct-Dec. 1973 & Jan-March 1974 : 13-30.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

EEC

42. EEC-ACP accord a catalogue of good intentions? (Africa's new trade and aid agreement with EEC). *E.T.*, 21 Feb: 10.

INDIA

43. India's joint venture abroad. *IATJ.*, Jan-Mar: 46-47.
44. Indian know-how welcome in Africa. *Patriot*, 13 Apr: 2.
45. Kalotikar, B. A design for co-development (The year 1975 begins with economic co-operation agreement). *De: World*, 9 Feb: 4-7.
46. Trade trends with African continent. *IATJ.*, Jan-Mar: 44-45.

Middle East

47. Africa and the Middle East. *IATJ.*, Jan-Mar: 57-65.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Asia

48. Gathani, Batuk, More U.K. vouchers for Asians from Africa. *Hindu*, 9 Feb: 6.

India

49. Extend Victory in Portugal to Africa (Communist party of India's hearty congratulations to the Africans for their liberation movement). *New Age*, 16 Feb: 13.
50. Indo-Tanzanian support for African liberation movements call for preservation of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. *In. & F. Review*, 12 (17), 15 June: 6.
51. Rao, M.S. Nagarajan. Ancient links between India and Africa. *In. Ex.*, 5 Jan: 7.

Israel

52. Sankari, Farouk A. The lost and gains of Israeli influence in Africa. *Afr. Quarterly*, 14 (1 & 2), Apr-June & July-Sept. 1974, 5-19.

Portugal

53. Cunhal, Alvaro. Portugal's new road (Introduction of basic freedom and an end put to the tyranny and colonial war). *Mainstream*, 13 (27), 8 Mar: 27-29.
54. Portugal the ideals fade. *Himmat*, 11 (21), 21 Mar: 10.
55. Rajdoot. Lisbon sees the writing on the wall. (The collapse of the Portuguese power that began with the liberation of Goa). *Organiser*, 18 Jan: 5.

United Kingdom

56. Hope of dawn in Africa (British foreign and commonwealth secretary of Africa). *Thought*, 27 (3), 18 Jan: 5.

United States

57. Subversion U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of other countries). *Patriot*, 27 Feb: 2.

FREEDOM & AFTER

58. Singh, J.D. Wind of change in Africa: End of colonial era. *T. Ind.*, 24 June: 4.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

59. Always something new from Africa (Comments). *Himmat*, 11 (25) 18 Apr: 3.
60. Gathani, Batuk. Division among black African leaders. *Hindu*, 19 June: 5.

61. Gathani, Batuk. Ominous clouds over East and Central Africa. *Hindu*, 5 Mar: 6.

Change of Government

62. African coups. *Hind. T.*, 4 May: 5.
63. Armed forces role. *Link*, 17 (38), 4 May: 29.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

64. Africa: Fighting for complete independence. *Century*, 12 (46), 22 Mar: 3.
65. Alva, Joachim. Liberators of Africa. *E.T.*, 2 Feb: 7.
66. Moolla, M. Africa 1975. *Mainstream*, 13 (43), 28 June: 18-19.
67. Moolla, M. Towards total African liberation. *Mainstream*, 13 (21&22), 71-72.
68. Rybakov, Vesvolol. New type of national liberation resolution (Soviet outlook for the liberation movements). *Mainstream*, 13 (23), 8 Feb: 31-34.

LITERATURE

69. Asein, Samuel Omo. Christian moralism and Apartheid: Patons 'Cry the Beloved Country' reassessed. *Afr. Quarterly*, 14 (1&2), Apr-June & July-Sept: 1974: 53-63.

POPULATION

70. Moraes, Dom. Third World viewpoint (population problem). *IICQ*, 2(2), 111-118.

PRESS

71. A common voice for African journalist. *Century*, 12, (36) 11 Jan: 5.

PROBLEM OF RACE

72. Hope of dawn in Africa. *Thought*, 27 (3), 18 Jan; 5.

SOCIALISM

73. Habibullah, E. People of third world need to think (Third World) should unite for future prosperity and also should take up the poor man's burden). *Mainstream*, 13 (20), 18 Jan: 9-10 & 30.
74. Okuneva, M. Bourgeois society and working class in

developing countries (Class development and class struggle in the third world countries). *Mainstream*, 13 (18), 4 Jan: 21-25.

75. Rajimwale, Anil. The ideology of revolutionary democracy in countries of socialist orientation. *In. Left Review*, 3 (9), May: 27-31.

WOMEN

76. Bangura, Bassie G. Women in the liberation struggle in Africa. *So. Ind.*, 2 (11) (26), 15 June: 23.

ALGERIA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

77. A non-event in Algiers (OPEC summit in Algeria). *Statesman*, 10 Mar: 6.
78. Algeria banks on natural gas. *T. Ind.*, 13 May: 8.
79. Algeria preparing for take-over. *E.T.*, 2 May: 8.
80. Algeria's golden energy. *Hindu*, 27 May: 6.
81. More than a man's job. (Algerian oil export). *De. World*. 15 June: 7-8.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

82. India-Algeria. Lessons of Algerian experiment: Speech by socialist vanguard party's representative. *New Age*, 16 Feb: 16.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

83. Howe, Russel Warren. The crisis in Algeria: Mismanagement and misfortune. *Statesman*, 30 May: 4.

SOCIALISM

84. Algerian links (After independence Algerian reforms in agriculture and education). *Hind. T.*, 19 Feb: 7.
85. Lessons of Algerian experiment. *New Age*, 16 Feb: 6

ANGOLA

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

86. Gandhi, Arun. Angolan politics and prospects. *In. Ex.*, 3 May: 6.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

87. Angola revolutions-and others. *E. & P. Weekly*, 10(18), 3 May: 723-724.
88. Angola : Tribal-war or proxybattle field? *Himmat*, 11(38), 30 May: 7.
89. Angola accord (Agreement between Portugal and Angolan liberation fronts for the total liberation of Angola). *Hind T.*, 20 Jan: 2.
90. Angola in fighting *Hind T.*, 2 Apr: 5.
91. Angolan rivalries. *T. Ind.*, 4 Apr: 4.
92. Das Gupta, Punyapriya. The crisis in Angola. *In. Ex.*, 21 May: 4.
93. Encouraging (The danger of a civil strife in Angola) *T. Ind.*, 24 June : 4.

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

ADMINISTRATION

94. Sastry, K.K. "One man one job" ruled in flouted Egypt with impunity. *T. Ind.*, 28 Jan: 4.

DEFENCE & SECURITY

95. Nair, V.M. Sadat's move to reduce dependence on Moscow. (Egypt, France arms deal). *Statesman*, 1 Feb: 6.
96. Sadat's dilemma (Sadat's conformation that he has failed to get arms). *Hind T.*, 16 May: 5.
97. Sadat's military tightrope. *E.T.*, 26. Jan: 8.
98. Sadat's time table (Egypt-France arms deal) *Hind T.*, 30 June: 1.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

99. Damning the dam (The construction of Aswana High Dam). *Hind T.*, 19 Jan: 5.
100. India, Embassy (Arab Republic of Egypt). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Sept-Oct. 1974. *In. Trade J.*, 22 Jan: B1 45-55.

Issued by the Second Secretary.

101. India, embassy (Arab Republic of Egypt). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Nov. 1974. *In. Trade J.*, Feb: B 629-30.
102. Sadat's Suez gamble (If succeeded will bring peace and prosperity in the Middle East). *Himmat*, 11(32), 6June: 8.

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

103. Subharawal, Satender Mohan. India's participation in Egypt's national reconstruction plan. *In. Exporter*, Mar: 11-12.

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

India

104. Chavans's Arab round (Mr. Chavan's visit to Egypt and other countries). *Hind T.*, 31 May: 5.
105. India and Egypt to cover new areas of collaboration: Mr. Y.B. Chavan's visit to Egypt. *In. & F. Review*, 12(1), 15 June: 6-7.
106. Indo-Egyptian ties (Mr. Chavan's forthcoming visit to Cairo). *T. Ind.*, 11 Apr.: 4.
107. Mr. Y.B. Chavan's visit to Egypt and Syria (Comments). *Ind. & F. Review*, 12(17), 15 June: 8.
108. Singh, I.J. Bahadur. New directions for Indo-Egyptian Relations. *In. & F. Review*, 12(15), 15 May: 19-20.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

109. Conner, William. Sadat look to the future. *Himmat*, 11(35), 27 June: 11.

CHAD

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Change of Government

110. Coup in Chad, *Hind T.*, 15 Apr: 5.

SLAVE TRADE

111. A country where slave trade still continues. *Hindu*. 28 Apr. 6.

CONGO

SOCIALISM

112. Ngouabi, Marien. Congo: Problems views and experiences, (Scientific socialism in Africa). *Prob. Peace and Soc.* 3(5), May: 140-149.

DAHOMEY

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

GDR

113. Friendly relations strengthened with Republic of Dahomey (The personal envoy of the president of Dahomey, minister of foreign affairs with other members of NRC of Dahomey paid an official visit to the GDR from 4 to 8 Apr. 1975). *F. Af. B.*, 15(12), 23 Apr: 90.

EAST AFRICA

EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

114. Ramchandani, R.R. East African community relations. *Ind. Quarterly*, 31(1), Jan-Mar: 74-81.
115. Shanti S.A. Realignment in East Africa.

ETHIOPIA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

116. Ethiopia's development plan. *Hind T.*, 22 Mar: 5.
117. India, Embassy (Ethiopia). Report on Economic and commercial conditions, Dec. 1974-Feb. 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (10), 4 June: B501-503.
118. India, Embassy (Ethiopia). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Aug-Nov. 1974. *In. Trade J.*, 22 Jan: B55-56.

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

Sudan

119. Nimery's mediation (In Ethiopian civil war). *In. Ex*, 30 May: 4.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Change of Government

120. Army rule in Ethiopia. *Hindu*, 5 Feb: 5.

121. Critical days for Ethiopia's young rulers. *Himmat*, 11(24), 11 Apr: 10.
122. Democratic Movement in Ethiopia. *So. World*, 2(107), 1 June: 16-18.
123. Battle for the Red Sea (Secessionist movement in Eritrea should be suppressed since the province's 544 mile coast line represent Ethiopia's only outlet to the Red Sea). *Statesman*, 5 Feb: 4.
124. Call for Ethiopian cease fire. *Himmat*, 11(16), 14 Feb: 10.
125. Civil war in Ethiopia. *In. Ex.*, 2 Feb: 6.
126. Das Gupta, Punyapriya. The Eritrean problem. *In. Ex.*, 12 Feb: 4.
127. Eritrea peace making is urgent business. *Himmat*, 11(18), 28 Feb: 3.
128. Eritrean revolt. *Hind T.*, 4 Feb: 5.
129. Eritrean revolt (Military rulers in Addis Ababa face a grave crisis in Eritrea). *In. Ex.*, 5 Feb: 4.
130. Ethiopia's Eritrean Dilemma. *Hind T.*, 8 Feb: 5.
131. How to lose a province (Fight for the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia). *De. World*, 16 Feb: 2.
132. Padgaonkar, Dileep. Eritrea bent on breaking away by civil war likely. *T. Ind.*, 28 Feb: 4.
133. Problem for the OAU (42 Members of OAU in Addis Ababa to discuss problem). *Hindu*, 21 Feb: 6.
134. The Eritrean issue. *T.Ind.*, 7 Feb: 4.
135. War threat in Eritrea. *E. T.* 8 Jan: 8.

LAND REFORMS

136. Fruits of feudalism (Ethiopian land reform). *E. T.*, 23 Jan: 8.
137. Land reform in Ethiopia. *Hind T.*, 3 May: 5.
138. Rift in Addis Ababa (Radical land reforms under military rulers). *In. Ex.*, 10 May: 6.

SOCIALISM

139. Ethiopia's socialist crusaders, *Hind T.*, 4 Jan: 5.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

GENERAL

140. Equatorial Guinea. *Hindu*, 3 Mar: 6.

GABON

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

141. India and Gabon. Communique, New Delhi Oct. 5, 1974. *F. Af. Record*, 20(10), Oct: 267-269.

GHANA

AGRICULTURE

142. Shanti S.A. Operation 'Feed yourself' programme of Ghana. *In. Ex.*, 16 Feb: 4.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

143. India, High Commission (Ghana). Report on economic and commercial conditions of Ghana & Sierra Leone Nov-Dec. 1974. *In. Trade J.*, 12 Feb: B284-85.
144. India, High Commission (Ghana). Report on economic and commercial conditions of Ghana & Liberia, Jan. 1975. *In Trade J.*, 272(3), 16 Apr: B101-3.
145. India, High Commission (Ghana). Report on economic and commercial conditions. Feb. 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 272(9), 28 May: B 453.
146. India, High Commission (Ghana). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Mar. 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (11), 11 June: B545.
147. India, High Commission (Ghana). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Apr. 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273(13), 22 June: B 655-59.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

148. Adverse trade balance with India worries Ghana (Stronger trade ties between India and Ghana). *Fin. Ex.*, 29 Mar: 4.

GUINEA BISSAU

INDEPENDENCE & AFTER

149. Shanti, S.A. Guinea Bissau on the March Guinea Bissau is the first Portuguese territory to attain independence). *In Ex.*, 11 Apr: 4.

INDIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

- Africa-General *see* entry No. 43-46.
Arab Republic of Egypt *see* entry No. 103.
Gabon *see* entry No. 141.
Ghana *see* entry No. 148.
Libya *see* entry No. 180.
Mauritius *see* entry No. 187-190.
Nigeria *see* entry No. 215-218.
North Africa *see* entry No. 232.
Zambia *see* entry No. 347.

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- Asia *see* entry No. 49-51.
Algeria *see* entry No. 82.
Arab Republic of Egypt *see* entry No. 104-108.
Mauritius *see* entry No. 191-195.
Rhodesia *see* entry No. 270.
Senegal *see* entry No. 297.
South Africa *see* entry No. 309.
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APARTHEID

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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India

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India

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Gandhi Marg	Q	New Delhi
Gandhi Sanghralaya	Q	New Delhi
Gandhian Thought	Q	Ahmedabad
Himmat	W	Bombay
Hindu	D	Madras
Hindustan Times	D	New Delhi
India International Centre Quarterly	Q	New Delhi
India Quarterly	Q	New Delhi
Indian Archives	Q	New Delhi
Indian Economic Review	S-A	Delhi
Indian Economic & Social History Review		New Delhi
Indian Express	D	New Delhi
Indian Exporter	M	Bombay
Indian Finance	W	Calcutta
Indian Horizon	Q	New Delhi
Indian Journal of Commerce	Q	Patna
Indian Journal of Industrial Relations	Q	New Delhi
Indian Journal of International Law	Q	New Delhi
Indian Journal of Political Science	Q	Delhi
Indian Journal of Politics	S-A	Aligarh
Indian Journal of Public Administration	Q	New Delhi
Indian Journal of Social Work	Q	Bombay
Indian Labour Journal	M	New Delhi
Indian Left Review	M	New Delhi
Indian Political Science Review	H-Y	Delhi
Indian Recorder & Digest	M	New Delhi
Indian Trade Journal	W	Calcutta
Indian & Foreign Review	F	New Delhi
Indo-African Trade Journal	M	New Delhi
Indo-British Review	Q	Madras
Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal	Q	New Delhi
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International Studies	Q	New Delhi
Islam and the Modern Age	Q	New Delhi
Islamic Culture	Q	Hyderabad
Janata	W	Bombay
Journal of Asiatic Society	Y	Calcutta
Journal of Gandhian Studies	Q	Allahabad
Journal of Industry and Trade	M	New Delhi
Journal of Oriental Research	Q	Madras
Journal of Parliamentary Information	Q	New Delhi
Journal of the Constitutional & Parlia- mentary Studies	Q	New Delhi

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Journal of the National Academy of Administration	Q	Mussorie
Journal of the Oriental Studies		Baroda
Journal of the University of Bombay	Y	Bombay
Link	W	New Delhi
Literary Criteria	Q	Bombay
Literary Half Yearly	H-Y	Mysore
Mainstream	W	New Delhi
March of the Nation	W	New Delhi
Modern Review	M	Calcutta
National Herald	D	New Delhi
New Age	W	New Delhi
New Frontiers in Education	Q	Delhi
Niti	Q	New Delhi
Patriot	D	New Delhi
People's Democracy	W	Calcutta
Problems of Peace and Socialism	Q	New Delhi
Quarterly Review of Historical Studies	Q	Calcutta
Quest	Q	Bombay
Secular Democracy	Q	New Delhi
Seminar	M	New Delhi
Social Action	Q	New Delhi
Social Scientist	M	Trivandrum
Socialist Digest	Q	Bombay
Socialist India	W	New Delhi
Socialist Perspective	Q	Calcutta
Socialist World	F	Delhi
States	F	New Delhi
Statesman	D	Calcutta
Swarajya	W	Madras
Times of India	D	New Delhi
Yojana	F	New Delhi
Young India	W	New Delhi

List of Abbreviations

A.	Administration	IATJ.	Indo-African Trade Journal
Af.	Affairs	Ins.	Institute
Afr.	Africa	J.	Journal
B.	Bulletin	L.	Literary
C.	Contemporary	O.	Oriental

Sources Quoted

D.	Democratic	P.	Political
E.	Economic	Pr.	Proposals
Ea.	Eastern	Prob.	Problems
Ed.	Education	S.	Social
Ex.	Express	Sc.	Science
F.	Foreign	So.	Socialist
Fi.	Finance	Soc.	Socialism
Fin.	Financial	St.	Studies
G.	Gandhi	T.	Times
H.	Horizon	U.	University
He.	Herald	IICQ.	India International Centre Quarterly
Hi.	History	JLBSAA.	Journal of Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration
Hind.	Hindustan	JNAA.	Journal of the National Academy of Administration
His.	Historical		
I.	International		
In.	Indian		
Ind.	India		

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
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
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AFRICA QUARTERLY

- 5 Policy-Making for Development : The Tanzanian Case
Goran Hyden
- 25 The O.A.U and the Problems of African Unity
S. C. Ukpabi
- 56 African Literature and Its Language of Expression
Mrs. J. I. Okonkwo
- 67 Historical and Sociological Constraints on the Economic
Development of Africa
Mrs. Padma Srinivasan
- 90 India and Africa (A Quarterly chronicle for October-
December 1975)
Vijay Gupta
- 112 Book Reviews
- 124 Africa Through Indian Eyes—A Documentation List
Miss Pakeeza Sultan

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Goran Hyden

Policy-Making for Development : The Tanzanian Case

This article discusses the style of policy-making that has developed in Tanzania as a result of the commitment of its leadership to socialist development. It does so in the light of prescriptions to improve public policy-making in countries like Tanzania, notably through the institutionalization of a "planned" strategy of development. The argument presented below is that Tanzania neither can nor ought to concern itself so deeply with the problem of optimization as is implied in the planning literature. This point is only appreciated if one considers the many constraints under which socialism is being built in Tanzania. There socialism is not an original product of a domestic class struggle, but induced primarily by the contradictions at the international level interpreted and developed as an ideology by one man (President Nyerere) and finally taken to the people *through* a mass political organization *by* what is essentially an emerging bourgeois class. The contradictions involved in this process are bound to produce the need for other considerations than those implied in the conventional planning models. One such consideration is that in the absence of a revolutionary struggle, the foundation for socialist development has to be laid by other means. The revolutionary spirit has to be artificially created. In Tanzania this has been done by insisting that "we must run while others walk". Major policies are produced under dramatized circumstances so as to make people feel that the country is making great leaps forward. Thus, one can say that policy-makers in Tanzania operate under the influence of the above dictum : "we must run while others walk."

Planning : Review of the literature

Planning, usually dressed up in attractive attributes like "comprehensive" and "development", has been presented in Africa as *the* mode of policy-making. The literature is more concerned with recommending models of how to plan than to analyze the conditions under which policies are made. In reviewing the literature one notices an original concern with plan formulation in the early 1960s, replaced in the middle of the decade by the question of how to improve policy execution. A third school of thought has treated planning primarily as a behavioural problem.

a) Focus on plan formulation

Literature on problems of plan formulation discusses these in the context of two fundamental questions : (1) Who should make the choices ? (2) How should choices be made ?

Tinbergen's writing on central comprehensive planning may serve as a useful starting-point for a discussion of models aimed at improving plan formulation, because his ideas did have considerable influence on planners in Africa in the 1960s.¹ He starts from the assumption that there is a sovereign political body, which specifies the social and economic objectives of development. Subordinated to this body is a group of planners, who are directly responsible for the formulation of the plan.

This type of planning is often referred to as the "synoptic" mode of problem-solving and it assumes that planners are economists who can work out the necessary comprehensive and aggregative analyses to meet the demand for optimal solutions. It would be wrong to imply that all planners agree with this particular model of planning, but it is a fact that many western professional economists who went to Africa as planners in the 1960s brought along with them this synoptic idea in their brief-case. The first post-independence development plans in the three East African countries, for instance, bore many of these features. Tinbergen's ideas were also echoed in one publication on development planning in East Africa². To all these economists, planning is a series of definite steps, calculated on the basis of aggregate data in comprehensive and

long-term perspective. The aim is to secure the optimal choice, given the constraints identified.

The critique directed against this model by practising planners and academics ranges from concern with how to incorporate the model with the prevailing patterns of politics to the adverse impact of environmental uncertainty. Waterston's global survey covers all these aspects and offers on basis of practical experience the most comprehensive critique of the synoptic approach.³ Killick, for example, argues that the model of politics adopted by proponents of comprehensive development planning is in almost all respects in conflict with the actual way policies are made in developing countries.⁴ It would be wrong to assume, however, that the lessons learnt in the first years of such planning were identical. A brief analysis of the Kenyan and the Tanzanian cases show that divergent tendencies began to emerge.

The general view of the shortcomings with the first five year plan in Tanzania is that it was too much the work of a small group of expatriate planners (in this case from France). Both Bienen⁵ and Leys⁶ view the relative failure of this plan as caused by the absence of strong political structures in which the planning process could be embedded. Thus, as Leys says : "In an important sense the 1964-69 plan had no goals; everything it contained was presented as an "implication" of the perspective objectives accepted for 1980; and even those were more categorical than specific"⁷.

When Tanzania was preparing its second development plan this lesson had been learnt. Furthermore, the coming of the Arusha Declaration had changed the conditions in many important respects. Thus, greater care was taken this time to ensure that the plan reflected the political aspirations of TANU. The control over the planning process exercised by the political centre was definitely stronger in the case of the second development plan. This was indicative of the general trend towards party supremacy that was sparked off in Tanzania by the Arusha Declaration.

Like its Tanzanian counterpart at the time, the first Kenya Development Plan (1964-69) which was rushed into existence and later substantially revised, lacked a political profile. Furthermore, to judge from information provided by one of the practising planners

Gray⁸, little attention was devoted contrary to prescriptions to deriving development programmes from comprehensive, quantitative analyses of growth targets. Instead the Kenyan planners proceeded to construct the plan "from bottom up", meaning that it was built on micro data in respect of the public sector and relevant parts of the private sector. The pragmatic planners found the comprehensive model of planning impractical.

The Second Development Plan in Kenya (1969-74) differed from the second Tanzanian plan in that it made no attempt to fill out the picture of future Kenyan society that may result from the plan. While this was explicit in the Tanzanian plan, its Kenyan counterpart admitted that political guidance had been very general and the approach adopted, therefore, eclectic. Nor was any serious attempt made at "perspective" planning. It was "down-to-earth" in that it focused primarily on identifying projects, some of which were assigned in the plan to specific public institutions. Unlike the second Tanzanian plan, it was presumably not aimed at pre-empting major alternative policy choices arrived at through the "normal" political process.

The second plans of the two countries, much more than the first, indicated the divergencies in the policy-making strategies adopted. While Kenya satisfied itself with dependence on expert planners who could put together a "shopping-list" of identifiable projects, Tanzania emphasized political control over the planning process and long-range commitment of resources to objectives set by TANU. In the Kenyan case, the notion of finding optimal choices within the context of comprehensive planning had been virtually abandoned in practice.

The general uncertainty surrounding in developing countries, however, limited the effectiveness of strategy adopted by Tanzania. The type of uncertainties we are referring to include unavoidable natural disasters, like drought and floods, dependence on economic relationships with more powerful capitalist nations, fluctuating commodity prices, "imported" inflations, monetary instability, etc. All these factors have a bearing on the planning process. Foreign exchange shortages call for capital import restrictions; capital goods prices rise over budgeted levels; crop failures and

famine lead to diversion of investment funds into consumption, etc. These uncertainties are known to the planners, but because their effects are unknown, not included in the analysis underlying the plan projections. Thus, it is clear that long-range commitment of resources easily becomes meaningless, and, if taken seriously, a burden since it reduces adaptability to an undeciphered future.

In summary, we can say that at least three principal lessons were learnt during the first years of development planning in Kenya and Tanzania, although as we have stated above, the implications drawn from these differed from one country to the other. The first is that to implant a sophisticated planning model is extremely difficult in a political and administrative infrastructure, very different from that of those countries in the West where it originated. The second is the limitations of the view that planning is primarily an exercise for economists concerned with making optimal choices. The third is, as Holmquist⁹ has underlined, the mistake to assume that the plan is "the big decision" which in turn determines the policy outcome. This ignores the fact that fundamental policy decisions are made during implementation and that these decisions often substitute those made in the plan.

(b) Focus of plan execution

The difficulties involved in formulating valid and optimal choices in the context of comprehensive development planning forced many planners and observers in the latter part of the 1960s to rethink their approaches. One of the original sources of rethinking was the symposium on "crisis in planning" held at the University of Sussex in 1969. There a team of international planning experts agreed on the need to find more appropriate means of implementing plans and policies in developing countries¹⁰. Similar ideas were advocated in a separate paper by Helleiner¹¹ with specific reference to Africa: planning in the 1970s must go beyond growth rates and plan volumes and deal more directly with problems of project implementation.

Other forces contributing to the rethinking have been foreign aid agencies and management consultancy firms. Esman and Montgomery, both closely involved in the administration of US technical assistance, have advocated a systems approach to plan execution in

view of its "overall detailed interrelated factors in a complex system of action; precise time phasing of related activities and control of operations through the use of modern high speed communication and reporting instruments"¹². The Ndegwa (Public Service Review) commission in Kenya relying on the services of an American management consultancy firm, recommended the adoption of Management by Objectives (MBO) and Organizational Development (OD) techniques in the public service. With specific reference to field administration it proposed a systems management approach to program implementation. The Kenya Government endorsed these views in a White Paper 1974. In Tanzania the McKinsey consultants, from the U.S.A., on behalf of the Government, have introduced a system of programmed implementation procedures aimed at achieving better control of policy execution under the new system of decentralised administration.

Another proposal, advanced in recent years in the spirit of the same philosophy, is the integrated development programme. Partly influenced by the experience of India's Intensive Agricultural District Programmes this kind of area-based programme has come to East Africa in different shapes. In Kenya it has been called the Special Rural Development Programme. Belshaw and Chambers¹³ have developed a systems framework for the management of the SRDP, stressing the need for adequate reporting, continuous monitoring and regular evaluation. In Zambia the programme goes under the name of "Intensive Development Zones" and was originally conceived as a replicum of the Kenyan SRDP. The integrated development approach has also reached Tanzania, albeit without any fancy epithet. The new system of decentralised administration is area-based and presupposes that the development directors manage an integrated programme for their particular territorial unit (region or district) of administration.

The concern with better instruments of policy execution has also grown out of dissatisfaction with the inherited colonial administrative structures, portrayed as being "bureaucratic" and primarily law-and-order-oriented. An argument has developed about how relevant the Weberian model of modern organization is to the administration of public affairs in developing countries. Schaffer, among

others, has warned against too strong dependence on the Weberian type of bureaucratic administration since it stresses "repetition and reiteration rather than innovation."¹⁴ For instance Leonard, on the other hand, has argued that bureaucracy can be developmental, if it encourages such qualities as expertise, a universalistic and professional outlook and a depersonalised and routinized approach to the treatment of substantive issue.¹⁵ It appears as if the management consultants working in East Africa, by and large, agree with Schaffer that flexibility is needed for innovation but at the same time agree with Leonard on the need for stricter procedures in order to develop a more rational decision-making system in the public service.

Will the proposed management tools aimed at a more integrated and programmed implementation of policies overcome the problems of "under-bureaucratized" and "over-bureaucratized" administrative structures?

A definite answer is premature at this stage, but it is clear that newly established implementation regulations are not sufficient to achieve significant improvements in the administration. In his study of the administration of the Rural Health Centre Programme in Tanzania, Mayer concludes for instance, that the reporting system established under the decentralised system of administration "carries information to people (in the centre) who have little ability to facilitate the implementation of health centre projects at the district and regional levels. Moreover, the information these reports contain does not provide a basis for control of implementation."¹⁶

(c) Focus on policy-making behaviour

While the two intellectual orientations described above by and large have ignored the political variable, those who focus on policy-making behaviour recognize the importance of the broader policy-making context. This is certainly true of Braybrooke and Lindblom in their extensive criticism of synoptic or comprehensive model planning and decision-making.¹⁷ In their view, the latter represents an ideal which apart from being applicable only in closed systems, corresponds to no sequence of analytic behaviour within reach of human beings. Basing themselves on what they consider the prevailing be-

haviour among policy-makers, they proceed to offer their own alternative: "the strategy of disjointed incrementalism".

The main benefit associated with this strategy, according to the two authors is that it is possible. The strategy of "disjointed incrementalism" is a practical way of "muddling through" in complex policy-making situations. We cannot dwell on all the criticisms raised against this model; only those of immediate relevance to policymaking in developing countries will be considered below.

The emphasis on considering policy alternatives in the light of the existing situation rather than a set of independent social values compels the reader to ask whether "status quo" is such a uniform and tangible thing as implied by the authors. As Dror has noted, in conditions of very rapid social change the concept of "status quo", with which increments of change may be compared, is really not always clear and hence the strategy not so operational as it sounds.¹⁸

Secondly, there is the question of the nature of politics subsumed in the model. Based on one notion of Western politics, it assumes a situation of pluralism within the context of shared values. The conception is unlikely to be applicable to decision-making situations in developing countries. Milne has noted that if the latter want to employ the strategy of incrementalism, they face a dilemma: lacking the "shared values" which make the method possible in e.g. the United States, they may settle for agreement among a small ruling group.¹⁹ But in that event, as the same author points out, they will be unable to secure the fragmentation and the feedback that are essential to the incrementalist method.

Braybrooke and Lindblom consider their strategy as well suited to policy-making by people aiming at rapid change as to policy-making by people preferring a more gradual change. Yet, it does exclude all changes regarded within any particular society as "large" or "important". Thus, as Leys says, "it is certainly not compatible with planned structural change which is what many leaders of poor countries say they want".²⁰

Leys' main criticism of "disjointed incrementalism," however, concerns its unplanned character. It is primarily a strategy of adaptation of policies which can be achieved through least cost and effort.

In this respect it differs from planning which is characterized by prior selection of targets and the subsequent manipulation of behaviour to achieve them. What distinguishes planned from unplanned behaviour, according to Leys, is not its superior rationality in relation to some criterion of economic efficiency, but its specifically purposive character in relation to some predetermined goals. A programme may be "badly" planned; unplanned activity, guided by intuition or habitual patterns of behaviour, might be more efficient or even more successful in reaching the objectives conceived as targets in the plan. This, however, is less important; what matters is whether the activity is planned or calculated to attain pre-set goals.

This approach, then, differs from the model of "disjointed incrementalism" by reasserting the broadly sequential nature of planning. It differs from the "synoptic" model by arguing that it is possible to plan without seeking, in the economic sense, to optimize. The reasons for planning may be to some extent independent of the desire to optimize.

Although one of the most interesting analyses made of planning, Leys' argument may underestimate the task of realizing "planned behaviour" in developing countries. Milne has argued that the behavioural traits required in planned activities are often absent in the social milieu prevailing in these countries.²¹ Certainly a personal concern with solving ends-means conflicts is as much a precondition for institutionalizing Leys' planned behaviour as it for planning aimed at optimization. Another point is that Leys may not give full weight to the structural or organizational constraints surrounding the policy makers in developing countries. While agreeing with Bienen²² that the organizational distance between the political party and the planning organs which characterized the preparation of Tanzania's first plan is undesirable, Leys does not address himself to the implications of the situation where the ruling party is supreme. This may to some extent be so because he wrote his article only one year after the Arusha Declaration. Since the contention of this paper is that the policy-making conditions have drastically changed in recent years we must now turn our attention to the "transition to socialism" phase.

Policy-making for socialist development

When analysing socialist development in Tanzania observers have invariably compared it to the experience of other more advanced socialist countries. Bienen maintains that because Tanzania still is at a low level of economic development it cannot sustain a Leninist vanguard party, a precondition, according to him, for radical and purposeful change.²³ His analysis of Tanzania in terms of the Soviet model is questioned by Lionel Cliffe in a review of the same book.²⁴ Because Tanzania's emerging socialism is rural, the country has more to learn from Chinese experience. Like in China, reliance on people and local cadres rather than a state bureaucracy, must be Tanzania's strategy, says Cliffe. Writing along similar lines, Saul emphasizes the need to consider the socio-political context of planning; the latter is not purely a matter of economic calculation or improved coordination.²⁵ In offering prescriptions as to how the contextual variable can be changed Saul is basing himself on the experience of revolutionary transformations in other countries. While all these points are potentially valid, the focus on the comparative experience of other socialist countries has often been pursued at the cost of local factors.

The real constraints that shape policy-making in Tanzania have usually been ignored. The possibility that Tanzania's policy-makers develop their own way of tackling these has not been fully explored. It is to this issue, however, that we will now turn our attention.

(a) The style of we-must-run-while-others-walk

One main reason why many Tanzanians believe that they have to "run" rather than "walk" is that their country is one of the 25 poorest in the world and a "late-comer" in the development race. It would be wrong to assume, however, that Tanzania is running only because some other countries are ahead of her. She is not contented with watching the backs of her competitors without first knowing where the race is supposed to end. The socialist ideology of ujamaa provides a nation of what is conceived by many people in the country as the ultimate stage of this development race. This race is a long-distance one, full of hurdles that have to be overcome.

This approach is aimed partly at holding expectations back, partly at enforcing the need for discipline and restraint. Given the fact that the still undeveloped forces of production do not automatically enforce such discipline and that Tanzania lacks the guerilla warfare conditions that may produce the same effects, ideology and party organization do take on key roles in the efforts to achieve such behavioural transformation. Policies have to be so presented that they have the effect of changing people's attitude to life and work. They always have to be put forward in the name of the official ideology so as not to imply a change in direction. Secondly, they must be so presented that people see the rationale of making a sacrifice in the interest of the long-term goals of socialism. Thirdly, since the implications of this long-distance race are known to only a few Tanzanians, the party has to play the role of the coach, standing by the side to ensure that those involved in the race do not lose their stamina. They must be constantly reaffirmed that it is worth continuing the race.

This strategy or mode of policy-making has at least four main features. The first is the strong urge to do everything and do it at once. The effort is to maximize as many social values as possible through policies which serve to mobilize new resources for their very achievement. This ambition is manifested in the way various programmes and policies are presented as "frontal attacks" (cf. the ujamaa programme), "operations" (cf. the villagization moves 1974-75) and "matters of life and death" (cf. efforts at raising agricultural production 1974-75). Because the social values rarely are operationalized in advance, the aspiration to maximize is pursued with an explicit or implicit acceptance of the fact that one has to settle for a less ambitious target. In this respect, the approach resembles that of the fisherman who when throwing his net out is aware that while pulling it back some of the catch may escape.

The second feature is that policy-makers often decide without first having obtained detailed knowledge of possible consequences of their decisions. They start running and take the consequences as they occur. It resembles the approach which Hirschman has called "the motivation-outruns-understanding" style of policy-making.²⁶ Full understanding of what can or cannot be achieved with existing

resources is not sought as a precondition for making a policy. Instead, the political decision is made first often under dramatized circumstances, to produce a sense of rapid advance. In this approach ends are allowed to justify means : the ultimate objective is considered so important that the costs of resources to attain it becomes a secondary matter. The Arusha Declaration 1967, as well as *Mwongozo* 1971 and the Musoma Resolutions 1974 and the policies emanating from these are cases in point. In 1967 Tanzania expressed its readiness to accept a lower economic growth rate per annum in the interest of building socialism. In *Mwongozo* it put human dignity above the specifics of organizational efficiency. In the recent Musoma Resolutions, universal primary education (UPE) was set for 1977 instead of the previous target year of 1989 leaving the task of working out the implications of this decision to those in-charge of implementation.

The third feature of the strategy is the unwillingness of policy-makers to use the past as a source of guidance for the future. Being associated with colonial rule, from which the present leadership seeks a break, the past is to them by and large irrelevant. Dror has identified this inclination as a main feature of policy-making in most developing countries.²⁷ It is likely to be particularly strong in Tanzania where the desire to break with the past is very explicit. Policy-makers in Tanzania, therefore, are not always, trotting on familiar grounds but making frequent moves into the unknown, the assumption being that the right policies are not necessarily those which are chosen from the realm of what is presently known as feasible in economically rational terms. The solution to a given problem is not always found where there is light; it may well be hidden in the dark. Thus, the task of the policy-makers becomes, in Hirshman's terms, that of "zeroing in" on a new policy which would otherwise have been ruled out by the conventional criteria of rational calculation. One case in point is the policy of cooperative development in recent years. The management crises in the cooperative institutions have not been solved by gradual improvements from "within", as proposed, for instance, by the 1966 Presidential Committee of Enquiry but rather tackled by more far-reaching structural changes as outlined in the policy of establishing ujamaa

villages and related programmes.

The fourth feature of the strategy is that employees in the public sector are compelled to work in a context where public expectations constantly supercede what can actually be attained by the incumbent officers. This situation no doubt makes many public servants feel a sense of anxiety. The President, who makes most top appointments in the public sector, seems to work on the assumption that this state of anxiety or insecurity will produce beneficial results as officers will clamour for more security through improved performance. In this respect, the Tanzanian strategy differs from the findings of, e.g. Blau that initiative occurs only with job security.²⁸ It is more in line with the view of Gunder Frank who argues that "over-defined" roles, i.e. where role expectations cannot be satisfied by role incumbents, often produce positive results.²⁹

(b) The rationale of the strategy

We have argued that this strategy is one way of creating a sense of participation in a radical transformation of a society which is void of the preconditions that have allowed for revolutionary changes in countries like China, Korea and Vietnam. This, however, is not the only reason that justifies the policy-making strategy adopted by Tanzania.

It may be useful to return to the development race analogy. When Tanzania is attempting to run while others walk she is not proceeding on a smooth and well-paved track. Running in this context is more like a rough cross-country contest where the problems are not only unknown but all the time pressing themselves on the competitors. Tanzania, like most other developing countries, does not have its development problems, so to speak, at arm's length. Her race is a constant fight against heavy odds, with no or little breathing-space. Boggled down by these hurdles there is rarely time to plan the next move. Under such circumstances it is not only natural but also justified if policy-makers abandon the disposition of routinization implied in planning and, instead of extolling the values of efficiency and rationality and gearing their efforts towards results that are measurable in economic terms, seek refuge in the more "spontaneous" style of we-must-run-while-others-walk. There is

no doubt that this way of making policies may cause disorder and discomfort to those who are used to the routinizing tendencies of orderly administration. Yet, the nation of "we must run while others walk" serves as a useful counterforce to the crippling effects on the development efforts by the people that easily follow from too strong dependence on planning and administration³⁰

To make bold policy moves into the unknown may be justified particularly in circumstance like those in Tanzania where understanding, due to environmental and other factors, is low. Hirschman concludes that this problem-solving approach becomes harmful only if it is insisted upon after knowledge about the problem has accumulated and progress has been made in tackling it.³¹ In such situations a formalized system of planning becomes cumbersome and policies produced under it easily lose their validity, as extensive conclusions have been drawn from incompleting and often unreliable data. Thus, it is not the "optimizing" orientation of the planner, but rather the commitment of the policy-maker to realize an idea or a social value that is important for initial success in development programmes. In this context, it would be wrong not to remember Landau's warning that policy-making under conditions of uncertainty can never search for optimal or perfect solutions but must go for reliable ones.³²

Also the prevalence of "overdefined" roles may have its positive effects. The gap between ends and means of roles surrounded by excessive expectations can generate enterprise and initiative, so sorely needed in countries anxious to enjoy rapid social and economic development, argues Gunder Frank.³³ Such situations give the incumbents a substantial range of direction and permit innovation and adaptation. His conclusion, not very different from that of Hirschman, is that if only there is a single desired direction of change, and it is known, reliance on excessive role expectations is appropriate, say for countries like Tanzania, which try to lift themselves by their bootstraps or run while others walk. Such discretion may not only help to combat the dangers of routinization but also facilitate making new policy-moves.

(c) Implication of the strategy

The implications of Tanzania's policy-making strategy must

also be considered as they point in the direction away from those associated with more conventional policy-making models of capitalist and socialist societies.

Western decision-making models, as shown above, assume that ends-means conflicts are solved prior to the final authoritative decision that turns proposal into official policy. Either it is achieved through the optimizing efforts of professional planning economists or it is arrived at through a process of bargaining between effected individuals, groups and organizations. This pluralistic model of policy-making suggests the existence of a positive-sum game, i.e. everybody given and takes in such a way that in the end they all register some positive gains, even if these may be less than what they had originally aimed at. This is the assumption lying at the bottom of the strategy of "disjointed incrementalism."

The Tanzanian mode of making policies does not resemble this model. Nor does it come close to the Soviet practice concentrating all efforts at solving ends-means conflicts within an all-powerful planning agency. There the role of planners has been to work out maximum targets and necessary links of coordination which to other public institutions serve as laws.

The Tanzanian style of policy-making differs from both these models. Its sense of urgency rules out any effective resolution of ends-means conflicts prior to the "big" decision. When this announced, usually under dramatized circumstances and always in the name of TANU, it is expected that everybody in the affected executing agencies will abide and do his best to attain the objectives. It would be wrong to imply that these big decisions are made out of the blue. Usually they arise out of some shortcoming brought to the attention of the President or other key decision-makers in the party. In those cases when lengthy discussions do precede these big decisions, it is important to note that they take place within the framework of the key decision-making organs of TANU rather than in the National Assembly. The rationale for this is that frank discussions can best be held behind closed doors and that dissension in the public limits the effectiveness of this mode of policy-making. On occasions when serious dissension within party ranks has leaked to the public drastic actions have been taken against those

who have undermined the conception of party unity. In a policy-making situation which is guided by the notion that "We must run while others walk" there simply is no room or time for *open* dissension.

While TANU is monolithic, the government structure is highly fragmentary and far from the centrally controlled bureaucratic machinery that developed in the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin. This means that there is plenty of room for bargaining and compromise once the executing agencies get involved in trying to interpret and implement the big policy decisions. At this stage, the policy-making process takes on some resemblance with the strategy of disjointed incrementalism. Ends-means conflicts are resolved and invariably the result is a discrepancy between the original policy objectives and the practical targets that the executing agencies set themselves. In one way this is a disadvantage of the system as outcome is modest compared to the policy promises. It does also tend to give rise to the belief that the role of the politicians is primarily that of shouting slogans. Still, in terms of assuring party supremacy this style of policy-making has its advantage in that it always gives TANU the right to "whip" the bureaucracy. Mistakes can always be blamed on the executing agencies.

Because policies are made before full understanding of all their implications have been obtained, this way of making policies does depend on an effective feed-back system. To ensure that policies do not end up in blind alleys or are deliberately changed in view of inadequate or unreliable information, facts about what really happens at the stage of implementation have to be fed back to the top policy-makers—by officials or by ordinary citizens. There is evidence to suggest that this does not always happen.

Plan implementation procedures and reporting systems were introduced in 1972 by the McKinsey consultants with the aim of improving evaluation and control. Formalization of government structures, however, sometimes increases their bureaucratizing tendencies. Warnings against such measures have been raised by at least two observers of the Tanzanian scene.³⁴ Conflicts arise between the demands of effective management of development projects and those of routine administration.³⁵

It would be wrong, however, to blame everything on the new procedures. In a situation where senior administrators and managers have to play "over-defined" roles and have to take responsibility for failures and shortcomings many will experience a sense of insecurity.³⁶ This often breeds reluctance to disclose information to the public and to admit mistakes in public. Under such conditions many top managers and administrators become problem-dodgers rather than problem-solvers by throwing the problem back on someone else or by blaming it on circumstances beyond their control.

Particularly unfortunate is the tendency for policy executors to feed policy-makers with information that the latter wish to hear. This false sense of subservience reduces the ability of the executors to recognize on their own the ends-means conflicts arising in the process of implementing individual policies. In such situations, little thinking, if any, goes into the questions of how implementation can be accelerated or in any other ways be made more effective and what consequences various decisions such matters would have.

It can be argued that the notion of the past as wholly irrelevant is gradually losing its validity as new states in Africa gain experience from development strategies and projects chosen by themselves. Van Rensburg has shown how the lessons learnt in the process of initiating a development project in Botswana served as valuable sources of inspiration for future action.³⁷

In a situation where full information is not insisted upon *before* policies are made, greater understanding must be accumulated *in the process* of implementation.

Conclusions

The style of we-must-run-while-others-walk contradicts the notion of Western planning economists that policy-making is a sequence of steps carefully calculated in a comprehensive and long-term perspective. It is also at odds with the bureaucrat's view that policy-making for development is like a regular and steady march. Furthermore, it goes contrary to the idea that managing development is a matter of 'muddling through' at a leisurely speed. Tanzania does not want to proceed at a "normal" pace.

We have argued in this paper as if this policy-making style is

predominant in Tanzania. To be sure, there are many key policy-makers, notably political leaders in the regions and the districts, who have developed a "vested interest" in this mode of policy-making. It gives them increased autonomy of action and a sense of involvement in the development process. It would be wrong to assume, however, that everybody accepts the premises on which this policy-making style is based. There are those in the public sectors who consider it a wasteful way of policy-making. Many administrators and managers experience the predominant policy-making style as a constraint. Thus, the way of making policies is a tool in a power struggle between politicians who believe in ideological spontaneity and bureaucrats who stress the orderly and rational measures implied in planning an administration. These conflicts over how policies should be made do reflect the deeper contradictions that exist in a society which tries to revolutionize itself in the absence of the domestic conditions that elsewhere have supported revolutionary struggles.

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S. C. Ukpabi

The O.A.U. and the Problems of African Unity

On May 26, 1963, thirty one African leaders signed the charter of the Organisation of African Unity, at Addis Ababa, and thus opened a new chapter on the long road to continental unity. The establishment of the O.A.U. marked the culmination of a long process whose origins go back to the nineteenth century, and even beyond. At the same time the same historical processes which led to the formation of the O.A.U. have, since 1963, hampered its further development.

In the charter itself, the African leaders pledged themselves to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹ In the preamble, which is loaded with a sense of history, the leaders showed their awareness of those problems which have militated against the overall development of Africa and their determination to overcome them.

These objectives, especially those relating to the abolition of racism, and social injustices; to the advancement of African peoples in all fields of endeavour; promoting understanding and solidarity among Africans, political independence for the various peoples, have been of long-standing. However, in tracing their development,

certain issues were, at different times, accorded greater prominence over others.

Very often in trying to determine the origins of the O.A.U.; there is the tendency to look at the western world, particularly the West Indies and the U.S. where negro intellectuals, groaning under severe social disabilities evolved ideas which were to culminate at the beginning of this century in the Pan-African movement which was later to merge with other factors to give birth to the O.A.U. While there is no doubt as to the contributions of the New World to the development of the O.A.U., it is important to remark that ideas about African solidarity, independence, and African personality existed in Africa independently of influences from the West Indies and U. S.; in the 19th century and even earlier.

PAN AFRICANISM—A HISTORICAL VIEW

To attribute the origins of the O.A.U. Western origins presupposes that until European colonisation, Africans themselves were so isolated from one another that they could hardly think on Pan-African level. No-one these days doubts the fact that trade, diplomatic and political links existed between one part of the continent and another. Through these links ideas of regional and Pan-African nature were bound to be propagated. In periods of emergency, when Africans living in a certain area were confronted with alien hostility the former made efforts to ward off this external threat by closing their ranks. This was the sentiment of the letter sent by Hendrik Witbooi, the Nama chief of South-West Africa, to his enemy, Maharero, the ruler of the Hereros. in 1888, when he urged Maharero to join him in warding off German aggression.

"You are to be protected and helped by the German government but, my dear Captain, do you appreciate what you have done? Do you imagine you will retain all the rights of your independent chieftainship after you shall have destroyed me (if you succeed)? You will have bitter remorse for this handing of your land and sovereignty over to the hands of white people. This giving of yourself into the hands of the whites will become to you a burden as if you were carrying the sun on your back."²

Of great importance in fostering a sense of common identity and destiny among Africans was the "Ethiopian Movement" whose influence was felt in West Africa, South and Central Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century.³ This movement derived its name from Psalm 68:31, 'Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands to God,' Ethiopianism soon became identified, by members of the movement, with Africa and "Ethiopians" with the Negro race. In a general way Ethiopianism became the term used to describe African nationalism as manifested through the medium of the Christian church. In South and Central Africa the racist attitude of the governments drove the members into "separatist and anti-government activities. Thus, the political and religious situation in which they found themselves caused the "Ethiopians" in this part of Africa to strive the move to create a greater sense of solidarity among Africans. In West Africa, the Ethiopians found sufficient scope within the established Christian churches to express their desire for responsibility and leadership. They also used every opportunity to advance their sentiments with regard to Africa. Thus, in the 1860s the concept of "Africa for the Africans" was already a familiar theme among "Ethiopians" in Nigeria⁴ while in Sierra Leone, the C. M. S. Grammar School called its magazine, "The Ethiopian."⁵ Long before the Pan-Africanists of the present century began to popularise the achievements of ancient Egypt as evidence of Africa's capacity to manage its affairs, the "Ethiopians" had taken great pride in these achievements which they believed would even be overshadowed by what Africans were destined to achieve in future.⁶ Thus, they believed that within a short time Africa and the Africans would be emancipated politically and covered in glory. Then Africa would be in a position to inspire and lead other "continents" in Christianity, literary arts, science and technology. In Central Africa, the anti-government and separatist tendencies in Ethiopianism were to lead John Chilembwe into open rebellion in 1915 in Malawi.⁷

One of the best known of indigenous Pan-Africanists of the Nineteenth Century was James Johnson.⁸ He grew up in Africa and developed Pan-African ideas independent of the New World. Born around 1835 of Yoruba recaptive-parents who had settled in Sierra

Leone, Johnson attended protestant schools in Sierra Leone and between 1860 and 1863 taught at Fourah Bay College. Between 1863 and his death in 1917, he advocated African nationalism in church and state since he regarded religion and politics as inseparable. He believed that the establishment of an all-Christian Pan-African state would be the answer to Africa's problems. He deplored those factors such as ethnicism which separated one African from another, condemned the various brands of christianity which were being introduced into Africa and which aggravated the disunity among Africans. He visualised the time when there would emerge one African church which would be manned only by Africans, and which would wear the African complexion. As an exponent of "African Personality" he believed the African to be a distinct being who should be proud of his cultural heritage. Because of his contributions to pan-Africanism Johnson was duly honoured in 1900 by the first Pan-African Congress.⁹

Similarly, although Dr. E. W. Blyden¹⁰ the son of two slaves from Togo was born in the West Indies in 1832, yet at an early age he returned to Liberia where he was educated and was moulded by the African environment. He also became an exponent of the concept of "African Personality" and contributed so much to the propagation of Pan-African ideas.

In his address to the Liberia College in 1881, Blyden declared, *inter alia* :

"The African must advance by methods of his own. He must possess a power distinct from that of the European. It has been proved that he knows how to take advantage of European culture and that he can be benefited by it. Their proof was perhaps necessary, but it is not sufficient. We must show that we are able to go alone, to carve out our own way. We must not be satisfied that, in this nation, European influence shapes our polity, makes our laws, rules in our tribunals and impregnates our social atmosphere."¹¹

Nor should one forget the Pan-Africanist ideas of James Africanus Horton and Mojola Agbebi. The latter not only championed

the Africanisation of the christian churches but also infused in his converts "individuality of Race". In 1894, while in Liberia, he changed his name from D. B. Vincent to Mojola Agbebi. To him, the negro settlers in Liberia were Americans in Africa whom he advised to disperse into the interior in order to be absorbed into African culture. During his tour of the U.S.A. in 1904, where he lectured on African customs, wore his voluminous indigenous dress proudly, and was "repelled" by American civilisation, he made such an impression on the Negroes of Yonkers who decided to celebrate 11 October each year as Agbebi Day "in remembrance of African customs and institutions and in support of his evangelistic exertions in Southern Nigeria."¹³

The African origin of the O.A.U. still awaits its historian. For long, peoples in other continents had referred to those in any part of Africa as Africans. It would not be a surprise if such a historian found in Arabic and other sources that educated Africans when confronted with people from other continents, in the past centuries, simply referred to themselves as Africans. Neither should such a historian overlook the influence which Islam had in creating a sense of community among African Muslims. Moreover, it can be argued that the existence of the idea of Africa as forming a diversified community may have facilitated the spread of the ideology in Africa of Pan-Africanists of the West Indies and the U.S.

With regard to the foreign origins of the O.A.U. one has to look at the situation in the West Indies and U.S.A. where the peoples of African descent who suffered severe social disabilities began to idealise Africa, to use it as a reference point and to seek ways to create a sense of solidarity among negroes. In this quest, the institution of slavery was criticised and the sufferings of negroes became a favourite theme for songs and writings. As far back as 1787, Ottobah Cugoana,¹⁴ a Fanti ex-slave criticised the slave traffic and the role played by Europeans in de-humanising the black. The numerous slave revolts in the new world could be seen as the practical manifestation of this attempt on the part of blacks to improve their social standing.

In their idealisation of Africa, many of these negroes, no matter from where they came, looked upon Africa as their motherland and

attributed any historical achievements in one part of the continent to the whole continent. A favourite theme was to regard the glories of ancient Egypt not only as proof of Africa's ability to manage its affairs but also as a vital contribution to the development of world civilisation. These were some of the themes in the work of David Walker who in 1829 wrote in protest against slavery and sought to create a new and golden image about Africa.¹⁵ Some like R. Denaly and Paul Cuffee attempted to persuade negroes in the new world to migrate to Africa as the means of escaping from the disabilities which they suffered in America, Denaly not only regarded Africa as the "father-land" but also questioned the prevalent ideas concerning the inferiority of the African.¹⁶ In his report on the Niger Valley Expedition of 1859, Denaly declared that "Our policy must be... Africa for the Africans and black men...By black men I mean, men of African descent who claim an identity with the race."¹⁷

Certain factors must be noted. These early sentiments were addressed by negroes, not to Africans, but to fellow negroes in the new world who were in a position to understand what they were talking about. Secondly, they were the product of those negroes educated in the philosophies of the Western world and thus able to challenge the European concepts about Africa with the same tools. In this way, these ideas became part of the world intellectual movement which have shaped nations and continents and brought about a sense of fulfilment among various peoples. Before the end of the nineteenth century these views were to crystalise into movements aimed at ameliorating the condition of not only the negroes but also the Africans who in the second half of the nineteenth century increasingly shared the plight of the negro in the new world as a result of European colonisation. Thus the movement for the liberation of the negro in America and the West Indies became fused with the desire to see Africa free from European domination. In addition, these ideas in the first half of the 19th century were discussed so widely as to have a direct influence on people like Du Bois and Marcus Garvey who, in this century, made the advancement of blacks the main theme of their life's work. During this period also these ideas were to find their way to Africa through contacts between African students in the United States, educated Africans in West African

cities along the coast and negro intellectuals in the new world.¹⁸ Thus the triangular trade, between Africa, America and Europe, through which African slaves were taken to the new world became the same route by which an intellectual movement begun in the West Indies and America helped to transform Africa in the twentieth century.

FIRST PAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE

When, in 1900, Henry Sylvester-Williams of Trinidad convened the First Pan-African conference in London, there was already a body of ideas which was to shape the development of this movement in the pre-independence era in Africa.¹⁹ Pan Africanism has been defined as :

“(a) an intellectual or political movement among Africans or people of African descent which saw Africa, Africans and people of African descent as a unit, designed to instil self confidence by referring the latter back to Africa as their ‘Father-land’, without meaning necessarily physical return to Africa, (b) any ideas which saw Africa as a unit, which stood for the political independence of Africa, the economic, technical and social modernisation of African political unity or close political cooperation.”²⁰

Until the end of World War II, the Pan-African movement was dominated by negroes from the new world who still looked upon African problems as part of the universal problems of black men everywhere. It was only latter that essentially African matters gained the upper hand. In this period the Pan-Africanists were prepared to cooperate with non-Africans and organisations in order to achieve their ends and sometimes, as in the case of association with communists, the end-results differed from what the Pan-Africanists envisaged.²¹ The wonder was not so much that the movement was in the eyes of its detractors, “more talk and less action” as that it was able to survive at all given the personality conflicts within the movement,²² inadequate financial support, open hostility from some quarters, and the difficulty of the Pan-Africanists in adhering to

their objectives. Thus, as a result of the historical setting of the time in which it operated and the conflict in the modern and traditional elements of African societies, the movement had a certain air of vagueness about it especially in the very early years. One of its main achievements was to infuse a sense of racial solidarity among those Africans who understood its message and to bring some of them together periodically to discuss their common problems. In this regard, the movement was assisted by Africa's colonial experience. By creating large territorial blocks such as French West Africa, Nigeria etc. the European powers fostered greater contacts among Africans. By establishing schools, these powers helped to widen the audience of the Pan-Africanists. Communication facilities helped to spread these new ideas. Thus, those instruments established by the colonial powers as the means of facilitating their rule became the very instruments which were to assure the demise of colonial rule through the joint efforts of the ruled.

One of the ways of propagating Pan-African ideas was through the establishment of various societies and associations which not only accepted a common unity of purpose but tried in practice to improve Africa's image. For instance, the African Association which was formed in 1897, in Britain and which was transformed into the Pan-African Association during the Pan-African Conference of 1900 had the following as its aims :

"To encourage a feeling of unity, to facilitate friendly intercourse among Africans in general; to promote and protect the interests of all subjects claiming African descent, wholly or in part, in British colonies and other places, especially in Africa, by circulating accurate information on all subjects affecting their rights and privileges as subjects of the British empire and by direct appeals to the imperial and local government."²³

In 1910, the African National Congress was founded in South Africa, while the National Congress of British West Africa was convened in 1920. In 1935, and with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, George Padmore founded the International African Friends of Abyssinia which in 1937 changed its name to the International African

Service Bureau. Increasingly the name Africa came to be attached to various organisations formed in various parts of the continent as if it was the only magic word necessary to achieve the desired unity of action.

On the intellectual level, associations and individual writers sought to create a common sense of identity among black peoples. In 1901, *the Pan-African*, a journal edited by Sylvester Williams, was meant to be the mouthpiece of the Pan-African Association. Poets in the West Indies, and America and the African and Caribbean intellectuals in Paris extolled pride of colour, rejected feelings inferiority and espoused the cause of black solidarity. In July, 1912, Mohamed Ali Duse, an Egyptian of Sudanese origin brought out the first issue of the *African Times and Orient Review* whose interests went beyond Africa to include events in America, Japan, China, Persia and Turkey. Later, since its financial support came from some members of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, the journal came increasingly to concern itself with affairs in British West Africa.²⁴ During its life time, the *African Times and Orient Review* attacked German colonialism in Togoland, exposed abuses in the British colonial system, and provided the forum for the views of Pan-Africanists.

*Nor would one under-estimate the role of Marcus Garvey in this intellectual movement,*²⁵ :

“for he inspired not only the masses of Afro-Americans, but also many of the new African intellectuals, and his influence even spread to the masses in Africa which Du Bois could ever have hoped to reach. Both Azikiewe and Nkrumah were originally inspired by Garvey, Nkrumah more than his Nigerian counterpart, for latter he acknowledged Garvey’s influence on him, while studying in the U. S., openly and he made Garvey’s Black Star the great political symbol of Ghana. Similarly a closer study of the development of the French-speaking version of Pan-Africanism will show what an impact Garvey made initially through the French section of his paper, *The Negro World*.”²⁶

Throughout this period, these intellectuals (who between the war years included some from Africa itself) had the duty of defending the programme of Pan-Africanism against attacks from communists and the racist doctrines of fascists, at the same time as evaluating European political theories and choosing from them what they considered valuable to the cause of Pan-Africanism.

PAN-AFRICANISM TAKES ROOTS

Before the end of World War II, there began to emerge greater liaison between the various organisations in Europe and America which espoused the cause of pan-Africanism. In Britain, thirteen welfare, students and political organisations formed the Pan-African Federation in 1944 and cooperated actively in convening the Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945. This Congress was an important milestone on the road to African unity for it was attended by many young African intellectuals who were to play an important role in liberating their countries from colonial rule. Among them were Kwame Nkrumah, J. Annan, and Joe Appiah from Ghana; Chief H.O. Davies, Magus Williams and S.L. Akintola from Nigeria; Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya; Wallace Johnson from Sierra Leone; Dr. Raphael Armattoe from Togo and Peter Abrahams from South Africa. Where the past Congresses were contented with passing pious resolutions against European imperialism, social injustice and land alienation, the Manchester Congress went beyond these to demand political independence :

“We are determined to be free...We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence, so far and no further than it is possible in this One World for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation...We affirm the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic.”²⁷

The delegates then proceeded to serve notice on the colonial powers of their intention to resort to violence if these powers failed to cooperate.

An important establishment which emerged from the Manchester Congress was the West African National Secretariat formed by Nkrumah who at this time was toying with the idea of creating a "Union of African Socialist Republics." At its conference in August 1946, in London, the Secretariat pledged itself to promote the concept of a West African Federation "as an indispensable lever for the ultimate achievement of a United States of Africa."²⁸ In December 1953, after Ghana had been granted internal self government, Nkrumah convened a West African Nationalist Conference which was attended by delegates from Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

With the intensification of African nationalism after World War II, many Pan-Africanists seemed to have concentrated their energies, between 1946 and 1957, not in attending Pan African Congress but in fostering the spirit of nationalism in their various countries and in seeking to win political independence. When Pan-Africanism re-emerged after Ghana's independence in 1957 efforts were directed towards "positive action" aimed at achieving national independence in the various colonial territories, and promoting African unity. Independence came to be seen as the only way of solving African's numerous social and economic problems.

In another direction, the gap between English-speaking and French-speaking Pan-Africanists began to narrow after World War II. Uptill then, and even upto the eve of independence Pan-Africanism was monopolised by English-speaking Africans and Negroes.²⁹ This state of affairs was partly the result of political consideration. French colonial policy, symbolised by the tenets of Assimilation,³⁰ ruled out, for a long time, any nation of granting independence to the colonies or allowing them to go their separate ways. Overcentralisation in Africa and tight control from Paris put great pressure on African intellectuals. By 1946, Nkrumah had established contact with such leaders as Senghor, Apithy, and Houphouet-Boigny. About this time, the reaction of French-speaking Africans to French colonial policy resulted in the negritude movement whose great apostles were Aime Cesaire of Martinique and Leopold Senghor of Senegal.³¹ The roots of this movement go back to the 1930s to the founding of the literary journal, *Legitime Defense*³² by the Martiniquan poet Etienne Lero in association with others. Negritude endea-

voured to make the negro accept himself for what he is. It endeavoured to give him self-confidence. It stood for the Negro's distinctive outlook on life, for his race and culture consciousness. It, therefore tried to do for the French Africans what Pan-Africanism was already doing for the English-speaking Africans.³³ The journal, *Presence Africaine*, founded by Alioune Diop, in 1949, became the mouthpiece of this movement. In September 1956, *Presence Africaine* convened the first World Congress of Black Writers and Artists, in Paris, which was attended by many writers and artists from English-speaking Africa. This Congress did a great deal to promote cooperation between the two linguistic groups, to narrow their difference in outlook and to channel their energies in the cause of black solidarity and African unity.

In the early fifties there were also visible signs that the gap between the Arabs of North Africa and the Africans to the south was being bridged. This was particularly the case after the revolt in Egypt of 1952 which brought Nasser to power. Egypt looked upon itself as playing a leadership role in Africa, the success of which depended partly on how far it could convince the Africans of its genuine commitment to their cause. Cairo became the home of African exiles and through Islamic propaganda and radio broadcasts, Egypt gave encouragement to the nationalists further south to end colonial rule. Egypt now saw itself as part of the African continent and sought ways to assert its influence in Africa. In this regard, Nasser was to declare: "...we cannot under any condition even if we wanted to, stand aloof from the terrible and terrifying battle now raging in the heart of that continent between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot stand aloof for one important and obvious reason—we ourselves are in Africa. Surely the people of Africa will continue to look to us—we who are the guardians of the continent's northern gate, we who constitute the connecting link between the continent and the outer world. We certainly cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility to help to our utmost in spreading the light of knowledge and civilisation up to the very depth of the virgin jungles of the continent".³⁴

The period between 1957 and 1963 was the most crucial for the development of African unity. Certain factors which emerged at

this period should be noted. African unity could only be facilitated as soon as the governments of independent states were committed to it and were prepared to utilise their resources to achieve this objective. By 1957, there were eight independent African states namely: Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Ghana. These were to be joined, unceremoniously by Guinea in 1958. The attitude of these states to African unity influenced not only its course but also the reaction of those states which became independent later. At a lower level, non-governmental bodies, such as trade unions,³⁵ pull their resources together in the interest of unity and solidarity as was shown in their intra-African conferences. They also exhibited very radical and forceful attitude towards continental unity thus causing even the most lukewarm government to take notice of the wishes of these bodies for some form of continental cooperation. At the same time, what was happening in one African country became the concern of the peoples and governments of other African countries. This sense of common purpose and identity was manifested in such issues as the war in Algeria, the case of Namibia which south-Africa continued to administer in spite of international opinion, and the ready manner in which several African governments were prepared to assist Guinea after it was abandoned by France in 1958. Similarly, in external affairs, Africa was beginning to present a united front. This trend became more visible with the increase in the number of independent states, after 1960, which were represented by their ambassadors who formed the African caucus at the U.N. Then there was the proliferation of regional groups, caused partly by personal rivalries and differences of opinion as to the best way of achieving African unity. Often this rivalry was intense and acrimonious. Consequently, the wonder was not so much that a watered-down version of African unity emerged in 1963 as that anything at all came out of this unity movement.

In April 1958, Nkrumah who was then the head of the government of an independent Ghana and who had played a vital part in the Pan-African movement, summoned the first conference of independent African states which was held in Accra and which was attended by eight African states. In their resolutions the members asserted and proclaimed "the unity among ourselves and our soli-

darity with the dependent peoples of Africa as well as our friendship with all nations. We resolve to preserve the unity of purpose and action in international affairs which we have forged among ourselves in this historic conference: to safeguard our hard-won independence sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to preserve among ourselves, the fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy so that a distinctive African Personality will play its part in cooperation with other peace-loving nations to further the cause of peace.”³⁶ They also committed themselves to the total liberation of Africa from colonial rule and agreed to observe each other’s political and territorial integrity, and to settle any differences which might arise among them by conciliation and mediation within the African community. This conference therefore set the pattern for future conferences. It is relevant to observe that many of the important resolutions adopted at this conference were echoed in the charter of the O.A.U.

In December, 1958, the All African Peoples Organisation met for the first time, in Accra. It was a non-governmental organisation, and was attended by leaders like Tom Mboya of Kenya, Patrice Lumumba of Zaire, and Roberto Holden of Angola. This conference went much farther than the conference of African governments in April, 1958, in calling for the establishment of a Commonwealth of free African States—a call which was to be echoed in subsequent meetings of the AAPO in Tunis in 1960 and in Cairo in 1961. Part of its resolution on African Unity in 1958 was: “Whereas the great mass of African peoples are animated by a desire for unity; whereas the unity of Africa will be vital to the independence of its component units and essential to the security and general well-being of African peoples; whereas the existence of separate states in Africa is fraught with the dangers of exposure to imperialist intrigues and of resurgence of colonialism even after their attainment of independence, unless there is unity among them; and whereas the ultimate objective of African nations is a Commonwealth of Free African States;

“Be it resolved and it is hereby resolved by the all-African Peoples Conference that the Conference (a) endorses Pan-Africanism and the desire for unity among African peoples; (b) declares that its ultimate objective is the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free

African states; (c) calls upon the Independent States of Africa to lead the peoples of Africa towards the attainment of this objective; and (d) expresses the hope that the day will dawn when the first loyalty of African states will be to an African Commonwealth.'

Between the first conference of Independent African states in 1958 and the second conference in 1960 there were several attempts made to bring about unity at regional and local level. In 1958, an extremely loose regional organisation, the Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA)³⁷ was formed as a clearing-house for the various African political parties in Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Rhodesia, Malawi, and Zanzibar. It discussed seriously the possibility of forming a regional federation of East and Central Africa and took a common attitude on matters relating to East Africa at the All African Peoples Organisation Conferences. In 1959 the short-lived Mali federation comprising Senegal and Sudan was formed, while in the same year, Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast formed the Council de l'Entente which comprised Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger. But from the beginning their unity remained at best fragile. Their significance should not, however be underestimated. These were attempts made by French-speaking West African leaders, even before independence, to recreate in a new form, the Federation of French-speaking West Africa which the French themselves had helped to destroy. France's continued hostility towards the recreation of a West African Federation, the reluctance of the leaders to make the sacrifice necessary for the realisation of the union, and the differing political and ideological attitudes of the heads of states contributed to the failure of these unions.

Guinea's accession to independence in 1958 had several important effects on the development of African unity. Abandoned by France, she knew that she could only survive through the goodwill, assistance and cooperation of the other African states. The result was that its leaders became avowed supporters of African unity and solicited for assistance from other African nations. At the U.N., Diallo Telli, Guinea's representative, convened the African group and informed them that Guinea was not simply Guinea but Africa.³⁸ In addition, the Ghana-Guinea union which was announced in November, 1961, became the first attempt at a political

union between an English-speaking independent state and an independent French-speaking state. This union which was later expanded to include Mali, lasted until it was dissolved with the creation of the O.A.U. in 1963. Although, very little institutional change took place in the three countries as a result of this union, yet it not only bolstered the independence of Guinea and its image abroad but also showed that language was no barrier to unity where the will existed. What is even more important was the fact that Ghana and Guinea looked upon their union as the nucleus of a union of independent African states. In the Conakry Declaration of May 1, 1959, they declared that membership of the union would be open to all independent African states or federations adhering to the principles on which the union was based.³⁹ They then indicated what would be the general policy of such a large union and how it would operate to practice.

Alarmed at the prospect of such a union existing at his doorstep, the President of Liberia, William Taubman, convened a meeting at Sanniquellie which was attended by the leaders of Ghana and Guinea and which, in its communique, set out to create not a union, but a community of independent African states. Although the Sanniquellie declaration recognised the great need for unity of purpose among independent African states it emphasised the uniqueness of each state and stressed that nothing should be done to prejudice the present or future international policies, relations and obligations of the states involved.

There were clearly two approaches to African unity which were beginning to emerge. People like Nkrumah believed in the immediate creation of a political union of independent African states⁴⁰ while those like Taubman favoured a gradual and loose association. From 1960 onwards, when more African states became independent and began to assert themselves on Africa's scene, the question of the best way to achieve African unity, the issue of leadership; ideological differences and personal interests brought about intense rivalry among African leaders and split them into various camps. Nigeria's ostensibly pro-West posture, its insistence on a gradual approach to a loose association of African states and its criticism of Nkrumah's efforts to dictate the pace of unity, created much

any country. Part of its resolutions reads as follows:

"The Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Africa and Malagasy meeting at Monrovia on 8th to 12th May 1961... Solemnly affirms and adopts the following principles which shall govern the relationship between the African and Malagasy states :

- "1. Absolute equality of African and Malagasy States whatever may be the size of their territories, the density of their populations, or the value of their possessions.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states;
3. Respect for the sovereignty of each state and its inalienable right to existence and development of its personality;
4. Unqualified condemnation of outside subversive action by neighbouring states;
5. Promotion of cooperation throughout Africa, based upon tolerance, solidarity and good-neighbour relations, periodical exchange of views, and non-acceptance of any leadership;
6. The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African States, but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity."⁴⁴

It is quite easy to see the influence which this declaration had on the outcome of the heads of state meeting at Addis Ababa in May 1963.

During this period, the ideas of a Maghreb Federation (embracing Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and Mauritania); the Union of the Nile states (sponsored by Egypt and meant to include Egypt, Sudan and Uganda) and a Greater Somalia Union⁴⁵ (meant to unite all Somalis living in Somalia, parts of Ethiopia and Kenya) were contemplated but very little came out of them. They did show, however, how widespread was the idea of regional grouping which many people believed would serve their interests best and, in any case, should precede continental unity. Indeed, Africa seemed to lend itself to regionalism based on geography, language and ideology.

Therefore, between 1960 and 1963, there were many factors which made for disunity, rather than for unity, in Africa and on which many African states had very strong feelings. These factors included: attitude towards the Algerian war of independence; hostility or otherwise towards Israel; refuge to political exiles; the Katanga secession; boundary disputes; conflicts among the various African trade unions and organisations; attempts at unification movements by such group as the Ewe in West Africa and the Somali; political instability in the new states; attitude towards the former colonial powers and the influence of the latter in the new states; the existence of regional groups and loyalties, and personality conflicts.

Yet in 1963 through formal, informal and diplomatic contacts, direct talks between Heads of State during their frequent state visits, and the spirit of compromise, it was possible to reconcile the various political groups and to establish the Organisation of African Unity. In certain respects the formation of the O.A.U. can be regarded as the greatest accomplishment of the Pan-African Movement.⁴⁶ But above all it portrays the awareness of the independent African states of their common colonial past, and the fact that, in a world of super powers and power blocks they could constitute an effective unit in international affairs, and could safeguard their joint interests if they presented a united front. In addition, by establishing the O.A.U. the African states have provided an institutional framework within which member states can interact. This organisation also serves as a multilateral forum (in place of the bilateral arrangements made by member states) for fostering cooperation and coordination in dealing with matters of mutual interest. It continues to serve as one of the links between member states and the world outside.

In discussing the issue of the origins of the O.A.U. and the problems of African unity two questions can be posed namely: How far has its historical development affected the institutions and the performance of the O.A.U.?, and how can this organisation escape the disabilities imposed on it by its history?

With regard to the first question there is no doubt that the charter and the institutional framework of the O.A.U. were the direct result of its historical development. What emerged was a compromise between the "functionalist" states who wanted to see

African unity brought about through a gradual process of integration of economic and technical institutions and the "revolutionaries" who favoured an immediate and all-embracing political union. Since the former were in the majority it was not surprising that the outcome was heavily tilted in their favour. As a result, the Secretariat, and the Administrative Secretary-General have been shorn of many of the powers which should enable them to function effectively and to take certain initiatives. Indeed, deliberate efforts were made in the charter to emphasise the administrative nature of Secretary-General. Moreover, efficiency has from time to time been sacrificed on the altar of trying to obtain state representatives in the secretariat, while in some cases certain governments had withdrawn their nationals in protest against specific lines of action being taken by the Secretariat.⁴⁷

Nor can one really say that the O.A.U. has gone far towards achieving the much-desired political unity. In this regard so much ink has been spilled in determining whether it should be called the organisation of, or for, African unity (and one finds the two prepositions used in writings on the O.A.U.)⁴⁸ If it is the former, it is argued, it is a misnomer for no unity has been achieved. On the other hand, if it is the latter then it is a betrayal of the aspirations of those who had laboured for so many years to cure Africa's ills through political unity. History does not justify the expectation that all the peoples in Africa must form a political union simply because they all happen to live in a continent named Africa. The community of interests may be felt by many people but it is a different matter when it comes to setting aside national interests for the purpose of forming a political union. This was the essence of the statement of Nnamdi Azikiwe when he declared :

"It would be capital folly to assume that hard-bargaining politicians who passed through the ordeal of victimisation and the crucible of persecution to win their independence will easily surrender their newly-won power in the interest of a political leviathan which is populated by people who are alien to one another in their social and economic relations. It has not been possible in Europe or America, and unless Africa can show


herself different from other continents, the verdict of history on this score will remain unchallenged and unaltered."⁴⁹

As a result of the involvement of individual heads of state in the establishment of the O.A.U. it seemed as if this was a kind of unity imposed from above for the specific purpose of safeguarding the interests of these rulers particularly against popular and adverse reaction to their rule, in their own countries. It has also introduced strong personality element into the functioning of this organisation with the result that some members have even boycotted the meetings⁵⁰ of the heads of state or refused to ratify decisions taken by the majority of members.

The gap between the Casablanca and the Monrovia group has only been minimised but not totally obliterated. At the same time, there has been lack of total commitment to the O.A.U. by some members. This has resulted in the continuing financial dilemma faced by the Organisation due to the failure of such members to pay their dues.⁵¹ It has been argued that this lack of total commitment has arisen from the feeling that the O.A.U. has not adequately served the national, and other interests of such defaulters.⁵² In other words, the reservation felt by some states about the usefulness of belonging to this organisation has persisted after its establishment. It has also led to the continued existence of regional groups which the members believe will adequately cater for their economic and modernising interests. The Conseil de l'Entente remained an economic and customs union; the Equatorial Union (made up of Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo and Chad) was transformed in 1966, into the Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Central (UDEAC) and was later joined by Cameroon, with the aim of coordinating customs, transport, higher education, and defence. Shortly after the signing of the O.A.U. charter the leaders of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda met in Nairobi on June 5, 1963 to inaugurate the East African Federation whose life did not go beyond the drawing-board. In December 1967, the same leaders signed in Kampala the treaty which brought into being the East African Community aimed at establishing a common market among members and maintaining and expanding common services.⁵³

In North Africa the Arab states still try to reconcile their allegiance to Pan-Arabism with that of the O.A.U.⁵⁴ Perhaps the grouping which has posed the greatest threat to the O.A.U. has been the Organisation Commune Africaine at Malagache (OCAM) which succeeded the shortlived Organisation for Afro-Malagasy Cooperation (U.A.M.C.E.). In February, 1965, the leaders of Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta agreed to set up OCAM in order to reinforce cooperation and solidarity among members and to speed up their political, economic, social, technical and cultural development.⁵⁵ Not only was this the largest regional group in terms of the number of states involved but also its political character went beyond the objectives of similar groupings. In addition to all these groupings, many African states still retained their links in such non-African organisations as the British Commonwealth and the European Economic Community. Although some of these groupings have diminished in importance and have suffered from lack of total commitment among members yet their continued existence has detracted from the effectiveness of the O.A.U.

The O.A.U. itself has not been able to escape its colonial past. Africa is still susceptible to political, psychological and diplomatic pressure from the former colonial powers and the U.S. The fact that a large sector of the national economy of African states is in the hands of European companies enables the latter to influence events in the various states. Thus any unity which might result in the enthronment of socialist ideologies and the expropriation of their wealth is bound to be resisted by such companies and their home governments. In addition, the continuing political instability in various African countries, their nation-building problems and economic difficulties have made such states more inward-looking and unable, even if they had the will, to contribute effectively to the realisation of African unity. There are forty two independent states which are now members of the O.A.U. For these states one of their primary objectives—national independence—has been achieved. One may not be surprised to find that each of these states may have its own peculiar approach to achieving a political unity in Africa. Consequently, it is an infinitely more difficult task trying to reconcile



forty two different views than reconciling ten or even fifteen different ones.

Matters have not been helped by the world political order in which the African states have been trying to unify themselves. With the end of the cold war, the reduction in the spate of activities arising out of the process of decolonisation in the sixties, the little strategic importance of Africa in global confrontation among the Super-powers and the existence of trouble-spots in the Middle East and Asia, Africa is no longer the focus of international attention. Under this condition and with no immediate threat to their independence there appears to be no compelling reason for African states to achieve a more binding unity than what they have at the moment. Indeed, their membership of the U.N. affords these states the opportunity to participate in the making of the world order and in safeguarding their interests. Such has been the support which these states have accorded the U.N. in the recent past that some African diplomats have contended that some African states value membership of the U.N. more than that of the O.A.U.

The second question—how the O.A.U. can escape from the disabilities imposed on it by its history—cannot have a set answer and what follows is an attempt to generate meaningful discussion on this issue. There are very few historical precedents of continental political unity to go by. Even if there were, history does not repeat itself in exactly the same way since different historical situations, no matter how minute, bring about a great deal of change in a movement and its outcome. Neither can one commend the present efforts towards a European union in their entirety to Africa because the historical situations of the two continents are not the same.

Large empires and kingdoms have arisen mostly out of the conquest of diverse peoples by others. Many of the kingdoms and empires in pre-colonial and colonial Africa were built in this way. No one would like to recommend that a continental unity should be imposed on Africa by an African super-power. This method of bringing about unity, even if it is feasible, should be regarded as an anachronism in this age. However one should not lose sight of the possibility that a greater sense of unity would have been achieved if this organisation was established before 1960, that is before many

of the present 47 member-states of the O.A.U. became independent or if these states had shed their blood together in liberating one another from colonial rule.⁵⁶ Similarly, there is the argument that the founding fathers did much disservice to the organisation by failing to establish the nucleus of continental government from the beginning. By now, such an organisation would have passed through its teething period (exactly as the O.A.U. seems to be doing now) and would have been ready now to absorb any stresses which might be imposed on it in the interest of greater unity.

The African states can still make history and thereby bring about a greater sense of solidarity and unity if they can pursue with greater vigour the liberation of Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia from minority rule. They should be prepared to back their numerous resolutions in Southern Africa with force or to create the dangerous confrontation which the super-powers and the U.N. cannot ignore. The African states have so far restricted their support to the nationalist groups, to financial, mediatory and diplomatic aid. If they had been prepared to contribute troops to aid such groups or aid, for instance Guinea when it was threatened with invasion by Portugal, the planning and coordination necessary to make such troops contributions effective would have led inevitably to greater coordination in the political field.

It is now more than eleven years since many of these states achieved independence. They have therefore had one decade in which to exercise their sovereignty.

The Path Ahead

One considers the time opportune for the gospel of greater political unity to be preached with greater vigour. Such unity will necessitate certain sacrifice being made by each state for the good of all. African leaders should exploit the feeling that no member state wants to bear the stigma of openly undermining the O.A.U. Indeed, the success of the unions already achieved—between French-speaking and English-speaking Cameroun, and Tanganyika and Zanzibar—are glowing examples of what benefits political union can bring. At the same time they show that neither language nor size can be insurmountable barrier to unity where the will exists.

Improvements in Africa's communication systems—such as highways linking the various countries—will go a long way in promoting inter-state travels among Africa's teeming population. Greater mobility will bring with it greater awareness of those ties which bind the peoples of Africa. It will also help to break the cultural and social barriers between states eliminate any suspicion which militates against greater unity among the member-states of the O.A.U. In order to promote this much-desired mobility visas, at least for short visits, should be abolished. This step can be taken without much harm being done to any nation's sovereignty.

It is regrettable to note that several African countries insist on conducting bilateral negotiations with foreign nations, in spite of the former's membership of the O.A.U. which could through the collective bargaining of all members achieve better results. A case in point is the recent oil crisis which caused the O.A.U. to open negotiation with the oil-producing Arab states with a view to securing better oil terms for the member states. Yet, some members found it necessary to negotiate individually and directly with the Arab states, thus weakening and embarrassing the O.A.U. in its efforts. The O.A.U. states should borrow a leaf from the Arab League whose relations with Africa are regulated and coordinated through an African Affairs Office. Arising from the above trend is the fact that member states of the O.A.U. have not even implemented the resolutions which they themselves helped to work out at the meetings of heads of state or at the various committees of the organisation. The resolutions on Rhodesia after U.D.I. and on South Africa are typical examples. This attitude on the part of member-states must change if greater unity is to be achieved. The same change of attitude is required with regard to contributions for the up-keep of the organisation. The O.A.U. budget often cannot be met because some members either make their contributions late or refuse to pay their dues. As a result, difficulties over finance have led to the "suppressing" of the Committee on Arbitration which used to be one of the most successful committees of the O.A.U.⁵⁷

One can also understand why so many member-states have put so much premium on economic development. However this development has been hampered by lack of political unity.⁵⁸ For instance,

many West African countries cannot build and manage an iron and steel industry because of the enormous cost involved and yet they need the by-products for the development of less expensive industries. A number of steel industries can be planned on a continental basis to cater for the needs of member-states. But this will depend in part on political considerations. Consequently, it will be necessary for member-states to realise that greater political unity is necessary for the achievement of the social and economic development so dear to African leaders.⁵⁸

Above all, the O.A.U. Secretariat should be reorganised to make it more effective to tackle the problems of the organisation. In this regard, it is encouraging to note that at the last meeting of the summit in Mogadishu, the delegates called for this reorganisation.⁶⁰ A decade ago, one could appreciate why the Administrative Secretary General was required merely to supervise the execution of resolutions. Today he should be given the powers to formulate policies for adoption and to initiate ways and means of bringing about a greater unity of purpose among members. He should not be seen as a political officer but as a technocrat at the head of a group of experts dedicated to the cause of African unity. In addition, the subtle pressures put on the officials of the secretariat to the a certain line by their home governments should be abolished. The Secretariat should be given the authority to recruit its staff directly rather than through the governments of the various member-states. This is the only way in which to ensure that the loyalty of such officials is to the O.A.U. The secretariat should also be reorganised into Departments staffed by experts and given the tasks of coordinating of efforts of member-states in a given area. For instance, the economic department could promote cooperation among member states in economic matters, while the Foreign Affairs Department could coordinate the efforts and policies of member-states in their dealings with the outside world.

No one doubts the salutary effects which the O.A.U. has had on Africa's political scene since 1963. It is already becoming difficult to visualise an Africa without the O.A.U. All that is now required is for the African leaders to take that necessary step forward which will culminate in African unity whose quest has spanned

several continents and many decades, and on whose service many Africans had spent their lives.

FOOT NOTES

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49. Zik, A : Selection from speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 72.
50. This and other issues are discussed in Thompson and Bissell "Legitimacy and Authority in the O.A.U." in *African Studies Review*, Vol. XV, No. I, April 1972, p. 17-41.
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52. This and other issues are discussed in Pul Saenz : "The Organisation of African Unity in the Subordinate African Regional system" in *African Studies Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, Sept. 1970, p. 203-225.
53. Z. Cervenka. op. cit. p. 153-156. also Donald Rothchild, "Experiment in Functional Integration" in *Africa Report*, April, 1968.
54. The recent war of words between the Arab States and the other African member-states of the O.A.U. over oil quite clearly show that there is lingering suspicion between the two groups.
55. *West Africa* : No. 2490, February 20, 1965, p. 203.
56. For a discussion of this and other problems affecting the O.A.U. see Richard A. Fredland: "The O.A.U. After Ten Years: Can it Survive ?" in *African Affairs*. Vol. 72: No. 288, July, 1973 p. 309-316.
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59. The problem of regional economic planning is discussed in Reginald H. Green : "Multi-Purpos Economic Institutions" in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2, June 1962, p. 184.
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African Literature and its Language of Expression

More than a decade has passed since Obi Wali's provocative article¹ in which he questioned the validity of writing 'African Literature' in languages other than African. He argues that by writing in European languages, specifically English and French, the literature produced so far is "a mere appendage to European literature"; encourages slipshod literary criticism; guarantees the decay and extinction of African languages. Moreover,

The consequence of this kind of literature is that it lacks any blood and stamina, and has no means of self-enrichment. It is severely limited to the European-oriented, few college graduates in the New Universities of Africa, steeped as they are in European literature and culture. The ordinary local audience, with little or no education in the conventional European manner, and who constitute an overwhelming majority, has no chance of participating in this kind of literature..²

Objections to Wali's views were already anticipated by him that the multiplicity of African languages was a serious impediment to their use in literature; the readership of such literature would be drastically reduced whereas English and French have wide international currency; that most African writers think in English and French and so naturally use those languages. One writer, nevertheless, came up in full support of Wali by asserting that :

In Europe there is no literature in a non-European language. Even in India, literature in English would not be called Indian literature. Every piece of literature written in English, even if written in African, is a contribution to English literature, not to any African literature. Literary history has always been classified by language : Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, not by country or continent. I do not think there can be any other African literature but literature in African languages.³

Nothing has happened since then to change the situation. But to the sensitive African, Wali's verdict lurks always in the background, emerging periodically like the Ghost in *Hamlet* to goad one on to further reflection. These comments are evoked by certain type of criticism that comes from non-African pens. In his book on Achebe's novels, for instance, G.D. Killam writes :

More recent comment on Achebe has sought to relate him to the literary traditions of England. This is appropriate since not only does he write in English and prefer to be judged by the general critical standards which apply; but also he admits that the writers who have influenced him number among them Conrad, Graham Greene, Waugh and others, and thus it would be expected that his work would fit into the general pattern of English fiction in the twentieth century.⁴

The obvious report is that the English medieval poet Chaucer was overwhelmingly influenced by European poets; Wyatt and Surrey were influenced by the Italian Petrarch, Dante and Ariosto; Edmund Spenser was influenced by the work of the French *Pleiade* Du Bellay. Ronsard and Desportes ; William Wordsworth was influenced by the German Schlegel. The list is endless, but it has not occurred to anybody to fit their works into the general pattern of the countries from which they borrowed. Surely, what matters in these situations is the use of the English language. It is the same criterion by which Joseph Conrad, although a Pole, has his works classified as English. Comparison of the African situation with those of America, Canada or Australia is erroneous. These countries' retention of English pro-

vides no anomaly, because, in spite of the presence of other nationals in their population, the original founding stock was English.

Another critic, Bernth Linfors is uncertain how to describe this type of African literature which is written in English. On one occasion he describes it as "Nigerian literature in English" and at another "Nigerian English Literature", thus emphasizing the ultimate Englishness of its heritage.⁵ Publishing houses do not have doubts about their own classification. New leaflets advertising publications list the novels of Achebe, the plays of Soyinka and others under 'English Literature'.

Of recent, a non-African critic,⁶ J. Georges Joyaux, admitting the chaotic state in African literature criticism, suggested procedures "to insure that tomorrow's African literature be truly African". These include the creation of "an authentic African School of Sociology, whose analysis and definitions would provide a guarantee for the permanence of the African identity"; the creation of an authentic School of African criticism whose authority would eventually supersede that of the European (and Western) School which has for too long evaluated African Literature in terms of Occidental standards". When he comes to the choice of language he is sufficiently objective to discern that:

Not only do the African writers find their public abroad, but they also find their consecration there, and as a result they are to some extent reshaped by the public which reads them upon whose support they depend for their existence.⁷

Nevertheless, he ends with the old slogan which discourages the use of the vernaculars for "not only it would not bring the writer a quantitatively increased reading public, but again it would confront him with another dilemma: which to choose of the hundred of languages and dialects currently in existence south of the Sahara". Yet, earlier on, the same writer had decried the linguistic partitioning of Africa according to the mother tongue of the colonizing nation as "a kind of unavowed cultural imperialism which strives to enlarge ever further one's cultural domain through absorption and annexation." Most people believe that its language is the deepest

and fullest expression of any culture.

The peculiar situation which the choice of a foreign language creates for the African writer is exhaustively analysed by Gerald Morre in his book *The Chosen Tongue*.⁸

“Where the common speech is not simply a dialect of English, however, but another language altogether, the writer who works in English finds himself in a rather anomalous position with regard to what would normally be his immediate public. It is true that as this public progressively acquires some knowledge of English, through education and contact, his works will become accessible to more and more of them. But, whereas the West Indian writer may be strengthening and enriching the local vernacular by giving it new patterns of literary expression, the African or Indian writer in English can only enrich the language in which he works. Hence his own mother tongue, the tongue in constant use by those immediately around him, enjoys no refreshment from the activities of its own sons and, without such refreshment, may gradually weaken and deteriorate.

“The West African writer occupies a position of singular linguistic complexity in this regard. His native languages offer no discernible alternative to English as a nationally unifying form of expression, let alone a pan-African one. Yet they are still very much a part of the living texture of his society, still the medium in which most popular discussion or celebration takes place.”

There is, therefore, no question about the significance of writing ‘African Literature’ in foreign languages. It is the most eloquent manifestation of the degree of cultural imperialism imposed by Europe on Africa. It is a symbol of the extent to which Europe has absorbed and annexed Africa.

The limitation which this phenomenon places on African literature is illuminate in the type of criticism exemplified in Bernth Linfor’s essay “Oral Tradition and the Individual Literary Talent”. In that essay, Linfors repeatedly asserts his theme of the derivativeness of

African writing. His most sustained attack reads thus :

There is still a good deal of derivative writing coming out of Africa today. Africans continue to publish collections of retold tribal tales and to mimic the literary fashions of Europe and America. It is the carbon copies of classic Western forms and techniques that are often most amusing to a Western readers, especially when they are crudely done and couched in diction that is either extremely dated or extremely contemporary. Aspiring African bards have composed solemn Horatian odes, romantic Petrarchan and Shakespearean sonnets, lofty Miltonic elegies, Pope-like heroic couplets, and Whitmanesque, free verse; playwrights have experimented with drawing room comedy, epic tragedy. Brechtian expressionism, and theatre of the absurd ; novelists have attempted to emulate such luminaries as Dickens, Hardy, Dumas, Faulkner, Joyce and Marie Corelli ; and short story writers have enthusiastically responded to a wide variety of literary and cinematographic stimuli, ranging from Maupassant and O' Henry to true confessions...⁹

A young poet who addresses a tribute to the fallen Lumumba is castigated by Limfors for using the sonnet from "The poet does not seem to be aware that he himself has surrendered unconditionally to European cultural imperialism".¹⁰

Literary history is studded with records of the dependence of newer writers on the materials and techniques of their predecessors, within or outside the same culture. The period of the European Renaissance, in particular, witnessed a most unprecedented plundering of the literary heritage of Greece and ancient Rome by northern European literary practitioners. Adaptations of subject matter and theme, translations, imitations, paraphrases, borrowings of literary forms and devices were methods by which these countries succeeded in infusing new life and expanding the scope of their own native literatures. The objective was to bring home to the native populations the best that had been thought and written by the 'ancients'. Thus, the thoughts of Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Epicurus, Seneca,

the forms of Greek and Roman drama, the poetic techniques of Horace, Martial Juvenal, Vergl, and of the latter Dante, Petrarch and Ariosto became the common property of all Europeans. Since each nation converted its borrowings into its own mother-tongue, it was new to its immediate reading public. There were no accusations of derivation or theft. To the literary practitioners, the exercise of transplanting all this material provided a training ground, and apprenticeship during which the individual genius had an opportunity to mature.

An important element in this ferment of literary activity was the desire and conscious effort to stretch and refine the native languages through their use in literature. Patriotism, a product of the Renaissance spread through Europe on the rising tide of national self-consciousness. It affected the language of European literature.

All this is being denied to the African writer—because he writes in languages where all the spade-work has already been finished. He is therefore expected to reach maturity without passing through childhood or adolescence. Since only a small minority of the African population—university educated elites who graduated with degrees in the Arts—has any acquaintance with the classical origins of literature, both its thought and techniques there is no avenue through which those important concepts which have contributed to the foundations of modern civilization can reach the ordinary people.

Two courses seem open to Africans. (The East Africans have made their choice by formally adopting Swahili). One is to retain the European languages with full realization of all its implications. It is a negation of all African efforts in the struggle for decolonization. In the political, economic, and even patently cultural areas, Africa's battle has been to free herself from European domination. The perpetual adoption of European languages is the greatest single manifestation of permanent European cultural domination. Perhaps it is possible for Africans to achieve the objectivity in this matter, advocated by Barry Reckord in his response to Wali:¹¹

"I believe the less languages the better, and wish to Christ everybody spoke Yoruba. I also believe theories of the peculiar potency of any black language are as unfounded as

theories of the peculiar potency of blacks. Both are propagated by nationalists and racists to suit their book."

Africans invented neither nationalism nor racism, and they are not likely to be the culprits in keeping them alive. Would Reckord have been so objective and accommodating if his own language is threatened with extinction?

The adoption of European languages has far-reaching consequences. Just as the texture of the literature which has already been produced has been affected (through the influence of overseas readership and approbation) its future development will be dictated by the same exigencies. With the exception of a few works of genuine artistic merit, the importance of African literature to a large percentage of its promoters, has been the esoteric matter it embodies mostly of sociological, anthropological and political interest. Now that the systems of African thought, social, and political organizations have been completely exposed, what is going to happen? By 1966 Lewis Nkosi in *Africa Report* had already begun to ask:

"Where does African literature go from here? After the initial excitement about any African who could put two sentences together, critics are going to harden toward African books and treat them like any writing from anywhere in the world. Already the African themselves and foreign scholars working intelligently in African universities have begun to sort out the aristocracy of creative talent from hack writers drawn to writing only by the attractions of instant publication."

Three years later, another critic John Porey, again confirmed the new development.¹²

"Looking back over 1968, there appears to have been a hiatus in the publication of African literature in London—perhaps because of political events, perhaps because of a new rigor in publishers standards of acceptability now that an African book no longer sells purely as novelty."¹³

The future is easily predictable. With the programme of modernization which is being zealously pursued in all African states, these

states will in spite of efforts to retain aspects of their culture, approximate more and more to the European states. The matter of literature will then almost virtually overlap. The difference between African writers and European writers will then be in the fields of technique and imaginative use of language. In both of these areas, the owners of the language who have had a longer and wider acquaintance with modes and techniques will certainly have the advantage. Achebe, Soyinka, Clark, Okara leave all experimented with adding a new dimension to the creative use of English. Like the subject matter, these linguistic innovations are circumscribed within limited circles of development. Moreover, one would have to master the Queen's English first before embarking on that sort of experimentation, as the English writer Paul Edwards has pointed out in *Transition* :

"If African English writing is to take on an individuality, it must come, I think, from an initial control of the language, but school-texts like *Tales Out of School* will not help to give the learner that control. And until we have a much clearer idea of the place of local English usage in West African life, the least we can expect of school reading is that it should be written in good, plain common English.

Pidgin English which titillated the imagination of critics for a while has gradually become significant only in drama and dialogue where it normally characterizes illiteracy or semi-illiteracy.

As Gerald More pointed out,

"deep pidgin will prove to be as restricting, from the point of view of audience, as single tribal vernacular. It will be largely unintelligible to English-speaking communities outside the Guinea coast and may even present difficulties for many of the writer's own countrymen; especially those taken from the far interior, where pidgin has never really taken root."¹⁵

The strain of these limitations will certainly crush all but a few exceptionally gifted Africans. For these few too, the strain of producing a work of art will be at last three times that of the native

of the language. The judges and critics will remain foreign, which is, in itself, an anomaly. The most reliable critics whose verdict is final for any literature are from those to whom the writer belongs.

We would then be back where we started. The racial implications are obvious. For, if the African is not as productive as his European counterpart, he must be biologically and intellectually inferior. The battle against colonialism will have been fought in vain, for, as Charles Larson (*The Emergence of African Fiction*) sanguinely concludes :

“For better or for worse, because of the colonial era English and French seem fated to be the two major languages of communication on the African continent.”¹⁶

The second alternative for Africa is encompassed with difficulties which will be hard but not impossible to circumvent. Its fruition cannot be expected in over a lifetime but it can be guaranteed by laying solid foundations. Povey has already hinted at a new line of development :

“There is also increasing recognition of the quantity and literary quality of African vernacular literatures, both oral and written. While such works will be difficult for Western-trained critics to encompass, they will demonstrate the continuing development of African literature, will not be tied to foreign expectations, but will increasingly taken on the essential nationalism that distinguishes all but derivative literatures.”¹⁷

Isolated reviews and recommendations of literature in the African vernaculars have been launched at various times in the past. Ulli Beier's ‘Saving a Language’¹⁸ takes stock of existing Yoruba vernacular literature, O.R. Dathorues ‘Ibo Literature: The novel as Allegory’¹⁹ does the same for Ibo vernacular literature.

It is clear, however, that were there to appear considerable volume of literature in the vernaculars now, few people will be adequately equipped to read them. This African dilemma was created by the coincidence of the introduction of writing and the

Roman alphabet with the political subjugation of Africa by European imperialists.

Because of European political interventions in Africa, the work started by missionaries on the African vernacular languages was quickly squelched.²⁰ The Europeans in Africa were neither humble nor tactful. For humility, moderation and selective re-moulding, they substituted arrogance, violence and cultural eradication and domination. Africans are once more in political control of their own land and have the opportunity to restore their culture and language. They will have, however, to start from the very beginning.

The sudden arbitrary imposition of one sectional language on other citizens of a country will not solve the problem. It will cause as much resentment as the imposition of European languages and can lead to other forms of conflict as was the case in India. Besides, as all critics of African literature, including Africans themselves admit, none of the African vernaculars-except possibly Swahili is in a shape to carry the weight of modern complexity in thought or expression. The first step will be to encourage the study of the vernaculars in schools and to provide adequate texts to give practice in the use of these vernaculars in writing. Secondly, committees of scholars and linguists should be set up to explore all avenues to salvage what remains of the vernaculars and to work out a comprehensive programme which will lay solid foundations for the rehabilitation of the vernaculars to their original positions of primacy. The programme outlined in A. N. Skinner's "Centre for Nigerian Language"²¹ incorporates the main areas of emphasis. But this work should be undertaken on a national level with adequate financial support. If such a programme is vigorously pursued, with periodic revision, it will then be possible for future generations of Africans to be so competent in the use of their own languages to choose them for creative work.

At the same time, a local readership would have emerged. African writers would then have as their immediate audience primarily their own people who will have the opportunity to participate in, and help to determine the future development of their national literature. This is what obtains in other parts of the world.

FOOT NOTES

1. Wali, Obiajunwa, "The Dead End of African Literature", *Transition*, Vol I, No. 10, Sept. 1963, pp 13-15.
2. *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 1963, pp. 7-9.
Vol. 3, No 12. January-Feb 1964 pp. 5-10.
3. Knappert, Jan, "Swahili as an African Language", *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 13, Mar-April 1964, p. 6.
4. Killam. G. D. *The Novels of Chinua Achebe*, Heinemann, London, 1969, p. 2
5. Linfors, Bernth, "Oral Tradition and the Individual Literary Talent", *Folklore in Nigerian Literature*, Africana Publishing Company, New York, 1973, p. 32.
6. Joyaux, Georges J. "On African Literature", *African Studies Review*, Vol. XV, No. 2., Sept. 1972, pp. 307-318.
7. Ibid. pp. 316-7.
8. Moore, Gerald, *The Chosen Tongue*, Longmans, London, 1969, pp. xix-xx.
9. Linfors, *Op. Cit.*, p. 26.
10. Loc. Cit.
11. *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 11, Nov. 1963, p. 7.
12. Nkosi, Lewis, "Where does African Literature go from Here", *Africa Report*, Vol 11, No. 9, December 1966, p. 11.
13. Povey, John, "African Literature's Widening Range" *Africa Report*, Vol. 14, Nos. 5 & 6. May-June, 1969, p. 69.
14. Edwards, Paul *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 12, Jan-Feb. 1964, p. 10.
15. Moore, Gerald, *Op. Cit.*, p. xx.
16. Larson, Charles, *The Emergence of African Fiction*, Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1972, p. 11.
17. Povey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 69.
18. Beier, Ulli, "Saving a Language" *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. V. No. 4, Jan-March 1966. pp. 324-338,
19. Dathorne, O.R, "Ibo Literature: The Novel As Allegory" *Africa Quarterly*, Vol VII No. 4 Jan-March, 1968. pp. 365-368.
20. See E. N. Obiechina's "Growth of Written Literature in English speaking West Africa" *Presence Africaine* 66, 2nd Quarterly, 1968, pp. 58-78.
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Historical and Sociological Constraints on the Economic Development of Africa.

The Economic development of Africa suffers from two types of constraints—viz, historical and sociological. Under the former category only those constraining factors that developed under colonial rule have been examined.

Historical Constraints

Colonial domination and the deliberate exploitation that went with it, may be seen in itself as a major set back in African history. The white impact was felt both in the material and in the psychological spheres. Colonialism deflected Africa from the path of her natural evolution to such an extent that she can never be her old self again. The new processes of economic and political orientation that started under alien rule will have an incalculable influence on future development. There was unbridled economic and human exploitation and the African was uprooted from his cultural matrix.

For more than four hundred years the slave trade ate into the body and soul of Africa, destroying more than 20 million people. "It is estimated that at least one African died before being sold at the coast for every one who was sold. Thus, some 25 million to 26 million Africans were killed or removed from Africa between 1451 and 1870, as a result of the slave trade, on both sides of the continent."¹ The economic effects of the hideous trade were profound. All peaceful pursuits in western and west central Africa were neglected. In East Africa smiling villages gave way to desolation. Agriculture and orderly economic development were abandoned. As

A. Adu Boahen writes² "the European trade with Africa in general and the Atlantic slave trade in particular definitely delayed economic development in Africa for well over three hundred years." From the social point of view, the European impact was indeed ghastly. Fear and insecurity stalked the land. None dared to stray far from his home without a gun. There could be no social or cultural life in the land of death and fear.³ Boahen tells us that by 1700 'the great art and sculpture of the people of Ife, Benin, and Oyo had virtually disappeared.' Even the white man's cynical attempt at spreading Christianity had to stop, as some of the priests and teachers wanted a share in the spoils of slavery. It is difficult to visualize the universal brutalization that resulted among both blacks and whites. We often forget that the memory of slavery is still fresh in the minds of the common people. If Africa is impoverished and paralyzed today it is because of the Europeans. The destruction of the African's self-confidence and self-respect is a task that is not even yet at an end. The poor motivation that is hampering progress today is a result of slavery. Most racist attitudes towards blacks today are a direct result of the period of slave trade. No other country in the world today is suffering from a comparable constraint on its economic development.

Even at the turn of the century, alien government did nothing to speed up economic growth. Rather were economic and social development subjected to the profit motive. All transport and communication system reflect the needs of the erstwhile exploiter rather than those of the African people. Inter-African trade has been hampered by exchange difficulties because African currencies are chained to the metropolitan currencies. In transport bottlenecks and unfair tariffs we see the legacies of colonial rule.

Another factor that adversely affects the economic life of Africa today stems from the 'scramble' days when European powers carved Africa up for themselves in the council halls of Europe. They did not notice that they were cutting across ethnic groups. This has led to tensions between African countries. Hostile attitudes and mutual suspicions have caused most attempts at political or economic integration to fail Africa, with her contending tribes, is still searching for sound bases of economic cooperation, without which there can be

no take-off. The politics of the East African Community reflect all the problems of integration.

The cultural polarisation of the continent into Anglophone and Francophone areas has added immensely to the difficulties of integration of any kind. Indeed, the areas are vastly different worlds and have inherited all the cultural animosities and prejudices that the Britain and the France have had for each other since ancient times. The culture and attitudes and language of the former rulers cannot be shaken off after independence. The tensions that such differences generate are a drag upon economic development.

There is a problem that is peculiar to the countries of East Africa. It is the presence of the Asians as a dominant minority. Though initially they may be said to have benefited the country economically their continuing presence is of doubtful value. They were the pioneers who carried their goods far into the bush to villages beyond the reach of road or railway. Even today they form an intellectual, professional or entrepreneurial elite. It is their very success as such an elite that makes them a menace to the economic welfare of Africa. For, these fine entrepreneurs and teachers and doctors are taking the fight out of the African. Africa is finding it hard to breathe and grow—unless the Asian is prepared to stand by and watch and encourage. But they are human beings after all. There is no Brown Man's Burden any more than there is a White Man's. To the extent to which African intelligence and skill were not trained and utilized by the Asians, there was a waste of human resources. A limited use of resources implies a limitation of control over the material environment. We call this increasing control over our material environment 'progress', and this is a fundamental value in modern times. Asian attitudes and exclusivity involve at least a partial abandonment of this value. Besides the incalculable psychological costs for economic development there are also some obvious monetary costs. An intelligence report from Washington⁴ confirms that the Asians of East Africa have at least 750 million dollars invested in Britain and that Ugandan Asian sent more than a tenth of this sum to London within the few months prior to their expulsion. But a hasty and inhuman expulsion of these people or an overnight Africanisation are not answers to the problem. African leaders like

the late Tom Mboya are keenly aware of the wrong attitudes, often poisoned by racialism, of private Asian employers. They are sensitive to the needs of economic development and know that it can be retarded by tense employer—employee relations. Asian employers still exhibit colonial postures by regimenting and suppressing workers. They label Africans with imperialistic tags like “they are lazy” or “their needs are few”. They also pay them very low wages, exploit them and order them about. Thus, the leaders of nascent Africa know that it is necessary to free the African both physically and mentally in order to accelerate economic growth.

The Psychological Legacy of Colonial Rule

Several obstacles to development arise from the attitudes, ideas and practices of the colonial era.

There was a widespread economic paternalism that sapped all initiative in the African. Authoritarianism existed both in the political and economic life of colonial Africa. The African farmer was told what to grow, when and how to grow it, and at what price his produce must be sold. They were not allowed to produce first quality maize or eggs or potatoes. All elite goods came in time to be identified with the European and all inferior things were African.⁵ These attitudes soon sank deeper into the subconscious and helped strengthen the ubiquitous myth of African inferiority. The African almost began to believe that he could never compete with the white man because he had not even learned how to produce a nail. Tom Mboya had heard this so often at meetings or *Barazas*.⁶ Mboya also talks of the way in which white missionaries told very young African children that they would never be ready for independence for a long, long time to come. It was and is very difficult for Africans to grow out of this kind of conditioning.

The colonial powers manipulated the entire economy to their own advantage. They organized the markets and controlled the flow of commodities and labour. From Harry Thuku's autobiography we see that Africans were not allowed to grow coffee and thus, compete with the European. Later on, a concession was made, but the number of trees was limited; a supervisor would count the

saplings on African farms. There were innumerable state controls like sales quotas, price controls, the monopolistic allocation of sales and purchases, the regulation of entry into trade and industry, the provision of "rations" as part of wage payment and compulsory "deferred saving" schemes of various sorts in the wage sector. Needless to say, all these controls were for the benefit of the Europeans. The psychological harm they did to the African is beyond measure. They arrested the growth of a sense of responsibility in him. He was not thrown into a free competitive market to make and learn from countless decisions at every turn. Anglophone West Africa suffered less from the heavy hand of paternalism than did East Africa. It is probably because of this that there is so much economic vitality in the West. Even while reading an autobiography, like that of Chief Awolowo, one senses the ubiquitous desire to enter business. The Economic Woman is as impressive a fact of Nigerian life as the Economic Man. What is interesting is that the political elites of independent Africa show a penchant for state enterprises and state control of production and marketing. There is a little enthusiasm for individual initiative in a free market. One wonders how far this approach is a result of colonial history and how far it is dictated by socialist ideology.

Another attitude that colonialism has left in its wake occurs in the wage-earning sector. The hostility of employees towards their employers was continued to the present day. It is evident even in state-run enterprises. The employers of an alien race were "they". There was no pride of belonging or sense of participation. The railways in Guinea suffered seriously because of this hostile attitude. Thus, psychological decolonization in the African's work-habits must be brought about if economic growth is to be quickened.

The wage-structure of colonial times tends to get crystallized into the economy of a new state. Where trained and educated men are hard to come by, know-how gains a special rarity value. This causes wages to remain high. Under imperial rule, skill and training have an extra value when clothed in a white skin. Along with several handsome fringe benefits, white salaries were so high as to be unconscionable in a poor African country. Next came the salaries of the Asians, whom the British brought into Africa as scapegoats

and buffers for imperialist rule. Below the skilled Asians was the semi-skilled and unskilled mass of black Africans forming the *tiers-etat* of colonial Africa. The wages at the top were five times that of the lowest level. By contrast the ratio obtaining in the United States is 1.2 to 1. This absurdity has continued even after independence when most of the top posts are held by Africans. This wage structure impoverishes Africa and constitutes a serious impediment to planning a rational economy. We here a lone voice in the wilderness—that of Nyerere—repeating “The country cannot afford it.” Though most countries have succeeded in paring away the “Fringe benefits”, they cannot touch the basic salaries which are protected by the forces of supply and demand, deep-set habits and political considerations.

A colonial heritage peculiar to Francophone Africa is the heavy dependence on the ‘mother’ country for direct subsidies. This is especially true after the Second World War. France financed most of the development projects in her former colonies and also helped their capital formation. In a sense this has been a disservice to the African countries concerned. Their leaders are unwilling to face a future in which they will have to be self-reliant financially. Even after independence, nearly 70 per cent of the trade of Francophone Africa has been within the France zone. High tariffs and exchange controls have forced the African countries to purchase expensive consumer and capital goods. At times the African producers also benefited from the protected market in France. They sold peanuts and coffee at much higher prices than those obtaining elsewhere. In 1961, Ivory Coast coffee fetched twice the world price in France. Despite an apparent benefit, African countries must free themselves of colonial apron-strings in a psychological sense, if they wish to develop into sturdy economic entities.

Sociological Constraints

Before analyzing the sociological constraints existing in Africa, it is necessary to focus our attention on the nature of traditional African society.

Through the centuries, the ethnic community has been so well integrated that every individual’s physical and psychic needs for

food, shelter and security are well looked after from birth to death. The highest ideals of socialism and the welfare state have always been in operation within the tribe, to say nothing of democracy in its pristine purity as a government based on a consensus of the opinions of all. Nobody went hungry in Africa if there was a morsel to share. If a man's hut was burnt accidentally, all his neighbours gave a helping hand. An inclament environment forced the Africans to become a very practical people who placed social survival above all else. The emphasis is always on the present, on group survival and on co-operation. All past feuds must be forgotten. Only those events of the past must be remembered that will unite the people in the present and in the future.⁷ The group afforded the African an almost maternal care. No one was unwanted. No one was too ugly or too poor to be married. Cattle owned by an uncle or a distant cousin or by any member of his tribe could easily be acquired to provide the bride/wealth he needed. Not seldom the tribal elders arranged for several people to provide the bride wealth for a poor, solitary man. It was not expected that he should return the cattle; rather was it taken for granted that he would do the same years later for somebody else's son.

When this kind of a society which was wholly self-sufficient in peace and contentment encountered the powerful alien force of a monetary economy, the impact was *au fond* psychological. The African has to work for wages but he returns the more compellingly to the bosom of his people. They are the only source of security to which he can look in old age or sickness. It is a social security scheme that will never fail him. Without an in-depth study of the psycho-ethnography of a people, it is difficult to understand their economic behaviour. Thus, what J. H. Boeke⁸ noted about the inverse elasticity of supply operating in pre-war Indonesia is true also of African countries. When wages are raised less work is done and labour flees the faster to the villages. The problem of an unstable labour market is a continuing one and plagues the most resourceful entrepreneur in Africa, for it defies all the incentives he dangles before it. Most young men go into a town like Nairobi to find work so that they can save up enough to pay bridewealth. Once the target is achieved they go back to their *shambas*. If wages are

raised, the target is reached sooner. Thus, economic incentives only aggravate the problem of labour turnover. Economic development is retarded by this problem to a considerable degree. S. Daniel Neumark⁹ is of the opinion that the phenomenon "does not arise from the innate characteristics of the people.....it arises from the characteristics of an embryonic exchange economic which, inspite of its dealings with the outside world, operates only on the fringe of a modern exchange economy." He feels that there is no continuous use for money earned in the embryonic economy; there are only occasional needs for specific things—like a bicycle, or a watch or bride wealth. Such a demand he calls a "target demand". These target demands are the people's only link with the outer economic world. While the importance of these economic factors cannot be denied, it should be emphasized that sociological factors provide the matrix for the "embryonic exchange economy". A whole world of social and cultural values is involved in the problem of labour turnover. The answer cannot be found in economics alone.

Melville Herskovits¹⁰ has shown that the rhythm of work in indigenous societies is also the rhythm of the seasons. It is the seasonal rhythms that dictate changes in economic activity. The iron workers of the Volta River are also agriculturists and divide their time between the two types of activities. All iron-work is put off till after the rainy season. Similarly, house-building or mat weaving or the manufacture of utensils are put off till the dry season. Even rituals are put off till then, unless there is an emergency. The dry season was the time for travel, for visiting distant relatives or going on hunting expeditions. This change in the routine was always welcome. So when Africans went to work in factories and mines they continued to look forward to this sort of a break in the dry season, which would be crowded with social and religious activities. This attitude of mind goes back through centuries of time and is closely linked to the problem of incentives. Thus, it is clear that the problem of the flight of labour is more complex than is apparent in Neumark's narrow economic interpretation.

An important factor that creates tensions and hampers economic development is the alterations in the habits of food consumption that are forced upon people in a changing society. The patterns of

food consumption, the types of food taken and the time-schedule, all undergo change. Herskovits has emphasized the importance of the cultural time-table for meals. Workers in factories develop hostility and aggression because of this sudden change in their lives. Even in fields such as education, which are so vital for programmes of development, the effects of these changes are keenly felt. Most mission-educated Africans have painful memories of long stretches of hunger as school children. This constraint upon development is itself a result of development programmes.

Another noteworthy factor of this type that arises from development, is the individualistic nature of modern employment. A modern entrepreneur appoints individuals to specific tasks. He watches and rewards individual progress. Wages and incentives are also directed towards individuals. The men who have been appointed are fresh from an environment where they have always worked in a group for the benefit of the whole group living in the village. Land is owned by the whole community. As a boy the African herded all the animals of the community in an orderly system of rotation; as a young man he hoed his neighbour's fields one day and was helped on his own *shamba* the next. In Africa we find not so much the primacy of the joint family as the primacy of the ethnic group. Members of an initiation age-set are as emotionally integrated as brothers. But the process of modernization brings these highly collectivized people under canons of employment obtaining in Europe and America. Even when European workers form trade unions they are just aggregates of individuals. In Africa group labour has been necessitated by the environment and the need for cultivation by the hoe. Labour can only be mobilized in groups; each group with a leader who alone is responsible for the quality and quantity of work done. Under the traditional system the leader is primarily responsible to the group itself and he is himself a member thereof. It is a "democratically controlled indigenous cooperative work group",¹¹ and bears little resemblance to the western work gang under an authoritarian supervisor. The African who was born and bred in a system in which initiative and effort arose from an inner motivation has to adjust himself to a system which is essentially impersonal. The widespread social disorganization and individual

demoralization are largely due to this clash of cultures. This social disorganization constitutes a major impediment to economic development, while being itself a result of development programmes.

The psychological acceptance of new ideas and innovations is important in the process of modernization. Ralph Linton¹² tells us that most of the factors that affect the adoption and integration of new ideas by a society can be phrased more effectively in cultural than in psychological terms. He says that if we can have deep knowledge of a particular culture, including its particular system of values and attitudes we can predict with a fair degree of probability whether the people will accept or reject an innovation. But there is one variable that can upset the tidy apple-cart of prediction and that is the personality of the individual. According to Linton, the force of character of particular individuals has a very decisive effect on patterns of economic growth. It can either hasten or retard it.

There are a number of cultural or social factors that inhibit or retard individual and social growth. Perhaps the most important of these is unrestricted breeding. While this is a perfectly natural feature of human behaviour, its effects on economic development are vastly augmented by cultural values. In Africa, as in India, a large family brings social prestige. Children are an economic asset when there is herding and farming to do. This social value is closely linked to two other values—viz., an increasing number of wives and an increasing number of livestock—both of which are indicators of economic prosperity. It is doubtful whether a plurality of wives necessarily leads to an increase in the population; Elspeth Huxley disputes this in her book *Sorcerer's Apprentice*. It is the nature of the environment that has made polygyny a necessity.¹³ An African's herds and flocks would increase if he had more daughters than sons, as they would bring him bridewealth. While daughters are a great economic asset, sons are desired to carry on the family name and herd the animals. A man who has no son at all is pitied as his family line would die out.

The pressure of the increasing numbers of people and livestock on the land is East Africa's biggest problem. The people can never reconcile themselves to destocking and finding other forms of wealth because bridewealth is usually demanded in the form of goats and

cattle. Lean, hungry animals crop the countryside and large areas have become dust-bowls because of over-grazing. Often hard-earned money is exchanged for goats. These animals have always been the traditional form of investment. Both economic advantage and social prestige are involved. Modern ideas of banking and investment are fighting a stiff battle against these ancient economic values. A recent study conducted by the UNESCO¹⁴ of ethnic groups in Senegal and Tanzania reveals that young men working in towns cannot marry girls of their choice from the countryside unless they buy the required number of goats or sheep to pay the bridewealth. Plain-tive letters from newspapers are reprinted as proofs and show the strength of the traditional value-systems. This continues to be a serious constraint on economic development because ultimately it hampers banking, capital formation, the growth of industries, the improvement of the livestock, the establishment of modern dairies and agriculture. Attempts at destocking have led to tensions and revolt both in the colonial and in the post-colonial periods. Recently, Masai herds posed a problem as they competed for grazing grounds with some of the world's rarest fauna in the Serengeti Plain of Tanzania. Finally, the pressure of opinion from the world of wild life lovers decided that "Serengeti shall not die". The respective grazing grounds of the bony Masai herds and wild fauna were clearly demarcated. The preservation of Africa's wild life is important both in the interests of Natural History and Tourism.

In East Africa cattle are rarely killed for food. Thus, they do not form an important element in the subsistence economy. Only the milk is used. The Masai drink both blood and milk. There is meat only when a cow dies or when an ox is sacrificed at the funeral of the owner of the herd. Herskovits¹⁵ points out how the only innovation from the west that was welcomed was the improvement in the breed and health of the animals. Almost all the cattle are kept exclusively for internal prestige consumption and there is hardly a marketable surplus. Land that is essential for food or cash-crop production is often taken over for grazing. Most government projects involving their disposal end in social disutility. An example cited by Herskovits illustrates the difficulties faced by development programmes. East Africa has some of the finest pasture-lands in

the world. They could be used to produce meat for the world market. A vaccine to immunize cattle from trypanosomiasis caused by the tsetse fly was developed. All the elements that were essential for a successful development programme were present in the situation. Yet, nothing happened. For cattle occupy the central place in the African scheme of life. It is a system of prestige economics which means nothing to us. Indeed, it is very difficult for us to appreciate the fact that cattle are the very meaning of the life of the African. Besides being a mark of status, cattle validate the marriages of his children. Off spring do not become legitimate unless the bridewealth is paid in full. Above all, cattle link the African living today with all his ancestors through a complex system of rituals. Herskovits mentions an African veterinary assistant who knew each cow he injected by name. There are scores of words with the subtlest shades of meaning to describe every part of a cow. The glory of the kine is sung in the oral literature of the land. All these cultural values have deep roots. Only Nyerere's gentle method of ushering in economic change will prevent psychological harm. While touring Nzega District which has a higher cattle population than any other in Tanzania, the President said: "cattle is our wealth and you must use your wealth. Every year you must sell some cattle to get money for your children's schooling, and for better houses."¹⁶

Constraints on the Entrepreneur

A disincentive to greater individual effort in the economic field lies in the fact that every educated and well-placed African finds himself obliged to provide for a large extended family. Thus, the traditions of African family life prevent the growth of individualism and the accumulation of capital—two factors which are crucial to development. The budding entrepreneur finds the obligations of kinship draining away his financial resources. In a subsistence economy there is general levelling because of the widespread poverty. In the absence of elitism, communal sharing is easier. But no sooner does a man rise above his kins folk, his relatives descend upon him with insistent demands for school fees, free boarding and jobs. Thus, a talented and ambitious entrepreneur is unable to save up and expand business. If he gets discouraged from higher efforts,

the general development of the country suffers a set-back. The money earned comes from individual effort but the consumption pattern is based upon the traditions of a collectivist society. It would appear that the selfishness that western-type economic development entails goes ill with African socialism. However, it must not be forgotten that many African boys have been sent to mission-schools and then to England or the United States from money contributed by a whole kin group. Unless a wealthier relative in town gives free boarding, lodging and school-fees to poor relatives, they can have no hope of even getting an education. It can be convincingly argued that this system of kinship obligations is an aid to economic growth. Not all entrepreneurs are hindered completely by their familial obligations; for they know when to be firm and insist that their business is something apart from their private lives. They argue that business has its own laws of economic rationality and that the success of the enterprise must be put above all else. While cultural factors are not unimportant determinants of economic behaviour, it must be noted that it is not impossible to overcome them with a strong personality.

An African entrepreneur works in a socio-economic environment which he does not understand fully and cannot manipulate easily. Sources of credit, or skills or knowledge are hard to come by. There are language difficulties if he has started out with a poor schooling. He has very few contacts outside his own ethnic group. Just above and around him is the Asian economic wall he cannot penetrate. In olden days, the economy was simpler and contacts with the outside world was through the trade-routes. But today, Africa is drawn into the vortex of world economic pressures. There is a sudden breaking down of all barriers with the outside world without a corresponding increase in the individuals knowledge of the factors operating in the world markets. Conscious efforts must be made to educate the naturally venturesome entrepreneur in the very practical skill of knowing and exploiting his resources. Confidence must be stimulated in him to face a network of commercial institutions largely created and manned by an alien elite. The social background to which he belongs is an entirely different world. There are two opposing cultures, and he has to go from the one to

the other over a yawning abyss. His society, the skills it has taught him, the men he always looked up to as being wise and great have nothing at all to do with the world of cut-throat competition he wishes to enter. His people can give him no financial backing, securities or credit-worthiness. The world of commerce for him is not a world of other Africans he can trust, learn from or form partnership with. Rather it is a hostile world of aliens, created for him under colonial rule.

After independence Africans have got into the habit of looking up to their Government for guidance, help of all kinds, loans and credits. Government must give them contacts with foreign firms, arrange for hired experts, provide capital, buy up their produce and sell it for them. This means that they do not look market forces of demand and supply in the face and learn to put through deals on their own initiative. The new paternalism (or is it maternalism) of African Governments may continue to hamper the entrepreneur for a long time. Of course, it is hard to see any alternative to governmental help to stimulate initiative. It is hoped that the African entrepreneur will outgrow his swaddling clothes. Africanisation is only a psychological comfort. When an Asian refuses an African a loan because of his poor credit, the latter fails to understand the economic rationale of the refusal and vents his spleen against all Asians. This is a sort of displacement activity that is quite irrelevant to the problem on hand. Economics is something that is happening to the African ; it must become something he does, something he can manipulate to achieve a desired end. He must know the market mechanism well and establish contacts with the outside world. It is after this take-off in the personal life of the African businessmen that the large-scale benefits of their kinship obligations will be evident as it pulls more and more of their countrymen into the commercial network.

African Economic Motivation

The collectivist ethos of African peoples is usually a drag on those individuals who have a penchant for aggressive trade. Many an African shopkeepers is unconscious of the fact that he is competing with other shopkeepers for a limited number of customers.

The cultural emphasis on co-operation rather than competition has perhaps much to do with this. The underlying culture-conflict between the two value-systems of Africa and Europe—the former stressing brotherhood and the latter stressing personal aggrandisement sometimes comes to the fore in specific situations. One such situation, mirroring this conflict, is described with subtle charm in a children's story by Geraldine Kaye.¹⁷ A little girl called Esi leaves her friends to sell oranges at the cross-roads near the police station and moves away with her basket of oranges. She moves up the road and sells aggressively. After conspicuous success she returns home early. But subsequently the loneliness and group pressure force her to give in and join her friends at the cross-roads.

With regard to the effective incidence of economic motivation in Africa, scholarly opinion is divided. It is divided simply because social phenomena are too varied for generalization. An acceptance of the broad psychological effects of culture upon economic individualism does not imply a naive belief in the complete economic innocence of all Africans. The writer does not conform to any such myth of Africa's pristine innocence of economic motivation. Indeed, trade has been an important aspect of African life down the centuries. Trans-Saharan trade brought Sudanic civilization flowering, in the great empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai. There were teeming markets in Walata and Awdoghash where, Berbers, Soninke and Malinke traders bargained briskly for silk, cotton cloth, salt, metal-work and other goods from North Africa. There were caravans of donkeys bringing in Kola nuts, pepper, elephant tusks, gold, iron bars, sorghum, leather and millet. The king of Ghana had an army of officials and tax collectors; there were carefully specified customs duties and the merchants were protected against thieves. Africa also had a system called dumb barter, which Herodotus described in the 5th century. Another area of trade was the eastern seaboard where maritime commerce created famous cities. The Gold Coast, the Niger delta, the area between Loango in modern Congo (Brazzaville) and Luanda in Angola and the mouth of the Senegal River were the great Afro-European trading regions on the West Coast. European goods like cloth, knives,

axes, swords and luxury items flooded Africa. They were cheaper than those produced indigenously. African rulers waxed rich on the duties they levied and developed an insatiable hunger for guns to strengthen their states. There was nothing Europeans valued more than slaves, which African rulers eagerly supplied. The slave trade was an important part of the general trade between Europe and Africa. The Ovimbundu tribe which had established a powerful federation of kings and chiefs in the Benguela Highlands in the heart of Angola was notorious for its raids into Rhodesia to capture slaves. Their economic drives credit them with about three million slaves sold to the Portuguese and the English¹⁸. Rosemary Arnold describes the elaborate organization developed by Dahomey to control the passage of slaves, Europeans and fire-arms through its territory, its relations with and final control of Whydah a port of slave-trade on the Gold Coast¹⁹. The Dahomans were far from being a trading people. But the Moors from the north had introduced fire-arms into the Sudan and the Europeans had done the same in the south. This put the bow-and-arrow culture of Dahomey in jeopardy. Sheer survival forced an elaborate organization for trade and customs control upon the Dahoman state. In the process they revealed a genius for both economic and political organization.

The truth is that Africans are as human as anyone else and they exhibit the same economic drives. This is emphasized by Christopher Fyfe who cites a pioneering study: *An Economic History of West Africa* by A.G. Hopkins in 1973²⁰. Fyfe also shows how Hopkins' conclusions were earlier confirmed implicitly by Sir Frederick Pedlar. It was Polly Hill who first pointed out that the farmers of Ghana took the initiative in growing cocoa on a large scale for export. Fyfe shows that "the recovery of prosperity in West Africa in the early 20th century owed as much to the enterprise of African farmers as to the colonial governments which built the railways to carry their produce." We must indeed be wary about generalizations. African economic innocence should not be erected into a myth. On the other hand we must recognize the fact that the African's normal economic drives have often lost their edge in the cultural matrix of the tribe. This is more likely

to happen within a tribe. African peoples have been economically venturesome vis-a-vis other tribes and foreigners. Yet, childhood conditioning towards cooperation may often intervene in commercial deals put through in extra-tribal, impersonal, urban contexts.

Other Constraints

In many parts of Africa, customary law has it that when a man dies, his brothers and his cousins have a right to all his property. His widows and children are virtually turned into the streets to fend for themselves as best as they can. Sometimes the widows have to stay with the dead man's brothers. This is what happened to Jomo Kenyatta's mother. He found life so intolerable that he ran away. The same tragedy overtook Awolowo's early life and he was at the mercy of unscrupulous, hard-hearted uncles. Awo went straight from the lap of luxury into beggary because of the traditional law of inheritance. The speedy reform of such laws will aid economic development to a great extent, as regards incentives, investments, productivity, banking etc.

While most African peoples have been stirred to newer efforts by the call of education and a higher standard of life, there is at least one tribe in East Africa that is full of disdain for all things modern. This is the Masai, who have become famous by being romanticized by the British. The Masai hold out proudly against all efforts to change their way of life. It is easy to tell a Masai by the infinite scorn on his face and the typical posture of standing on one leg. The Masai form an island of tradition in a sea of economic change. Thus they are a damper in economic motivation for development.

The place of the African woman, as compared to that of the Indian woman is very high. She is highly respected as wife and mother and economic provider. It is because a woman is so greatly respected that extra wives are coveted. Women are the pillars of the economy in rural Africa. Daughters fetch considerable bridewealth at the time of their marriage. They grow uninhibited and free and never marry a person they do not like. They learn to take their place in society and contribute to its welfare almost as soon as they begin to walk. To send a daughter to school would take her away

Mrs. Padma Srinivasan

from her environment and reduce her usefulness to the rural economy. A mother can ill afford to dispense with the services of her daughters who act as baby-sitters, cooks, water-carriers and general help on the shamba. It is difficult for rural Africans to see how education can add to the value of a person who is already so highly-valued in their economy. Perhaps, education may take her away to a distant, urban environment and she may contract a marriage which will fetch no wealth at all for her father. Thus, traditional society is preventing the spread of female education, which alone can spur modernization.

Traditional Agriculture as a constraint on development

Agriculture under the traditional system has many obstacles for development. Under the customary system, each married man is entitled to clear as much of the bush as is required for his family. He has exclusive right to the return from his work. His right to the land he worked remains dormant even if the area is temporarily lying fallow. But it must be remembered that this individual right was minimal. Land belonged to the entire ethnic group. Clearing the bush and building a hut was group work. Everyone worked at hoeing and harvesting. Land was never owned by an individual and could not be disposed of by anybody. Although each family had its own *shamba*, a hungry person could always walk into the nearest garden and help himself to bananas or maize. Nobody would stop him unless he was taking loads of food away. Nobody starved under this system of socialism.

Nowadays the position of the individual actually cultivating the land has become equivocal. In the past, any piece of land was as good as any other and a shamba had to be abandoned after three or four years. Moreover, there was always plenty of land to go round. Under the circumstances, no thought was given to intensive farming. But in modern agriculture a great deal of individual effort must go into cultivation for increased output or into terracing to stem soil erosion. Communal ownership and farming do not provide the incentives for individual efforts under modern methods. Besides, rational agriculture requires that land should be grouped into economically viable units; this is not the case with tribal lands which are often highly fragmented as in Cameroon and Malawi.

In areas where land is scarce and the desire for cash crops is increasing, we find a growing demand for the individualization of land tenure. The East Africa Royal Commission welcomed this change in attitudes, and recognized the fact that tribal agriculture was outmoded as it made for subsistence farming based on shifting cultivation. It said that a complete social and agricultural re-orientation might have to take place. But mere production for the market was not enough and would but lead to soil exhaustion. The land must lie fallow and crop rotation and soil nutrients were necessary. The trend for the future lies in increased individualization; but this does not necessarily imply complete property rights.

The allocation of tribal lands is often vested, as in Sierra Leone, in the hands of the family head. This often leads to undesirable results when he disposes it to his own advantage. In Sierra Leone, the sale of land for individual ownership is resisted because there is a fear that alien groups from Freetown and its environs would establish estates to the detriment of the members of the tribe. The dampening effect of a traditional land tenure system upon economic incentives is clearly seen in the Kivu Province of the Belgian Congo. Though the peasants knew that an application of manure would increase the yield five-fold, they did nothing to their fields. But they did apply manure to their banana gardens. This was because, according to customary law, the ownership of land was vested in their chief. The peasant has no permanent tenure in land which yields annual crops like manioc or beans; but he enjoys permanent tenure in land where a perennial crop, like bananas, is grown. He knows that if he improves the farmer type of land, his chief would be tempted to take it away. Thus, a traditional system of land holding can prove a drag on economic development.

The Tanzanian Experiment

Nyerere's great experiment in socialism seeks to generate economic development within the traditional matrix of African society. It is a unique experiment because it seeks to harmonize two conflicting factors—viz., modernization and tradition. If this experiment succeeds in the teeth of harsh economic realities it will become an outstanding contribution to political and economic thought. Ujamaa

Socialism is a noble ideology wrought out of the pure socialistic elements of African society. The basic unit of African society is the extended kin group. In the extended or Ujamaa family there is joint ownership of property such as a mutual obligation to work for the group as a whole. With his passion for hard work and perfection even in simple details, Nyerere proceeded to apply this philosophy to the economy of Tanzania. Fired by a sort Gandhian idealism, he tours distant villages and talks to individual farmers, encouraging, advising or warning at every turn. But essentially, he has the undaunted spirit of a teacher, which is why he is affectionately known as 'Mwalimu'.

In all attempts at introducing modern economic and political institutions there is a tendency to level, to uproot and to destroy the heritage of the past. The manipulation of traditional cultures implies an attitude of Eurocentrism. There is a subconscious acceptance of modernization as the highest and only good for mankind. Even the most thoughtful and critical amongst us are not wholly rid of this cultural dependence upon the west. This paper itself is an attempt to see the extent to which traditional society and its norms act as a brake upon economic progress as it is understood in the west. Nyerere's starting point is refreshingly different from ours. Far from seeing traditional society as being at odds with development, he seeks the roots of Africa's upliftment in her own pristine socialism. There is no place in his scheme of things for the acquisitive capitalist or the educated elitist earning twenty times as much as the peasant. He is determined to prevent the rise of a class of capitalists and the occurrence of what he calls the "new scramble for Africa." Of course, it will be very hard to stem the tide of individualism (a euphemism for pure selfishness) that necessarily accompanies the development of a cash economy. No country today can exist in an economic vacuum, and Africa is being drawn irresistibly into the whirlpool of global forces of supply and demand. Monetary transactions and technological change have penetrated deep into Savannah and forest.

It is the all too familiar phenomenon of the traditional society disintegrating in the face of economic change that is evident now in Tanzania. That is the fly in the ointment, and it poses a very real

dilemma for Tanzania's rural policies. A variety of incentives are used to encourage individual producers; however; material progress is being achieved only at the cost of socialist ideals. Increasing commercialization is leading to greater social fragmentation and atomization. The problem is to reconcile economic development and socialist ideals with their contrary pulls. The logic in the situation seems to be : The more of the one, the less of the other. Time alone will show whether Nyerere will succeed in resolving this dilemma and whether the assumption inherent in his ideology—that the economic upliftment of the Tanzanian masses is not incompatible with the high moral ideals of African Socialism is right after all. Economists will then do much rethinking about the problem of tradition as a constraint on economic development.

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FOOT NOTES

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 4. *The Statesman* (Calcutta), Oct. 16, 1972 "General Amin and the Head-load Syndrome" by Russell Warren Howe.
 5. See Mboya, Tom, *Freedom and After*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1963, p. 64.
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 7. Duerden, Dennis, *African Art*, The Colour Library of Art Hamlyn, London. 1968, p. 9.
 8. Cited by Neumark, Daniel S. "Economic Development and Economic Incentives" in Uppal and Salkever, Eds., *Africa : Problems in Economic Development*, The Free Press, New York, 1972, p. 57.
- A contrary opinion is expressed by P. de Briey, "The productivity of African labour", Uppal and Salkever, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
10. Herskovits, Melville J. "Adapting societies to New Tasks' in *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, Edited by Bert F. Haselitz, The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1952.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
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In addition to the items mentioned above, I have benefited greatly in the preparation of the paper from the following books:

1. For the sections on labour tension in Asian owned enterprises, I am indebted to Kapferer, Bruce. *Strategy and transaction in an African Factory* (African workers and Indian management in a Zambian town) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1972.
2. Many of the ideas regarding historical constraints have been suggested by the section 'Tensions in African Development' in Mboya, Tom. *The Challenge of Nationhood* Andre Deutsch, London, 1970, p. 23.
3. The major arguments in the section: "The psychological legacy of Colonial Rule" are drawn from Berg, Elliot J. "The Character and prospects of African Economics" Part I, Chapter I in Uppal and Salkever *op. cit.*, p. 5.

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8. The section on traditional agriculture is based on a study conducted by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization entitled : Problems of Land Tenure and Settlement" in Uppal and Salkever, op. cit., p. 143.
9. Ideas regarding the culture conflicts that hamper the work of the African Entrepreneur were suggested to me by Peter Marris' discussion paper entitled *The Social Barriers to African Entrepreneurship* (cyclostyled). Institute for Development Studies. Nairobi, Discussion Paper No. 61, January 1968.
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Dr. Vijay Gupta

India and Africa

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE
October-December 1975

Afro-Asians Back India

The Secretary-general of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Mr. Youseff el-Sebai of Egypt, expressed his organisation's full support to "the patriotic national policy" of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and called upon "the whole world to pledge solidarity with the people of India."

He said : "In India the forces of reaction and Fascism supported by world imperialism attempted to bring chaos in the country and overthrow the democratically elected government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi through intrigues. Once again the democratic forces rallied together and thwarted these attempts." (October 1, 1975)

Commercial Vehicles Exported

The value of commercial vehicles exported by India in 1974-75 was estimated to be Rs. 200 million, against Rs. 100 million in the previous years. The countries to which Indian vehicles were exported or are being exported include Afghanistan, Uganda, Sri Lanka, Zaire, Mauritius, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Iraq and West Indies. (October 10, 1975)

Close Economic Relations with West Africa

India's deputy minister for external affairs, Mr. Bipinpal Das, said on October 27 in New Delhi that a drive to foster closer economic relations between India and west African countries was to be launched soon.

On his return to the capital after his visits to West African countries i.e. Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Senegal, Mr. Das said that while India had close relations with the African countries on the eastern coast, those with the west African countries had developed only after independence. He said that the heads of states of these countries had told him that they had full faith in the leadership of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, and they extended full support for her actions. They hoped that the steps she had taken would strengthen India.

One of the main points he discussed with the west African leaders, Mr. Das said, was the role of nonalignment in strengthening the movement for closer economic cooperation among nonaligned countries. The discussions also covered Angola, Sahara, west Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Referring to the economic relations between India and West African countries, Mr. Das said the shipping corporation of India was trying to sort out the problem of establishing a shipping line to west African ports. Once the shipping service was established, trade would be easier. India, Mr. Das said, was interested in establishing trade with these countries by setting up joint ventures and providing consultancy services.

An official handout, issued on October 8 in New Delhi, prior to the deputy minister's west African visit, said that "India's relations with all countries in Africa are very friendly and as members of the nonaligned family, all of them have been cooperating with India in various international forums." However, it said "India's historical commitment for the freedom of colonies in Africa and eradication of racialism and apartheid further require that we should have a close joint look at the burning issues in Africa which have defied solution so far." (October 28, 1975)

African Planners Seek Indian Child-care Plan

African children may soon benefit from India's experience in rural child welfare, and have a better chance of growing up in a healthy rural environment that can sustain them instead of driving them to cities ill-equipped to cope with the needs of immigrants. Sudan, the Ivory Coast and Togo have expressed interest in deve-

loping a rural cadre of African "bal sevikas" to run much needed child-care services there.

The need for policies based on efficient rural child-care programmes was highlighted by the recent conference of the International Union for Child Welfare (IUCW) held at Nairobi, Kenya. The Indian pattern of "batwadia" and 'anganwadis' and trained village level workers was cited as a model which could profitably be adopted by African countries. Trained rural welfare workers are in short supply in nearly all of them. Togo, Sudan and the Ivory Coast have asked for Indian knowhow and assistance in setting up training schemes. The Indian Council for Child Welfare pioneered and organised such training in India. (October 28, 1975)

Commonwealth Parliamentary Meet Opens in Delhi

The 21st commonwealth parliamentary conference was inaugurated by President Ahmed on 28 October in New Delhi. This is the second time that India hosted this conference since independence. The earlier conference was held in New Delhi in 1957 jointly with Pakistan and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Others who addressed the inaugural session were the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, (India) and Mr. R. Gujadhur (Mauritius) vice-president of the commonwealth parliamentary association.

The 50-member Indian delegation to the conference was headed by Mr. K. Raghu Ramaiah, India's minister for works, housing urban development and parliamentary affairs. About 260 delegates from 27 commonwealth countries and 16 auxiliary branches attend the conference, scheduled to last till 4 November.

The commonwealth conference is generally held annually and debates matters of immediate concern to the commonwealth. This year's conference, an official handout issued on 18 October in New Delhi said, had special significance in view of the world energy crisis and general economic difficulties which were part of the agenda of deliberations. Subjects like world security, unemployment, functioning of parliamentary government, and building a new international economic order were also taken up for discussion.

(October 29, 1975)

India's Ties with Arabs Hailed

Dr. Abdul Halim Mahmud, Rector of the 1,200-year-old Al-Azhar University of Egypt recalled the cordial relationship between India and the Arab world since the days of Alberuni and praised the high religious and cultural heritage of India.

Presiding over the four-day world Islamic Educational Conference, at Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama here, Dr. Mahmud said that Islam could play a great role in bringing about world brotherhood and interpret perspective.

A large number of delegates including theologists, educationists, Arabic scholars, teachers and authorities of Islamic theology from Africa, west Asia and the Far East attended the conference coinciding with the 85th anniversary of the Nadwatul Ulama, a great seat of Islamic learning in Lucknow.

A similar conference was last held in India in 1912. Some 40 delegates from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, Algeria, Iran, the USSR, Yugoslavia, Syria and Kuwait also attended it.

(October 31, 1975)

International Muslim Meet at Lucknow

A Common, modernised education programme for Islamic countries and establishment of an international Islamic academy were advocated at a four-day international Muslim educational conference, which met from 31 October to 3 November at Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh).

Eminent educationists and theologians from all over the Muslim world who attended the conference discussed problems faced by Muslim societies as a result of the impact of science and technology on them. In his message to the conference, President Ahmed appealed to those dealing with the Muslim educational system to meet the challenges inherent in the changing social order.

The conference, organised to mark the 85th anniversary celebrations of the Darululoom Nadwatul Ulema, a leading institution of the religious learning in the Muslim world, was presided over by Dr. Abdul Hamid Mahmud, rector of Al-Azhar university of Egypt. More than 60 delegates from Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain,

Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Yugoslavia, and the USSR attended the conference. Messages of goodwill were received, among others, from President Sadat of Egypt, King Khalid Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, and King Husain of Jordan.

A group of 25 distinguished Islamic scholars from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates, who attended the Islamic meet, were also given a reception by the Indian Institute of Islamic Studies on 4 November in Delhi. The institute is building a six-storeyed circular library which will have 2 million books, and will probably be one of the biggest libraries, in Asia. (November 4, 1975)

Afro-Asian Solidarity for Economic Independence

Inaugurating the new office of the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation on 10 November in New Delhi, Mr. Chavan, India's minister of external affairs, said that the last two decades, have been truly epoch making in the world history. Peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, representing an overwhelming segment of humanity, have successfully asserted their will to be sovereign and not be mere objects of imperial and colonial exploitation. "This is, however, only a beginning. With every passing year, the Afro-Asian movement, despite formidable obstacles, has grown from strength to strength". He said, "It has not only invigorated, inspired and strengthened the fight for independence in countries under colonial dominance but the movement has now assumed a dynamic form and become the focal point of ideas and positive action with a view to achieving economic independence for the peoples of Africa, Latin America and Asia."

Mr. Chavan said that countries from the developing world, dedicated to the policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence, have a part to play in the remaking of the world. Today, there is undoubtedly widespread understanding and acceptance of the policy of nonalignment and its relevance and importance. Non-aligned countries have consistently worked to democratise international relations, both in political and economic spheres, and to move from confrontation and deadlock to the fields of cooperative and constructive endeavours.

And yet all the success which the nonaligned countries supported by socialist and progressive countries have achieved, Mr. Charan said, needs to be consolidated. "The need for forging unity and solidarity was never as imperative and urgent as it is today", he said. "We are the children of the revolution, as Jawaharlal Nehru used to say often, and it is for us to be united at this crucial juncture in thwarting the attempts of those who would only be too glad to obstruct our march towards orderly progress, stability and much needed development to overcome as quickly as possible the economic, technological and intellectual consequences of long years of colonialism".

Mr. Chavan also said that in a world situation marked by wide economic disparity and unequal trade patterns, there is an urgent and vital need to give a practical and concrete shape to the solidarity of Afro-Asian people in order to bring about a new international economic order.

In conclusion, India's external affairs minister said that we in India have not only said but have consistently worked in our relations with our neighbours and others for building durable peace, understanding and cooperation. "We hope that developing countries in our own region as well as outside it will be able to work out their destinies without any outside interference," he said.

(November 11, 75)

Mr. Yunus' Visit to North Africa

The Prime Minister's special envoy, Mr. Mohammed Yunus, officially visited Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the Arab Republic of Egypt, from October 15 to November 20 and met and held discussions on bilateral and international issues with heads of states and other dignitaries of the north African countries. He also conveyed personal messages from the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, to them. The leaders of these countries expressed their understanding and appreciation of the recent measures taken by the Prime Minister and reaffirmed the friendly relations between India and countries in the region.

During his visit, Mr. Yunus, "who was received with warmth and friendliness everywhere", found much interest in these countries

in expanding cooperation with India, particularly in economic and technical fields. In his discussions, he referred to the long-established contact between India and the countries in the region, and India's willingness to share with them her industrial and technological expertise and facilities in such fields as consultancy and construction services. Among the new proposals discussed for increasing cooperation were offers for medical treatment and educational exchanges. There was scope for expansion in trade with these countries, and for exports from India of items like steel, engineering goods, cement and sugar.

Mr. Yunus also discussed aukaf matters with the concerned ministers and gathered detailed information on their policies and regulations on this subject. He found much appreciation for India's concern for the welfare of Muslims and their charitable endowments. There was also great interest and support for the exchanges of ideas and aukaf matters, particularly on the Indian proposal to convene a seminar to examine various aspects of aukaf administration with the representatives of these countries. (November 25, 1975)

Low-cost Houses for Asia and Africa

President Ahmed called for "bold and unconventional measures" for tackling what he described as the "formidable" housing problem not only in India but in other countries of Asia and Africa. Inaugurating the fourth Afro-Asian housing congress, which began in New Delhi on November 24, President Ahmed asked "policy-makers and planners" to ensure that the measures they evolved brought about improvements in the general quality of life of the masses. He added that with population growth and migration of people in search of employment it seemed that, in the coming decades, the housing problem in Afro-Asian countries might become quite formidable.

About 450 housing experts, including 150 from 19 countries, attended the week-long congress. The main subjects for discussion were measures to promote low-cost housing and problems of human settlements in developing countries.

An exhibition on low-cost demonstration houses was also inaugurated by Mr. B.D. Jatti, vice president, on 25 November in New

Delhi. Commending the exhibition, Mr. Jatti said that through the exhibition an attempt has been made to give an opportunity to those who have attempted to utilise new techniques, designs and materials to reduce the cost of construction. (November 26, 1975)

Newly-free Countries must Safeguard Freedom

India and all newly-free countries must safeguard their freedom and integrity from outside interference, said the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, in her message to the world anti-fascist conference held on 4-7 December at Patna (Bihar).

Mrs. Gandhi added that most of the 6,000 delegates, including more than a hundred from 50 countries, have suffered from fascism, colonialism or neocolonialism in their own countries. "So they can appreciate our present difficulties and the dangers which threaten our democracy and hence our very freedom," the Prime Minister said. "They are aware of the forces which obstruct the road to progress in developing countries and of the various methods adopted by foreign elements who sympathise and encourage them."

An 800-word "Patna declaration," adopted by the conference extended its fullest solidarity and support to all democratic forces in India and to the government of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in "their struggle against internal fascist forces and the threats of foreign imperialists and reaction from outside".

The declaration was presented on 6 December by Mr. Mark Solomon of the USA, and seconded by the former Prime Minister of Poland, Mr. Josef Cyrankiewicz, to the plenary session of the conference.

The declaration also stated that the proclamation of emergency by the Prime Minister and the firm and timely steps taken by her against the rightist and fascist forces saved India from a big calamity. This was followed up by the announcement of the 20-point economic programme and a policy of involving the popular masses and all patriotic forces actively in the implementation of this programme.

The conference appealed to world public opinion to give full support to the Indian people in their struggle for the defence of

Dr. Vijay Gupta

India's sovereignty and independence, and for social progress and peace.
(December 15, 1975)

Seminar on Afro-Asian Women

A seminar on the role and position of women in Afro-Asian countries was held on December 28, 1975, at Azad Bhavan. It was jointly sponsored by the Indian Centre for Africa and African Students Association, (India). The seminar was attended by over seventy young Indian and African participants. The African participants from Kenya, Nigeria, Angola, Zaire, Uganda and South Africa are studying at various places in India such as Ajmer, Aligarh, Bombay, Delhi, Ludhiana, Poona and Varanasi.

While the Indian participants spoke on the role of women in India, the African side gave a picture of the position and role of women in African society.

Examining the role of women in Africa the seminar acknowledged that women played very important role both in and out of the home. It was emphasized that all through the liberation struggle women have played leading role and have thus helped their brothers in the early achievement of Independence. It was stated that in Africa today the majority of women are self-employed in production and processing of food, marketing, handicrafts and cottage industries.

Speaking on the position of women under the South African regime a participant pointed out that the women under the racist South African Government had special problems and lived the life of agony.

The seminar was presided over by Smt. S. Kochar, Secretary, I.C.C.R.

The seminar was followed by a colourful cultural programme presented by African students studying in India. (December 28, 1975)

India's Greetings to Angola

Greeting Angola on its attainment of independence, India has hailed the "heroic effort and sacrifices made by all liberation movements" in that country.

The official spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said that the "Government and people of India greatly welcome the attainment of independence by Angola after five centuries of Portuguese colonial rule.

They express their warmest congratulations to the people of Angola and pay tribute to the heroic efforts and sacrifices made by all liberation movements in Angola in the struggle for national liberation".

He added that India looked forward "to close and friendly cooperation between the two countries in their common task of rapid economic development and building a peaceful world".

(November 13, 1975)

India Condemns S. African Action in Angola

Calling it aggression, the Government of India strongly condemned the South African action in sending its armed forces into Angola.

In a statement, the Government said by introducing its troops into Angola and violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the new nation, the racist regime of South Africa, which has been continuously violating various UN and OAU resolutions, "has further added to its long record to defiance of international law."

The Government of India reaffirmed its pledge to "support the heroic people of Angola in their brave struggle for defending their newly-won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity."

The statement said the Government and the people of India were happy to welcome the independence of Angola on November 11. They had wished them well for consolidating their independence in complete peace and freedom, safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. But South Africa had sent its armed forces into the country. The statement also drew attention to the South African Government's policy of apartheid and continued illegal occupation of Namibia.

(December 9, 1975)

Shellac Export to Egypt

The State Trading Corporation has finalised contract for the

Dr. Vijay Gupta

sale of about Re. one crore worth of shellac to Egypt during the last quarter of this year.

This is the largest single contract signed after canalisation of shellac through the STC in June 1975.

The sale has been effected to the Egyptian public sector organisation "General Company for Trading in Chemicals".

With the finalisation of this contract, India will be exporting shellac worth more than Rs. six crores to various countries during the current financial year.

The contract was signed in Cairo.

(October 5, 1975)

Warm Welcome to President Ahmed in Egypt.

President Ahmed and Begum Abida Ahmed were accorded a warm welcome on 2 December on their arrival at Cairo on a six-day official visit to Egypt. President Sadat of Egypt, along with Begam Jahan Sadat, was present at the airport to receive the Indian presidential party. The route from the airport to the city which was decorated with Indian flags was crowded by large groups of people waiting to have a glimpse of President Ahmed.

The two Presidents had, on 3 December, wide ranging talks which included a review of bilateral relations, the situation in the Indian subcontinent and west Asia and other international developments. After the talks, President Sadat told newsmen that there always had been a special relationship between the two countries which was reflected in their "fruitful talks." Earlier, President Sadat commended the policies of Mrs. Gandhi who, he said, was striving courageously and determinedly for realisation of social justice and political stability and for carrying Indian society to the highest levels of progress in all spheres.

At a social function held in honour of President Sadat on 6 December at Cairo, the two Presidents expressed fraternal sentiments and friendship for each other's country. President Ahmed expressed India's staunch support for Arab cause, and said west Asia would not find peace unless the Palestine problem was solved.

Addressing a largely attended meeting outside the thousand-year old *Al Azhar* university on 5 December at Cairo, President Ahmed called upon the Egyptian people to disabuse themselves of any anti-

Indian propaganda by interested parties about treatment of Muslims in India. President Ahmed said that after partition, India chose secularism where all communities were treated alike. Under this system, Muslims in India had risen to highest positions without discrimination and enjoyed all personal laws. President Ahmed also told his audience, who gathered to join him in Friday prayers, that in India there were 60 million Muslims, the third largest Muslim population after Indonesia and Bangladesh.

The Sheikh of *Al Azhar*, Dr. Abdel Halim Mahmoud, who visited India in November to attend the Islamic conference in Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh) said that during his tour of India, he perceived that all places of Islamic culture were well preserved and Muslims in India had complete freedom in the performance of the rituals of Islam and the propagation of its principles. The Sheikh also presented President Ahmed an Arabic copy of the Koran.

Later, President Ahmed visited a fortress near *Al Azhar* built by Saladin "the Great" in the twelfth century. President Ahmed also met members of the Indo-Egyptian solidarity organisation and explained to them India's achievements.

President Ahmed and Begum Abida Ahmed extended an invitation to President Sadat and Begum Jahan Sadat to visit India which was accepted.

President Ahmed left Cairo on 7 December for Khartoum for a four-day official visit to the Sudan. (December 15, 1975)

Egyptian Oil for India

Egypt has agreed to supply India half a million tonnes of crude worth Rs. 40 Crores under a new bilateral trade agreement for 1976.

The two countries have also agreed that 1976 will be last year of rupee trade. From January 1, 1977, they will switch to trading in convertible currency.

Till now India has been forced to pay hard currency for all crude imports. Egypt is the first country willing to give oil for rupees. However, the cost of Egyptian oil may be somewhat higher than of Persian Gulf oil in view of the higher freight rate involved.

Rice and rock phosphate are other items which Egypt will sell



Dr. Vijay Gupta

to India under the trade agreement, which envisages a turnover of Rs. 120 crores against Rs. 75.28 crores in 1974-75. Over and above this, trade in free foreign exchange will take place. This will cover the possibility that one side may want to buy much more from the other side than it can sell.

India will supply Egypt with engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, refractories, iron and steel, paper products, and a variety of traditional items like jute, tobacco and spices.

An interesting new item which India will sell is blendable coking coal. India itself is normally short of coking coal, but now there is a glut of some of the inferior blendable grades.

PM's Message to Boumedienne

The Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, has sent a personal message to the Algerian President, Mr. Houari Boumedienne.

The message was delivered to him in Algiers by the Prime Minister's special envoy, Mr. Mohammed Yunus, who also conveyed India's warm greetings to the Government and the people of Algeria.

Mr. Yunus a former Ambassador to Algeria, had a 90-minute meeting with Mr. Boumedienne.

Reporting on the meeting, sources said Mr. Boumedienne had expressed deep appreciation for the success achieved by India under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi. He spoke of close identity of interests between India and Algeria and praised this country's contribution to the non-aligned movement. (October 17, 1975)

India, Chad ties Discussed

The Minister of State for Planning, Mr. I. K. Gujral said his talks with the Chief of State, Gen. Felix Malloum, centred on bilateral co-operation.

Positions, the two non-aligned countries should take at international gatherings were also discussed, Mr Gujral told newsmen before emplaning for home after a brief visit to Chad.

Mr. Gujral gave Gen. Malloum a message from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. It has been announced that India and Chad will establish diplomatic relations. (October 20, 1975)

Kenyan M. P. Visits India

Mrs. Eddah Gachukia, MP from Kenya visited India from 11th November to 21st November as a guest of the Council.

During her stay in Delhi, she met Shri Bipinpal Das, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mrs. Varadappan, Chairman, Central Social Welfare Board, Professor Rais Ahmed, Director, N.C.E.R.T. Professor R. K. Das Gupta of Delhi University ; Mrs. Tara Ali Baig, President of the Council of Child Welfare and Office bearer of All India Women Conference. She also visited Spring's dale School, Cottage Industries Emporium, Teen Murti House and Gandhi Museum. Beside Delhi she visited Agra, Madras, Bangalore and Bombay. Deputy Minister for External Affairs hosted a lunch in honour of Mrs. Gachukia at Azad Bhavan.

Indian Know-how for Libyan Plant

Indian firm has won a Rs. 100-million consultancy contract in the face of stiff international competition in Libya.

The Dastur and Company has been appointed as principal consultants for a large iron and steel plant in Libya. The firm will be responsible for design, engineering, management of construction and recruitment of labour and personnel. (October 4, 1975)

Mauritian Women Affairs Minister in India

Indian Centre for Africa assisted Mrs. Radha Poonoosamy Minister for Women Affairs, Price and Consumers Protection in the Government of Mauritius. The ICA arranged her programme in Delhi. Mrs. Poonoosamy was in India to attend Anti-Fascist Conference at Patna. During her stay she met Shri. T. A. Pai, Minister for Industries & Supply, Mr. P. Chattopadhyaya, Minister for Commerce, Mrs. Kamla Devi Chattopadhyaya, Brigadier Chadha, Director, Handicrafts Board, Mrs. Arti, Editor Consumers Herald and Mr. Inder Verma, Editor, Consumer Gazette and discussed with them the measures the Government of India and other organisations have taken to keep the prices of consumer goods in check. She also visited Handicrafts Board and Khadi Gramudyog and Small Scale Industries units and Super Bazar. (December 18, 1975)

Dr. Vijay Gupta

Mauritian Parliamentary Secretary for Sports Visits India.

Mr. & Mrs. Raouf Bundhun of Mauritius visited India as guest of the Council from 11th November to 22nd November. Mr. Bundhun is the Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Youth and Sports in the Government of Mauritius. During their stay in Delhi they met Professor Nurul Hasan, Minister for Education, Mr. E. Alkazi, Director, National School of Drama. They were interviewed on Television and Radio. Deputy Minister for External Affairs hosted a lunch in their honour at Azad Bhavan. They also visited Ajmer, Madras, Bombay and Bangalore.

(November 23, 1975)

Indian Electric Fittings for Triveni Club Mauritius.

Indian Centre for Africa has on behalf of the government of India gifted electric fittings and carpets to the Triveni Club, Mauritius. The Air India is lifting the entire consignment free of charge. The Triveni Club will work for better understanding of Mauritian culture and shall provide a very modern stage for young artists.

India Offers Arms Help to Nigeria

India has offered its cooperation in the field of defence production to Nigeria.

The offer was made by Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Bipinpal Das who paid a goodwill visit to Nigeria.

In a television interview recorded in Lagos, Mr. Das said that he was on a goodwill visit to Nigeria which would consolidate the existing Indo-Nigeria friendship.

(October 18, 1975)

Cotton Made-ups for Nigeria

Nigeria has placed the biggest export order for the supply of pillow cases worth Rs. 60 lakhs with an Indian firm, Mahavir Textile Industries Ltd. According to Mr. Kantilal Haria, the company's Managing Director, the yearly export around Rs. 1 crore could easily be trebled with a little more effort.

(November 10, 1975)

Indian Minister George for Senegal

India's Minister of State for Civil Supplies A. C. George

visited West African countries, as part of a tour to strengthen India's relations with West Africa.

The Minister had talks with President Meussa Traore during his stay in Bamako, Senegal. He later visited Mauritania and Niger. (October 8, 1975)

India Calls for Complete Sanctions Against South Africa & Rhodesia

India has called for complete and unrelenting pressure—political, economic and moral—against the racial polity of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Participating in the debate on "Africa, South of the Sahara and relationship with Rhodesia and South Africa" in the Plenary session of the 21st Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held in New Delhi, Shri Indrajit Gupta, MP said the South African Government was continuing to violate the human rights of the majority and to refuse to vacate Namibia. Similarly in Southern Rhodesia also the illegal minority-Smith regime was continuing.

In South Africa he pointed out the white minority regime is desperately playing for time with the hope that their resorting to brutal suppression would held them postpone their down fall for an indefinite period. India on its part would greatly welcome the convening of a constitutional conference on Zimbabwe's future. But he said, there should be full participation in it of all the African Liberation movements of Rhodesia. Shri Gupta further said that it was the responsibility of the British as the Administering Power to ensure majority rule in Southern Rhodesia even if it meant taking of necessary measures including the use of force. (October 29, 1975)

Racist Regime of South Africa Condemned

India's solidarity with the South African political prisoners was reiterated by prominent leaders at the Solidarity Day, organised in the Capital on October 16th, 1975.

An exposition of the African point of view was made by the representatives of the African National Congress and the Tanzanian High Commissioner.

Union Minister for Steel and Mines Chandrajit Yadav and Mr. Harsh Dev Malaviya, M.P. speaking on the occasion, condemned

Dr. Vijay-Gupta

the white racist regime and its policies of repression and torture in South Africa. Expressing the Indian Government's and solidarity with the freedom fighting people of South Africa, they pointed out that India was one of those countries which had spearheaded the struggle against colonialism and racism at all international forums.

Mr. Moosa, representative of the African National Congress said that over 2,000 political prisoners in South Africa on baseless charges, and numerous others had been illegally detained. The issue of their release was linked with the general question of their release in South Africa and other African nations.

Tanzanian High Commissioner in India A. D. Hassan declared that the entire African continent was committed to the cause of liberation from colonialism.

The Solidarity Day was organised by the All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation, Asian Mission of the African National Congress and Indian Centre for Africa. (October, 1975)

Ban on S. African Sports Teams Urged

India introduced in the UN special political committee a resolution calling on all Governments and sports bodies and organisations "to refrain from all contacts with sports bodies established on the basis of apartheid or racially-selected sports team from South Africa".

Mr. Bhatia, MP, Member of Indian delegation to UN charged that the racist authorities of South Africa were adopting certain "crude manoeuvres" to gain acceptance in international sports events. "While continuing to deny any mixing of races in sports at club, local or provincial levels, they have been trying to hood-wink international public opinion by calling their teams multinational by including a few non-Whites", he said.

He pointed out that these manoeuvres had been exposed by the non-racial sports federations in South Africa and appealed to countries, which were still accepting teams sponsored by the racist regime to resist from doing so. The Indian resolution is expected to be adopted by the committee and by the General Assembly later by a big majority. (October 30, 1975)

Drilling Deal with Tanzania

The Oil and Natural Gas Commission has agreed to assist Tanzania in oil exploration.

Following discussions with Tanzanian delegation led by Mr. S. Barongo, Chairman of the Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation, ONGC has undertaken to drill a well on Songo-Songo islands on Tanzanian coast.

Preparatory work is likely to commence in the next two months.

This is the first drilling contract of ONGC outside India. The contract is worth approximately Rs. 2 crores and is subject to approval by both the Government.

A memorandum of understanding was signed by Mr. S. Barongo and the ONGC Chairman, Mr. N. B. Prasad.

Tanzanian personnel will be associated with the drilling operations to enable them gain job experience. (November 9, 1975)

NIDC to Establish Paper Industry in Zanzibar

The National Industrial Development Corporation of India, will establish paper and pulp industry in Zanzibar. The State Planning and Development Commission of Zanzibar has appointed the NIDC to undertake a comprehensive investigation into the possibility of establishing a pulp and paper industry in Zanzibar based on locally available raw material. Spirit of cooperation to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to them in the directives of the two heads of government." An understanding has been reached on the admissibility of compensation for Indian nationals who left Uganda. (November 21, 1975)

Ugandan Writer Speaks on Indian Literature

Indian Centre for Africa arranged a lecture at the Jawaharlal Nehru University by Mr. Theo Luzuka from Uganda. Mr. Luzuka is a writer and a scholar of English literature. Presently he is working on Asian literature written in English and its social impact. He was on a visit to India to collect material for his research work.

Mr. Luzuka's lecture was attended by scholars of African Studies, English literature and Modern Indian literature.

Dr. Vijay Gupta

Mrs. Gandhi's Message to Mobutu

Deputy Minister for External Affairs Bipinpal Das handed over a personal message from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to President Mobutu of Zaire at Kinshasa.

Mr. Bipinpal Das, who was now on tour of West and Central African States called on President Mobutu and discussed with him a wide range of subjects, including bilateral relations and international situation for about 45 minutes.

Mr. Das explained to President Mobutu the steps taken by India to normalise relations in the sub-continent. Their discussions also covered South and South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the question of strengthening of non-aligned movement.

(October 15, 1975)

Economists' Team for Zaire

A delegation of Indian economists visited Zaire to identify certain projects to be started with Indian technical collaboration.

Mr. Ileka Mboya, Ambassador of Zaire disclosing the above said that talks between India and Zaire were in progress for the purchase of 400 Indian wagons, 15 diesel and five electric locomotives.

Mr. Mboya also said that his country was prepared to buy substantial amounts of finished and semi-finished products and in turn, Zaire could supply India minerals like copper and other raw materials.

(November 23, 1975)

Indo-Zairian Association

An Indo-Zairian Friendship Association has been formed in Delhi to promote the cultural and social ties between Zaire and India.

Mr. Ileka Mboyo, Ambassador of Zaire in India has been unanimously chosen its patron-in-chief.

(October 27, 1975)

Goodwill Delegation to Zaire

Shri G. Shahani, Secretary of the Indo-Zaire Friendship Association in India, in an interview with the official Zaire news agency

AZAP, said in Kinshasa that the visit to Zaire of the goodwill delegation of the Association has led to strengthening of friendly relations between the people of the two countries.

After paying tribute to the political stability, national unity and progress of Zaire, Shri Shahani said : "Like Zaire, India under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi follows a policy of non-alignment and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, which has enabled India to make rapid progress in technology agriculture etc."

During its stay, the delegation called on the Ministers of Culture, National Economy, National Orientation and Tourism to discuss possibilities of exchanges between India and Zaire

(December 16, 1975)

Early Zimbabwe Settlement Urged

India urged in the Decolonisation Committee of the UNO that a time limit be fixed for the settlement of the question of self-determination for the people of Zimbabwe.

Mr. V. N. Gadgil, MP, who spoke for India in the Committee pointed out that the racist regime of Ian Smith has successfully evaded a settlement of the question for nearly 13 years after the UN was seized of it.

He said, "India will support any proposal made in this Committee which would help in finding a just solution to the problem. We are convinced that it is better to find a peaceful solution. But the time is fast running out and if the problem cannot be resolved peacefully, then the inevitable consequences will be bloody racial war which could spill over the borders of Zimbabwe and create a major point in history."

He said that the matter had been discussed in the committee for over a decade and it was high time a solution was found. "Should we choose to be mere spectators while Mr. Smith proceeds to try and split the African National Council," he said. "We are convinced that a White settler minority of 2,70,000 persons cannot indefinitely continue to rule over nearly six million Black people of Zimbabwe. We have been all along of the view that the principle

Dr. Vijay Gupta

of one man one vote must apply in the case of Zimbabwe, and that there must be majority rule in the territory.” (October 3, 1975)

Indian Solidarity with Zimbabwean People

Indian Centre for Africa in collaboration with Zimbabwe Students Union, organised '*Solidarity Day with the people of Zimbabwe*' on 11th November. A largely attended meeting was addressed by Shri R. N. Mirdha, Minister for Defence Production who was also the chief guest. Beside Mr. Mirdha, Mr. M. Moola, Chief Representative of South African National Congress, Mr. Priya Ranjan Das, M.P., and a youth leader, H. E. Mr. A.D. Hassan, High Commissioner for Tanzania also addressed the gathering. The function was followed by a cultural programme.

African Order Bagged

Firm orders worth Rs. 4 crores for export of "Real Madras handkerchiefs" to the West African countries have been booked against Japanese competition for execution before March 1976 by a sales-cum-study team which visited West African countries recently.

Members of the team told a press conference that exports of Real Madras handkerchiefs to the West African countries during April-September, 1975 had doubled to Rs. 6.84 crores from Rs. 3.22 crores achieved in the corresponding period of the previous year, with the present order on hand, exports, to these countries during 1975-76 were expected to touch Rs. 11 crores. (November 5, 1975)

Amin for Close Ties with India

Uganda President Idi Amin has expressed a wish to strengthen relations with India.

In response to a letter from President Idi Amin inviting a delegation from India to discuss the question of compensation for Indian nationals who left Uganda, the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi nominated Mr. J.S. Mehta, additional secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, to lead a delegation to hold discussions with Uganda officials on the subject. The Indian delegation was received by President Amin on 27 October, when the Indian Prime Minister's reply was delivered.

Indian High Commission sources said 1,535 Indian national were affected by the takeover.

Uganda Finance Minister Oboto Ofimbi, who chaired the Indian compensation talks, said that Uganda's decision to expel non-citizens for the country was not racist but purely "in the interests of the indigenous citizens".

He praised the Indian Government for having adopted a positive attitude towards Uganda and not mounting a propaganda campaign against us. He said that compensation would be worked out fairly.

The negotiations started on 28th October, following a formal opening by the cabinet valuation committee of the Ugandan Government. Throughout the negotiation both the delegations were engaged in a detailed scrutiny of the claims of Indian nationals in the light of the principles of evaluation enunciated by the Ugandan government.

The joint press statement issued in New Delhi on November 21, 1975 said that the two delegations worked "earnestly and with goodwill and in a very cordial atmosphere."

Book Reveiws

The Tanzania Civil Service A Decade After Independence : Adebayo Adedeji, University of Ife Press, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1974, pages 30.

Tanzania launched a great experiment of nation-building on the basis of socialism after gaining independence in 1961. President Nyerere is committed to socialism and self-reliance as mentioned in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Further, rural development is the mainstay of socialism in Tanzania. According to Nyerere, the tradition of African society is socialist; and hence 'Ujamaa' is a logical step in the African development.

Large scale public management of the social services

needs a committed and politically responsive civil service. But the inherited bureaucracy was racial in foundation and suffered from superiority complex towards the natives. The restructuring of civil service was first on the agenda of national leadership. The most important problem facing the African-leadership was the 'Africanisation' of the civil service, which was dominated by the expatriates. The following table would reveal the enormity and complexity of the task.

TABLE
Racial Composition of Tanzanian Civil Service.

Year	Citizens	Others	Total
1961	1,170	3,282	4,452
1962	1,821	2,902	4,723
1963	3,469	2,580	5,049
1964	3,083	2,306	5,389
1965	3,951	2,011	5,962
1966	4,364	1,898	6,262
1967	4,937	1,817	6,754
1968	6,208	1,619	7,827
1969	6,123	1,351	7,474
1970	8,042	1,377	9,419

The above data reveal the dependence of the Tanzanians on the foreigners for the management of sensitive areas of public activities. The target of 'Africanisation' would be achieved by the expansion of higher educational facilities and man power planning in Tanzania. The educational system in Tanzania is geared to the fulfillment of this goal.

A. L. Adu's "The Civil service in Commonwealth Africa" and "The Civil Service in New African States" provided information about the problems of civil service in the African countries. The particular problems of the various African countries need probing in depth and this monograph by Adedeji is a step in the right direction. Professor Adedeji starts with the history of the Tanzanian civil service which was based on the racial principles and structured on the British pattern of the hegemony of the generalists. He is critical of the democratic Tanzanian government following the British pattern of classification of the civil services.

He writes;

"The oddity of class-structured civil services in a society that is determined to become completely socialist has not yet dawned on policy makers. There is therefore an urgent need to re-examine the civil service structure with a view to abolishing the classes." (p. 20).

The most important challenge to the African leadership is to adapt its civil service to the changing milieu. Adu observes:

"... the main problem facing the African governments is the need to maintain an effective administration which is efficient, loyal and in tune with the political spirit of the time. This problem is aggravated by the need to re-orientate and transform the civil service in its structure and objectives, from a colonial service into a service which is resonance with the highly nationalistic independent states. This is a very difficult adjustment to bring about even under the most

favourable staffing conditions.”

(A.L. Adu: *The Civil Service in New African States* (1965) p. 86).

This difficult problem has been tackled by Tanzania with the help of intensive political education of the civil servants. The Tanzanians have rightly rejected the concept of ‘neutrality’ of civil service. Prof. Adedeji clearly shows that the civil servants in Tanzania contest elections and are governed by the Leadership Code of Ethics which has now been incorporated in the Civil Service Regulations. With the help of Leadership Code and the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (Amendment) Act, the Tanzanian leadership hopes to combat the problem

of corruption in civil service.

Prof. Adedeji expresses doubts about the standards of efficiency of the civil service in the process of Africanisation which in the initial stages means lowering of qualifications for entry to the services.

This monograph has raised very important questions which need further probing and discussion. Experience of all the Third World countries with regard to the adaption of the colonial legacies is interesting. And monographs like this shed light on important issues. The value of this monograph would have been enhanced if Adedeji had related the experiences of the Tanzanian civil service with special reference to rural reconstruction in that country.

C. P. BHAMBHRI

African Agricultural Research Capabilities, Report of the Committee on African Research Capabilities : Published by the National Academy of Sciences, 2101, Constitution Avenue, N. W. Washington (USA) 1974.

Africa is no longer a dark continent. It has now stolen the lime-light of the world. Its rich and varied natural resources—though most of them continue to remain either un-explored or un-exploited—are increasingly drawing world attention. Africa's agricultural potentials are none-too-small though productivity of this important sector which sustains the majority (in many cases over 90%) of its growing population is astonishingly low. This is reflected not only on the standard of living of its people, but also on the state economic development of many countries. However, given the necessary know-how, apparatus and inputs supported by requisite national and international efforts, agricultural sector of the countries of the African Continent can be transformed to provide the major thrust for all round development. Promises and potentialities of this sector

are indeed great. Planned and systematic research have, therefore, to be made for "qualitative and quantitative improvement of food crop production, improvement of traditional agricultural system and modernisation of farming methods and techniques and reorientation of its educational pattern."

These basic facts have been brought into focus in this study, prepared by the Committee on African Agricultural Research Capabilities which was appointed by the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, at the instance of United States Agency for International Development. The experts constituting this Committee were drawn from Africa, Europe and North America.

This study, the first of its kind, undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences, outlines the key problems facing African agriculture such as low productivity and conse-

quent deficits of food and nutrients, uneven development between farm and non-farm sectors and formulation of "sound agricultural policy which is in the best interests not only of the individual African nation but also of the region in which that nation is situated and of the Continent of Africa as a whole". It also indicates the broad areas where more knowledge is needed and suggests means by which this knowledge can be best utilised to enable this sector "to make maximum contribution to the development goals of Africa". It pinpoints that "research capabilities in areas of farming system, food crops and livestock improvements be strengthened and reinforced". It also underlines the need to modernise the methods and techniques of cultivation and improve quality of inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, irrigation, pest control measures and machinery.

These are indeed essential pre-requisites if the problem of chronic food shortage and inadequacy in the availability of raw materials for industries

are to be solved. The experts are also aware of the need for creating necessary infrastructure for intensifying agricultural development efforts. It is in this context, they have emphasised the importance of building a strong cadre of well trained and well-educated men and women in the agricultural, physical, biological and social sciences.

The report presents a panoramic view of the different agricultural products obtained in various parts of the Continent. The availability of most of the cereals, varieties of fruits and vegetables, sugarcane, beverages (cocoa, tea, coffee, kola), fibre crops, (cotton and sisal), oilseeds (sesam, groundnuts) and other important products like tobacco and rubber, to mention only a few, have been vividly described. Such a description gives an impression that African agricultural research is relatively well-advanced in its coverage and capable of turning out varied outputs in sufficient quantity. In truth, however, critical gaps exist in each field, in each crop and in most of the African countries.

While potentialities of African agriculture are vast and indeed recognised, low productivity is becoming apparent in view of the growing paucity of food and industrial raw materials and consequent deprivation of people. Inadequacy of agricultural research capabilities thus becomes quite obvious.

It is in this context the need for systematic agricultural research is called for. While national research institutes and social scientists have to rise to the occasion and shoulder major responsibilities for bringing about the necessary changes in African agriculture, international support and help is equally, if not more, important and have to be sought and forthcoming. This is not only to fill up the critical gap which exists in African research system and supply the requisite tools which are either non-

existent or in short supply but also to take the responsibility for work which extends the scope of a single African country" and help ensure that national as well as international organisations reinforce agricultural development process rather than duplicate the effort or compete with one another.

In short, the study covers a wide spectrum of African agricultural research, its promises and potentialities, its defects and deficiencies and suggests ways and means for suitable improvements. It thus makes an interesting reading and is a useful document not only for social scientists, agriculturists, policy makers but also for all those who are interested in African agriculture and its all round development.

J. C. SRIVASTAVA

"Kenyatta" by Jeremy Murray-Brown

History broke into their (the Kikuyu's) world with the arrival of the first white man. Mr. Jeremy Murray-Brown in his book *"Kenyatta"* devotes two pages to the existence of the Kikuyu before the coming of the white man. These two pages complete Chapter I which has as its heading "A world outside history".

It is fair to assume that Mr. Murray-Brown does not have much information regarding pre-colonial Kikuyu society but that is hardly reason enough to thrust a whole community beyond the pale of history.

The author was born in India in the hey-day of the British Empire. His "parents are grandparents believed unquestioningly in the civilising mission and gave their working lives to its fulfilment in India". The book leaves us in no doubt that this 'missionary' zeal continues to be a family tradition.

The book on *"Kenyatta"* makes interesting reading for the wealth of detail that has

been uncovered by Mr. Murray-Brown about the early life of the President, and his sojourn in Europe. The young Kenyatta's sense of independence which often led him into conflict with the church missions and his later political contacts, life style and interests in Europe reveal many fascinating and relatively unknown aspects of Kenyatta's formative years. The problems he encountered on his return to Kenya in 1946, and the multiple factors which led up to his trial and detention are pieced together to give us a grand view of Kenya's march to independence and the man who led it.

Interwoven with this narrative are Kenyatta's early concerns for the values of peace and tolerance, his denunciation of 'Mau Mau' and the experiences in detention including his relationships with the other detainees.

The book covers the period from Kenyatta's early childhood to the attainment of Kenya's independence. The

last chapter deals in five pages with the period 1963-1969. Very little (if at all) biographical material is available on the President's personality in the post independence era—an insight into this would have been very welcome. Instead the final chapter is extremely sketchy and seems to have been written merely to draw the attention of the reader to the major areas of tension and confrontation in Kenya's first six years of nation building.

Though Mr. Murray-Brown has presented a very detailed and authenticated life portrait of "Kenyatta", his paternalistic approach to the subject is a constantly irritating factor.

Statements such as 'Dehmare gave his life to Kenya', 'Corfield and Rension were both honest men' and a whole range of such reactionary colonialist evaluations create serious doubts as to the author's intentions in writing the book.

Just because the subject of

the book is one of Africa's greatest personalities, one does not demand an unmitigated apaulogy. One does however expect to learn more about Kenyatta as a product of his own tradition, culture and background.

Instead Mr. Murray-Brown draws a portrait of Kenyatta as seen through the white man's eyes, his concern is not so much with the problems and trials and tribulations encountered but rather how, when and where Kenyatta failed to meet the requirements and values set by Western, 'civilized' standards, that this book has been applauded by no less reputable critics than the T.L.S. and the S., is further indication of the continuing prevalence of neo-colonialist mentality.

It makes the need for the people of Africa to write about their own history and countrymen even more urgent and vital.

ZARINA PATEL

Managing Rural Development : Ideas and Experience from East Africa by Robert Chambers, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1974, pp. 216.

Despite rapid urbanization in the developing countries most of their population lives in rural areas. The difference of level of income and standard of living between the rural and urban is great. With the large majority of people living in the rural areas it becomes essential for the governments in these countries to accord top priority to rural development. Plans focussing on improvement of rural life have been formulated and the government machinery in almost all the cases for their implementation has been utilised. The experience however has not been very encouraging as the efforts made by the governments have succeeded in touching the rural populations only superficially. The book looks into this malady and diagnoses ailments and prescribes a new methodology through which the entire government machinery responsible for bringing about rural development can be greatly motivated and more pragma-

tism can be brought in formulating plans for rural areas.

Although the book has been written in the background of East Africa the problems and prescriptions to combat them have much wider applicability to most of the developing countries. The author's experience with the Kenya Government's Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) forms the basis of outlining the problems of rural development and methods to tackle them. The lessons from the SRDP are interesting and deserve serious attention of those who are concerned with rural development in any capacity.

The major problem of rural development particularly of formulating pragmatic plans is that top persons in planning and administration have little or no idea of rural needs and there is hardly any involvement of the lower level staff at this stage. Thus plans formulated by the higher level staff do not invoke correct

responses from their juniors, who become disinterested in the execution of the plans for various reasons : "a flow of mutually incompatible instructions and programmes from the headquarters, overlaying and burying one another, in demands for information which is never used for plans, in high-powered flying visits by senior officers in which snap decisions are taken and instructions issued on the basis of patently inadequate information." (pp. 23) The strains on the implenting machinery are so many, and of such varying nature, which is true of India also, that it results in poor performance of the lower level staff.

Besides, in the name of 'co-ordination' and 'integration' in rural development has also resulted in heavy costs and very little benefits. The time spent in meetings and in dealing with paperwork has high costs. Also the structure of the government with authority centralised in the capital has hindered development in rural areas. The heavy paperwork in Ministries in the capital leaves very little time

for the higher officials to visit rural areas to have first hand knowledge of rural problems.

All these factors lead to one major problem, namely, improvement in management procedures. It is towards this theme that the book has been addressed. The author realizes that it is important to tackle and improve management procedures, as they are "a key point of entry and leverage in securing better performance from government staff in rural development." With his experience with the SRDP the author has suggested six clusters of procedures using systems analytical approach : programming and implementation, field staff management, local participation, evaluation, rural research and development, and plan formulation. The programming and implementation management (PIM) system was experimented in the Kenya SRDP in 1970 by the author and his colleagues. It had three main components—an annual programming exercise, a monthly management meeting and a monthly action report. The new approach was meant to

avoid authoritarian management, wasteful meetings, excessive reports, departmentalism, top-down targetry, inadequate resources and ineffective work programming.

The approach experimented in the SRDP also helped improve the involvement and performance of the field staff and resulted in greater participation of local people. The large field staffs in various departments and organisations are 'organized as territorial hierarchies as pyramids with their apexes in the capital city, subordinate levels at province or region, district and sometimes subdistrict, and finally a broad base of field workers ...in the lowest sub-areas.' It is this broad base of the pyramid which is directly in touch with the rural people and through which most of the government policies and programmes for rural development are executed. But it is unfortunate in most of the developing countries that this crucial link between the rural people and the government have been neglected at the plan formulation stage. The 'top-down' approach for plan

formulation was abandoned in the SRDP experience for the 'bottom-up' approach which allowed greater participation of the lower level field staff in target formation and plan execution. Similarly, a different attitude and approach was adopted for getting the local participation for rural development.

At the end the book outlines some useful principles derived from the SRDP experience which, the author hopes may provide starting points for others who may want to launch out into the field of rural development, have been outlined. These principles have scope for refinement and improvement. The pragmatism at every step in developing the PIM and the meticulous care for getting the fuller involvement of people, within the government at different levels and of the rural people of the area under development.

The unorthodox approach experimented in the SRDP certainly deserves attention and critical assessment by those who are concerned not only in Africa but also in

India and other developing countries. The attitude and skills of local people and the quality and performance of the government machinery of the country or region in which the ideas derived from the SRDP experience will have to be studied first and necessary adjustments in the approach may have to be made. However the book forms a sound

basis for further improvement in management procedures suited to local needs.

For those who have a regional interest in East Africa the bibliography at the end of the book will be very useful. On the whole, the book has been written with a clear cut purpose and is thought provoking.

DR. C. P. SINGH

Pakeeza Sultan

Africa Through Indian Eyes

A Documentation List

(July-September 1975)

AFRICA THROUGH INDIAN EYES is a Documentation based on coverage of Africa in Indian newspapers and periodicals. It is arranged in a classified order. However, subject headings are broad and are in alphabetical sequence. Under each subject heading entries are listed alphabetically under the name of author or title and for each entry a reference is made to the publication (name of publication is in italics in an abbreviated form) including its volume, number, date of issue and the page on which the article appears. Abbreviations employed for the names of publications are given in the end. The matter in brackets has been provided in order to make captions more clearly understood. Annotations have also been given to the articles and editorials wherever found necessary.

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389. Chabra, Hari Sharan. African press backs emergency (African states admire India's proclamation of a state of emergency in the country). *So. Ind.*, 11 (8), 26 July : 16.
390. Khandelwal, Brij. Growing Indo-African relations (Foreign policy perspectives). *Century*, 13 (3 & 4), 15 July : 12-14.

Portugal

391. Imperialist plots in former Portuguese colonies. *Link*, 18(4), Sep : 29.
392. What next in Lisbon? (after the independence of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique). *Frontier*. 8(11), 19 July : 1

United States

393. Hindu. US and the Third World. *Hindu*, 17 July : 6. Editorial.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

394. Gupta, Anirudha. Political system and the one-party states of tropical Africa. *Ind. Quarterly*, 31(2), Apr-June : 159-184.

364. Indian Express. Amin's shadow over OAU. *In. Ex.*, 22 July : 4.
Editorial.
365. Indian Express. Test for OAU. *In. Ex.*, 29 July : 3,
Editorial.
366. OAU faces new danger (dangerous situation in Angola is likely to cause the assembled African leaders most anxiety). *Himmat*, 11(40), 11 Aug : 10.
367. Patriot. OAU call. *Patriot*, 30 July : 2.
Editorial.
368. Statesman. The OAU and Israel. *Statesman*, 1 Aug : 4.
Editorial.
369. Times of India. African disunity (Western powers have been responsible for the crises that have erupted in Africa time to time). *T. Ind.*, 12 Aug : 4.
Editorial.
370. Times of India. Arabs and the OAU. *T. Ind.*, 5 Aug : 4.
Editorial.
371. Times of India. Crucial task. *T. Ind.*, 29 July : 4.
Editorial.
372. Tiwari, B.K. Helsinki and Kampala : Two sides to Unity *In. Ex.*, 7 Aug : 4.
373. Tiwari, B.K. Problems before OAU. *In. Ex.*, 26 July : 4.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

374. Joshi, Navin Chandra. Development Strategy for third world. *Fin. Ex.*, 5 July : 4.
375. Khan, Rahmatullah. The struggle for world resources : A review of the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly 1974. *F.Af. Reports*, 24(7), July : 101-117.
376. Ramchandani, R.R. Pluralistic structures and development criteria : A case of sub-Saharan African economies. *Afr. Quarterly*, 14(3 & 4), Oct-Dec. 1974 & Jan-Mar 1975 : 5-21.
377. Shift in development pattern the Third World. *Century*, 13(5), 1 Aug : 16.

EMPLOYMENT

378. Employment problem in the Third World. *Ea. Economist*, 65(13) 26 Sept : 600-3.
379. Employment and inflation : A world picture (including Africa). *Yojana*, 19 (11), 1 July : 19-21.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

380. Dalal, K.L. Indian technical and economic cooperation : An essay in interdependence among developing countries (Technical and economic cooperation between India and Africa and some other countries). *F. Trade Review*, 10(1), Apr-June : 68-75.

395. Indians in Africa (future of Indians in Africa). *Fin. Ex.*, 9 Aug : 4.
396. Storm in clerical tea cup (Church's role in Africa). *Century*, 13 (7 & 8), 15 Sept : 13-14.

HISTORY

397. Alva, Joachim. New rulers of Africa. *E.T.*, 14 Aug : 5.
389. Times of India. Thrust of life. (The oldest form of life was found in Africa). *T. Ind.*, 15 July : 4.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

399. Hower, Russel Warren. Africa's problem areas : Independence likely by end of December. *Statesman*, 2 Aug : 6.
400. Lambert, Tom. African freedom fighter. *In. Ex.*, 24 Aug : 4.
401. Way out the armed struggle (Struggle of the African people for freedom from racist domination). *Link*, 18 (4), 7 Sept : 28-29.

PRESS

402. Jose, Alhaji Babatunde. The role of the press in Africa. *Himmati* (11 (41), 8 Aug : 7 & 19.

ANGOLA

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

403. Angola's twin crises. *Hind. T.*, 9 Aug : 5.
404. Cabinda Versus Angola (Cabinda which was forcibly tagged with Angola by the Portuguese in 1956 will not remain silent about its status as nation at the time of independence of Angola). *Janata*, 30 (22), 20 July : 8-10.
405. Essack, A.K. Angola's future. (Significance of the suspension of the Alvo Agreement). *Frontier*, 8 (20), 22 Sept : 6.
406. Gupta, Anirudha. Nature of Angolan crisis. *Mainstream*, 13 (48), 2 Aug : 13-14.
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Big Powers Interference

408. Bhatt; V.R. Big power rivalry in Angola. *Hind T.*, 1 Aug : 5.
409. Mukherjee, Sadhan. Naked imperialist middling in Angola. *New Age*, 10 Aug : 15.
410. Sino Soviet rivalry for power in Angola. *Hindu*, 2 Sept : 6.

Civil War

411. Airlift of whites from Angola. *Hindu*, 23 Sept : 6.
412. Angola (Civil war in Angola). *Swarajya*, 20 (9), 20 Aug : 16.
413. Angolans achieve unity. *People's D.*, 11 (27), 6 July : 10.
414. Angola's hopes of unity and progress. *Century*, 13 (5) 1 Aug : 8.

Pakeeza Sultan

415. Angola's troubled heritage (Angola's nationalist forces fighting) *Link*, 18 (14), 16 Nov : 27.
416. Dolgov, Andrei. Angola : Hopes of unity among parties and steady progress. *New Age*, 13 July : 14.
417. Hindu. Discord in Angola (African nationalist groups fighting in Angola). *Hindu*, 15 July : 6.
Editorial.
418. Indian Express. Angola cockpit (power struggle between MPLA and FNLA), *In. Ex.*, 24 July : 4.
Editorial.
419. Indian Express. Backward in Angola. (Power struggle at home). *In. Ex.*, 16 Aug : 4.
Editorial.
420. Indian Express. New danger in Angola (Civil war). *In. Ex.*, 4 Sept : 4.
Editorial.
421. Ottaway, David B. Angolan tragedy (Civil war). *In. Ex.*, 11 Sept : 4.
422. Patriot. Angola tragedy (struggle for power in nationalist parties in Angola). *Patriot*, 15 July : 2.
Editorial.
423. Statesman. Danger in Angola (National group fighting in Angola). *Statesman*, 20 July : 6.
Editorial.
424. Statesman. Rivalries in Angola. *Statesman*, 11 Aug : 6.
Editorial.
425. Telang, G.M. Angola on brink of civil war : Can OAU avert the tragedy? *T. Ind.*, 4 Aug : 4.
426. Veritas : Birth pangs of Angola. (civil war in Angola). *Mainstream*, 13 (50), 16 Aug : 29-30.

CAMEROON

REVENUE

427. Ndongko, Wilfred A. Revenue allocation in Cameroon under the federal System. *Afr. Quarterly*, 14 (3 & 4), Oct-Dec. 1974 & Jan-Mar : 1975 22-34.

CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

INDEPENDENCE & AFTER

428. Indian Express. Cape Verde Islands, *In. Ex.*, 7 July : 4.
Editorial.

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

429. Caught between peace and war (Egyptian economy effected by the war and Sadat need peace to press domestic problems). *De. World*, 6 July : 8-9.

FAMILY PLANNING

430. Family planning in Egypt. *Hindu*, 27 Aug : 6.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

USSR

431. Indian Express. The Arab divide (President Sadat blamed the Soviet Union for the Arab disunity). *In. Ex.*, 6 Aug : 4.
Editorial.

IRRIGATION & POWER

432. Lycett, Andrew. Sadat talks a new view of the Aswan. *Century*, 13 (5), 1 Aug : 10-11.

EAST AFRICA

EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

433. Chhabra, Hari Sharan, Rift in East African community. *Hind. T.*, 18 Aug : 5.
434. End of the East African community. *Century*, 13 (6), 15 Aug : 15-16.
435. End of the East African community. *Young Ind.*, 5 (32), 17 July : 2 & 11.

ETHIOPIA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

437. Ethiopia's economic woes. *Hind. T.*, 1 July : 5.
436. India, Embassy (Ethiopia). Report on economic and commercial conditions, March-May, 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (8), 20 Aug : B-413-15.
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FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

439. Economic Times. India and Ethiopia (trade between the two countries). *E. T.*, 27 July : 5.
Editorial.

HEAD OF THE STATE

440. Financial Express. Haile Selassie. *Fin. Ex.*, 30 Aug : 4.
Editorial.
441. Statesman. Haile Selassie. *Statesman*, 28 Aug : 4.
Editorial.

GHANA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

442. India, High Commission (Ghana). Report on economic and commercial conditions, June. 1974. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (9) 27 Aug : B463.

GAMBIA

GENERAL

443. Wolfers, Michael. Africa's smallest state: A patch work of tribal affiliations. *Statesman*, 15 Aug : 6.

INDIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

- Africa General *see* entry no 380-382.
Ethiopia *see* entry no 439.
Sudan *see* entry no 523.
Zambia *see* entry no 538.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

- Africa General *see* entry no 387-390.

KENYA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

444. India, High Commission (Kenya). Report on economic and commercial conditions, May 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (8), 20 Aug : B416-19.
445. India, High Commission (Kenya) Report on economic and commercial conditions, July 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (12), 17 Sept : B630-36.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

446. Storm in clerical tea cup (Expulsion of American church leader from Nairobi). *Young Ind.* 5 (39), 4 Sept : 4.

Problem of Asians

447. 'Aliens' in Kenya told to behave. *Fin. Ex.*, 18 July : 4.
448. Chhabra, Hari Sharan. British Asians in Kenya. *Hind. T.*, 19 Sept : 6.
449. Kenyanisation of business (Asians asked and ordered to handover their business to local people). *Fin. Ex.*, 30 July : 4.

PRESIDENT

450. Bhatia, Prem. African father figure. (President Jomo Kenyatta). *T. Ind.*, 24 Aug : 8.

LIBYA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

Oil

451. Political lags behind oil. *De. World*, 17 Aug : 7-9.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

452. India, Embassy (Libya). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Apr. 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (2), 9 July : B90-94.
453. India, Embassy (Libya). Report on economic and commercial conditions, May 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (4), 30 July : B250-52.

454. India, Embassy (Libya). Report on economic and commercial conditions, June 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (9), 27 Aug : B473-74.
455. India, Embassy (Libya). Report on economic and commercial conditions, July 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (13), 24 Sept : B682-85.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

456. Hindustan Times. Restless colonel. *Hind. T.*, 11 Sept : 5.
Editorial.

MALAWI

NATIONALISM

457. Africanization (Dr. Banda of Malawi is not kicking out brown Britains but he had ordered an immediate Africanization of Asian business). *Young Ind.*, 5(33), 24 July : 9-10.

MOROCCO

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

458. Manson, Mathew. Morocco claims Spanish Sahara's wealth. *Himmat*, 11 (37), 11 July : 9.

MOZAMBIQUE

INDEPENDENCE & AFTER

459. A. D. Long live free Mozambique. *Century*, 13(5), 1 Aug : 11-12.
460. A time to consolidate. *De. World*, 6 July : 2.
461. Lavrentyer, Alexander. Africa on the march (independence of Mozambique on 25th June 1975). *Contemporary*, 19 (9), Sept : 39.
462. Mozambique (Independence of the country). *Swarajya*, 20 (2), 12 July : 17-18.
463. Mozambique : An introduction. *People's D.*, 11 (31), 3 Aug : 5.
464. Mozambique : New African Republic. *In. & F. Review*, 12 (18), 1 June : 28.
465. Mozambique becomes independent. *Swarajya*, 11 (5), July : 11.
466. Mozambique freedom day celebrated (on 9th July Mozambique independence day was celebrated). *S. Ind.*, 11 (7), 19 July : 24.
467. Mozambique is free after 366 years. *People's D.*, 11 (27), 6 July : 9.
468. Solidarity with Africa (A meeting organised in New Delhi on 9th July to observe Mozambique independence). *New Age*, 20 July : 5.

NIGERIA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

Oil

469. Nigeria (Increase in oil prices and its effect on distribution to other countries). *Swarajya*, 20 (1), 5 July : 11.

470. Nigeria increases oil production (Africa's share in world oil production). *Young Ind.*, 5 (33), 24 July : 9.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

471. India, High Commission (Nigeria). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Apr. 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (3); 16 July : B125-28.
472. India, High Commission (Nigeria). Report on economic and commercial condition, May 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (3), 20 Aug : B419-23.
473. India, High Commission (Nigeria). Report on economic and commercial conditions, June 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (9), 27 Aug : B474-78.
474. India, High Commission (Nigeria). Report on economic and commercial conditions, July 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (13), 24 Sept : B685-88.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Change of Government

475. A tactical change in Nigeria (replacement of Gen. Gowon is a change tactics by the military group). *Hindu*, 9 Aug : 6.
476. Hindustan Times, Coup in Nigeria. *Hind. T.*, 31 July : 7. Editorial.
477. Howe, Russell Warren. Nigeria's tribal coup ; putting off return to civilian rule. *Statesman*, 27 Aug : 4.
478. Narayanswamy, Ramanath. The tribal imbalance (military coup in Nigeria). *E. & P. Weekly*, 10 (32), 9 Aug : 1188-90.
479. Nigeria (General Gowon was ousted from power on July 29th). *Swarajya*, 20 (7), 16 Aug : 11-12.
480. Nigeria (recent coup, an initiative by the brigadiers). *Swarajya*, 20 (8), 23 Aug : 16.
481. Statesman. Gown toppled (General Gown ousted from power). *Statesman*, 31 July : 4. Editorial.
482. Times of India, Nigerian coup. *T. Ind.*, 31 July : 4. Editorial.
483. Tiwari, B.K. Tasks before the new Nigerian regime. *In. Ex.*, 5 Aug : 4.
484. Victim of Africa's 29th coup. : Nigeria's Gowon. *Himmat*, 11 (41), 8 Aug : 5-6.
485. Weakness of power (replacement of the head of Nigerian military govt.). *De. World*, 3 Aug : 2.

NORTH AFRICA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Arab-Israel Conflicts

486. Israeli threats (critical situation in West Asia). *Link*, 17 (51), 3 Aug : 25.

Peace Move

487. Bhasin, Prem. Peace may yet elude west Asia. *Janata*, 30 (27), 7 Sept : 1-2.
488. Economic Times. West Asia peace kite. *E. T.*, 16 July : 5.
Editorial.
489. Egypt in Geneva Peace Conference, (American proposal for a settlement of Middle East problem would serve as a basis for negotiations). *Swarajya*, 20 (2). 12 July : 17.
490. Patriot, Cairo move (Egypt's decision to terminate the peace keeping mandate). *Patriot*, 18 July : 2.
Editorial.
491. Rabin and Sadat on mideast peace proposal (Reconciliation needed, not just recognition). *Himmat*, 11 (38), 18 July : 10-11.
492. Times of India. Towards an accord (Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. *T. Ind.*, 19 Aug. : 6.
Editorial.
193. West Asia-disquiet on accord (agreement between Israel and Egypt). *Link*, 18 (14), Sept : 31.

Reopening of Suez Canal

494. Desai, H.B. Job ahead for our trade and shipping : Reopening of Suez, *E. T.*, 13 July : 3.
495. Impact of reopening of Suez canal on international trade. *J. Industry & Trade*, 25 (7), July : 47-80.

World Opinion

496. Samo, Elias. Western bias and the October war. *F. Af. Reports*, 24 (8), Aug : 121-138.

United Nations

497. Indian Express. Sadat serves notice (Egypt government refused to extend mandate of the UN force). *In. Ex.*, 18 July : 4.
Editorial.

United States

498. Shadow play (US pressure on Tel Aviv to reach some interim agreement). *Patriot*, 12 July : 2.

Palestine Problem

499. Essack, A.K. Growing support for Palestinian struggle. *E. & P. Weekly*, 5 July : 997-98.
500. Jammal, Laila. An introduction to the Palestinian problem. *Ea. J. I. Law*, 7 (2), July : 93-99.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Change of Government

501. Times of India. Alleged plots (communists plot to overthrow President Nimery in Khartoum and President Sadat in Cairo). *T. Ind.*, 9 July : 4. Editorial.

RHODESIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS— (Political)

United Kingdom

502. Chanaiwa, David. Shona and the British South Africa company in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1896. *Afr. Quarterly*, 14 (3&4), Oct-Dec 1974 & Jan-Mar 1975 : 35-63.

PROBLEM OF RACE

503. Rhodesia (African majority rule in Rhodesia either by negotiations or by war). *Swarajya*, 20 (4), 26 July : 17.
504. Rhodesia (Rhodesian minority rule ready to hold constitutional talks with African leaders). *Swarajya*, 20 (8), 20 Aug : 16.
505. Rhodesia (either to call a constitutional conference or to face guerilla war). *Swarajya*, 20 (6), 9 Aug : 16.
506. Spartacus Rhodesia : Racists don't change spots. *People's D.*, 20 Apr : 3.
507. Split in Rhodesian movement (Nationalist movement in Rhodesia). *Link*, 18 (5), 14 Sept : 24.

SEYCHELLS

INDEPENDENCE

508. Sadiqali, Shanti. On road to freedom. *In. Ex.*, 18 Aug : 4.

SOUTH AFRICA

APARTHIED

509. African National Congress. Bantustans : Aparthied plus land theft (excerpts from paper at the conference of the Council of foreign ministers of the OAU at Dar-es-Salaam). *Patriot*, 26 Aug : 2.
510. Two paces of apartheid (As one of the biggest victimisers of our time and a representative of reasonableness and restraint). *De. World*, 21 Sept : 6-8.

DEFENCE & SECURITY

511. Times of India. French ban (France has been a major supplier of weapons to S. Africa but the project ban is a rejection of Mr. Vorster's government), *T. Ind.*, 19 Aug : 6.

Simenstown Agreement

512. Anand, J.P. Simenstown base : US invited to replace Britain, *Young Ind.*, 5 (32), 17 July : 4-5.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

513. Ganapath, R.S. Science, technology and racism. *E.&P. Weekly*. 10 (31), 2 Aug : 1151.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

514. NATO and South Africa. *Frontier*, 8 (16), 23 Aug : 7-9.

United Nations

515. Indian Express, South Africa and UN. *In. Ex.*, 19 Aug : 4.
Editorial.

SOUTHWEST AFRICA (Namibia)

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

United Nations

516. Saxena, S.C. Namibia and the United Nations. *In. J.P. Sc.*, 36 (3), July-Sept : 274-296.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

517. Hindustan Times, Namibian ferment (fighting and terror in Namibia), *Hind. T.*, 19 Aug : 5.
Editorial.

518. National Herald. Namibia (Worldwide observance of Namibia day). *National Herald*, 27 Aug : 3.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

FOREIGN RELATIONS-(Political)

Portugal

519. Gupta, Anirudha. Collapse of the Portuguese empire and the dialectics of liberation of Southern Africa, *I. St.* 14 (1), Jan-Mar : 1-20.

SPANISH SAHARA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

520. Gretton, John. Spanish Sahara : Importance of the mining interests. *Statesman*, 20 Aug : 6.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

521. Who owns Spanish Sahara ? *Hindu*, 22 July : 6.

SUDAN

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

522. India, Embassy (Sudan). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Apr, 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (7), 13 Aug : P359-62.

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

INDIA

523. Financial Express. Indo-Sudanese trade. *Fin. Ex.*, 23 July : 4.
Editorial.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Change of Government

524. Suddenly in Sudan (another failed coup). *De. World*, 7 Sept : 2.

TANZANIA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

525. Rao, B.S. Venkata. Industrialization in Tanzania. *E.T.*, 31 Aug : 4.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

526. India, High Commission (Tanzania). Report on economic and commercial conditions, Apr, 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (3), 16 July : B129-30.
527. India, High Commission (Tanzania). Report on economic and commercial conditions, May 1975. *In. Trade J.*, 273 (7), 13 Aug : B370-71.
528. India, High Commission (Tanzania). Report on economic and commercial conditions, June, 1975, *In. Trade J.*, 273 (12), 17 Sept : B640-41.

TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS

529. Has this tanzam railway lost its significance ? *Hindu*, 21 July : 5.

UGANDA

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

530. Hindustan Times. A risky move (Presidentship of OAU is no doubt an honour for Idi Amin but it is a risk as far as the organization itself is concerned). *Hind. T.*, 23 July : 5.
Editorial.
531. Idi fiddling while Uganda burns (President Idi Amin declared 'economic war' and encouraged Africans to take over the business). *E. T.*, 26 Aug : 10.
532. Roy, Amit. U.K. how safe are Britons in Uganda ? *Capital*, 31 July : 132.
533. Uganda (Independent African states talk with Rhodesia and South Africa on independence issue at Kampala). *Swarajya*, 20 (7), 16 Aug : 12.

HISTORY

534. Mamdani, Mahmood, Class struggle in Uganda. *E. & P. Weekly*, 10 (33-35), special issue, Aug : 1272-1306.

WEST AFRICA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

535. Wolfers, Michael, Future of West Africa Obstacles to regionalism. *Statesman*, 27 July : 4.

ZAMBIA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

536. Chhabra, Hari Sharan. Zambia's sweeping measures. *Hind. T.*, 6 Aug : 5.
537. Kaunda's economic dilemma (Economic reforms in Zambia). *E.T.*, 6 Aug : 8.



FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

INDIA

538. Growing exports of Indian merchandise to Zambia. *J. Industry & Trade*, 25 (10), Oct : 59-60.

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

539. Sadiqali, Shanti. Zaire: straws in the wind. *In. Ex.*, 9 July : 4.

List of Abbreviations employed for the names of publications

A.	Administration	Ins.	Institute
Af.	Affairs	J.	Journal
Afr.	Africa	L.	Literary
B.	Bulletin	O.	Oriental
C.	Contemporary	P.	Political
D.	Democracy	Pr.	Proposals
De.	Democratic	Prob.	Problems
E.	Economic	S.	Social
Ea.	Eastern	Sc.	Science
Ed.	Education	So.	Socialist
Ex.	Express	Soc.	Socialism
F.	Foreign	St.	Studies
Fi.	Finance	T.	Times
Fin.	Financial	U.	University
G.	Gandhi	IATJ	Indo-African Trade Journal
Ga.	Gandhian	IICQ	India International Centre Quarterly
H.	Horizon		
He.	Herald	JLBSAA	Journal of Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration
Hi.	History		
Hind.	Hindustan	JNAA	Journal of the National Academy of Administration
His.	Historical		
I.	International		
Ind.	Indian		
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